Lake, Sea, Ocean, River

While the pilot was on a visual approach to the airport and descending over water on the left base leg, about 100 ft above the water's surface, the airplane entered instrument meteorological conditions with no forward visibility. The pilot looked outside his left window to gauge the airplane's altitude and saw "black waves of water approaching extremely rapidly." He tried to pull back on the yoke to initiate a climb, but the nosewheel contacted the water. Subsequently, the airplane nosed over and came to rest inverted in the water. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.

According to the pilot, when the airplane’s airspeed reached about 90 knots during the takeoff roll, he applied back pressure to the control yoke to initiate the takeoff and noted a brief positive rate of climb followed by a sinking sensation. The airspeed rapidly decayed, and the stall warning horn sounded. To correct for the decaying airspeed, he lowered the nose then pulled back on the airplane’s control yoke and leveled the wings just before impacting the ocean. The pilot stated there were no pre accident mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. Wind about the time of the accident was recorded as 110º downwind of the airplane at 15 knots gusting to 28 knots. The passengers recalled that the pilot’s preflight briefing mentioned the downwind takeoff but included no discussion of the potential effect of the wind conditions on the takeoff. The airplane’s estimated gross weight at the time of the accident was about 769.6 pounds over its approved maximum gross weight, and the airplane’s estimated center of gravity was about 8.24 inches beyond the approved aft limit at its maximum gross weight. It is likely that the pilot’s decision to takeoff downwind and operate the airplane over the maximum gross weight with an aft center of gravity led to the aerodynamic stall during takeoff and loss of control. Downwind takeoffs result in higher groundspeeds and increase takeoff distance. While excessive aircraft weight increases the takeoff distance and stability, and an aft center of gravity decreases controllability. Several instances of the operator’s noncompliance with its operational procedures and risk mitigations were discovered during the investigation, including two overweight flights, inaccurate and missing information on aircraft flight logs, and the accident pilot’s failure to complete a flight risk assessment for the accident flight. The operator had a safety management system (SMS) in place at the time of the accident that required active monitoring of its systems and processes to ensure compliance with internal and external requirements. However, the discrepancies noted with several flights, including the accident flight, indicate that the operator’s SMS program was inadequate to actively monitor, identify, and mitigate hazards and deficiencies.

The four engine airplane departed Santiago de Chile at 1021LT and landed at Punta Arenas for a technical stop at 1444LT. It took off at 1653LT on a leg to Teniente Rodolfo Marsh-Presidente Eduardo Frei Montalva Airport located on King George Island, Antarctica, carrying 21 passengers and 17 crew members. After flying a distance of about 390 NM, while in cruising altitude, the radar contact was lost, vertical to the Drake Passage. SAR operations were initiated jointly by the Chilean, Uruguay and Argentine Air Forces which dispatched several aircraft over the area. Two days later, debris were found floating on water. It seems that none of the 38 occupants survived the crash.

At approximately 0745 Central Daylight Time on 26 October 2019, the Blue Water Aviation float-equipped deHavillandDHC-3 Otteraircraft (registration C-GBTU, serial number 209) departed Bissett Water Aerodrome, Manitoba, with the pilot, 2 passengers, and approximately 800 pounds of freight on board. The destination was Little Grand Rapids, Manitoba, on the eastern shore of Family Lake. At approximately 0845, while on approach to Family Lake, the aircraft’s right wing separated from the fuselage. The aircraft then entered a nose-down attitudeand struck the water surface of the lake. The pilot and the 2 passengers were fatally injured. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces. The emergency locator transmitter activated momentarily.

En route from Durango to Acapulco, the twin engine airplane crashed in unknown circumstances in the Infiernillo River, in the region of Las Juntas. The wreckage was found inverted and partially submerged in water. All six occupants were killed.

On the 18th October 2019, at approximately 4:30 PM local time, a Douglas DC-3C aircraft, registration N437GB crashed in the ocean; at coordinates 25°05.55N 077°30.29W, approximately 2.87miles from Runway 14 at the Lynden Pindling International Airport (MYNN) Nassau, Bahamas. There were 2 souls on board. The pilot reported that the left engine failed approximately 25-30 nautical miles from MYNN. The pilot further stated that during single engine operation, the aircraft performance was not optimal so the decision was made to land the aircraft in the ocean. The Air Traffic Control tower was notified by the crew of N437GB, that they will be performing a control water landing. The Royal Bahamas Defense Force was notified. Rescue efforts were then put into place. No injuries were received by the occupants of the aircraft. Aircraft could not be located for physical analysis to be carried out. The weather at the time of the accident was visual meteorological conditions and not a factor in this accident. A limited scope investigation was conducted, no safety message or recommendations were issued.

On September 15, 2019, at 1146 central daylight time, a Piper PA-46-350P, N218MW, lost engine power while maneuvering over the Gulf of Mexico, and the pilot was forced to ditch. The private pilot was not injured. The airplane was registered to and operated by Mailworks, Inc., Spring Valley, California, under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a personal flight. Visual meteorological conditions existed near the accident site at the time of the accident, and the flight was operated on a visual flight rules flight plan. The flight originated at 0830 eastern daylight time from Space Coast Regional Airport (TIX), Titusville, Florida, and was en route to Ozona Municipal Airport (OZA), Ozona, Texas. His final destination was Gillespie Field Airport (SEE), El Cajon, California. According to the pilot's accident report, he departed TIX with 140 gallons of fuel. After crossing Gulfport (GPT), Mississippi's Terminal Radar Service Area (TRSA) at 10,500 ft, he initiated a slow descent over Boothville, Louisiana, and proceeded southbound towards the mouth of the Mississippi River, descending to 1,500 ft. He then configured the airplane for climb. The engine did not respond to the application of power and the airplane began losing altitude. After going through the emergency checklist, he was unable to restore engine power, and declared an emergency to Houston air route traffic control center (ARTCC) and on frequency 121.5 mHz. He also activated the emergency locator transmitter (ELT) prior to ditching. After ditching, the pilot put on his life jacket, exited the airplane, and remained on its wing until it sank. About an hour later, a U.S. Coast Guard helicopter rescued the pilot and transported him to a hospital in New Orleans, Louisiana. He was discharged a few hours later. The airplane has not been recovered.

En route from Vancouver to Pender Harbour, the pilot encountered engine problems and elected to ditch the aircraft about three miles off Sechelt. All three occupants were able to evacuate the cabin before the aircraft sank and was lost. All three occupants were rescued.

En route from Malabo to Bata, the crew encountered poor weather conditions when the airplane crashed in unknown circumstances into the sea few km off Kribi, South Cameroon. All seven occupants were rescued while the aircraft sank and was lost.

The pilot stated that, during takeoff in the float-equipped airplane, he saw the left float begin to move into his peripheral vision from the left cockpit window and the airplane began to yaw to the left. The left wing subsequently impacted the water and the airplane nosed over, separating the right wing from the fuselage. The passengers consistently reported choppy water conditions at the time of the accident; one passenger reported that white caps were visible on the ocean waves in the distance. The passengers said that, during the takeoff, the airplane impacted a swell or wave and nosed over abruptly, and the cabin rapidly filled with water. Examination of the float assembly revealed fractures in the left front flying wire attachment fitting and the right rear flying wire attachment strap and hole elongation in the left rear flying wire attachment fitting. Additionally, the bolts attaching the two left flying wire attachment fittings to the left float were bent, and the two flying wires that had been attached to the fractured attachment fitting and attachment strap were buckled. While some areas of corrosion were observed on the fractured left forward fitting, the total area of corrosion was a small percentage of the total cross-section, and the remainder of the fracture and associated deformation of the lug was consistent with ductile overstress fracture. Similar areas of corrosion were also observed on each of the intact flying wire attachment fittings. Post-accident testing completed by the float manufacturer revealed that buckling of flying wires similar to that observed on the accident airplane was only reproduced at strap and fitting failure loads above 9,000 pounds force; the design specification load was 3,453 pounds of force. This indicates that the small amount of corrosion present on the fractured flying wire attachment fitting did not reduce its loadcarrying capability below the design specification load of 3,453 pounds of force, and that both the flying wire attachment fitting and flying wire attachment strap fractured due to overload. Therefore, it is likely that the accident airplane floats were subject to forces that exceeded their design limitations, resulting in overload of the flying wires attached to the left float. It is also likely that, given the lack of damage on either float, the force was due to impact with an ocean wave or swell and not by striking an object.