Airport (less than 10 km from airport)

The flight crew reported to the tower controller that they were over the airport and requested a right downwind circling approach to runway 15. The tower controller and other witnesses observed the airplane in a steep right bank on base leg. The airplane overshot the extended runway centerline. The tower controller observed the airplane entering a steeper right bank to correct back to the runway centerline. The controller stated that he observed the airplane "flutter" and then crash right-wing first, about one mile north of the runway threshold. Other witnesses reported a variety of indications consistent with a loss of control. The last recorded transmission was "Oh no you're (stall…)." The ( ) indicates that the word was questionable text. Both engines were producing about 1,700 pounds of thrust (2,561 pounds available). A snow squall had just passed over the airport and was obscuring mountains to the east. The terrain was snow covered. The accident occurred about eight minutes before official sunset. The approach procedure is not authorized at night or for category D airplanes. Minimums for the approach were three miles visibility with an MDA of 10,840 feet. Airport elevation is 7,815 feet. Both pilots were rated in the airplane. It could not be determined which pilot was at the controls at the time of the accident.

On approach to Munich Airport, the pilot encountered strong crosswinds when the twin engine aircraft went out of control and crashed few hundred meters short of runway. Both occupants were killed.

While on a positioning flight, the twin engine aircraft crashed on approach to Epinal-Mirecourt Airport. The wreckage was found in a field 4 km short of runway threshold. Both pilots were killed.

The crew departed Dar es Salaam Airport on a local training flight. En route, he encountered technical problems and was unable to raise the landing gear. The crew returned to the airport where repairs were completed. After takeoff, the crew reported he was unable to lower the landing gear and was then forced to attempt a belly landing. The aircraft came to rest on the runway and both pilots escaped uninjured.

Crashed in unknown circumstances, injuring both pilots.

Crashed on approach to Monrovia-Roberts Airport for unknown reasons. All 72 occupants were rescued and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

SKW5569, N683AV, had been cleared to runway 24L, at intersection 45, to position and hold. The local controller, because of her preoccupation with another airplane, forgot she had placed SKW5569 on the runway and subsequently cleared US1493, N388US, for landing. After the collision, the two airplanes slid off the runway into an unoccupied fire station. The tower operating procedures did not require flight progress strips to be processed through the local ground control position. Because this strip was not present, the local controller misidentified an airplane and issued a landing clearance. The technical appraisal program for air traffic controllers is not being fully utilized because of a lack of understanding by supervisors and the unavailability of appraisal histories.

SKW5569, N683AV, had been cleared to runway 24L, at intersection 45, to position and hold. The local controller, because of her preoccupation with another airplane, forgot she had placed SKW5569 on the runway and subsequently cleared US1493, N388US, for landing. After the collision, the two airplanes slid off the runway into an unoccupied fire station. The tower operating procedures did not require flight progress strips to be processed through the local ground control position. Because this strip was not present, the local controller misidentified an airplane and issued a landing clearance. The technical appraisal program for air traffic controllers is not being fully utilized because of a lack of understanding by supervisors and the unavailability of appraisal histories.

During the takeoff roll, as he was approaching V1, the pilot saw a vehicle on the runway. He attempted to avoid the collision when the aircraft veered off runway and collided with trees. All five occupants escaped uninjured.

Aircraft was dispatched with inoperative airframe deice system, tho an operational deice system was required for flight in known icing conditions. During descent to land, aircraft encountered light icing conditions. Capt believed aircraft could 'handle it' and continued descent. As he began ILS final approach, he noted significant increase of ice accumulation and used higher than normal approach speed. As full (50°) flaps were set, aircraft began buffet and pitched nose down. Capt corrected with full back pressure on control column, but aircraft landed hard, gear collapsed and aircraft slid about 3,600 feet to a stop. No preimpact mechanical anomaly was found, except for inoperative deice system. Investigation revealed pilots had received printout of weather from company computer system with surface observation and terminal forecast, but no area forecast (FA). Pilots and ground personnel were not aware that FA was available at company weather terminal. FA forecasted light and occasional moderate rime and mixed icing in clouds and precipitation above freezing level. Weather deteriorated, but pilots did not require inflight weather info or pireps. Flight mnl noted tailplane ice may cause nose down trim change with flap extension. There was evidence of tail plane stall, lack of company training in cold weather operations, deficiencies in use of deicing systems, and lack of FAA surveillance.