Australia

On 28 January 2016 the pilot of a Cessna Aircraft Company Caravan 208 amphibian aircraft, registered VH-WTY (WTY) was conducting a series of charter flights in the Whitsunday region of Queensland. The pilot was conducting his third flight of the day when the aircraft departed Hamilton Island Airport at about 1415 Eastern Standard Time with 10 passengers on board. The tour included a scenic flight over the Great Barrier Reef for about 50 minutes before heading to Chance Bay, on the south-east tip of Whitsunday Island, about 11 km north east of Hamilton Island Airport. Following a water landing at Chance Bay, the group was to spend 90 minutes at the beach before a short flight back to Hamilton Island. The tour was originally planned to include a landing at Whitehaven Beach, however wind conditions at the time required the water landing be altered to Chance Bay. Radar surveillance data showed WTY approach Whitsunday Island from the north and conduct an orbit about 2 km north of Whitehaven Beach at about 1510, before heading toward Whitehaven Beach. WTY flew over the southern end of Whitehaven Beach and the strip of land that separates it from Chance Bay. At about 1515, after crossing Chance Bay beach in a southerly direction, WTY descended below radar surveillance for the remainder of the flight. The pilot advised that he flew WTY over the western end of Chance Bay’s main beach in order to conduct a visual pre-landing check of the bay. The pilot noted the positions of various vessels moored in the bay to determine the best taxi path to the beach. During this fly-over, the pilot also noted the sea state and observed evidence of wind gusts on the water surface. The pilot then initiated a right downwind turn toward the landing area. The approach was from the south with the intent to land in the most suitable location within the designated landing area and then taxi to the beach. The pilot reported setting up for landing at about 50 ft above the water and then delayed the landing in order to fly through an observed wind gust. Passenger video footage indicated that, during the subsequent landing, WTY bounced three times on the surface of the water. After the second bounce, with WTY getting closer to the beach and terrain, the pilot increased engine power and initiated a go-around. The third bounce, which occurred almost immediately after the second, was the most pronounced and resulted in the aircraft rebounding about 30 to 50 ft above the water. While increasing power, the pilot perceived that the torque was indicating red, suggesting an over-torque for the selected propeller configuration. Noticing that the climb performance was less than expected with the flaps at 30˚, the pilot stopped increasing power and reduced the flap to 20˚. As the aircraft climbed straight ahead towards a saddle, climb performance was still below the pilot’s expectations and he assessed that WTY would not clear the terrain. In response, the pilot turned right to avoid the surrounding rising terrain. WTY clipped trees during this turn, before colliding with terrain and coming to rest in dense scrub about 150 m from the eastern end of the main beach, near the top of the ridge. The pilot promptly advised the passengers to exit and move away from the aircraft. Some of the 11 people on board suffered minor injuries but all were able to quickly leave the aircraft. There was no post-impact fire. The aircraft’s fixed emergency beacon self-activated during the collision with terrain and was detected by the Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA), resulting in a search and rescue response being initiated by the Joint Rescue Coordination Centre (JRCC) Australia. The pilot reported also activating his personal locator beacon, however this was not detected by AMSA. In addition, the pilot used the company satellite phone to advise the operator of the occurrence and current status of all on board. At about the same time, several witnesses who were located in Chance Bay made their way to the aircraft before assisting everyone down to the beach. A tourist boat was utilized to transfer the pilot and passengers to Hamilton Island, arriving at about 1600. From there, one passenger was transferred by helicopter to Mackay for further treatment.

On the morning of 25 September 2015, the captain and copilot of a Cessna 550 aircraft (Citation Bravo), registered VH-FGK, prepared to conduct a private flight from Lismore Airport to Baryulgil, about 40 NM south-west of Lismore, New South Wales. The aircraft had been parked at the northern end of the airport overnight, with engine covers and control locks on. After arriving at the airport, the flight crew conducted a pre-flight inspection, with no abnormalities identified. They then commenced the normal pre-start checks, which included the disengagement of the flight control locks. The crew elected to use runway 15 for take-off, and used the Cessna simplified take-off performance criteria (see Take-off performance simplified criteria) to determine the thrust settings and take-off reference speeds. The resultant reference speeds were 105 kt for the decision speed (V1) and 108 kt for the rotation speed (VR). At about 1300 Eastern Standard Time, the flight crew started the engines and performed the associated checks, with all indications normal. The crew reported that they completed the after start checks, and the captain then taxied the aircraft to the holding point for runway 15, less than 200 m from where the aircraft was parked. While stopped at the holding point, the crew completed the taxi and pre-take-off checks, the copilot broadcast the standard calls on the common traffic advisory frequency, and the captain communicated with air traffic control (ATC). The captain taxied the aircraft onto the runway, and turned left onto the runway centreline to commence the take-off run from the intersection. While rolling along the runway, the captain advanced the thrust levers to the approximate take-off setting. The captain then called ‘set thrust’, and the copilot set the thrust levers to the more precise position needed to achieve the planned engine thrust for the take-off. As the aircraft accelerated, the copilot called ‘80 knots’ and crosschecked the two airspeed indicators were in agreement and reading 80 kt. The copilot called ‘V1’ and the captain moved their hands from the thrust levers to the control column in accordance with the operator’s normal procedure. A few seconds later, the copilot called ‘rotate’ and the captain initiated a normal rotate action on the control column. The crew reported that the aircraft did not rotate and that they did not feel any indication that the aircraft would lift off. The copilot looked outside and did not detect any change in the aircraft’s attitude as would normally occur at that stage. The captain stated to the copilot that the aircraft would not rotate, and pulled back harder on the control column. The copilot looked across and saw the captain had pulled the control column firmly into their stomach. Although the aircraft’s speed was then about 112 kt, and above VR, the crew did not detect any movement of the attitude director indicator or the nose wheel lifting off the ground, so the captain rejected the take-off; applied full brakes, and set the thrust levers to idle and then into reverse thrust. The aircraft continued to the end of the sealed runway and onto the grass in the runway end safety area (RESA), coming to rest slightly left of the extended centreline, about 100 m beyond the end of the runway. The aircraft sustained substantial damage and the flight crew, who were the only occupants of the aircraft, were uninjured. The nose landing gear separated from the aircraft during the overrun, and there was significant structural damage to the fuselage and wings. The right wheel tyre had deflated due to an apparent wheel lockup and flat spot, which had progressed to a point that a large hole had been worn in the tyre.

On 8 March 2015, the pilot of an Aero Commander 500 aircraft, registered VH-WZV, prepared to conduct a charter flight from Badu Island to Horn Island, Queensland, with five passengers. The aircraft had been refuelled earlier that day at Horn Island, where the pilot conducted fuel drains with no contaminants found. He had operated the aircraft for about 2 hours prior to landing at Badu Island with no abnormal performance or indications. At about 1330 Eastern Standard Time (EST), the pilot started the engines and conducted the standard checks with all indications normal, obtained the relevant clearances from air traffic control, and taxied for a departure from runway 30. As the pilot lined the aircraft up on the runway centreline at the threshold, he performed a pre-take-off safety self-brief and conducted the pre-takeoff checks. He then applied full power, released the brakes and commenced the take-off run. All engine indications were normal during the taxi and commencement of the take-off run. When the airspeed had increased to about 80 kt, the pilot commenced rotation and the nose and main landing gear lifted off the runway. Just as the main landing gear lifted off, the pilot detected a significant loss of power from the left engine. The aircraft yawed to the left, which the pilot counteracted with right rudder. He heard the left engine noise decrease noticeably and the aircraft dropped back onto the runway. The pilot immediately rejected the take-off; reduced the power to idle, and used rudder and brakes to maintain the runway centreline. The pilot initially assessed that there was sufficient runway remaining to stop on but, due to the wet runway surface, the aircraft did not decelerate as quickly as expected and he anticipated that the aircraft would overrun the runway. As there was a steep slope and trees beyond the end of the runway, he steered the aircraft to the right towards more open and level ground. The aircraft departed the runway to the right, collided with a fence and a bush resulting in substantial damage. The pilot and passengers were not injured.

On 12 June 2014, at about 1530 Eastern Standard Time (EST), a Piper PA-46 aircraft, registered VH-TSV, departed Dubbo, New South Wales for a private flight to the Sunshine Coast, Queensland with a pilot and one passenger on board. The planned route was to track via Moree and Toowoomba at 13,500 ft above mean sea level (AMSL). The pilot had operated the aircraft from Sunshine Coast to Lightning Ridge, Brewarrina and Dubbo earlier that day and reported that all engine indications were normal on those flights. About 1 hour after departing Dubbo, when about 26 NM south of Narrabri, at about 13,500 ft AMSL, the pilot observed the engine manifold pressure gauge indicating 25 inches Hg, when the throttle position selected would normally have produced about 28 inches Hg. The pilot selected the alternate air1 which did not result in any increase in power. He then elected to descend to 10,000 ft, and at that power setting when normally the engine would have produced about 29 inches Hg, the gauge still indicated only about 25 inches Hg. He turned the aircraft towards Narrabri in an attempt to fly clear of the Pilliga State Forest. The pilot assessed that the aircraft had a partial engine failure and performed troubleshooting checks. As the aircraft descended through about 8,000 ft, he observed the oil pressure gauge indicating decreasing pressure. When passing about 6,500 ft, the oil pressure gauge indicated zero and the pilot heard two loud bangs and observed the cowling lift momentarily from above the engine. The passenger observed a puff of smoke emanating from the engine and momentarily a small amount of smoke in the cockpit. The pilot established the aircraft in a glide at about 90 kt, secured the engine and completed the emergency checklist. He broadcast a ‘Mayday’ 2 call on Brisbane Centre radio frequency advising of an engine failure and forced landing. The pilot looked for a clear area below in which to conduct a forced landing and also requested the passenger to assist in identifying any cleared areas suitable to land. Both only identified heavily treed areas. The pilot extended the landing gear and selected 10º of flap and, when at about 1,000 ft, the pilot shut the fuel off, deployed the emergency beacon then switched off the electrical system. As the aircraft entered the tree tops, he flared to stall3 the aircraft. On impact, the pilot was seriously injured and lost consciousness. The passenger reported the wings impacted with trees and the aircraft slid about 10 m before coming to rest. The passenger checked for any evidence of fuel leak or fire and administered basic first aid to the pilot. The aircraft sustained substantial damage.

On 29 January 2014, at about 1100 Central Daylight-savings Time, the pilot prepared a Piper PA-31 aircraft, registered VHOFF, for a private flight from Aldinga aeroplane landing area (ALA) to Kangaroo Island, South Australia. To check fuel quantities, the pilot entered the cockpit, turned on the master switch and placed the left and right fuel selectors onto the main tank (inboard) position. The gauge for each tank showed just under half full. He then placed each fuel selector onto the auxiliary (outboard) tank position, where the gauge indicated the right and left auxiliary tanks were each about a quarter full. He did not return the selectors to the main tanks. He estimated that refuelling the main tanks would allow sufficient fuel for the flight with over an hour in reserve. He exited the aircraft while it was refuelled and continued preparing for the flight. Once refuelling was completed, the pilot conducted a pre-flight inspection, and finished loading the aircraft. The pilot and passenger then boarded. The pilot was familiar with Aldinga ALA, which is a non-controlled airport. At uncontrolled airports, unless a restriction or preference is listed for a certain runway in either the Airservices en route supplement Australia (ERSA), or other relevant publications, selection of the runway is the responsibility of the pilot. Operational considerations such as wind direction, other traffic, runway surface and length, performance requirements for the aircraft on that day, and suitable emergency landing areas in the event of an aircraft malfunction are all taken into consideration. On this day, the pilot assessed the wind to be favoring runway 14, which already had an aircraft in the circuit intending to land. However, he decided to use runway 03 due to the availability of a landing area in case of an emergency. He then completed a full run-up check of the engines, propellers and magnetos prior to lining up for departure. The pilot reported that all of the pre-take-off checks were normal. Once the aircraft landing on runway 14 was clear of the runway, the pilot went through his usual memory checklist prior to take-off. He scanned and crosschecked the flight and panel instruments, power quadrant settings and trims, but did not complete his usual final check, which was to reach down with his right hand and confirm that the fuel selector levers were on the main tanks. After broadcasting on the common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF) he commenced the take-off. At the appropriate speed, he rotated the aircraft as it passed the intersection of the 14 and 03 runways. Almost immediately both engines began surging, there was a loss of power, the power gauges fluctuated and the aircraft yawed from side to side. Due to the surging, fluctuating gauges and aircraft yaw, the pilot found it difficult to identify what he thought was a non-performing engine. He reported there were no warning lights so he retracted the landing gear, with the intent of getting the aircraft to attain a positive rate of climb, so he could trouble shoot further at a safe altitude. When a little over 50 ft above ground level (AGL), he realized the aircraft was not performing sufficiently, so he selected a suitable landing area. He focused on maintaining a safe airspeed and landed straight ahead. The aircraft touched down and slid about another 75-100 metres before coming to rest. The impact marks of the propellers suggest the aircraft touched the ground facing north-easterly and rotated to the north-west prior to stopping. The pilot turned off the master switch and both he and the passenger exited the aircraft. After a few minutes he re-entered the cockpit and completed the shutdown. Police and fire service attended shortly after the accident.

At about 1107 Eastern Standard Time on 01OCT2012, a de Havilland Aircraft Pty Ltd DH-84 Dragon, registered VH-UXG (UXG), took off from Monto on a private flight to Caboolture, Queensland under the visual flight rules (VFR). On board the aircraft were the pilot/owner and five passengers. The weather conditions on departure were reported to include a light south-easterly wind with a high overcast and good visibility. Sometime after about 1230, the aircraft was seen near Tansey, about 150 km north-west of Caboolture on the direct track from Monto to Caboolture. The aircraft was reported flying in a south-easterly direction at the time, at an estimated height of 3,000 ft and in fine but overcast conditions. At 1315, the pilot contacted Brisbane Radar air traffic control (ATC) and advised that the aircraft’s position was about 37 NM (69 km) north of Caboolture and requested navigation assistance. At 1318, the pilot advised ATC that the aircraft was in ‘full cloud’. For most of the remainder of the flight, the pilot and ATC exchanged communications, at times relayed through a commercial flight and a rescue flight in the area due to the limited ATC radio coverage in the area at low altitude. At about 1320, a friend of one of the aircraft’s passengers received a telephone call from the passenger to say that she was in an aircraft and that they were ‘lost in a cloud’ and kept losing altitude. Witnesses in the Borumba Dam, Imbil and Kandanga areas 70 to 80 km north-north-west of Caboolture later reported that they heard and briefly saw the aircraft flying in and out of low cloud between about 1315 and 1415. At 1348, the pilot advised ATC that the aircraft had about an hour’s endurance remaining. The pilot’s last recorded transmission was at 1404. A search for the aircraft was coordinated by Australian Search and Rescue (AusSAR). The aircraft wreckage was located on 3 October 2012, about 87 km north-west of Caboolture on the northern side of a steep, densely wooded ridge about 500 m above mean sea level. The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) later determined that the aircraft probably impacted terrain at about 1421 on 01OCT2012. Preliminary analysis indicated that the aircraft collided with trees and terrain at a moderate to high speed, with a left angle of bank. The aircraft’s direction of travel at impact was toward the south-south-west.

At 0445 Eastern Standard Time on 24 February 2011, the pilot of an Aero Commander 500S, registered VH-WZU, commenced a freight charter flight from Cairns to Horn Island, Queensland under the instrument flight rules. The aircraft arrived in the Horn Island area at about 0720 and the pilot advised air traffic control that he intended holding east of the island due to low cloud and rain. At about 0750 he advised pilots in the area that he was north of Horn Island and was intending to commence a visual approach. When the aircraft did not arrive a search was commenced but the pilot and aircraft were not found. On about 10 October 2011, the wreckage was located on the seabed about 26 km north-north-west of Horn Island.

On 20 December 2010, the owner/pilot of a Pacific Aerospace Corporation FU-24-954 Fletcher aircraft, registered VH-FNM, was conducting aerial spreading of urea fertilizer at Wynella Station; a property 40 km south-south-west of Dirranbandi, Queensland. At about 1650 Eastern Standard Time, the pilot was returning to the landing strip after the completion of an application run. The aircraft impacted the terrain, and the pilot was fatally injured.

The pilot was conducting a charter flight from Lady Barron, Flinders Island to Bridport, Tasmania with six passengers on board. The aircraft departed Lady Barron Aerodrome at about 1700 Australian Eastern Daylight-saving Time and entered instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) several minutes afterwards while climbing to the intended cruising altitude of about 1,500 ft. The pilot did not hold a command instrument rating and the aircraft was not equipped for flight in IMC. He attempted to turn the aircraft to return to Lady Barron Aerodrome but became lost, steering instead towards high ground in the Strzelecki National Park in the south-east of Flinders Island. At about 1715, the aircraft exited cloud in the Strzelecki National Park, very close to the ground. The pilot turned to the left, entering a small valley in which he could neither turn the aircraft nor out climb the terrain. He elected to slow the aircraft to its stalling speed for a forced landing and, moments later, it impacted the tree tops and then the ground. The first passenger to exit the aircraft used the aircraft fire extinguisher to put out a small fire that had begun beneath the engine. The other passengers and the pilot then exited the aircraft safely. One passenger was slightly injured during the impact; the pilot and other passengers were uninjured. During the night, all of the occupants of the aircraft were rescued by helicopter and taken to the hospital in Whitemark, Flinders Island.

The pilot was performing a cargo flight from Parkes to Orange, New South Wales. On final approach, the single engine aircraft was too low and impacted the roof of a metal hangar located near the runway threshold. The aircraft stalled and struck the runway surface. Upon impact, the nose gear was torn off. Out of control, the aircraft veered off runway and eventually collided with a metal hangar under construction. While the pilot was injured, the aircraft was destroyed.