Truckee

On final approach to Truckee-Tahoe Airport runway 20 in marginal weather conditions, it is believed that the pilot initiated a go around procedure. While climbing to an altitude of 7,200 feet, control was lost. The airplane entered a dive and crashed in a snow covered forest located near the airport, bursting into flames. Both occupants, Liron and Naomi Petrushka, were killed. At the time of the accident, visibility was limited due to snow showers.

The captain and first officer (FO) departed on a non-revenue flight operating under instrument flight rules with four passengers bound for Truckee, California. Most of the flight was uneventful. During the descent, air traffic control (ATC) told the flight crew to expect the area navigation (RNAV [GPS]) approach for runway 20. The captain (pilot flying [PF]) stated and the FO (pilot monitoring [PM]) calculated and confirmed that runway 20 was too short for the landing distance required by the airplane at its expected landing weight. Instead of making a request to ATC for the straight-in approach to runway 11 (the longer runway), the captain told the FO they could take the runway 20 approach and circle to land on runway 11, and the FO relayed this information to ATC. ATC approved, and the flight crew accepted the circle-to-land approach. Although the descent checklist required that the flight crew brief the new circle-to-land approach, and the flight crew’s acceptance of the new approach invalidated the previous straight-in approach brief, they failed to brief the new approach. ATC instructed the flight crew to hold, but the captain was slow in complying with this instruction, so the FO started the turn to enter the holding pattern and then informed ATC once they were established in the hold. About 20 seconds later, ATC cleared them for the approach. Before the FO confirmed the clearance, he asked the captain if he was ready for the approach, and the captain stated that he was. The FO subsequently commented that they had too much airspeed at the beginning of the approach and then suggested a 360° turn to the captain, but the captain never acknowledged the excessive airspeed and refused the 360° turn. After the FO visually identified the airport, he told the captain to make a 90° right turn to put the airplane on an approximate heading of 290°, which was parallel to runway 11 and consistent with the manufacturer’s operating manual procedures for the downwind leg of the circling approach. However, the FO instructed the captain to roll out of the turn prematurely, and the captain stopped the turn on a heading of about 233° magnetic, which placed the airplane at an angle 57° left of the downwind course parallel with runway 11. As a result of the early roll-out, the flight crew established a course that required an unnecessarily tight turning radius. When they started the turn to final, the airplane was still about 1.3 nautical miles (nm) from the maximum circling radius that was established for the airplane’s approach category. The FO also deployed flaps 45° after confirming with the captain (the manufacturer’s operating manual procedures for the downwind leg called for a flaps setting of 30°, but the manufacturer stated that a flight crew is not prohibited from a flaps 45° configuration if the approach remains within the limitations of the airplane’s flight manual). The airplane’s airspeed was 44 kts above the landing reference speed (Vref) of 118 kts that the flight crew had calculated earlier in the flight; the FO told the captain, “I’m gonna get your speed under control for you.” The FO likely reduced the throttles after he made this statement, as the engine fan speeds (N1) began to decrease from about 88% to about 28%, and the airplane began to slow from 162 kts. After the FO repeatedly attempted to point out the airport to the captain, the captain identified the runway; the captain's difficulty in finding the runway might have been the result of reduced visibility in the area due to smoke. The FO continuously reassured and instructed the captain throughout the circle-to-land portion of the approach. On the base leg to the runway and about 25 seconds before impact with the ground, the FO started to repeatedly ask for control of the airplane, but neither flight crewmember verbalized a positive transfer of control as required by the operator’s general operating manual (GOM); we could not determine who had control of the airplane following these requests. As the airplane crossed the runway extended centerline while maneuvering toward the runway, the FO noted that the airplane was too high. One of the pilots (recorded flight data did not indicate which) fully deployed the flight spoilers, likely to increase the airplane's sink rate. (The flight spoilers are deployed using a single control lever accessible to both pilots.) The airspeed at the time was 135 kts, 17 kts above the Vref based on the erroneous basic operating weight (BOW) programmed into the airplane’s flight management system (FMS). About 7 seconds later, the left bank became steeper, and the stall protection system (SPS) stick shaker and stick pusher engaged. The captain asked the FO, “What are you doing,” and the FO again asked the captain multiple times to “let [him] have the airplane.” The stick shaker and stick pusher then briefly disengaged before engaging again. The airplane then entered a rapid left roll, consistent with a left-wing stall, and impacted terrain. A postcrash fire consumed most of the wreckage. All six occupants, four passengers and two pilots, were killed.

During the flight, the instrument-rated private pilot was monitoring the weather at his intended destination. He noted the weather and runway conditions and decided to conduct a global-positioning-system instrument approach to a known closed runway with the intention of circling to a different runway. As the airplane neared the missed approach point, the pilot established visual contact with the airport's runway environment and canceled his instrument flight rules clearance. As he entered the left downwind leg of the traffic pattern for his intended runway, the pilot noticed that the first part of the runway was covered in fog and that the visibility was 0.75 of a mile with light snow. With at least 5,000 feet of clear runway, he opted to land just beyond the fog. Prior to touchdown, the pilot concluded that there was not enough runway length left to make a landing and performed a go-around by applying power, pitching up, and retracting the landing gear. During the go-around, the pilot focused outside the airplane cockpit but had no horizon reference in the dark night conditions. He heard the stall warning and realized that the aircraft was not climbing. The pilot pitched the nose down and observed only snow and trees ahead. Not being able to climb over the trees, the airplane subsequently impacted trees and terrain, coming to rest upright in a wooded, snow-covered field. The pilot stated that there were no anomalies with the engine or airframe that would have precluded normal operation of the airplane.

The airplane collided with the ground during a low altitude, steep banked, base-to-final left turn toward the landing runway during a circling instrument approach. The airplane impacted terrain 1/3-mile from the approach end of runway 28, and north of its extended centerline. A witness, located in the airport's administration building, made the following statement regarding his observations: "I saw the aircraft in and out of the clouds in a close base for [runway] 28. I then saw the aircraft emerge from a cloud in a base to final turn [and] it appeared to be approximately 300-400 feet above the ground. The left wing was down nearly 90 degrees. The aircraft appeared north of the [runway 28] centerline. The aircraft pitched nose down approximately 30-40 degrees and appeared to do a 1/2 cartwheel on the ground before exploding." ATC controllers had cleared the airplane to perform a GPS-A (circling) approach. The published weather minimums for category C and D airplanes at the 5,900-foot mean sea level airport was 3 miles visibility, and the minimum descent altitude was 8,200 feet mean sea level (msl). Airport weather observers noted that when the accident occurred, the visibility was between 1 1/2 and 5 miles. Scattered clouds existed at 1,200 feet above ground level (7,100 feet msl), a broken ceiling existed at 1,500 feet agl (7,400 feet msl) and an overcast condition existed at 2,400 feet agl (8,300 feet msl). During the approach, the first officer acknowledged to the controller that he had received the airport's weather. The airplane overflew the airport in a southerly direction, turned east, and entered a left downwind pattern toward runway 28. A 20- to 30-knot gusty surface wind existed from 220 degrees, and the pilot inadequately compensated for the wind during his base leg-to-final approach turning maneuver. The airplane was equipped with Digital Electronic Engine Controls (DEEC) that recorded specific data bits relating to, for example, engine speed, power lever position and time. During the last 4 seconds of recorded data (flight), both of the power levers were positioned from a mid range point to apply takeoff power, and the engines responded accordingly. No evidence was found of any preimpact mechanical malfunction. The operator's flight training program emphasized that during approaches consideration of wind drift is essential, and a circling approach should not be attempted in marginal conditions.

During an instrument approach, upon descending to the prescribed minimum descent altitude, about 1/2 mile from the missed approach point, the pilot failed to maintain flying airspeed. The airplane stalled, rolled left, and in an uncontrolled descent collided with a commercial building 0.96 nm from the runway's displaced threshold. The accident occurred during the return portion of a round trip flight, while on final approach to the pilot's alternate airport due to a weather-induced diversion. Moderate intensity snow showers and freezing fog existed. During the initial approach, the reported visibility was 1 1/2 miles. About the time the pilot passed the final approach fix, the visibility decreased to 1/2 mile, but the pilot was not informed of the decrease below his 1-mile minimum requirement. The pilot had maintained the recommended 140-knot approach speed in the icing conditions until about 3 1/2 miles from the runway. Thereafter, the airplane's speed gradually decreased until reaching about 75 knots. After the airplane started vibrating, the pilot increased engine power, but his action was not timely enough to avert stalling. Company mechanics maintained the airplane. On previous occasions overheat conditions had occurred wherein the environmental ducting melted and heat was conducted to the adjacent pneumatic tube that provides deice air to the empennage boots. During the accident investigation, the deice tube was found completely melted closed, thus rendering all of the empennage deice boots dysfunctional.

The pilot was cleared for a GPS approach. He stated that he was too high to make a good landing, so he opted for a circling approach to another runway. As he turned for the base leg, he lost visual contact and became disoriented. It was a dark night with no moon. The pilot realized that he was in a 70- to 80-degree left bank and returned the airplane to a level attitude, then noticed the ground directly in front of him. The aircraft ran through a barbed wire fence, collided with trees, and slid rearward to a stop in a high altitude meadow east of the airport. The FAA completed an evaluation of the circling approach procedures and night operations for that airport and did not find any problems.

A Cessna 414 collided with a tree in a mountainous residential area about 1 mile from the airport. Instrument meteorological conditions with 1/8 mile visibility prevailed and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was filed, but was not opened. The airplane departed under visual flight rules. The elevation of the collision was about 100 feet higher than the airport. The standard instrument departure procedures for the airport prescribe takeoff minimums of 3,500 foot ceiling and 3 miles visibility. The procedure requires a minimum climb rate of 425 feet per nautical mile, a right turn after takeoff to intercept a 002° radial off a VOR, and a climb to a specified altitude. The airman's information manual recommends that pilots climb to 400 feet agl before turning when executing standard instrument departure under IFR. The airplane was also determined to be about 400 pounds over maximum gross weight at the time of the takeoff. The wreckage examination disclosed no evidence of any pre existing aircraft or engine malfunctions or failures. All four occupants were killed.

While flying in poor weather conditions, the pilot lost control of the airplane that entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in flames in an uninhabited area located in the region of Chilcoot. The aircraft was destroyed and all four occupants were killed.

Just after liftoff, while in initial climb, the twin engine airplane encountered difficulties to gain height. It stall, struck the ground and crashed in flames. Both occupants were injured while the aircraft was destroyed.

En route from Ogden-Hill AFB to McClellan AFB in Sacramento, the aircraft crashed in unknown circumstances in an isolated area located in the east part of California. As the aircraft failed to arrive at destination, SAR operations were conducted but eventually suspended few days later as no trace of the aircraft nor the crew was found. In May 1951, a rescue team taking part to the search of two fishermen discovered the wreckage of the airplane into the Lake Independence, about ten miles northwest of Truckee.