Arkansas

The aircraft collided with mountainous terrain in a level descent during a visual approach to the destination airport. According to recorded radar data, 10 minutes after descending from 15,000 feet, the flight impacted about 200 feet below the top of the partially obscured ridgeline (elevation of 2550 feet), and 8 miles from the destination. The data indicates the flight path was similar to the global positioning satellite (GPS) approach to the airport. Six minutes before the accident, and the pilot's last transmission to air traffic control, he was informed and acknowledged that radar service was terminated. The flight was 12.4 miles from the accident site when radar contact was lost. Reduced visibility due to fog hampered search & rescue efforts, and the aircraft wreckage was located the next day. The aircraft was equipped with a GPS navigation system; however the installation was incomplete, restricting its use to visual flight rules (VFR) only. The investigation did not determine if the GPS was being used at the time. A non-enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System was also installed. The maximum elevation figure listed on the sectional aeronautical chart covering the area of the accident site and destination airport was 3000 feet mean sea level. The chart also shows an advisory for the area to use caution due to rapidly rising.

On June 1, 1999, at 2350:44 central daylight time, American Airlines flight 1420, a McDonnell Douglas DC-9-82 (MD-82), N215AA, crashed after it overran the end of runway 4R during landing at Little Rock National Airport in Little Rock, Arkansas. Flight 1420 departed from Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport, Texas, about 2240 with 2 flight crewmembers, 4 flight attendants, and 139 passengers aboard and touched down in Little Rock at 2350:20. After departing the end of the runway, the airplane struck several tubes extending outward from the left edge of the instrument landing system localizer array, located 411 feet beyond the end of the runway; passed through a chain link security fence and over a rock embankment to a flood plain, located approximately 15 feet below the runway elevation; and collided with the structure supporting the runway 22L approach lighting system. The captain and 10 passengers were killed; the first officer, the flight attendants, and 105 passengers received serious or minor injuries; and 24 passengers were not injured. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire. Flight 1420 was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 on an instrument flight rules flight plan.

During a cross-country flight, the pilot of the twin-engine airplane reported to air traffic control that he has 'lost an engine.' A witness observed the right engine hanging from its lower mounts as the airplane turned right and headed towards the nearest airport. The airplane impacted trees approximately 1 mile short of the runway threshold. Examination of the right engine propeller revealed that one of its blades was separated about mid-span. The separated tip section of the blade was not recovered. Metallurgical examination of the fracture surface revealed that the blade failed as a result of a fatigue crack that originated from corrosion pits on the camber surface (face) of the blade. The failed blade was examined approximately 6 hours prior to the accident in accordance with an airworthiness directive (AD 81-13-06 R2) that called for inspections of the blade for corrosion and fatigue. However, the inspections called out in the AD were only applicable to the blade fillet and shank regions, well inboard of the fracture location on the failed blade. Overhaul of the propeller in accordance with the propeller manufacturer's manual includes grinding of each blade to 'remove all visual evidence of corrosion.' According to the airplane's owner, the propellers had not been overhauled in the eight years that he had owned the aircraft. The maintenance records were destroyed in the accident, which precluded determination of the date and time of the last propeller overhaul. The accident airplane was being operated under Title 14 CFR Part 91, and therefore, the propellers were not required to be overhauled at specified intervals.

While in cruise flight at 24,000 feet msl, the pilot of the Piper Malibu Mirage advised Memphis Center that he had encountered icing conditions and was experiencing a fuel imbalance. The pilot requested and was cleared to deviate to the north. Subsequently, radio and radar contact were lost. A witness reported hearing the sound of the airplane's engine stop running and observed the airplane descending from the dark clouds in a nose down attitude and rotating clockwise. Residents of the area reported that the weather at the time of the accident was high ceilings with heavy rain just before and after the accident. There were thunderstorms with lightning in the area at the time of the accident. The wreckage of the airplane was scattered along an area of about four miles. The airplane was equipped with an autopilot, weather radar, and an ice protection system. The pilot had recently purchased the 1999 model airplane and had completed a Mirage initial training course. At the time of the accident the pilot had accumulated a total of 21.4 hours in the make and model of the accident aircraft. No anomalies were found with the airframe or engine that would have prevented normal operation.

The certificated commercial pilot picked up his newly painted airplane for a visual flight to the home base. About 17 miles south of the departure airport, witnesses initially observed the airplane in a 90 degree right bank. It continued to roll to an inverted position while simultaneously nosing down to a near vertical descent. The pilot's second class medical certificate application (July 7, 1997) indicated 3,700 hours flight time. A flight log indicted the pilot flew this aircraft 6.4 hours during the 60 days preceding the accident. No evidence was found that the pilot had not obtained sufficient rest before the flight. There was no evidence found to either suggest a medical cause for incapacitation or to rule out incapacitation for medical reasons. Aircraft maintenance records did not reveal any open discrepancies. All of the airplane was accounted for in the wreckage debris. No evidence of an in-flight fire and/or explosion, or in-flight mechanical and/or flight control malfunction was found.

The pilot of the Part 135 cargo flight was executing the 'full' ILS runway 27 approach at Helena Regional Airport in a non-radar environment. Although the approach calls for the pilot to maintain 7,000 feet until intercepting the glideslope, the aircraft impacted the terrain at 5,300 about 1.5 miles prior to reaching the point where the pilot should have crossed the Hauser NDB at an altitude of 6,741 feet. According to the approach plate, the aircraft should not have descended to an altitude below 5,400 feet until reaching the outer marker, which is located about five and one-half miles west of the impact site.

After the completion of scheduled maintenance and a normal ground run up, the airplane departed the airport for a local test flight. Witnesses observed the airplane in a nose high attitude, turn to the left, and then saw the nose drop toward the ground approximately 1 1/2 miles from the departure end of the runway. The airplane impacted hilly terrain and was consumed by a post impact fire. Detailed examination of the airframe, engines, and propellers revealed no defects or anomalies that would have contributed to the accident.

The pilot obtained a weather briefing, filed an IFR flight plan, and took off at night on a flight from Hot Springs, Arkansas, to Pueblo, Colorado. About one minute later, he advised air traffic control that he needed to return to Hot Springs. He then contacted the airplane operator and said the heater was not working. The operator suggested that he return for repairs. The pilot was then heard to say, 'oh, shoot!' No further radio transmissions were received from the flight. The airplane cut a 400 foot swath through trees, and the wreckage path measured 940 feet. With exception of a heater problem, no pre impact mechanical failure was evident. Both occupants were killed.

The instrument rated private pilot departed on a night ifr cross country flight into forecasted icing conditions. During the approach at his destination airport, the pilot requested lower altitude to attempt to breakout from the weather. After being assigned 3,100 feet and obtaining a clearance for the ILS approach, the pilot cancelled ifr during descent and proceeded visually for the airport. The aircraft operated in an area of reported freezing rain and ice pellets, with fog and drizzle. Control was lost during the turn from base to final approach. Both occupants were killed.

Approximately 7 minutes after takeoff, the airplane collided with terrain approximately 3 miles from the departure airport. The accident site was 1,100 feet msl; the highest terrain in the area is 1,400 feet msl. The departure airport elevation is 643 feet msl. According to witnesses, the airplane disappeared into clouds at approximately 200 feet following takeoff, and that the hills to the southeast were obscured by clouds. The pilot had about 4 hours sleep the night before the accident flight. Both occupants were killed.