Region

Crash of a GippsAero GA8 Airvan in Umeå: 9 killed

Date & Time: Jul 14, 2019 at 1407 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
SE-MES
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Umeå - Umeå
MSN:
GA8-TC320-12-178
YOM:
2012
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
8
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
9
Circumstances:
The single engine airplane operated by Skydive Umeå departed Umeå Airport at 1333LT on a local skydiving mission. It climbed to an altitude of 13,000 feet in relative good weather conditions. While the skydivers attempted to jump, the pilot lost control of the airplane that nosed down and entered a dive. In a vertical position, the airplane spiraled to the ground and lost part of its right wing before crashing in a wooded area located on the Storsandskär Island, about 2 km southeast of Umeå Airport. The aircraft was totally destroyed upon impact and all nine occupants were killed. Five days after the accident, on July 19, EASA published an Emergency Airworthiness Directive indicating that the airplane suffered structural failure and that a wing may have detached from the aeroplane prior to the accident, but, at this time, the root cause of the accident cannot be confirmed. For these reasons, all operations of the GA8 Airvan have been prohibited from July 20 for 15 days.

Crash of a Canadair Regional Jet CRJ-200PF near Akkajaure Lake: 2 killed

Date & Time: Jan 8, 2016 at 0020 LT
Operator:
Registration:
SE-DUX
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Oslo – Tromsø
MSN:
7010
YOM:
1993
Flight number:
SWN294
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
3365
Captain / Total hours on type:
2208.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
3232
Copilot / Total hours on type:
1064
Aircraft flight hours:
38601
Aircraft flight cycles:
31036
Circumstances:
The flight was uneventful until the start of the event, which occurred during the approach briefing in level flight at FL 330. The event started at 00:19:20 hrs during darkness without moonlight, clouds or turbulence. The lack of external visual references meant that the pilots were totally dependent on their instruments which, inter alia consisted of three independent attitude indicators. According to recorded data and simulations a very fast increase in pitch was displayed on the left attitude indicator. The pilot in command, who was the pilot flying and seated in the left seat exclaimed a strong expression. The displayed pitch change meant that the pilot in command was subjected to a surprise effect and a degradation of spatial orientation The autopilot was, most probably, disconnected automatically, a “cavalry charge” aural warning and a single chime was heard, the latter most likely as a result of miscompare between the left and right pilots’ flying displays (PFD). Both elevators moved towards nose down and nose down stabilizer trim was gradually activated from the left control wheel trim switch. The airplane started to descend, the angle of attack and G-loads became negative. Both pilots exclaimed strong expressions and the co-pilot said “come up”. About 13 seconds after the start of the event the crew were presented with two contradictory attitude indicators with red chevrons pointing in opposite directions. At the same time none of the instruments displayed any comparator caution due to the PFDs declutter function in unusual attitude. Bank angle warnings were heard and the maximum operating speed and Mach number were exceeded 17 seconds after the start of the event, which activated the overspeed warning. The speed continued to increase, a distress call was transmitted and acknowledged by the air traffic control and the engine thrust was reduced to flight idle. The crew was active during the entire event. The dialogue between the pilots consisted mainly of different perceptions regarding turn directions. They also expressed the need to climb. At this stage, the pilots were probably subjected to spatial disorientation. The aircraft collided with the ground one minute and twenty seconds after the initial height loss. The two pilots were fatally injured and the airplane was destroyed.
Probable cause:
The erroneous attitude indication on PFD 1 was caused by a malfunction of the Inertial Reference Unit (IRU 1). The pitch and roll comparator indications of the PFDs were removed when the attitude indicators displayed unusual attitudes. In the simulator, in which the crew had trained, the corresponding indications were not removed. During the event the pilots initially became communicatively isolated from each other. The current flight operational system lacked essential elements which are necessary. In this occurrence a system for efficient communication was not in place. SHK considers that a general system of initial standard calls for the handling of abnormal and emergency procedures and also for unusual and unexpected situations should be incorporated in commercial aviation. The accident was caused by insufficient operational prerequisites for the management of a failure in a redundant system.
Contributing factors were:
- The absence of an effective system for communication in abnormal and emergency situations,
- The flight instrument system provided insufficient guidance about malfunctions that occurred,
- The initial maneuver that resulted in negative G-loads probably affected the pilots' ability to manage the situation in a rational manner.
Final Report:

Crash of a Lockheed C-130J-30 Super Hercules near Kiruna: 5 killed

Date & Time: Mar 15, 2012 at 1457 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
5630
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Harstad - Kiruna
MSN:
5630
YOM:
2010
Flight number:
HAZE 01
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
5
Captain / Total flying hours:
6153
Captain / Total hours on type:
5937.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
3285
Copilot / Total hours on type:
243
Aircraft flight hours:
856
Circumstances:
The accident occurred during a Norwegian military transport flight from Harstad/Narvik Airport (Evenes) in Norway to Kiruna Airport in Sweden. The flight was performed as a part of the Norwegian-led military exercise Cold Response. The aircraft, which was of the model C-130J-30 Super Hercules, had the call sign HAZE 01. HAZE 01 took off with a crew of four and one passenger on board. The aircraft climbed to Flight Level 130 and assumed a holding pattern south of Evenes. After one hour, the flight continued towards Kiruna Airport. The Norwegian air traffic control had radar contact and handed over the aircraft to the air traffic control on the Swedish side. Swedish air traffic control cleared HAZE 01 to descend to Flight Level 100 “when ready” and instructed the crew to contact Kiruna Tower. The crew acknowledged the clearance and directly thereafter, the aircraft left Flight Level 130 towards Flight Level 100. The lower limit of controlled airspace at the location in question is Flight Level 125. HAZE 01 informed Kiruna Tower that the aircraft was 50 nautical miles (NM) west of Kiruna and requested a visual approach when approaching. Kiruna Tower cleared HAZE 01, which was then in uncontrolled airspace, to Flight Level 70, and the aircraft continued to descend towards the cleared flight level. Neither ACC Stockholm nor Kiruna Tower had any radar contact with the aircraft during the sequence of events because the Swedish air navigation services do not have radar coverage at the altitudes at which HAZE 01 was situated. HAZE 01 levelled out at Flight Level 70 at 14.57 hrs. Half a minute later, the aircraft collided with the terrain between the north and south peaks on the west side of Kebnekaise. Data from the aircraft's recording equipment (CVR and DFDR) showed that HAZE 01 was flying in level flight at a ground speed of approximately 280 knots prior to the moment of collision and that the crew was not aware of the imminent danger of underlying terrain. The remaining distance to Kiruna Airport was 42 NM (77 km). Everyone on board received fatal injuries. Accidents in complex systems are rarely caused by a single factor, but there are often several circumstances that must coincide for an accident to occur. The analysis of the investigation deals with the circumstances which are deemed to have influenced the sequence of events and the barriers which are intended to prevent dangerous conditions from arising. In summary, the investigation indicates that latent weaknesses have existed both at the Norwegian Air Force and at LFV. It is these weaknesses and not the mistakes of individual persons that are assessed to be the root cause of the accident. On the part of flight operations, the investigation has found shortcomings with respect to procedures for planning and following up a flight. Together with a probably high confidence in air traffic control, this has led to the crew not noticing that the clearance entailed an altitude that did not allow for adequate terrain separation. In terms of the air traffic services, the investigation demonstrates that the aircraft was not issued clearances and flight information in accordance with applicable regulations. This is due to it not having been ensured that the air traffic controllers in question had sufficient experience and knowledge to guide air traffic from the west in towards Kiruna Airport in a safe manner under the present circumstances. The lack of radar coverage reduced the opportunities for air traffic control to monitor and guide air traffic. The aircraft's Ground Collision Avoidance System is the last barrier and is intended to be activated and provide warning upon the risk of obstacles in the aircraft's flight path. The investigation has shown that with the terrain profile in question and the settings in question, the criteria for a warning were not fulfilled. No technical malfunction on the aircraft has caused or contributed to the occurrence of the accident. The rescue operation was characterized by very good access to resources from both Sweden and abroad. The operations lasted for a relatively long time and were carried out under extreme weather conditions in difficult alpine terrain. The investigation of the rescue operation demonstrates the importance of further developing management, collaboration and training in several areas.
Probable cause:
The accident was caused by the crew on HAZE 01 not noticing to the shortcomings in the clearances issued by the air traffic controllers and to the risks of following these clearances, which resulted in the aircraft coming to leave controlled airspace and be flown at an altitude that was lower than the surrounding terrain.
The accident was rendered possible by the following organisational shortcomings in safety:
 The Norwegian Air Force has not ensured that the crews have had sufficiently safe working methods for preventing the aircraft from being flown below the minimum safe flight level on the route.
 LFV has not had sufficiently safe working methods for ensuring, partly, that clearances are only issued within controlled airspace during flight under IFR unless the pilot specifically requests otherwise and, partly, that relevant flight information is provided.
Final Report:

Crash of a Casa 212 Aviocar in Malmö: 4 killed

Date & Time: Oct 26, 2006 at 1326 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
SE-IVF
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Ronneby-Malmö
MSN:
346
YOM:
1985
Location:
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
4
Captain / Total flying hours:
4424
Captain / Total hours on type:
4192.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
638
Copilot / Total hours on type:
421
Aircraft flight hours:
17048
Aircraft flight cycles:
7389
Circumstances:
The aircraft was making a routine flight between Ronneby and Malmö with a crew of 4 on board. While descending to Sturup airport, the aircraft crashed into the Falsterbo canal, south Sweden. All 4 occupants were killed and the aircraft sunk by 10 metres deep. Right wing broke off during flight, probably due to corrosion in salty environment.

Crash of a BAe Jetstream 31 in Lulea

Date & Time: Sep 17, 2003 at 1828 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
SE-LNT
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Pajala-Lulea
MSN:
948
YOM:
1991
Flight number:
EXC403
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
31000
Captain / Total hours on type:
2000.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
660
Copilot / Total hours on type:
237
Aircraft flight hours:
13494
Circumstances:
The aircraft crashed 300 metres past the runway 14/32 threshold for unknown reason. Weather was good at the time of accident and CAVOK.

Crash of a PZL-Mielec AN-2 in Trollhattan

Date & Time: Aug 26, 2003 at 1730 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
LY-KAE
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Trollhattan-Trollhattan
MSN:
1G196-54
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
In unknown circumstances, the single engine aircraft crashed near Trollhattan- Målöga airport, Sweden.

Crash of a Piper PA-31 Navajo Chieftain in Sundsvall: 8 killed

Date & Time: Dec 9, 1999 at 1204 LT
Operator:
Registration:
SE-GDN
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Sundsvall-Göteborg
MSN:
31-7300947
YOM:
1973
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
7
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
8
Captain / Total flying hours:
729
Captain / Total hours on type:
98.00
Aircraft flight hours:
7266