Crash of a PZL-Mielec AN-2R in Trollhättan

Date & Time: Aug 26, 2003 at 1730 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
LY-KAE
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Trollhättan - Trollhättan
MSN:
1G196-54
YOM:
1982
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
Upon landing at Trollhättan-Målöga Airport, the aircraft nosed over and came to rest upside down. Both occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged. It was apparently repaired.
Probable cause:
The pilot used excessive brakes after touchdown, causing the brakes to block. The landing maneuver was completed with a tailwind component.

Crash of a Piper PA-31-310 Navajo B in Sundsvall: 8 killed

Date & Time: Dec 9, 1999 at 1204 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
SE-GDN
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Sundsvall – Göteborg
MSN:
31-7300947
YOM:
1973
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
7
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
8
Captain / Total flying hours:
729
Captain / Total hours on type:
98.00
Aircraft flight hours:
7266
Circumstances:
Events prior to the flight:
On Wednesday the 8th of December 1999 at 08:32 hrs. the pilot took off with the aircraft from Gothenburg/Landvetter airport for an IFR flight to Sundsvall/Härnösand airport via Östersund/Frösön F4 airport. Present onboard were seven passengers, all employed by a company in Gothenburg. The flight proceeded via the reporting point of MEGEN (6001N 1424E) and they landed at 10:45 hrs. in Östersund. After a short groundstop to deplane one of the passengers, they took off 13 minutes later to continue the flight to Sundsvall. It was beautiful weather in Sundsvall. The wind was 320 degrees at 12 knots and the temperature –12°C. The pilot performed a visual approach to runway 34 and landed at 11:33 hrs. After the landing he parked the airplane for the night on spot 25 on the southern tarmac, designated “Apron S” (ref. 1.10). According to what he stated later that evening, he placed covers on the aircraft wings and stabilizer and connected electricity for heating in the cabin and engines before he, along with his passengers, departed for the city of Sundsvall. In Sundsvall they had lunch and had a business meeting with a subcontractor, which was concluded at approximately 16:00 hrs, at which time they were driven to the hotel. Around 19:00 hrs. the party dined at a restaurant together with a few of the employees from the subcontractor. The consumption of alcoholic beverages was sparse and none of the persons that SHK has talked with observed the pilot consume anything other than non-alcoholic beverage. Dinner concluded around 23:30, after which the party returned to the hotel. The following morning it was snowing. The group was picked-up around 08:00 hrs. and initially made a short visit at a factory. Thereafter they were driven to the subcontractor’s office where they had a short coffee break and then continued their business meeting. During the trip to the office the pilot called the airport and ordered weather information that was faxed to the office. On questions to the pilot concerning flying in the bad weather, his response was that it was no problem. If he had felt doubtful in that respect, he would cancel the flight. However, due to the weather situation the pilot decided not to perform the return flight to Gothenburg via Östersund. The passenger that was there had to get to Sundsvall with other means of transport and join the group at the airport.
Preparations before the flight:
The business meeting was concluded at time 10:30 hrs. A taxi had been booked for that time. Due to the taxi being somewhat late the group arrived at the airport around 11:15. The passengers remained in the flight planning room in the terminal building while the pilot ordered fueling and went out to prepare the aircraft for the flight. He had filed a flight plan by telephone earlier in the day. Departure was planned for 11:30 hrs. and the flight time was estimated to be 2 hours and 20 minutes. When the fueling order came, the fueling personnel were busy refueling another aircraft with type JET A-1 fuel. The tanker truck with AVGAS 100LL fuel had not been in use earlier that day. Prior to re-fueling with this truck it was drained and prepared for refueling. When the fueling personnel arrived at the aircraft the pilot was already in the aircraft warming-up the engines. He cut the engines and requested to have “full wings”. A total of 396 liters of fuel were uploaded in the aircraft's four fuel tanks. The fueling personnel noted that the aircraft wings were free from ice and snow. The pilot contacted the air traffic controller in the tower at 11:41.38 and requested clearance to taxi, which was granted, to the flight planning office next to Apron M, in order to pick up his passengers. At 11:49.24 hrs. the pilot again contacted the tower controller and requested clearance to startup the engines and at the same time reported that he had received the weather information. Four minutes later he requested taxi instructions and was cleared to taxi to holding position “Charlie” on the taxiway (ref. 1.10). After further instructions from the air traffic controller the pilot taxied to the specified position and held there for a departing SAS (Scandinavian Airlines) aircraft. The air traffic controller thought that the aircraft appeared to be free from snow when it was parked on Apron M, but that a thin layer of snow had accumulated when it taxied out for take off. The Commander of the departing SAS aircraft has recounted that both the approach and the departure from Sundsvall that day were difficult due to poor visibility, heavy snowfall and gusty winds. During taxi on the runway snowdrifts had occurred that created strands of blowing snow. He estimated the visibility to be 600-700 meters. During take off he was “fully occupied maneuvering the 58 ton heavy MD 80 in the wind gusts.
The Flight:
When the SAS aircraft had departed the pilot received clearance to taxi out to the take off position on runway 16. At the same time he received air traffic control clearance to Gothenburg/Landvetter via reporting point MEGEN at flight level 120 (approximately 3 660 meters), and the transponder code of 6377. He was also requested to report when the aircraft had reached the take off position, as the air traffic controller could not see the aircraft in the snowfall. At 12:00.18 hrs. the pilot reported that he had lined up into take off position. The controller then reported that the wind was 120 degrees at 17 knots, that the pilot was to make a right turn after take off and that he was cleared for takeoff. When the aircraft was airborne the pilot was to contact Sundsvall Control on frequency 135.02 MHz. The pilot read back these instructions and thereafter took off. The tower controller visually observed the aircraft a short moment during the take off as it passed abeam the control tower, then it disappeared again out of his sight due to the snowfall. A witness, who is a former pilot himself and was on the northern part of Alnön (an island), about 5 km south of the airport, heard the aircraft take off. After take off he heard that the engine rpm decreased somewhat and thereafter heard the characteristic sound that can arise on a multi-engine aircraft when the engines are not totally synchronized with the adjustment of the throttles and propeller levers. The sound of the engines became normal after a while. When the sound faded out is was perceived as normal for a twin engine aircraft. Witnesses who were situated along the flight path of the aircraft heard it and a few observed the aircraft during a short moment through the heavy snowfall. Several felt that the aircraft was flying low but that the sound of the engines was normal. One witness observed that the landing gear was retracted. In the vicinity of Kvickberget northwest of the airport a few witnesses heard that the engine rpm increased sharply. After that it was silent. Approximately two minutes after take off the tower controller observed that the echo from aircraft SE-GDN on his radarscope was not following the route cleared but had turned to the north. He made an inquiry with the air traffic controller at Sundsvall Control and received word that the same had not yet been contacted by the aircraft. The tower controller then contacted the aircraft on tower frequency and asked the pilot if he was experiencing problems. The pilot responded that he did have problems and in response to the controller’s inquiry about his intentions, the pilot answered “Climbing” twice and thereafter “-I have a problem with the eeee … uuumm .. with the compass at, at this moment, so could you, could you give me a … di, direction at this moment.” The tower controller then answered “Ja, you are climbing towards the north-west now, turn left about 90 degrees and climb as soon as possible, you meeting terrain.” Subsequently the tower controller was unable to attain any further radio contact with the aircraft.
Rescue operations:
At time 12:04.27 radio signals from an emergency locator transmitter were perceived in the area and the air traffic controller triggered the alarm button to the SOS center and alerted the air rescue services at ARCC. It was agreed upon to apply the yellow checklist, which meant assumed crash with unknown crash site. The airport was closed. The SOS center alerted according to the alert plan for an assumed crash. A suitable breakpoint (where the ground rescue party has to depart from the surface road structure) was chosen in connection with the area where the aircraft disappeared. ARCC alerted a search and rescue helicopter that was stationed at Sundsvall/Härnösand airport. The crew of the search and rescue helicopter received the alarm at 12:10 hrs. and was airborne with the helicopter at 12:24. Six minutes later the aircraft was located in the forest on the southern slope of a mountain known as Kvickberget. The helicopter lowered rescue personnel on the winch who ascertained that none of the persons on board had survived. They were only able however to find five persons and searched through an area around the downed aircraft without results. Police, ambulances and fire vehicles reached the breakpoint between 12:21 and 12:27 hrs. The SOS center received the exact position of the accident site at 12:35 hrs. and the breakpoint was moved to a road intersection about 4 km from there. The forest road towards the accident site was unplowed and two tracked vehicles had to begin the trip while snow plows cleared the forest road so that ambulances and fire vehicles could make their way. The last portion from the forest road up to the aircraft was approximately 300 meters long and consisted of a ravine and difficult terrain. Medical and fire personnel had to make there way on foot this last portion and reached the accident site at 13:30 hrs. They verified that none of the persons onboard had survived and found that there was an imminent risk of fire because of the large quantity of aviation gas that had been spread at the site. Hand-held fire extinguishers and police search and rescue dogs were requisitioned to the site. At 14:36 hrs. it was reported to SOS that additionally three people had been found in the aircraft. At 19:40 hrs. the last of the victims were transported from the accident site. A crisis group was established at Sundsvall/Härnösand airport. About 40 persons participated in the rescue operations at the site, which was concluded at 23:39 hrs. Despite the difficult terrain, which limited the availability of equipment, the general consensus was that the search and rescue action had worked well. The accident occurred at location: 6233N 1719E; approximately 200 m above sea level. All eight occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
The accident was caused by the pilot losing control of the aircraft during flight in IMC.
The following contributory factors were identified:
- The weather situation was difficult,
- The pilot’s time to prepare for the flight was insufficient,
- The navigation system was in all probability misaligned,
- The pilot mistrusted the flight instruments,
- The aircraft was overloaded and tail-heavy,
- The pilot probably felt pressured into carrying out the flight,
- The pilot’s medical condition can have reduced his ability.
Final Report:

Ground accident of a Saab 2000 in Stockholm

Date & Time: Oct 8, 1999
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
SE-LSF
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
MSN:
053
YOM:
1997
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
While being taxied by two engineers at Stockholm-Arlanda Airport, the aircraft went out of control and collided with a hangar door. Both occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was destroyed.

Crash of a BAc 111-525FT in Stockholm

Date & Time: Jun 7, 1997 at 1350 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
YR-BCM
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Bucharest - Stockholm
MSN:
256
YOM:
1977
Flight number:
RO335
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
20
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
12500
Captain / Total hours on type:
12000.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
1866
Copilot / Total hours on type:
50
Aircraft flight hours:
23901
Aircraft flight cycles:
17888
Circumstances:
Flight ROT 335, a BAC 111 coming from Bucharest, was about to land on runway 26 at Stockholm/Arlanda airport. The pilots had visual contact with the field and the landing was performed according to visual flying rules (VFR). The commander, who was pilot flying (PF), has stated the following. The approach was normal with occasional turbulence and wind gusts from the south. When the aircraft was on 8 nautical miles1 final, the air-traffic controller in the tower reported the wind 160°/13 knots. To begin with the aircraft was somewhat above the glide slope but was on the glide slope when it passed the threshold. The touchdown on the runway was in the normal touchdown zone on the left main gear and nose up. Shortly thereafter came a strong wind gust whereupon the right main gear touched down and the nose gear heavily hit the runway. The commander controlled the aircraft with rudder, reversed the engines and braked lightly. He did not notice anything special in the behavior of the aircraft at that point. When - after the speed had become so low that rudder steering was no longer possible - he reverted to nose wheel steering he noticed that it was not functioning. He continued the light wheel braking but could not prevent the aircraft from veering to the right. He then braked fully but the aircraft continued towards the right runway edge. It left the runway at a speed of around 60 knots out onto the grass field. The retardation was soft and the passengers disembarked through ordinary exit. The airport rescue service was speedily on the scene but no action was necessary. The accident occurred on 7 June 1997 at 1350 hours in position 5939N 1755E; 121 feet (37 m) above sea level.
Probable cause:
The accident was caused by the collapse of the nose gear as a result of overload when the aircraft touched down with its nosewheel first after two bounces. A contributing factor was shortcomings in cockpit’s CRM (Cockpit Resource Management) during the flight.
Final Report:

Crash of a Rockwell Grand Commander 680 near Väsby: 2 killed

Date & Time: Jul 7, 1994 at 1815 LT
Operator:
Registration:
SE-GUO
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Eskilstuna - Eskilstuna
MSN:
680-0535-204
YOM:
1957
Location:
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
4500
Captain / Total hours on type:
3000.00
Aircraft flight hours:
9965
Circumstances:
In the afternoon, the aircraft departed Eskilstuna Airport, carrying one geotechnician and one pilot for a low level survey mission on behalf of the Swedish Geological Service. Approaching the area of Väsby under visual flight rules conditions, while flying at an altitude of 30-50 metres, the aircraft collided with power cables. The right wing was partially sheared off then the airplane entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed 180 metres further. Both occupants were killed. There was no fire.
Probable cause:
It was determined that the accident was caused by the crew not being able to see in time those unknown to them and difficult-to-detect antenna cables emanating from the top of the telemast.
Contributing to the accident was the lack of information about the mast's special design in aviation publications.
Final Report:

Crash of a Piper PA-46-310P Malibu in Stockholm: 3 killed

Date & Time: Dec 3, 1992 at 0706 LT
Operator:
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Stockholm - Biggin Hill
MSN:
46-08118
YOM:
1988
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Captain / Total flying hours:
386
Captain / Total hours on type:
127.00
Aircraft flight hours:
845
Circumstances:
The single engine aircraft departed Stockholm-Bromma Airport runway 12 at 0703LT on a charter flight to Biggin Hill, carrying two passengers and one pilot. During climbout, at an altitude of 1,500 feet, the pilot was cleared to turn right and to continue to climb to FL040. At an altitude of 2,200 feet, the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent then partially disintegrated in the air and eventually crashed in a residential area located in Åkeslund, south of the airport, three minutes after takeoff. Several cars and apartments were destroyed but no one on the ground was injured. The aircraft was destroyed and all three occupants were killed. At the time of the accident, weather conditions were marginal with clouds and turbulences.
Probable cause:
It was determined that the aircraft was operated with a speed 30% above the maneuverable speed when, in turbulences, the left wing broke away due to excessive g loads. The aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and partially disintegrated before final impact. A probable disconnection or malfunction of the gyro horizon/automatic pilot system as well as a wrong trim on part of the pilot were considered as contributing factors.
Final Report:

Crash of an IAI-1124 Westwind I in Umeå

Date & Time: Sep 21, 1992 at 1433 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
SE-DLK
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Umeå – Arvidsjaur
MSN:
197
YOM:
1976
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
5
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
12945
Captain / Total hours on type:
4925.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
700
Copilot / Total hours on type:
300
Circumstances:
During the takeoff roll at Umeå Airport, at a speed of 50 knots, the crew heard a noise when the tower controller informed the crew that the aircraft was on fire. The crew aborted the takeoff and initiated an emergency braking procedure. The aircraft was stopped on runway and all seven occupants were able to evacuate within 15 seconds. The fire was extinguished but the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
It was determined that the low pressure compressor in the right engine disintegrated during the takeoff roll. Debris scattered in the engine, damaging fuel and hydraulic line. The engine caught fire and was destroyed. Investigation determined that the low pressure compressor failure was the consequence of fatigue cracks.
Final Report:

Crash of a Piper PA-31-310 Navajo B in Karlstad: 5 killed

Date & Time: Aug 16, 1992 at 1142 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
OY-BZD
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Roskilde - Karlstad
MSN:
31-7401266
YOM:
1974
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
7
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
5
Captain / Total flying hours:
550
Captain / Total hours on type:
20.00
Aircraft flight hours:
4725
Circumstances:
On approach to Karlstad Airport, the pilot informed ATC he was low on fuel. Shortly later, he declared an emergency when the both engines stopped. The aircraft lost height and eventually crashed in the Vänern Lake located 12,5 km from Karlstad Airport. Four passengers and the pilot were killed while three other passengers were rescued.
Probable cause:
The accident was caused by a double engine failure due to fuel exhaustion. This was due to the failure of the pilot to refuel the aircraft before the flight or to make a fuel stop en route. The following contributing factors were reported:
- Both engines stopped due to fuel exhaustion before the aircraft reached the destination,
- The flight was initiated with a too little amount of fuel on board,
- The pilot deviated from the current Danish regulations with regard to the prescribed minimum amount of fuel.
Final Report:

Crash of a McDonnell Douglas MD-81 in Gottröra

Date & Time: Dec 27, 1991 at 0851 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
OY-KHO
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Stockholm - Copenhagen - Warsaw
MSN:
53003
YOM:
1991
Flight number:
SK751
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
123
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
8020
Captain / Total hours on type:
590.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
3015
Copilot / Total hours on type:
76
Aircraft flight hours:
1608
Aircraft flight cycles:
1272
Circumstances:
The MD-81 arrived from Zurich at 22:09 and was parked at gate 2 overnight with temperatures of around +1 deg. C. Approx. 2550 kg of fuel remained in each wing tank. The aircraft was scheduled to leave Stockholm for Copenhagen at 08:30 and the temperature had dropped to -0 deg C in the early morning. During the night and in the early morning clear ice had formed on the upper side of the wings, but this was not detected by the ground crew member who checked the forward part of the wing. The aircraft was fuelled with 1400 kg of fuel and was ready for de-icing at 08:30, which was done using 850l of Type I fluid. After de-icing the mechanic didn't check whether there was any clear ice on the upper side of the wings, since he had previously found none. The flight was then cleared to taxi to runway 08 and the aircraft took off at 08:47. After 25 seconds (at 1124 feet height) bangs, vibrations and jerks were perceived in the aircraft. This was caused by a no. 2 engine surge. The engine was throttled down a little, but throttle control simultaneously changed to an automatic mode which increased throttle setting with altitude (Automatic Thrust Restoration - ATR). This in turn increased the intensity of the surging. The no. 1 engine surged 39 seconds later, but this was not noticed by the flight crew. An attempt to switch on the autopilot at 2616 feet failed. At 76 resp. 78 seconds into the flight both the no. 2 and no. 1 engine failed after breakup of the stage 1 stators of both engines (initiated by high loads from the surges). The aircraft was climbing through 3206 feet at that moment with a 196 KIAS. A no. 1 engine fire warning at 91 seconds into the flight made the crew activate the fire extinguishing system. A SAS captain traveling the passenger cabin realized that there were problems and hurried to the cockpit to assist the flight crew. The aircraft was in a gliding left turn at that moment. When descending through 420 m, still in the clouds, the assisting captain gradually extended the flaps. The flaps were fully extended at 1100 feet (340 m) and the plane broke through the clouds at 980-820 feet. A field in the direction of flight was chosen for an emergency landing. The wheels were selected down and Stockholm control was informed about the imminent crash-landing. The MD-81 contacted trees at 121 knots and a major portion of the right wing broke off. The plane then struck sloping ground tail-first and slid along the ground for 110 m. The fuselage was broken into three pieces, but there was no fire.
Probable cause:
The accident was caused by SAS' instructions and routines being inadequate to ensure that clear ice was removed from the wings of the aircraft prior to takeoff. Hence the aircraft took off with clear ice on the wings. In connection with lift-off, the clear ice loosened and was ingested by the engines. The ice caused damage to the engine fan stages, which led to engine surges. The surges destroyed the engines. Contributory causes were: The pilots were not trained to identify and eliminate engine surging; ATR-which was unknown within SAS - was activated and increased the engine power without the pilot's knowledge.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft 200C Super King Air in Halmstad: 2 killed

Date & Time: Sep 24, 1990
Operator:
Registration:
101001
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
MSN:
BL-25
YOM:
1981
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Circumstances:
While on approach to Halmstad Airport, the twin engine aircraft crashed in unknown circumstances 8 km short of runway. Both pilots were killed.