Youngstown-Warren

The twin engine airplane departed Youngstown-Warren Airport Runway 32 at 0653LT on a 5,5-hours flight to Bozeman, MT, carrying five passengers and one pilot. After takeoff, while in initial climb, the airplane initiated a left turn then started to descend until it crashed in the backyard of a private property located about 2 km northwest of the airfield. The accident occurred about one minute after liftoff. The airplane was destroyed and all six occupants were killed.

During the cruise portion of the cross-country flight, the pilot/owner informed air traffic control that the airplane’s left engine had lost power and he could not maintain altitude. The controller offered information on a nearby airport; however, the pilot requested, and then proceeded to, an airport farther away with a 9,003-ft-long runway. After twice circling the approach end of the runway to the left while descending, the pilot proceeded down the runway well above a normal glide path. A witness reported that the airplane never touched down, and track data showed that the airplane’s ground speed increased while over the runway. Airport surveillance video showed the airplane pitch up and to the left at the departure end of the runway. It continued into a left, descending turn until it impacted the ground about ¼ mile west of the departure end of the runway. Given this information, it is most likely that the pilot was unsuccessful in achieving an appropriate altitude and airspeed, which likely resulted in the pilot performing a single-engine go-around. During the subsequent climb and maneuvering, he lost control of the airplane, which resulted in an uncontrolled descent and impact with terrain. The wreckage was destroyed by impact forces and a postimpact fire. The left engine’s propeller blades were feathered and showed no indications of powered rotation at impact, while the right engine’s propeller blades showed damage signatures consistent with powered rotation at impact. A postaccident examination of the left engine revealed severe detonation damage of the No. 4 cylinder piston. Further examination of the left engine fuel servo revealed a significant amount of sand-like contamination in the servo inlet filter, which matched the properties of polyethylene terephthalate (PET), which is a thermoplastic polymer of the polyester family commonly found in fuel system components. The examination of the right engine fuel servo revealed that it was also contaminated with the same substance. The right engine’s spark plugs and one of its cylinders also displayed signatures consistent with a lean fuel to air ratio. Given this evidence, it is likely that the engines were operating with unpredictable fuel to air ratios due to the fuel system contamination, which likely contributed to the detonation in the left engine and pilot’s description that the engine lost power. The investigation was unable to determine how or when the PET was introduced into the fuel system due to the postimpact fire damage.

While enroute in instrument meteorological (IMC) conditions, the pilot of the twin-engine, piston-powered airplane declared an emergency following a loss of power to the right engine. The pilot secured the engine and was provided vectors by air traffic control for an instrument approach procedure at the nearest airport, which he successfully completed. The pilot reported that he flew the approach and landing with the wing flaps retracted and visually acquired the runway about 500 ft above the ground. The airplane touched down on the first third of the runway at 120 knots. The pilot knew he would not be able to stop the airplane on the 3,500-ft long runway but committed to the landing rather than risking a single-engine go-around in IMC. After landing, the airplane continued beyond the departure end of the runway and impacted a berm, collapsing the landing gear and resulting in substantial damage to the airplane. Examination of the engine revealed catastrophic damage consistent with detonation and oil starvation. The damage to the No. 5 cylinder was consistent with a subsequent over pressurization of the crankcase, which likely expelled the crankshaft nose seal and the oil supply. Detonation of the cylinder(s) can create excessive crankcase pressures capable of expelling the crankshaft nose seal. The crankshaft nose seal displacement likely created a rapid loss of oil and the resulting oil starvation of the engine. The fractured connecting rod and high-temperature signatures were consistent with oil starvation. No source or anomaly that would result in engine detonation was identified. According to the Pilot’s Operating Handbook (POH) for the accident airplane, during a single engine inoperative approach, the pilot should maintain an airspeed of 116 kts indicated (KIAS) or above until landing is assured. Once landing is assured, the pilot should extend the gear and flaps, slowly retard the power on the operative engine, and land normally. The airplane’s best single-engine rate of climb speed (blue line) was 106 KIAS, and its minimum controllable airspeed with one engine inoperative (Vmca) was 76 KIAS. The maximum speed for full flap extension (40°) was 132 KIAS. The POH also stated that a single-engine go-around should be avoided if at all possible. The pilot’s decision to commit to the landing was reasonable given the circumstances and the guidance provided by the POH; however, it is likely that his decision to conduct the landing without flaps and the airplane’s excessive airspeed at touchdown resulted in the runway overrun.

While in cruise flight, at 6,000 feet, the left engine lost power. The pilot attempted a restart of the engine, but only about one-half rotation of the left engine propeller was observed, and the engine was secured. The pilot stated that he was unable to maintain altitude and initiated a decent. He requested and was cleared for an instrument approach at an airport where the weather conditions were, 1/4 statute mile of visibility, fog, and a vertical visibility of 100 feet. On the approach, at the minimum descent altitude, the pilot executed a missed approach. As the airplane climbed, the pilot reported to the controller that the 'best altitude [he] could get was 2,200 feet.' A second approach was initiated to the reciprocal runway. While on the second approach, the pilot 'was going to fly the aircraft right to the runway, and told the controller so.' He put the gear down, reduced power, and decided there was 'no hope for a go-around.' He then 'flew down past the decision height,' and about 70-80 feet above the ground, 'added a little power to smooth the landing.' The pilot also stated, 'The last thing I remember was the aircraft nose contacting the runway.' A passenger stated that once the pilot could not see the runway, [the pilot] 'applied power, pitched the nose up,' and attempted a 'go-around' similar to the one that was executed on the first approach. Disassembly of the left engine revealed that the crankshaft was fatigue fractured between connecting rod journal number 2 and main journal number 2. Review of the pilot's operating handbook revealed that the single engine service ceiling, at a weight of 4,800 pounds, was 11,700 feet. The average single engine rate of climb, at a pressure altitude of 6,000 feet, was 295 feet per minute. The average single engine rate of climb, at a pressure altitude of 1,625 feet, was 314 feet per minute. Review of the ILS approach plate for Runway 34 revealed that the decision height was 200 feet above the ground.

The pilot had computed landing performance information for a landing on a wet runway with anti-skid; sufficient runway surface was available. Touchdown was normal, however during the braking process, the airplane started to fishtail and the pilot believed that the anti-skid system had failed. Therefore, the pilot turned the antiskid system off and continued the rollout with normal braking. The airplane went off the departure end of runway 05 and sustained substantial damage. Performance data indicated more runway surface was required for a safe landing on a wet runway without anti-skid assistance. The braking sequence of events described by the pilot resembled dynamic hydroplaning where there was a complete loss of braking effectiveness rather than an anti-skid malfunction. An examination of the airplane failed to disclose any mechanical problems.

After being delayed at least 2 days at Youngstown, OH, due to maintenance problems the pilot departed at approximately 1725 hours with the knowledge that the weather at his destination was ift to lifr. In addition, the pilot was scheduled for a vacation and had expressed hopes of departing on it that evening. The aircraft was seen circling West Point Municipal Airport in and out of low clouds, fog, and/or smoke from a nearby mill. Immediately before the aircraft collided with trees 6.5 miles west of the airport, a witness saw red lights, one on the rear and one close to the front of the aircraft, which was estimated to be flying at approximately tree top level. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

Before departing Youngstown, OH, the pilot filed two IFR flight plans, one for a flight to Plattsburgh, NY, the other for a return flight from Plattsburgh back to Youngstown. After a 2 hour and 10 minutes flight to Plattsburgh, 70 gallons of fuel was added, but the person who serviced the aircraft indicated the tanks were not full after servicing. The plane then made a 10 minutes flight to Burlington, VT, but no fuel was added at Burlington. The pilot then took off on a return flight to Youngstown. During the descent phase to Youngstown, the pilot requested vectors to the closest airport. He was provide vectors to the Chess Lamberton Airport and advised it was 6 miles away. A short time later, the pilot said the aircraft had lost power. Subsequently, it crashed in rolling, wooded terrain. During an exam, no fuel was found in the aircraft. No other evidence of a malfunction or failure was found. With the passenger and cargo load, a maximum of about 104 gallons of fuel could have been used without exceeding the certificated gross weight of the aircraft. At 45 to 55% power, the aircraft burned 17 to 22 gallons per hour. Wind gusts 30 knots. All six occupants were killed.

While in cruising altitude on a cargo flight from Charlotte to Youngstown, the pilot reported engine problems and elected to divert to Charleston-Kanawha Airport for an emergency landing. After being cleared, he initiated the descent when the airplane went out of control and crashed in flames few miles from the airfield. The aircraft was destroyed and the pilot, sole on board, was killed.

The pilot, on a cargo flight from Youngstown to Pontiac, decided to make a low pass over his mother's house. By night, the airplane struck tree tops and crashed in flames. The aircraft was destroyed and the pilot, sole on board, was killed. He was the leader of a formation of three aircraft when the accident occurred.

For unknown reasons, the twin engine airplane landed hard and bounced. It went out of control and crashed. The pilot, sole on board, was uninjured.