Country
code

South Australia

Crash of a Cessna 441 Conquest II in Renmark: 3 killed

Date & Time: May 30, 2017 at 1630 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
VH-XMJ
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Renmark - Adelaide
MSN:
441-0113
YOM:
1980
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Captain / Total flying hours:
14751
Captain / Total hours on type:
987.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
5000
Copilot / Total hours on type:
1000
Aircraft flight hours:
13845
Circumstances:
On 30 May 2017, a Cessna 441 Conquest II (Cessna 441), registered VH-XMJ (XMJ) and operated by AE Charter, trading as Rossair, departed Adelaide Airport, South Australia for a return flight via Renmark Airport, South Australia. On board the aircraft were:
• an inductee pilot undergoing a proficiency check, flying from the front left control seat
• the chief pilot conducting the proficiency check, and under assessment for the company training and checking role for Cessna 441 aircraft, seated in the front right control seat
• a Civil Aviation Safety Authority flying operations inspector (FOI), observing and assessing the flight from the first passenger seat directly behind the left hand pilot seat.
Each pilot was qualified to operate the aircraft. There were two purposes for the flight. The primary purpose was for the FOI to observe the chief pilot conducting an operational proficiency check (OPC), for the purposes of issuing him with a check pilot approval on the company’s Cessna 441 aircraft. The second purpose was for the inductee pilot, who had worked for Rossair previously, to complete an OPC as part of his return to line operations for the company. The three pilots reportedly started their pre-flight briefing at around 1300 Central Standard Time. There were two parts of the briefing – the FOI’s briefing to the chief pilot, and the chief pilot’s briefing to the inductee pilot. As the FOI was not occupying a control seat, he was monitoring and assessing the performance of the chief pilot in the conduct of the OPC. There were two distinct exercises listed for the flight (see the section titled Check flight sequences). Flight exercise 1 detailed that the inductee pilot was to conduct an instrument departure from Adelaide Airport, holding pattern and single engine RNAV2 approach, go around and landing at Renmark Airport. Flight exercise 2 included a normal take-off from Renmark Airport, simulated engine failure after take-off, and a two engine instrument approach on return to Adelaide. The aircraft departed from Adelaide at 1524, climbed to an altitude about 17,000 ft above mean sea level, and was cleared by air traffic control (ATC) to track to waypoint RENWB, which was the commencement of the Renmark runway 073 RNAV-Z GNSS approach. The pilot of XMJ was then cleared to descend, and notified ATC that they intended to carry out airwork in the Renmark area. The pilot further advised that they would call ATC again on the completion of the airwork, or at the latest by 1615. No further transmissions from XMJ were recorded on the area frequency and the aircraft left surveillance coverage as it descended towards waypoint RENWB. The common traffic advisory frequency used for air-to-air communications in the vicinity of Renmark Airport recorded several further transmissions from XMJ as the crew conducted practice holding patterns, and a practice runway 07 RNAV GNSS approach. Voice analysis confirmed that the inductee pilot made the radio transmissions, as expected for the check flight. At the completion of the approach, the aircraft circled for the opposite runway and landed on runway 25, before backtracking and lining up for departure. That sequence varied from the planned exercise in that no single-engine go-around was conducted prior to landing at Renmark. At 1614, the common traffic advisory frequency recorded a transmission from the pilot of XMJ stating that they would shortly depart Renmark using runway 25 to conduct further airwork in the circuit area of the runway. A witness at the airport reported that, prior to the take-off roll, the aircraft was briefly held stationary in the lined-up position with the engines operating at significant power. The take-off roll was described as normal however, and the witness looked away before the aircraft became airborne. The aircraft maintained the runway heading until reaching a height of between 300-400 ft above the ground (see the section titled Recorded flight data). At that point the aircraft began veering to the right of the extended runway centreline (Figures 1 and 15). The aircraft continued to climb to about 600 ft above the ground (700 ft altitude), and held this height for about 30 seconds, followed by a descent to about 500 ft (Figures 2 and 13). The information ceased 5 seconds later, which was about 60 seconds after take-off. A distress beacon broadcast was received by the Joint Rescue Coordination Centre and passed on to ATC at 1625. Following an air and ground search the aircraft was located by a ground party at 1856 about 4 km west of Renmark Airport. All on board were fatally injured and the aircraft was destroyed.
Probable cause:
Findings:
From the evidence available, the following findings are made with respect to the collision with terrain involving Cessna 441, registered VH-XMJ, that occurred 4 km west of Renmark Airport,
South Australia on 30 May 2017. These findings should not be read as apportioning blame or liability to any particular organisation or individual.
Contributing factors:
• Following a planned simulated engine failure after take-off, the aircraft did not achieve the expected single engine climb performance, or target airspeed, over the final 30 seconds of the flight.
• The exercise was not discontinued when the aircraft’s single engine performance and airspeed were not attained. That was probably because the degraded aircraft performance, or the
associated risk, were not recognised by the pilots occupying the control seats.
• It is likely that the method of simulating the engine failure and pilot control inputs, together or in isolation, led to reduced single engine aircraft performance and asymmetric loss of control.
• Not following the recommended procedure for simulating an engine failure in the Cessna 441 pilot’s operating handbook meant that there was insufficient height to recover following the loss of control.
Other factors that increased risk:
• The Rossair training and checking manual procedure for a simulated engine failure in a turboprop aircraft was inappropriate and, if followed, increased the risk of asymmetric control loss.
• The flying operations inspector was not in a control seat and did not share a communication systems with the crew. Consequently, he had reduced ability to actively monitor the flight and
communicate any identified performance degradation.
• The inductee pilot had limited recent experience in the Cessna 441, and the chief pilot had an extended time period between being training and being tested as a check pilot on this aircraft. While both pilots performed the same exercise during a practice flight the week before, it is probable that these two factors led to a degradation in the skills required to safely perform and monitor the simulated engine failure exercise.
• The chief pilot and other key operational managers within Rossair were experiencing high levels of workload and pressure during the months leading up to the accident.
• In the 5 years leading up to the accident, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority had conducted numerous regulatory service tasks for the air transport operator and had regular communication with the operator’s chief pilots and other personnel. However, it had not conducted a systemic or detailed audit during that period, and its focus on a largely informal and often undocumented approach to oversight increased the risk that organisational or systemic issues associated with the operator would not be effectively identified and addressed.
Other findings:
• A lack of recorded data from this aircraft reduced the available evidence about handling aspects and cockpit communications. This limited the extent to which potential factors contributing to the accident could be analysed.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft 200C Super King Air in Mount Gambier: 1 killed

Date & Time: Dec 10, 2001 at 2336 LT
Operator:
Registration:
VH-FMN
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Adelaide - Mount Gambier - Adelaide
MSN:
BL-47
YOM:
1982
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
13730
Captain / Total hours on type:
372.00
Aircraft flight hours:
10907
Circumstances:
The Raytheon Beech 200C Super King Air, registered VH-FMN, departed Adelaide at 2240 hours Central Summer Time (CSuT) under the Instrument Flight Rules for Mount Gambier, South Australia. The ambulance aircraft was being positioned from Adelaide to Mount Gambier to transport a patient from Mount Gambier to Sydney for a medical procedure, for which time constraints applied. The pilot intended to refuel the aircraft at Mount Gambier. The planned flight time to Mount Gambier was 52 minutes. On board were the pilot and one medical crewmember. The medical crewmember was seated in a rear-facing seat behind the pilot. On departure from Adelaide, the pilot climbed the aircraft to an altitude of 21,000 ft above mean sea level for the flight to Mount Gambier. At approximately 2308, the pilot requested and received from Air Traffic Services (ATS) the latest weather report for Mount Gambier aerodrome, including the altimeter sub-scale pressure reading of 1012 millibars. At approximately 2312, the pilot commenced descent to Mount Gambier. At approximately 2324, the aircraft descended through about 8,200 ft and below ATS radar coverage. At approximately 2326, the pilot made a radio transmission on the Mount Gambier Mandatory Broadcast Zone (MBZ) frequency advising that the aircraft was 26 NM north, inbound, had left 5,000 ft on descent and was estimating the Mount Gambier circuit at 2335. At about 2327, the pilot started a series of radio transmissions to activate the Mount Gambier aerodrome pilot activated lighting (PAL).2 At approximately 2329, the pilot made a radio transmission advising that the aircraft was 19 NM north and maintaining 4,000 ft. About 3 minutes later, he made another series of transmissions to activate the Mount Gambier PAL. At approximately 2333, the pilot reported to ATS that he was in the circuit at Mount Gambier and would report after landing. Witnesses located in the vicinity of the aircraft’s flight path reported that the aircraft was flying lower than normal for aircraft arriving from the northwest. At approximately 2336 (56 minutes after departure), the aircraft impacted the ground at a position 3.1 NM from the threshold of runway (RWY) 18. The pilot sustained fatal injuries and the medical crewmember sustained serious injuries, but egressed unaided.
Probable cause:
The following factors were identified:
- Dark night conditions existed in the area surrounding the approach path of the aircraft.
- For reasons which could not be ascertained, the pilot did not comply with the requirements of the published instrument approach procedures.
- The aircraft was flown at an altitude insufficient to ensure terrain clearance.
Final Report:

Crash of a Piper PA-31-350 Navajo Chieftain off Whyalla: 8 killed

Date & Time: May 31, 2000 at 1905 LT
Operator:
Registration:
VH-MZK
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Adelaide - Whyalla
MSN:
31-8152180
YOM:
1981
Flight number:
WW904
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
7
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
8
Captain / Total flying hours:
2211
Captain / Total hours on type:
113.00
Aircraft flight hours:
11837
Circumstances:
On the evening of 31 May 2000, Piper Chieftain, VH-MZK, was being operated by Whyalla Airlines as Flight WW904 on a regular public transport service from Adelaide to Whyalla, South Australia. One pilot and seven passengers were on board. The aircraft departed at 1823 central Standard Time (CST) and, after being radar vectored a short distance to the west of Adelaide for traffic separation purposes, the pilot was cleared to track direct to Whyalla at 6,000 ft. A significant proportion of the track from Adelaide to Whyalla passed over the waters of Gulf St Vincent and Spencer Gulf. The entire flight was conducted in darkness. The aircraft reached 6,000 ft and proceeded apparently normally at that altitude on the direct track to Whyalla. At 1856 CST, the pilot reported to Adelaide Flight Information Service (FIS) that the aircraft was 35 NM south-south-east of Whyalla, commencing descent from 6,000 ft. Five minutes later the pilot transmitted a MAYDAY report to FIS. He indicated that both engines of the aircraft had failed, that there were eight persons on board and that he was going to have to ditch the aircraft, but was trying to reach Whyalla. He requested that assistance be arranged and that his company be advised of the situation. About three minutes later, the pilot reported his position as about 15 NM off the coast from Whyalla. FIS advised the pilot to communicate through another aircraft that was in the area if he lost contact with FIS. The pilot’s acknowledgment was the last transmission heard from the aircraft. A few minutes later, the crew of another aircraft heard an emergency locater transmitter (ELT) signal for 10–20 seconds. Early the following morning, a search and rescue operation located two deceased persons and a small amount of wreckage in Spencer Gulf, near the last reported position of the aircraft. The aircraft, together with five deceased occupants, was located several days later on the sea–bed. One passenger remained missing.
Probable cause:
Engine operating practices:
• High power piston engine operating practices of leaning at climb power, and leaning to near ‘best economy’ during cruise, may result in the formation of deposits on cylinder and piston surfaces that could cause preignition.
• The engine operating practices of Whyalla Airlines included leaning at climb power and leaning to near ‘best economy’ during cruise.
Left engine:
The factors that resulted in the failure of the left engine were:
• The accumulation of lead oxybromide compounds on the crowns of pistons and cylinder head surfaces.
• Deposit induced preignition resulted in the increase of combustion chamber pressures and increased loading on connecting rod bearings.
• The connecting rod big end bearing insert retention forces were reduced by the inclusion, during engine assembly, of a copper–based anti-galling compound.
• The combination of increased bearing loads and decreased bearing insert retention forces resulted in the movement, deformation and subsequent destruction of the bearing inserts.
• Contact between the edge of the damaged Number 6 connecting rod bearing insert and the Number 6 crankshaft journal fillet resulted in localised heating and consequent cracking of the nitrided surface zone.
• Fatigue cracking in the Number 6 journal initiated at the site of a thermal crack and propagated over a period of approximately 50 flights.
• Disconnection of the two sections of the journal following the completion of fatigue cracking in the journal and the fracture of the Number 6 connecting rod big end housing most likely resulted in the sudden stoppage of the left engine.
Right engine:
The factors that were involved in the damage/malfunction of the right engine following the left engine malfunction/failure were:
• Detonation of combustion end-gas.
• Disruption of the gas boundary layers on the piston crowns and cylinder head surface increasing the rate of heat transfer to these components.
• Increased heat transfer to the Number 6 piston and cylinder head resulted in localised melting.
• The melting of the Number 6 piston allowed combustion gases to bypass the piston rings.
The flight:
The factors that contributed to the flight outcome were:
• The pilot responded to the failed left engine by increasing power to the right engine.
• The resultant change in operating conditions of the right engine led to loss of power from, and erratic operation of, that engine.
• The pilot was forced to ditch the aircraft into a 0.5m to 1m swell in the waters of Spencer Gulf, in dark, moonless conditions.
• The absence of upper body restraints, and life jackets or flotation devices, reduced the chances of survival of the occupants.
• The Emergency Locator Transmitter functioned briefly on impact but ceased operating when the aircraft sank.
Final Report:

Crash of a Piper PA-31-350 Navajo Chieftain in Innemincka

Date & Time: May 29, 1993 at 1258 LT
Registration:
VH-LIC
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Port Augusta – Innamincka – Durham Downs
MSN:
31-7652173
YOM:
1976
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
2930
Captain / Total hours on type:
966.00
Circumstances:
The pilot was conducting a scheduled passenger service flight from Port Augusta with a stop at Innamincka. A commercial pilot, travelling as a non-paying passenger, occupied the co-pilot's seat to observe the operation. Two additional passengers were on board the aircraft for the entire flight. After landing at Innamincka, the aircraft was refuelled by the pilot in command and the oil levels of both engines were checked by the observer, who experienced difficulty securing the combination oil filler cap-dipsticks. He asked the pilot for instructions and, although some advice was given, the pilot did not check the security of the dipsticks. Take-off was commenced towards the north into a 10-15 knot wind with a surface temperature of about 20 degrees C. Shortly after lift-off, at the first power reduction, the observer in the co-pilot's seat advised that there was oil seeping back along the cowl from the right side oil filler hatch. The pilot reported that he increased power to both engines but believed there was no response from the right. He began an immediate left turn to complete a circuit and attempted to secure the right engine and feather the propeller. The aircraft then began a roll to the right, the nose dropped and the aircraft impacted the ground. As the aircraft rolled right and the nose dropped, the pilot reported that he had secured the left engine and feathered the propeller. The observer in the co-pilot seat reported hearing a continuous stall warning horn as the right wing began to drop. All occupants, although injured, were able to vacate the aircraft through the main cabin door. The pilot provided assistance to the passengers and then returned to the airport to summon help.
Probable cause:
Examination of the wreckage revealed that the aircraft impacted the ground in a nose down, right wing low attitude while turning right. The landing gear collapsed due to impact forces and the right wing separated. Deceleration and impact forces were severe. The right propeller was found in the fine pitch range with no damage to the uppermost blade and the other two bent backwards. The right engine oil filler cap-dipstick was found to be correctly installed in the oil filler neck. There was a pattern of engine oil over the rear of the engine and inside the cowl originating from the oil filler neck. The left engine was partially torn from its mountings and displaced about 90 degrees to the right. Its propeller was in the fully feathered position. The oil filler cap-dipstick was on the ground adjacent to the engine. An oil spill pattern similar to that on the right engine was evident.
Significant Factors:
- The pilot-in-command reacted inappropriately to a perceived engine problem shortly after take-off.
- Control of the aircraft was lost at a height insufficient to effect a recovery.
Final Report:

Crash of a GAF Nomad N.24A at Edinburgh AFB: 1 killed

Date & Time: Mar 12, 1990
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
A18-401
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Edinburgh AFB - Edinburgh AFB
MSN:
128
YOM:
1982
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Aircraft flight hours:
300
Circumstances:
The pilot, sole on board, was completing a local training flight at Edinburgh AFB. On approach, the tail separated and the aircraft dove into the ground and crashed near the airfield. The aircraft was destroyed and the pilot F/Lt Glenn Kemshall Donovan was killed.
Probable cause:
After being manufactured in 1982, the airplane was used by GAF (renamed Aerospace Technologies of Australia - ASTA in 1987) for testing. Amongst others, service records indicated 177 hours of single engine ground running. This meant that the airplane was subjected to many high frequency asymmetric cycles. Cracks initiated and grew predominately due to torsional loading. Upon delivery to the RAAF, the airplane was inspected but this failed to detect significant cracking. The tailplane centre section failed in flight, 19 hours after the inspection.

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-2 Beaver in Orroroo: 1 killed

Date & Time: Sep 20, 1989 at 1222 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
VH-IDD
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Orroroo - Orroroo
MSN:
1532
YOM:
1963
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Circumstances:
The aircraft had been delayed in servicing and repair and had only been released six weeks prior to the accident. This delay had caused the operator/pilot to fall behind in his commitments and, according to some witnesses, caused him to worry about the situation. On the day of the accident, the pilot had just completed spraying a 243 hectare paddock and had landed to reload. After take-off for the new task, the pilot was seen to make an aerial inspection of the paddock before entering the first swath run. At the end of this run, the aircraft collided with a Single Wire Earth Return (SWER) powerline and crashed. It was later shown that the aircraft was in a bank to the right of about 18 degrees. The SWER line ran across one end of the paddock at an angle and on the crop side of a windmill just inside the fence which bordered the road. The line contacted the right maingear and outboard sprayboom attachment struts on the right wing. The wire broke after impact but the aircraft hit the ground heavily on the right main gear. The gear detached from the aircraft, the propeller struck the ground and the aircraft slewed around as it came to rest after some 27 metres of ground travel. The front half of the aircraft was destroyed by fire which broke out almost immediately the aircraft stopped. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.
Probable cause:
Two main hypothesis were proposed. One was that the pilot was distracted from a less than demanding task by business worries. The other was that the pilot had perceived that the SWER line was on the right of the windmill and outside the fence and therefore did not present an obstacle to his procedure turn. Neither hypothesis could be substantiated. An additional concern was the fact that the pilot had died from impact injuries in an accident that, prima facie, was survivable. Concern focused on whether the pilot had secured his harness properly and/or whether the inertia reel had failed. Detailed engineering inspection of the inertia reel by the Bureau and the manufacturer could not positively determine the mode of operation of the inertia reel. However, the post mortem report showed that the nature of injuries to the pilot, while sufficient to cause death prior to the fire, were such as to indicate that the inertia reel had probably not failed. The pilot did not see the powerline in time to avoid a collision.
Final Report:

Crash of a Douglas C-47B-35-DK at Edinburgh AFB

Date & Time: Oct 17, 1986
Operator:
Registration:
A65-114
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
MSN:
16712/33460
YOM:
1945
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
0
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
Just after liftoff, both engines failed simultaneously. The aircraft stalled and hit the runway surface. On impact, the left main gear collapsed and the aircraft came to rest. There were no casualties but the aircraft was considered as damaged beyond repair and later transferred to the South Australian Aviation Museum in Port Adelaide.
Probable cause:
Double engine failure for unknown reasons.

Crash of a Partenavia P.68B Victor near Adelaide: 2 killed

Date & Time: Nov 9, 1985
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
VH-YIH
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
MSN:
134
YOM:
1978
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Circumstances:
Crashed in unknown circumstances in an open field located about 80 km south of Adelaide and burnt. Both occupants were killed.

Crash of a Piper PA-31-350 Navajo Chieftain in Moomba: 1 killed

Date & Time: Jun 15, 1983 at 1140 LT
Operator:
Registration:
VH-DVX
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Adelaide – Moomba – Dullingari
MSN:
31-7405425
YOM:
1974
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Circumstances:
The aircraft was engaged on a charter flight from Adelaide to Moomba and Dullingari. The flight from Adelaide to Moomba was without incident and after landing the pilot parked the aircraft adjacent to the refuelling cabinets. He then assisted the passengers from the aircraft and removed baggage from the nose locker. During this period a conversation took place between the pilot and the aircraft refueller. The exact content of that conversation could not positively be determined but it appears that the pilot did not specify the type of fuel to be placed in the aircraft, only which tanks were to be fuelled. As the refueller was fuelling the aircraft, the pilot accompanied his passengers to the airport terminal. When the fuelling was completed the pilot returned, with his passengers, to the aircraft. He signed the fuel release note which showed that 263 litres of Jet A-1 (Aviation turbine fuel) had been supplied, then completed a check of the aircraft's fuel tanks to ensure no water was present in the fuel. The pilot reported that the fuel sample taken was free of water and appeared to him to be the normal fuel used by the PA-31 aircraft, AVGAS (Aviation Gasoline). The pilot and the passengers then boarded the aircraft, the engines were started and the aircraft taxied for a DEPARTURE on runway 12. During the taxiing phase the pilot completed the pre-take-off checks, these including a check that the temperatures and pressure relevant to the operation of the engine were within limits. The pilot subsequently advised that the take-off was normal and after the landing gear was raised, engine power was reduced to the standard settings for the climb. However, at about 500 feet above ground level the pilot sensed a loss of performance and noted that the indicated airspeed was 115 knots, 5 knots lower than normal. He then noticed a further decay in airspeed, accompanied by the onset of engine surging and rough running. He was unable to diagnose the cause of the loss of performance and commenced a turn back towards the aerodrome. Shortly after entering the turn the right hand engine began to misfire and feathering action was initiated for the propeller. At about this time the indicated airspeed had reduced to 85 knots, the aircraft had developed a high rate of sink and the pilot realised that impact with the ground was imminent. The aircraft initially struck the ground with the right wing, then the nose section before the fuselage made heavy contact in a flat attitude, sliding about 45 metres before coming to rest. The aircraft caught fire during the impact sequence and was completely burnt out. The pilot and two of the passengers escaped from the wreckage but attempts to assist the third passenger were thwarted by the fire.
Probable cause:
The investigation established that JET-A1 fuel had been added to the fuel tanks of VH-DVX, and of the total fuel in the tank approximately 68 percent was JET-A1 fuel. The type of engine fitted to VH-DVX is not compatible with the use of JET-A1 fuel.
Final Report:

Crash of a Piper PA-31-310 Navajo in Golden Grove: 8 killed

Date & Time: Jul 13, 1972 at 0748 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
VH-CIZ
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Adelaide - Moomba
MSN:
31-682
YOM:
1970
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
7
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
8
Captain / Total flying hours:
2697
Captain / Total hours on type:
987.00
Aircraft flight hours:
857
Circumstances:
The aircraft departed Adelaide-Parafield Airport on a charter flight to Moomba, carrying seven passengers and a passenger on behalf of Santos Ltd. At the time of the accident, it as owned and operated by Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd trading as Ansett General Aviation. During initial climb, while flying in clouds at an altitude of 700 feet heading 270°, the twin engine airplane went out of control, entered a left turn and subsequently stuck the ground at high speed in a shallow dive, some 13 miles northeast of Adelaide Airport. The airplane disintegrated on impact and all eight occupants were killed. The accident was not survivable.
Probable cause:
The cause of the accident was that control of the aircraft was lost and recovery was not effected before it struck the ground. The reason for the loss of control and the inability to take effective recovery action has not been determined. Although the aircraft was operating in cloud from a height of about 700 feet after takeoff until it emerged at a height of 300 to 500 feet above the terrain shortly before impact, there is no evidence of any meteorological condition which may have contributed directly to the accident.
Final Report: