United States of America

During approach to runway 9, the tower controller instructed the pilot to perform an “S” turn 3 miles from the runway. The pilot initiated the “S” turn to the left, and after turning back to the right towards the runway to complete the other half of the turn, the controller advised the pilot that he did not need to finish the maneuver, and could turn onto final approach. The last recorded ground speed was 89 knots when the pilot banked the airplane sharply to the left at this time, witnesses stated that the airplane seemed to do a wing over onto its back and go straight down. Flight simulation tests revealed that while making a steep turn and not adding power, as the bank angle increased the airspeed would decrease and the airplane would enter an aerodynamic stall. Toxicology testing indicated that the pilot had been using tramadol, a prescription painkiller with potentially impairing effects. The pilot had not reported its use on his most recent application for airman medical certificate approximately 20 months prior to the accident. It is unclear what role, if any, the medication or the condition for which it might have been used played in the accident.

On June 28, 2008, about 2215 Pacific daylight time, an ABX Air Boeing 767-200, N799AX, operating as flight 1611 from San Francisco International Airport, San Francisco, California, experienced a ground fire before engine startup. The captain and the first officer evacuated the airplane through the cockpit windows and were not injured, and the airplane was substantially damaged. The cargo flight was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121. At the time of the fire, the airplane was parked near a loading facility, all of the cargo to be transported on the flight had been loaded, and the doors had been shut.

The airline's chief pilot was giving a newly-hired pilot a required competency/proficiency check. Memory data from the airplane's global positioning system showed the airplane made
steep 360-degree turns to the left and right before continuing towards a practice area at gradually decreasing airspeed and altitude. A low cloud ceiling prevailed. Witnesses said they
heard both engines "sputter, then quit," and saw the airplane clear a grove of trees, stall, and strike the ground. The landing gear was down and the flaps were in the approach setting. Both propellers were in the low pitch/high rpm setting, and bore little rotational signatures. Both engine fuel supply lines contained only residual fuel. Those familiar with the chief pilot's flying practices stated that he always followed a certain routine when giving a check ride. The routine consisted of the following: After performing steep 360-degree turns, he would ask the trainee to configure the airplane for landing and demonstrate minimum control maneuvers. Prior to executing steep turns, he would turn the boost pumps on. At the completion of the maneuver, the pumps would be turned off. The investigation revealed that there are unguarded fuel shutoff switches next to the boost pumps, and the circumstances of the accident are consistent with the these fuel shutoff switches being inadvertently placed in the off position, instead of the fuel boost pumps.

The pilot contacted air traffic control and requested clearance to taxi for departure approximately an hour after the scheduled departure time. About 4 minutes later, the flight
was cleared for takeoff. A witness observed the airplane as it taxied, and found it strange that the airplane did not stop and "rev up" its engines before takeoff. Instead, the airplane taxied into the runway and proceeded with the takeoff without stopping. The airplane took off quickly, within 100 yards of beginning the takeoff roll, became airborne, and entered a steep left bank. The bank steepened, and the airplane descended and impacted the ground. Post accident examination of the wreckage revealed that the pilot's four-point restraint was not fastened and that at least a portion of the cockpit flight control lock remained installed on the control column. One of the pre-takeoff checklist items was, "Flight controls - Unlocked - Full travel." The airplane was not equipped with a control lock design, which, according to the airframe manufacturer's previously issued service bulletins, would "minimize the possibility of the aircraft becoming airborne when take off is attempted with flight control locks inadvertently installed." In 1990, Transport Canada issued an airworthiness directive to ensure mandatory compliance with the service bulletins; however, the Federal Aviation Administration did not follow with a similar airworthiness directive until after the accident.

The private pilot arrived at the accident airport as part of an Angel Flight volunteer program to provide transportation of a passenger who had undergone medical treatment at a local hospital. About 0937, the airplane landed on runway 30 (3,900 feet by 150 feet) with winds from 073-080 degrees and 5-6 knots, which continued to increase due to an atmospheric pressure gradient. The pilot met the passengers and departed the terminal about 1003, with winds at 101-103 degrees and 23-36 knots. About 1005 the airplane was near the approach end of runway 30 with wind from 089-096 degrees and 21-31 knots. The pilot stated that he began rotating the airplane about 3,000 feet down the runway. About 1006, the airplane was approximately 3,553 feet down the runway while flying about 30 feet above the runway. The airplane experienced an aerodynamic stall, and the left wing dropped before it impacted the ground. No mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal operation of the airplane were noted during the investigation. The fatally injured passenger, who had received medical treatment, was 2 years and 10 months of age at the time of the accident. She was held by her mother during the flight, as she had been on previous Angel Flights, but was otherwise unrestrained. According to 14 CFR 91.107(3), each person on board a U.S.-registered civil aircraft must occupy an approved seat with a safety belt properly secured during takeoff, and only unrestrained children who are under the age of 2 may be held by a restrained adult. Although the accident was survivable (both the pilot and the adult passenger survived with non-life-threatening injuries), an autopsy performed on the child revealed that the cause of death was blunt force trauma of the head.

About one minute after takeoff on a night Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) contract cargo flight, the tower controller advised the pilot that he was squawking the wrong transponder code. Although the pilot reset the transponder to the correct code, he was advised that he was still squawking the wrong code. He then realized that he had selected the wrong transponder, and then switched to the correct one. During the time the pilot was dealing with this issue, the airplane drifted about 30 degrees right of the assigned heading, but the pilot returned to the correct heading as he was contacting the departure controller. The departure controller cleared him to continue his climb and instructed him to turn left about 120 degrees, which he did. About 40 seconds after initiating his left turn of about 120 degrees, while climbing straight ahead through an altitude about 4,700 feet above ground level (AGL), the pilot was instructed to turn 20 degrees further left. Almost immediately thereafter, the airplane began turning to the right, and then suddenly entered a rapidly descending right turn. The airplane ultimately impacted the terrain in a nearly wings-level nose-down attitude of greater than 45 degrees. At the moment of impact the airplane was on a heading about 220 degrees to the right of the its last stabilized course. The investigation did not find any indication of an airframe, control system, or engine mechanical failure or malfunction that would have precluded normal flight, and no autopsy or toxicological information could be acquired due to the high amount of energy that was released when the airplane impacted the terrain. The determination of the initiating event that led to the uncontrolled descent into the terrain was not able to be determined.

The crew was completing a night training flight on behalf of the U.S. Air Force 86th Flying Training Squadron, 47th Flying Training Wing, Laughlin Air Force Base, Texas. After several manoeuvres in the vicinity of the Lubbock-Preston Smith Airport, the crew started an non precision approach to runway 17R. At that time, weather conditions were not so good with rain showers and winds up to 40 knots. On final approach, the aircraft seems to sink and pitched down. The captain increased both engines power but the aircraft hit the ground 1,1 mile short of runway 17R threshold. On impact, the nose gear was sheared off and the aircraft came to rest in a field. Both pilots were slightly injured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The amphibious-float-equipped airplane departed from a paved runway for the 40-nautical mile flight to its destination, where a water landing on a lake was to be made. The pilot did not raise the landing gear after takeoff. During the flight, the air was bumpy and turbulent, and this resulted in the gear advisory system activating numerous times. The purpose of the system is to alert the pilot of the landing gear position--up for a water landing or down for a runway landing--when the airspeed decreased below a set threshold value. The pilot disabled the system by pulling its circuit breaker because the alerts were becoming a nuisance; he intended to reset the breaker during descent, but did not do so. Upon reaching the destination, the pilot set up a 150- to 200-feet-per-minute rate of descent for a glassy water landing on the lake. With the landing gear in the down position, the airplane contacted the water and abruptly nosed over. The airplane came to rest floating inverted, suspended by the floats. The pilot reported that the day of the accident was his nineteenth consecutive duty day, including office duty and flight duty. He stated that he feels the lack of days off during the previous 19 days was a contributing factor to this accident. When asked what would have prevented the accident, the pilot suggested consistency in using the checklist. On two flights earlier in the day he had used a written checklist; on the accident flight he did not.

The airplane was on a visual approach to an airport when the engine stopped producing power. The pilot subsequently landed the airplane in a field, but struck trees at the edge of the field during the forced landing. Examination of the engine, engine fuel controls, and Power Analyzer and Recorder (PAR), provided evidence that the engine shut down during the flight. Further examination of engine and fuel system components from the accident airplane failed to reveal a definitive reason for the uncommanded engine shut-down.

The airline transport pilot was on an approach to land on Runway 30 at the conclusion of a visual flight rules (VFR)scheduled commuter flight. Through a series of radio microphone clicks, he activated threshold warning lights for vehicle traffic on a roadway that passes in front of the threshold of Runway 30. Gates that were supposed to work in concert with the lights and block the runway from vehicle traffic were not operative. On final approach, the pilot, who was aware that the gates were not working, noticed a large truck and trailer stopped adjacent to the landing threshold. As he neared the runway, he realized that the truck was moving in front of the threshold area. The pilot attempted to go around, but the airplane's belly struck the top of the trailer and the airplane descended out of control to the runway, sustaining structural damage. The truck driver reported that, as he approached the runway threshold, he saw the flashing red warning lights, but that the gates were not closed. He waited for about 45 seconds and looked for any landing traffic and, seeing none, drove onto the road in front of the threshold. As he did so, he felt the airplane impact the trailer, and saw it hit the runway. The accident truck's trailer is about 45 feet long and 13 feet tall. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Facility Directory/Alaska Supplement recommends that pilots maintain a 25-foot minimum threshold crossing height. The NTSB's investigation revealed that the gate system had been out of service for more than a year due to budgetary constraints, and that there was no Notice to Airman (NOTAM) issued concerning the inoperative gate system. The FAA certificated airport is owned and operated by the State of Alaska. According to the Airport Certification Manual, the airport manager is responsible to inspect, maintain, and repair airport facilities to ensure safe operations. Additionally, the airport manager is responsible for publishing NOTAM's concerning hazardous conditions. A 10-year review of annual FAA certification and compliance inspection forms revealed no discrepancy listed for the inoperative gates until 16 days after the accident.