Learjet 35

On August 11, 2007, at 1635 Atlantic standard time, a Gates Learjet 35A, N500ND, registered to World Jet of Delaware Inc, and operated by World Jet II as a 14 CFR 135 on-demand on-scheduled international passenger air taxi flight, went off the end of runway 09 at Melville Hall, Dominica, on landing roll out. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed. The airplane received substantial damage. The airline transport rated pilot in command (PIC), first officer (FO), and four passengers reported no injuries. The flight originated from Saint John's Antigua Island on August 11, 2007, at 1600. The PIC stated the first officer was flying the airplane and the tower cleared them to enter a left downwind. On touchdown the FO requested spoilers, and noticed poor braking. The PIC pumped the brakes with no response. The drag chute was deployed but was not effective. The PIC stated he took over the flight controls and applied maximum braking. The airplane continued to roll off the end of the runway, down an embankment, through a fence, and came to a stop on a road.

The airplane was substantially damaged during an in-flight recovery after the captain attempted an intentional aileron roll maneuver during cruise flight and lost control. The cargo flight was being operated at night under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 135 at the time of the accident. The captain reported the airplane was "functioning normally" prior to the intentional aileron roll maneuver. The captain stated that the "intentional roll maneuver got out of control" while descending through flight level 200. The captain reported that the airplane "over sped" and experienced "excessive G-loads" during the subsequent recovery. The copilot
reported that the roll maneuver initiated by the captain resulted in a "nose-down unusual attitude" and a "high speed dive." Inspection of the airplane showed substantial damage to the left wing and elevator assembly.

Shortly after takeoff from Nakhon Sawan-Takhli AFB, while climbing to a height of about 150 feet, the pilot contacted ATC and declared an emergency following a loss of engine power. He elected to return for an emergency landing when the aircraft went out of control and crashed onto a hangar located near the airport, bursting into flames. All seven occupants were killed, among them two photographers and one mechanic who were taking part to a reconnaissance mission in view to prepare an incoming air race in Thailand.

The crew briefed the Instrument Landing System approach, including the missed approach procedures. Weather at the time included a 100-foot broken cloud layer, and at the airport, 2 miles visibility. The approach was flown over water, and at the accident location, there was dense fog. Two smaller airplanes had successfully completed the approach prior to the accident airplane. The captain flew the approach and the first officer made 100-foot callouts during the final descent, until 200 feet above the decision height. At that point, the captain asked the first officer if he saw anything. The first officer reported "ground contact," then noted "decision height." The captain immediately reported "I got the lights" which the first officer confirmed. The captain reduced the power to flight idle. Approximately 4 seconds later, the captain attempted to increase power. However, the engines did not have time to respond before the airplane descended into the water and impacted a series of approach light stanchions, commencing about 2,000 feet from the runway. Neither crew member continued to call out altitudes after seeing the approach lights, and the captain descended the airplane below the decision height before having the requisite descent criteria. The absence of ground references could have been conducive to a featureless terrain illusion in which the captain would have believed that the airplane was at a higher altitude than it actually was. There were
no mechanical anomalies which would have precluded normal airplane operation.

During the takeoff roll, after the pilot disengaged the nose gear steering, the airplane began to turn to the right. The copilot noticed fluctuations with the engine indications, and called for an abort. Power was reduced to idle, and the pilot corrected to the left using left rudder pedal and braking. The airplane turned to the right again, and the pilot corrected to the left. The airplane continued to turn left, and departed the left side of the runway, tail first, and was substantially damaged. The airplane had accrued 18,040.3 total hours of operation. It was powered by two turbofan engines, each equipped with an electronic fuel computer. Examination of the left engine's wiring harness revealed that the outer shielding on the fuel computer harness assembly was loose, deteriorated, and an approximate 3-inch section was missing. Multiple areas of the outer shielding were also chaffed, the ground wire for the shielding was worn through, and the wiring was exposed. Testing of the wiring to the fuel computer connector, revealed an intermittent connection. After disassembly of the connector, it was discovered that the connector pin's wire was broken off at its crimp location. Examination under a microscope of the interior of the pin, revealed broken wire fragments that displayed evidence of corrosion. Simulation of an intermittent electrical connection resulted in N1 spool fluctuations of 2,000 rpm during engine test cell runs. According to the airplane's wiring maintenance manual, a visual inspection of all electrical wiring in the nacelle to check for security, clamping, routing, clearance, and general condition was to be conducted every 300 hours or 12 calendar months. Additionally, all wire harness shield overbraids and shield terminations were required to be inspected for security and general condition every 300 hours or 12 calendar months, and at every 600 hours or 24 calendar months. According to company maintenance records, the wiring had been inspected 6 days prior to the accident.

The aircraft was flying back to Paraná (Argentina) with an intermediate stop at Santa Cruz with 3 military personnel and 3 technicians and board. They came in La Paz to deliver humanitarian aids after important flood in Bolivia. Shortly after takeoff, while in initial climb, the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in an open field located 20 km from La Paz-El Alto Airport. All six occupants were killed.

The airplane collided with the ground during a low altitude, steep banked, base-to-final left turn toward the landing runway during a circling instrument approach. The airplane impacted terrain 1/3-mile from the approach end of runway 28, and north of its extended centerline. A witness, located in the airport's administration building, made the following statement regarding his observations: "I saw the aircraft in and out of the clouds in a close base for [runway] 28. I then saw the aircraft emerge from a cloud in a base to final turn [and] it appeared to be approximately 300-400 feet above the ground. The left wing was down nearly 90 degrees. The aircraft appeared north of the [runway 28] centerline. The aircraft pitched nose down approximately 30-40 degrees and appeared to do a 1/2 cartwheel on the ground before exploding." ATC controllers had cleared the airplane to perform a GPS-A (circling) approach. The published weather minimums for category C and D airplanes at the 5,900-foot mean sea level airport was 3 miles visibility, and the minimum descent altitude was 8,200 feet mean sea level (msl). Airport weather observers noted that when the accident occurred, the visibility was between 1 1/2 and 5 miles. Scattered clouds existed at 1,200 feet above ground level (7,100 feet msl), a broken ceiling existed at 1,500 feet agl (7,400 feet msl) and an overcast condition existed at 2,400 feet agl (8,300 feet msl). During the approach, the first officer acknowledged to the controller that he had received the airport's weather. The airplane overflew the airport in a southerly direction, turned east, and entered a left downwind pattern toward runway 28. A 20- to 30-knot gusty surface wind existed from 220 degrees, and the pilot inadequately compensated for the wind during his base leg-to-final approach turning maneuver. The airplane was equipped with Digital Electronic Engine Controls (DEEC) that recorded specific data bits relating to, for example, engine speed, power lever position and time. During the last 4 seconds of recorded data (flight), both of the power levers were positioned from a mid range point to apply takeoff power, and the engines responded accordingly. No evidence was found of any preimpact mechanical malfunction. The operator's flight training program emphasized that during approaches consideration of wind drift is essential, and a circling approach should not be attempted in marginal conditions.

A witness saw the airplane approach from the east. She said that the airplane came in "pretty fast" and touched down "approximately half way down the runway." The witness said, "The nose was down. He hit the ground and within 3 seconds he was off the runway and gone. Then all you saw was smoke." The witness said when the airplane hit "the front end shook. It wobbled like a kid on a tricycle. When it shook, it kind of looked like it [the airplane] bounced. Then it was gone." The control tower operator said he heard the captain say something over the radio, which caused him to look in the direction of the airplane. The tower operator saw the airplane off the runway, the main landing gear came off behind the airplane, and the airplane caught fire. The tower operator said he saw four people get out of the airplane. The airplane came to rest in a shallow ravine approximately 331 feet north of the runway. An examination of the airplane showed impact damage to the nose gear and nose gear wheel well. An examination of the airplane's systems revealed no anomalies.