Crash of a Learjet 35A in Marigot

Date & Time: Aug 11, 2007 at 1635 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N500ND
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Saint John's - Marigot
MSN:
35A-351
YOM:
1980
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
4
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
On August 11, 2007, at 1635 Atlantic standard time, a Gates Learjet 35A, N500ND, registered to World Jet of Delaware Inc, and operated by World Jet II as a 14 CFR 135 on-demand on-scheduled international passenger air taxi flight, went off the end of runway 09 at Melville Hall, Dominica, on landing roll out. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed. The airplane received substantial damage. The airline transport rated pilot in command (PIC), first officer (FO), and four passengers reported no injuries. The flight originated from Saint John's Antigua Island on August 11, 2007, at 1600. The PIC stated the first officer was flying the airplane and the tower cleared them to enter a left downwind. On touchdown the FO requested spoilers, and noticed poor braking. The PIC pumped the brakes with no response. The drag chute was deployed but was not effective. The PIC stated he took over the flight controls and applied maximum braking. The airplane continued to roll off the end of the runway, down an embankment, through a fence, and came to a stop on a road.

Crash of a Swearingen SA227AC Metro III in Goose Bay

Date & Time: Mar 4, 2002 at 0456 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
C-FITW
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Saint John's - Goose Bay
MSN:
AC-638
YOM:
1986
Flight number:
PB905
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The aircraft was on a scheduled courier flight from St. John=s, Newfoundland and Labrador, to Goose Bay. The aircraft touched down at 0456 Atlantic standard time and, during the landing roll on the snow-covered runway, the aircraft started to veer to the right. The captain's attempt to regain directional control by the use of full-left rudder and reverse on the engines was unsuccessful. The aircraft continued to track to the right of the centreline, departed the runway, and struck a hard-packed snow bank. There were no injuries to the two crew members. The aircraft was substantially damaged.
Probable cause:
Findings as to Cause and Contributing Factors:
1. Aircraft directional control was lost, likely because of negative castering of the nosewheel when snow piled up in front of the nosewheel assembly.
Findings as to Risk:
1. The crew members were not aware of negative castering; the aircraft flight manual and emergency checklists do not address negative castering.
2. The emergency response to the occurrence was delayed by four minutes because of the lack of communication from the aircraft to the tower.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft 1900C in Saint John's

Date & Time: Sep 14, 2001 at 2118 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
C-GSKC
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
MSN:
UB-27
YOM:
1984
Flight number:
SLQ621
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
On take off from runway 11 at St. John's, the crew felt the nose of the aircraft rise to a high-pitch attitude. The aircraft climbed to about 150 to 200 feet, and was about to enter cloud when the crew reduced power. The crew lowered the nose, and force-landed the aircraft on the runway. The main gear, wings, engines and fuselage sustained substantial structural damage. Weather conditions at the time of the crash were reported as: winds 090° at 25 knots gusting to 35 knots, horizontal visibility 1/2 statute mile in light rain and fog, vertical visibility 100 feet, temperature 15° Celsius, dew point 15° Celsius, altimeter 29.31 Hg., pressure dropping.

Crash of a Boeing 737-2E1F in Saint John's

Date & Time: Apr 4, 2001 at 0615 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
C-GDCC
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Hamilton – Montréal – Halifax – Saint John’s
MSN:
20681
YOM:
1973
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
At 2320, Newfoundland daylight time, on 03 April 2001, the Royal Cargo flight, a Boeing 737-200, left Mirabel, Quebec, for a scheduled instrument flight rules cargo flight with two pilots on board. The flight was headed for Hamilton, Ontario; Mirabel; Halifax, Nova Scotia; St. John's, Newfoundland; and Mirabel. The flights from Mirabel to Halifax were uneventful. Before departure from Halifax, the pilot flying (PF) received the latest weather information for the flight to St. John's from the company dispatch; he did not ask for, or receive, the latest notices to airmen (NOTAMs). At 0545, the aircraft departed Halifax for St. John's. The PF was completing his line indoctrination training after having recently upgraded to captain. The training captain, who was the pilot not flying (PNF), occupied the right seat. After departure from Halifax, he contacted Halifax Flight Service Station (FSS) and received the latest weather report for St. John's, the 0530 aviation routine weather report (METAR). The weather was as follows: wind 050° magnetic (M) at 35, gusting to 40, knots; visibility 1 statute mile in light snow and blowing snow; ceiling 400 feet overcast; temperature -1°C; dew point -2°C; and altimeter 29.41 inches of mercury. The FSS passed runway surface condition (RSC) reports for both runways (11/29 and 16/34), including Canadian runway friction index (CRFI) readings of 0.25 for Runway 11/29 and 0.24 for Runway 16/34. The FSS specialist also provided the NOTAMs for St. John's, which included a NOTAM released more than five hours earlier advising of the unserviceability of the instrument landing system (ILS) for Runway 11. The flight crew had initially planned an ILS approach, landing on Runway 11 at St. John's. Because of the marginal weather, the loss of Runway 11/29, and his greater experience, the training captain decided to switch seats and assume the duties and full responsibilities as captain and PF. Returning to Halifax was not considered because the aircraft would be overweight for landing there. The option of diverting the flight to the alternate airport was also discussed by the crew; however, in the end, they felt that a safe landing was achievable in St. John's. At 0638:27, the PF contacted St. John's tower to ask if the approach to Runway 34 was still an option. The response indicated that Runway 34 was probably the only option because of the wind: 050°M (estimated) at 35, gusting to 40, knots. The ILS on Runway 11 was unserviceable, and the glidepath for Runway 29 was unserviceable. The only instrument approaches available were the localizer back course Runway 34 and the ILS Runway 16. Also, at about 0638, the Gander Area Control Centre (ACC) controller suggested to the crew that they obtain the 0630 automatic terminal information service (ATIS) for St. John's. The ATIS was reporting surface winds of 055°M at 20, gusting to 35, knots. The PNF attempted to obtain the ATIS information; however, because of a simultaneous radio transmission on the second VHF radio between the PF and St. John's tower, the ATIS information was not obtained. At 0641, the PNF contacted Gander ACC, which reported the winds at St. John's as 040°M at 13, gusting to 18, knots. The PNF pointed out the discrepancy in the two wind reports to the PF; however, there was no acknowledgement of the significance of the discrepancy. It was later determined that the discrepancy was an unserviceable anemometer at the St. John's airport due to ice accretion on the anemometer. The anemometer was providing a direct reading of the incorrect wind information to Gander ACC. Gander ACC was unaware of the unserviceability and unknowingly passed the incorrect wind information on to the flight crew. At 0644, Gander ACC transmitted a significant meteorological report (SIGMET), issued at 0412 and valid from 0415 to 0815, that included St. John's. The SIGMET forecast severe mechanical turbulence below 3000 feet due to surface wind gusts in excess of 50 knots. However, the crew may not have been listening to the SIGMET broadcast: while the ACC transmitted the SIGMET, the crew were discussing the application of an 18-knot quartering tailwind for the approach to Runway 16. This tailwind was well under the 50 knots described by the SIGMET. The crew did not acknowledge receipt of the SIGMET until prompted by the controller. Before the descent into St. John's, the crew discussed approach options. The approach to Runway 11 was discounted because of the unserviceability of the ILS, and Runway 34 was eliminated as an option because the weather was below its published approach minimums. The crew discussed the ILS approach to Runway 16. Although the PNF expressed concern about the tailwind, it was decided to attempt the approach because the wind reported by Gander ACC was within the aircraft's landing limits. In calculating the approach speed in preparation for the approach, there was confusion during the application of the tailwind and gust corrections to the landing reference speed (Vref ). The crew had correctly established a flap-30 Vref of 132 knots indicated airspeed (KIAS) and ultimately an approach speed of 142 KIAS. The approach speed calculations were derived using the incorrect wind information from Gander ACC; further, the crew added five knots for the gust increment to the nominal approach speed (Vref + 5 knots), that is, Vref + 10 knots. This incorrect calculation (adding the gust factor) was consistent with company practice at the time of the accident. During the descent, the crew also had difficulty completing the descent and approach checklists; there were several missteps and repeated attempts at completion of checks. Clearance for an ILS approach to Runway 16 was obtained from Gander ACC , and the crew was advised to contact St. John's tower. Just over two minutes before landing, the tower advised that the wind was 050°M (estimated) at 20, gusting to 35, knots and provided the following RSC report for Runway 16: Full length 170 feet wide, surface 30% very light dusting of snow and 70% compact snow and ice; remainder is 20% light snow, 80% compact snow and ice, windrow along the east side of the runway; friction index 0.20; and temperature -1°C at 0925. The aircraft crossed the final approach fix on the ILS glideslope at 150 KIAS. During the final approach, the airspeed steadily increased to 180 KIAS (ground speed 190 knots); the glidepath was maintained with a descent rate of 1000 feet per minute. From 1000 feet above sea level, no airspeed calls were made; altitude calls were made and responses were made. The Royal Boeing 737 operations manual states that the PNF shall call out significant deviations from programmed airspeed. In the descent, through 900 feet above sea level, the aircraft encountered turbulence resulting in uncommanded roll and pitch deviations and airspeed fluctuations of +/- 11 knots. At about 300 feet above decision height, the crew acquired visual references for landing. Approximately one minute before landing, St. John's tower transmitted the runway visual range, repeated the estimated surface wind (050°M [estimated] at 20, gusting to 35, knots), and issued a landing clearance to the aircraft; the PNF acknowledged this information. The aircraft touched down at 164 KIAS (27 KIAS above the desired touchdown speed of Vref), 2300 to 2500 feet beyond the threshold. Radar ground speed at touchdown was 180 knots. The wind at this point was determined to be about 050°M at 30 knots. Shortly after touchdown, the speed brakes and thrust reversers were deployed, and an engine pressure ratio (EPR) of 1.7 was reached 10 seconds after touchdown. Longitudinal deceleration was -0.37g within 1.3 seconds of touchdown, suggesting that a significant degree of effective wheel braking was achieved. With approximately 1100 feet of runway remaining, through a speed of 64 KIAS, reverse thrust increased to about 1.97 EPR on engine 1 and 2.15 EPR on engine 2. As the aircraft approached the end of the runway, the captain attempted to steer the aircraft to the right, toward the Delta taxiway intersection. Twenty-two seconds after touchdown, the aircraft exited the departure end of the runway into deep snow. The aircraft came to rest approximately 75 feet beyond and 53 feet to the right of the runway centreline on a heading of 235°M.
Probable cause:
Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors:
1. A combination of excessive landing speed, extended touchdown point, and low runway friction coefficient resulted in the aircraft overrunning the runway.
Findings as to Risk:
1. Before departure from Halifax, the flight crew did not request nor did dispatch personnel inform the crew of the notice to airmen (NOTAM) advising of the instrument landing system's failure for Runway 11 at St. John's International Airport.
2. The St. John's dynamic wind information provided to the Gander Area Control Centre controller was inaccurate. The controller was not aware of this inaccuracy.
3. The crew applied tailwind corrections in accordance with company practices; however, these practices were not in accordance with those stated in the operations manual.
Final Report:

Crash of a Pilatus PC-12/45 in Clarenville

Date & Time: May 18, 1998 at 1741 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
C-FKAL
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Saint John’s – Goose Bay
MSN:
151
YOM:
1996
Flight number:
FKL151
Country:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
9
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
4700
Captain / Total hours on type:
800.00
Aircraft flight hours:
3913
Circumstances:
The aircraft, a Pilatus PC-12, serial number 151, was on a scheduled domestic flight from St. John's, Newfoundland, to Goose Bay, Labrador, with the pilot, a company observer, and eight passengers on board. Twenty-three minutes into the flight, the aircraft turned back towards St. John's because of a low oil pressure indication. Eight minutes later, the engine(Pratt & Whitney PT6A-67B) had to be shut down because of a severe vibration. The pilot then turned towards Clarenville Airport, but was unable to reach the airfield. The aircraft was destroyed during the forced landing in a bog one and a half miles from the Clarenville Airport. The pilot, the company observer, and one passenger sustained serious injuries. The Board determined that the pilot did not follow the prescribed emergency procedure for low oil pressure, and the engine failed before he could land safely. The pilot's decision making was influenced by his belief that the low oil pressure indications were not valid. The engine failed as a result of an interruption of oil flow to the first-stage planet gear assembly; the cause of the oil flow interruption could not be determined.
Probable cause:
The pilot did not follow the prescribed emergency procedure for low oil pressure, and the engine failed before he could land safely. The pilot's decision making was influenced by his belief that the low oil pressure indications were not valid. The engine failed as a result of an interruption of oil flow to the first-stage planet gear assembly; the cause of the oil flow interruption could not be determined.
Final Report:

Crash of a Transall C-160D off Ponta Delgada: 7 killed

Date & Time: Oct 22, 1995
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
50+43
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Ponta Delgada - Saint John's
MSN:
D65
YOM:
1969
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
7
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
7
Circumstances:
After takeoff from Ponta Delgada-Nordela Airport, the aircraft encountered difficulties to gain height. It collided with power lines, stalled and crashed in the sea few dozen metres offshore. All seven crew members were killed.
Probable cause:
It was reported that one of the engine failed after Vr but before rotation. It was apparently too late for the crew to abort the takeoff procedure. Due to insufficient power, the aircraft was unable to gain height.

Crash of a Swearingen SA226T Merlin IV in Deer Lake

Date & Time: Dec 6, 1993 at 0919 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
C-GVCY
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Saint John's - Deer Lake
MSN:
AT-003
YOM:
1974
Flight number:
AG601
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
After landing on runway 25 at Deer Lake Airport, the aircraft deviated to the right and veered off a snow covered runway. It lost its undercarriage and came to rest. Both pilots escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. It is believed that the crew encountered technical problems with the reverse system on the right engine.

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-4 Caribou in the Atlantic Ocean: 1 killed

Date & Time: Oct 23, 1984 at 0307 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N5488R
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Santa Maria - Saint John's
MSN:
216
YOM:
1964
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
50000
Captain / Total hours on type:
5000.00
Aircraft flight hours:
4500
Circumstances:
Pilot ditched aircraft in Atlantic Ocean following a loss of power due to fuel exhaustion. Copilot stated they were aware of bad weather along the route but the pilot was anxious to get to their destination. Headwinds encountered en route were stronger then expected. Copilot stated they had shut down one of the engines approximately 1/2 hour before the ditching in an effort to conserve fuel. A pilot died while the second was rescued.
Probable cause:
Occurrence #1: loss of engine power (total) - nonmechanical
Phase of operation: cruise - normal
Findings
1. (f) weather condition - rain
2. (c) preflight planning/preparation - poor - pilot in command
3. (f) weather condition - unfavorable wind
4. Judgment - poor - pilot in command
5. (f) anxiety/apprehension - pilot in command
6. Fluid, fuel - exhaustion
7. (c) fuel consumption calculations - inaccurate - pilot in command
----------
Occurrence #2: forced landing
Phase of operation: descent - emergency
----------
Occurrence #3: ditching
Phase of operation: landing
Findings
8. Terrain condition - water, rough
Final Report:

Crash of a Saunders ST-27 in Saint John's

Date & Time: May 28, 1984 at 1615 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
C-FCNT
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Saint Anthony – Saint John’s
MSN:
007
YOM:
1972
Country:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
5
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
Upon touchdown at St John's Airport, the left main gear collapsed. The airplane came to rest on its belly and was damaged beyond repair. All eight occupants evacuated safely.
Probable cause:
The damper lever jack, the main jack, and the lever stay link of the left gear assembly had failed in overload prior to landing. The cause of the failure could not be determined.

Crash of a Beechcraft 65-A80 Queen Air in Saint John's: 10 killed

Date & Time: Jun 23, 1978 at 0915 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
C-GGAL
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Saint John's - Saint Anthony
MSN:
LD-233
YOM:
1965
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
8
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
10
Circumstances:
Shortly after takeoff from St John's Airport, while in initial climb, the twin engine airplane struck tree tops and crashed on the slope of Mt Picco's Ridge located near Portugal Cove, about six km west of the airport. The aircraft was destroyed upon impact and all 10 occupants were killed.
Crew:
Gerald Eichel, pilot,
Michael Fitzpatrick, copilot.
Passengers:
Bill Manning,
Marc Laterreur,
B. Napier Simpson Jr.,
Robert Painchaud,
Jules Leger,
Jacqueline Leger,
Brenda Babbits,
Alex Babbits.
Source: www.planecrashgirl.ca