Honda HA-420 HondaJet

After landing on runway 05 at North Bend-Southwest Oregon Regional Airport, the airplane was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran and came to rest into the Coos Bay. All five occupants were uninjured and quickly rescued. The airplane was damaged beyond repair.

During the takeoff roll on runway 22L at Mesa-Falcon Field Airport, after completing a distance of about 3,400 feet and at a speed of 133 knots, the crew decided to abort the takeoff procedure and initiated an emergency braking maneuver. Unable to stop within the remaining distance, the airplane overran, went through the perimeter fence, hit a car moving around on North Greenfield Road and eventually came to rest against trees, bursting into flames. A passenger was rescued while four other occupants, two passengers and both pilots were killed. The car's driver was also killed. The accident occurred in good weather conditions.

The pilot was attempting to land on a wet, 5,000-ft-long asphalt runway in night conditions with calm wind. He stated that the airplane touched down before the 1,000 ft markers and that he immediately applied full brake pressure. The brakes began to cycle in anti-skid mode, but the pilot said the cycling felt slower than normal. The pilot considered a go-around, but the left brake “grabbed” suddenly, and the airplane yawed left and began a sequence of left and right skids before it continued off the end of the runway. The airplane traveled down an embankment onto a rocky berm and came to rest about 360 ft from the end of the runway. The pilot and the passengers egressed the airplane uninjured before a post-impact fire consumed the cockpit, center fuselage, and the right wing. The pilot stated that he used the airplane’s cockpit display unit (CDU) computer to calculate the airplane’s landing reference speed (Vref) of 120 knots (kts) and reported that the airplane touched down at this speed. Although recorded data for the flight was not available due to thermal damage to the avionics, ADS-B data last captured the airplane on final approach at a ground speed of 120 kts, about 200 ft above the runway, consistent with the pilot’s statement. However, when the conditions that existed at the time of the accident were entered into an exemplar CDU, the calculated Vref was 112 kts, and the required landing distance for a wet/contaminated runway was 4,829 ft. To determine the landing distance required at a Vref of 120 kts, a Vref increment of Vref+5 (117 kts) and Vref+10 (122 kts) were entered into the CDU; the results were 5,311 ft and 5,794 ft, respectively. When these landing distances were calculated, the CDU, which had already been programmed for a 5,000-ft-long runway, displayed a prominent caution below the Vref number that stated: “LANDING FIELD LENGTH INSUFFICIENT.” How the accident pilot achieved a Vref of 120 kts via the CDU based on the conditions that existed at the time of the accident could not be determined. Postaccident examination of the braking system revealed no evidence of any preimpact anomalies or malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation; however, a testing anomaly was observed when the power brake and antiskid valve were tested. An initial test on an exemplar bench stand produced hysteresis that could not be produced when it was tested on a certified bench at the manufacturer. According to the manufacturer, the anomaly observed would not prevent the application of brakes nor the removal of pressure during skidding events; however, significant hysteresis may lead to braking performance degradation due to a decreased pressure application for a given current input. The reason for the anomaly was unknown, and therefore, it could not be determined if it played a role in the loss of braking action reported by the pilot. Despite this anomaly, and based on all other available information, the pilot landed the airplane faster than the prescribed landing speed with insufficient runway length available given the wet runway condition, which resulted in a runway excursion.

The pilot was landing at the destination airport with a gusting crosswind. Upon touchdown, he established the aileron controls for the crosswind and applied the brakes; however, no braking action was observed. The airplane subsequently drifted left and departed the runway pavement. It came to rest upright in the grass infield area adjacent to the runway. The outboard portion of the right wing separated which resulted in substantial damage. Data indicated that the airplane was 14 knots or more above the published landing reference speed when it crossed the runway threshold, and it touched down about 2,000 ft from the threshold. The left and right weight-on-wheels (WOW) parameters transitioned from air to ground consistent with initial touchdown; however, the left WOW parameter transitioned back to air about 2 seconds later. The right WOW parameter remained on ground until the airplane departed the runway pavement. A detailed review of the Central Maintenance Function (CMF) data files did not reveal any record of airplane system anomalies from the time the airplane lifted off until it touched down. Multiple system anomalies were recorded after the runway excursion consistent with airframe damage sustained during the accident sequence. The brake system touchdown protection is designed to prevent brake application until wheel spin-up occurs to avoid the possibility of inadvertently landing with a locked wheel due to brake application. After weight-on-wheels has been true for three seconds, power braking is enabled. It is likely that the lack of positive weight-on-wheel parameters inhibited brake application due to the touchdown protection function and resulted in the pilot not observing any braking action. The excess airspeed, extended touchdown, and transient weight-on-wheels parameters were consistent with the airplane floating during the landing flare and with the application of aileron controls for the crosswind conditions. The airplane was not equipped with wing-mounted speed brakes which would have assisted in maintaining weight-on-wheels during the initial portion of the landing. The most recent wind report, transmitted by the tower controller when the airplane was on a 3- mile final, presented a 70° crosswind at 15 knots, gusting to 25 knots. The corresponding crosswind gust component was about 24 knots. The airplane flight manual specified a crosswind limitation of 20 kts for takeoff and landing; therefore, the crosswind at the time of the accident exceeded the airframe crosswind limitation and would have made control during touchdown difficult. The pilot reported that he had made two requests with the approach controller to land on a different runway, but those requests were denied. The investigation was unable to make any determination regarding a pilot request for an alternate runway. Federal Aviation Regulations stated that the pilot in command of an aircraft is directly responsible for, and is the final authority as to, the operation of that aircraft. The regulations also stated that no person may operate a civil aircraft without complying with the operating limitations. The pilot’s ultimate acceptance of the runway assignment which likely exceeded the crosswind limitation of the airplane was contrary to the regulations and to the safe operation of the airplane.