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Crash of an IAI 1124A Westwind II in Manila: 8 killed

Date & Time: Mar 29, 2020 at 2000 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
RP-C5880
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Manila - Tokyo
MSN:
353
YOM:
1981
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
6
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
8
Circumstances:
The twin engine aircraft was engaged in an ambulance flight carrying one Canadian patient with Covid-19 and medical staff to Tokyo-Haneda Airport. While taking off from runway 06 at Manila-Ninoy Aquino Airport, the aircraft went out of control and crashed near the runway end, by the West Service Road, bursting into flames. The aircraft was destroyed and all eight occupants were killed.

Crash of an IAI 1124 Westwind in Sundance: 2 killed

Date & Time: Mar 18, 2019 at 1537 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N4MH
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Panama City - Sundance
MSN:
232
YOM:
1978
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Circumstances:
The aircraft impacted terrain near the east side of runway 18 at Sundance Airport (HSD), Yukon, Oklahoma. As the airplane approached the approach end of runway 18, it began to climb, rolled left, and became inverted before impacting terrain. The airplane was destroyed. Both pilots sustained fatal injuries. The airplane was registered to and operated by Sundance Airport FBO LLC under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. The flight was operating on an instrument rules flight plan. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. The flight departed from Northwest Florida Beaches International Airport (ECP), Panama City, Florida and was destined to HSD. The airplane was located about 1,472 feet down and 209 feet east of runway 18. The landing gear and wing flaps were extended. The left thrust reverser was unlatched and open and the right thrust reverser was closed and latched. The airplane was equipped with a cockpit voice recorder (CVR); however, the accident flight was not recorded. The audio on the CVR indicated the last events recorded were from 2007.

Crash of an IAI 1124A Westwind II in Huntsville: 3 killed

Date & Time: Jun 18, 2014 at 1424 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N793BG
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Huntsville - Huntsville
MSN:
392
YOM:
1983
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Captain / Total flying hours:
28421
Captain / Total hours on type:
1816.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
20200
Copilot / Total hours on type:
850
Aircraft flight hours:
7571
Circumstances:
A pilot proficiency examiner (PPE) was using the airplane to conduct a pilot-in-command (PIC) proficiency check for two company pilots. Before the accident flight, one of the two company pilots on board received a PIC proficiency check, which terminated with a full-stop landing and reverse thrust application; no discrepancies with either thrust reverser were discussed by either flight crewmember. The pilot being examined then left the cockpit, and the accident pilot positioned himself in the left front seat while the PPE remained in the right front seat. The flight crew then taxied to the approach end of the runway to begin another flight. Data from the enhanced ground proximity system (EGPWS) revealed that, the flight began the takeoff roll with the flaps retracted, the thrust reversers armed, and both engines stabilized at 96 percent N2. About 2 seconds later, the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) recorded the "V1" call while on the airplane was on the runway; acoustic analysis indicated that the N2 speed of one engine, likely the right, decreased; the N2 speed of the other engine remained constant. This decrease in N2 speed was consistent with the PPE retarding right engine thrust to flight idle with the intent of simulating an engine failure. The takeoff continued, and, while the airplane was in a wings-level climb at an airspeed of 148 knots about 18 ft radar altitude, the CVR recorded the pilot command that the landing gear be retracted. The landing gear remained extended, and, about 1 second after the command to retract the landing gear, or about 3 seconds after becoming airborne, while about 33 ft above the runway and at the highest recorded airspeed of 149 knots, the CVR recorded the beginning of a rattling sound, which was consistent with the deployment of the right thrust reverser, and it continued to the end of the recording. About 1.5 seconds after the rattling sound began, the CVR recorded the PPE asking, "…what happened," which indicates that the deployment was likely not annunciated in the cockpit. The right engine N2 speed continued to gradually decrease, and the airplane rolled slightly left, back to a wings-level position. The airplane continued climbing with the landing gear extended as pitch changes continued to occur. During this time, the flight crew exchanged comments about their lack of understanding about what was occurring. While flying 10 knots above V2 speed with the left engine N2 speed remaining steady and the right engine N2 speed decreasing at a slightly greater rate than previously, the airplane began a right roll with a corresponding steady decrease in airspeed from about 144 knots. About 9 seconds after the original call to retract the landing gear, the CVR recorded the PPE requesting that the landing gear be retracted, which occurred 1 second later. The airplane then continued in the right turn with the airspeed steadily decreasing, and about 11 seconds after the PPE asked "…what happened", the EGPWS sounded a bank angle alert. At that time, the airplane was in a right roll of about 30 degrees, and the airspeed was about 132 knots. The right roll continued to a maximum value of about 39 degrees, which was the last valid bank angle value recorded. The airplane impacted the ground off the right side of the runway in a nose- and right-winglow attitude. The landing gear and flaps were retracted, and there was no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction of the flight controls for roll, pitch, and yaw; nor was there any evidence of a mechanical failure or malfunction of either engine. A definitive reason for the deployment of the right thrust reverser could not be determined. No previous instances of inadvertent in-flight thrust reverser deployment were documented by the operator of the accident airplane or by the airframe manufacturer for the accident airplane make and model. Certification flight testing of an airplane with the same thrust reverser system determined that the airplane remained controllable with the right thrust reverser deployed and throttle retarder system functioning. The flight testing also included application of a momentary, peak burst of right engine thrust, again with no controllability issues noted. It was also noted that with the installed throttle retarder system, in the event of inadvertent thrust reverser deployment, that the engine's thrust should have been reduced to idle within 4 to 8 seconds. Acoustic analysis of the accident flight indicated that the lowest recorded N2 rpm value was about 84 percent and that the reduction in rpm occurred over a period of about 8.5 seconds, after the right thrust reverser deployed. No determination could be made as to why the throttle retarder system did not reduce the right engine thrust to flight idle as designed. Additionally, no determination could be made as to why the flight crew was not able to maintain directional control of the airplane following deployment of the right thrust reverser. Although the PPE had severe coronary artery disease, which placed him at risk for an acute coronary event that would cause symptoms like chest pain, shortness of breath, or sudden unconsciousness, the CVR recorded no evidence of impairment. Neither the heart disease nor the medications he was taking to treat it would have impaired his judgement or physical functioning. Therefore, it is unlikely any medical condition or substance contributed to the PPE's actions. Additionally, there was no evidence that any medical condition would have impaired judgement or physical functioning of the pilot being examined.
Probable cause:
The flight crew's inability to maintain airplane control during initial climb following deployment of the right thrust reverser for reasons that could not be determined because postaccident examination of the airframe and engine thrust reverser system did not reveal any anomalies. Contributing to the accident was the excessive thrust from the right engine with the thrust reverser deployed for reasons that could not be determined during postaccident examinations and testing.
Final Report:

Crash of an IAI-1124 Westwind in Norfolk Island

Date & Time: Nov 18, 2009 at 2156 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
VH-NGA
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Apia - Norfolk - Melbourne
MSN:
387
YOM:
1983
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
4
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
3596
Captain / Total hours on type:
923.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
1954
Copilot / Total hours on type:
649
Aircraft flight hours:
21528
Aircraft flight cycles:
11867
Circumstances:
On 18 November 2009, the flight crew of an Israel Aircraft Industries Westwind 1124A aircraft, registered VH-NGA, was attempting a night approach and landing at Norfolk Island on an aeromedical flight from Apia, Samoa. On board were the pilot in command and copilot, and a doctor, nurse, patient and one passenger. On arrival, weather conditions prevented the crew from seeing the runway or its visual aids and therefore from landing. The pilot in command elected to ditch the aircraft in the sea before the aircraft’s fuel was exhausted. The aircraft broke in two after ditching. All the occupants escaped from the aircraft and were rescued by boat.
Probable cause:
The pilot in command did not plan the flight in accordance with the existing regulatory and operator requirements, precluding a full understanding and management of the potential hazards affecting the flight. The flight crew did not source the most recent Norfolk Island Airport forecast, or seek and apply other relevant weather and other information at the most relevant stage of the flight to fully inform their decision of whether to continue the flight to the island, or to divert to another destination. The flight crew’s delayed awareness of the deteriorating weather at Norfolk Island combined with incomplete flight planning to influence the decision to continue to the island, rather than divert to a suitable alternate.

Final Report: