Savannah

On 2 May 2018, at approximately 1127 hours local time (L), the Mishap Aircraft (MA), a WC-130H, tail number 65-0968, assigned to the Puerto Rico Air National Guard, 156th Airlift Wing (156 AW), located at Muñiz Air National Guard Base, Puerto Rico, crashed approximately 1.5 miles northeast of Savannah/Hilton Head International Airport (KSAV), Georgia. All nine members aboard the MA—Mishap Pilot 1 (MP1), Mishap Pilot 2, Mishap Navigator, Mishap Flight Engineer, and Mishap Loadmaster (collectively the “Mishap Crew (MC)”), and four mission essential personnel, Mishap Airman 1, 2, 3, and 4—perished during the accident. The MC’s mission was to fly the MA to the 309th Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Group at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona (commonly referred to as the “Boneyard”), for removal from service. The MA had been at KSAV for almost a month, since 9 April 2018, to undergo prescheduled fuel cell maintenance and unscheduled work on engine number one by 156 AW maintenance personnel using the facilities of the 165th Airlift Wing. During takeoff roll, engine one revolutions per minute (RPM) fluctuated and did not provide normal RPM when MP1 advanced the throttle lever into the flight range for takeoff. Approximately eight seconds prior to aircraft rotation, engine one RPM and torque significantly decayed, which substantially lowered thrust. The fluctuation on roll and significant performance decay went unrecognized by the MC until rotation, when MP1 commented on aircraft control challenges and the MA veered left and nearly departed the runway into the grass before it achieved flight. The MA departed KSAV at approximately 1125L. As the MC retracted the landing gear, they identified the engine one RPM and torque malfunction and MP1 called for engine shutdown. However, the MC failed to complete the Takeoff Continued After Engine Failure procedure, the Engine Shutdown procedure, and the After Takeoff checklist as directed by the Flight Manual, and the MA’s flaps remained at 50 percent. Additionally, MP1 banked left into the inoperative engine, continued to climb, and varied left and right rudder inputs. At an altitude of approximately 900 feet mean sea level and 131 knots indicated air speed, MP1 input over nine degrees of left rudder, the MA skidded left, the left wing stalled, and the MA departed controlled flight and impacted the terrain on Georgia State Highway 21.

The aircraft collided with a ditch during a precautionary landing after takeoff from Savannah/Hilton Head International Airport (SAV), Savannah, Georgia. The pilot and copilot sustained minor injuries, and the airplane was substantially damaged. The airplane was registered to Upper Deck Holdings, Inc. and was being operated by PlaneSense, Inc,. as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 positioning flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed for the flight to Blue Grass Airport (LEX), Lexington, Kentucky. The pilot in the left seat was the pilot monitoring and the copilot in the right seat was the pilot flying. The crew had the full length of the runway 1 available (7,002 ft) for takeoff. The pilots reported that the acceleration and takeoff was normal and after establishing a positive rate of climb, the crew received an auditory annunciation and a red crew alerting system (CAS) torque warning. The engine torque indicated 5.3 pounds per square inch (psi); the nominal torque value for the conditions that day was reported by the crew to be 43.3 psi. With about 2,700 ft of runway remaining while at an altitude of 200 ft msl, the copilot elected to land immediately; the copilot pushed the nose down and executed a 90° left descending turn and subsequently landed in the grass. Although he applied "hard" braking in an attempt to stop, the airplane impacted a drainage ditch, resulting in substantial impact damage and a postimpact fire. The pilot reported that, after takeoff, he observed a low torque CAS message and the copilot told him to "declare an emergency and run the checklist." The pilot confirmed that the landing gear were extended and the copilot turned the airplane to the left toward open ground between the runways and the terminal. About 60 seconds elapsed from the start of the takeoff roll until the accident. The airport was equipped with security cameras that captured the airplane from its initial climb through the landing and collision. One camera, pointed toward the west-southwest, recorded the airplane's left descending turn and its landing in the grass, followed by impact and smoke. A second camera, mounted on the control tower, pointed toward the southeast and showed the airplane during the initial climb before it leveled off and entered a descending left turn; it also showed the airplane land and roll through the grass before colliding with the ditch.

The pilot had flown the airplane the day before the accident and after landing on the morning of the accident; she ordered fuel for the airplane. While exiting the airplane another pilot informed her that he had heard a "popping noise" coming from one of the engines. The pilot of the accident airplane elected to taxi to a run up area to conduct an engine run up. The fuel truck arrived at the run up area and the pilot elected not to refuel the airplane at that time and continued the run up. No anomalies were noted during the run up and the airplane was taxied back to the ramp and parked. The pilot arrived back at the airport later on the day of the accident and did not re-order fuel for the airplane nor did she recall checking the fuel tanks during the preflight inspection of the airplane. The pilot departed and was in cruise flight when she noticed the fuel light on the annunciator panel flickering. The pilot checked the fuel gauges and observed less than 100 pounds of fuel per-side indicated. The pilot declared low fuel with Columbia Approach Control controllers and requested to divert to the nearest airport, Orangeburg Municipal. The controller cleared the pilot for a visual approach to the airport and as she turned the airplane for final, the left engine lost power followed by the right engine. The pilot made a forced landing into the trees about 1/4 mile from the approach end of runway 36. The pilot exited the airplane and telephoned 911 emergency operators on her cell phone. The pilot stated she did not experience any mechanical problems with the airplane before the accident. Examination of the airplane by an FAA inspector revealed the fuel tanks were not ruptured and no fuel was present in the fuel tanks.

The airplane was on final approach to land at Hilton Head Airport, when according to witnesses, it suddenly rolled to the right, and descended, initially impacting trees at about the 70-foot level, and then impacting the ground. A fire then ensued upon ground impact, and the debris field spanned about 370 feet along an azimuth of about 082 degrees. Examination of the airplane wreckage revealed that left wing flap actuator and jack nut measurements were consistent with the wing flaps being extended to 40 degrees, and on the right wing the flap jack nut and actuator measurements were consistent with the right flap being extended to about a 20-degrees. In addition, the right flap torque tube assembly between the flap motor and the flap stop assembly had disconnected, and the flap torque tube assembly's female coupler which attaches to the male spline end of the flap motor and flap stop assembly was found with a cotter pin installed through the female coupler of the flap stop assembly. The cotter pin, had not been placed through the spline and the coupler consistent with normal installation as per Mitsubishi's maintenance manual, or as specified in Airworthiness Directive 88-23-01. Instead, the cotter pin had missed the male spline on the flap motor. In addition, the flap coupler on the opposite side of the flap motor was found to also found to not have a cotter pin installed. Company maintenance records showed that on April 3, 2001, about 87 flight hours before the accident, the airplane was inspected per Airworthiness Directive (AD) 88-23-01, which required the disassembly, inspection, and reassembly of the flap torque tube joints. In addition, on July 9, 2001, the airplane was given a phase 1 inspection, and Bankair records showed that a company authorized maintenance person performed the applicable maintenance items, and certified the airplane for return to service.

The flight was executing the non-precision NDB runway 04 approach, had reported procedure turn inbound, and was cleared to change to advisory frequency. Witnesses observed the airplane descend out of the base of the overcast clouds in a 10° nose down, 45° left wing down attitude. The airplane impacted terrain about 3/4 mile south-southeast of the airport. Witnesses in the area reported that the weather was ceilings of about 100 feet and visibility of about 500 feet in light rain and fog. The minimum descent altitude for the approach is 465 feet agl. Both pilots were killed.

At 0716, the pilot received a weather brief for a proposed takeoff of 1130. The FSS briefer provided info on thunderstorms forecast in GA and FL. No info was provided about forecast lines and clusters of thunderstorms in SC coastal plains and sern GA. En route, the pilot was given info about level III thunderstorms across the projected flight path by Beaufort and Savannah approach control. ATC radar data revealed that the aircraft flew the route contained in the flight plan clearance. Radio transmissions from the aircraft indicated that onboard weather radar was being used. ATC radar data and radio communications indicated that the aircraft entered a thunderstorm, then made a 180° turn to exit the storm. Examination of the wreckage revealed plastic deformation of the wings inboard of the engines in an upward direction. Also, both wings broke off outboard of the engines in a downward direction. The horizontal stab and elevator were not recovered. There was fuselage damage which indicated that the horizontal stab separated aft and down. All five occupants were killed.

During landing, upon nose wheel contact with the runway, directional control was lost and the aircraft exited the runway hard surface and crossed a ditch collapsing the nose gear. The crew stated that full left rudder and differential braking would not stop the right drift, and that the aircraft was in grass uncontrollable by the time the steering tiller was reached. The nose wheel steering system was extensively damaged by the impact sequence when the nose wheel well aft bulkhead was forced into the steering assembly. The pilot stated that if he had been 'spring loaded to the tiller' that he could have possibly kept the aircraft off the grass.

At 0938, while climbing thru 9,000 feet, the pilot was cleared to climb to FL210. Approximately 10 minutes later, the ATC controller noted the aircraft's mode C return wasn't being displayed on his scope. He tried to advise the pilot, but couldn't establish radio contact. The aircraft broke up in flight and the wreckage was found submerged in a creek and on marshland. A large piece of the right outboard wing panel was found about 2 miles east of the main wreckage. The right engine was found approximately 800 feet to 1,200 feet northeast of the main wreckage in 4 feet of water. There was evidence the right outboard wing had failed from upward and aft overload. No pre-accident mechanical failure or malfunction was found that would have resulted in an in-flight break-up. Radar data showed the aircraft was climbing at 115 knots and 1,100 feet/minute; at approximately 16,000 feet msl, rate of climb slowed to approximately 750 feet/minute, then increased to 1,200 feet/minute. Peak altitude was approximately 18,200 feet. Aircraft then entered a steep descent and crashed. At the approximately time and place of peak altitude, primary targets appeared on radar and remained for several minutes. Organic material was found on left engine inlet screen, but source was not determined. Accident occurred along bird flyway. Both occupants were killed.

During final approach the pilot noticed aircraft flying 'unusual' and elected go-around. During power-up, the aircraft lost power and a forced landing was made on a residential street near the airport. The pilot stated that he had inadvertently placed the fuel selector in crossfeed and had exhausted the fuel supply in the right wing by feeding both engines. There were no reported mechanical problems prior to the accident.

The aircraft disappeared from radar coverage while in cruise flight at 10,000 feet msl near Orangeville, FL. The ATC transcript revealed that the pilot had been inquiring about the weather ahead of him and was cleared to descend to 6,000 feet in order to get below strong headwinds. One minute later he transmitted that he was going to stay at 10,000 feet because he did not have any choice (strong turbulence). His last transmission stated the weather was getting worse. The aircraft has not been located.