Geographical / Geophysical / Scientific

Conclusions
Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors:
1. The right engine lost power when the intermediate spur gear on the torque sensor shaft failed. This resulted in loss of drive to the high-pressure engine-driven pump, fuel starvation, and immediate engine stoppage.
2. The ability of the left-hand No. 2 ejector pump to deliver fuel to the collector tank was compromised by foreign object debris (FOD) in the ejector pump nozzle.
3. When the fuel level in the left collector tank decreased, the left fuel level warning light likely illuminated but was not noticed by the crew.
4. The pilots did not execute the fuel level warning checklist because they did not perceive the illumination of the fuel level left tank warning light. Consequently, the fuel crossfeed valve remained closed and fuel from only the left wing was being supplied to the left engine.
5. The left engine flamed out as a result of depletion of the collector tank and fuel starvation, and the crew had to make a forced landing resulting in an impact with a concrete noise abatement wall.
Findings as to Risk:
1. Depending on the combination of fuel level and bank angle in single-engine uncoordinated flight, the ejector pump system may not have the delivery capacity, when the No. 1 ejector inlet is exposed, to prevent eventual depletion of the collector tank when the engine is operated at full power. Depletion of the collector tank will result in engine power loss.
2. The master caution annunciator does not flash; this leads to a risk that the the crew may not notice the illumination of an annunciator panel segment, in turn increasing the risk of them not taking action to correct the condition which activated the master caution.
3. When cockpit voice and flight data recordings are not available to an investigation, this may preclude the identification and communication of safety deficiencies to advance transportation safety.
4. Because the inlets of the ejector pumps are unscreened, there is a risk that FOD in the fuel tank may become lodged in an ejector nozzle and result in a decrease in the fuel delivery rate to the collector tank.
Other Findings:
1. The crew’s decision not to recover or jettison the birds immediately resulted in operation for an extended period with minimal climb performance.
2. The composition and origin of the FOD, as well as how or when it had been introduced into the fuel tank, could not be determined.
3. The SkyTrac system provided timely position information that would have assisted search and rescue personnel if position data had been required.
4. Saskatoon police, firefighters, and paramedics responded rapidly to the accident and provided effective assistance to the survivors.

Landing gear went through the ice after landing on ice/snow terrain.

In-flight loss of control due to loss of airspeed and subsequent stall of the aircraft at low altitude. Investigations determined that the rudder trim was set to the full left at the time of the accident as opposed to the normal (central) takeoff setting.

The accident occurred after the pilot suffered a loss of situational awareness while flying at low altitude, which did not allow him to avoid the collision with the mountain. Such operation conducted in a single pilot configuration was considered as a contributing factor as the workload was high.

Loss of control after the crew encountered adverse weather conditions with low level windshear. The following contributing factors were identified:
- Although the operations were carried out in accordance with the regulations in force, the pilots regularly exceeded the flight times and this type of prospecting mission is extremely tiring insofar as it is systematically operated at low altitude without the aid of the autopilot system in a high outside temperature environment, leading to greater than normal physical wear of the pilots,
- Poor flight preparation regarding the probable evolution of the weather conditions,
- The accident occurred in low visibility as the crew was presumably trying to return to his base,
- The accident occurred outside of the intended flight area,
- The flight, which was scheduled to take three hours, was started with an aircraft whose tanks were full (seven hours autonomy), unnecessarily increasing its weight,
- Poor flight planning,
- Non-compliance with standard operator procedures on part of the crew who positioned the flaps in an inappropriate angle to fly over obstacles,
- In the days preceding the accident, two incidents occurred at Paramirim Airport involving the captain, and neither of these two events had been reported to the management of the operator, indicating the absence of an effective control of operations,
- The supervision of crew schedules was poor,
- The operator wanted this type of flight to be carried out in the morning in order to avoid atmospheric turbulence specific to the region, but the crew decided to take off in the afternoon when the conditions were not favorable.

Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors:
1. The pilot did not avoid the trees that obstructed his immediate flight path on descent to the lake.
2. The damage to the aircraft from the tree-strike seriously compromised the pilot's ability to control the aircraft, to the point where continued flight was impossible.
3. The pilot and the passenger suffered serious injuries. It is highly likely that proper use of a passenger restraint system would have lessened the injuries to both persons.
Findings as to Risk:
1. Canadian regulations regarding the use of seats and seat restraint systems are not sufficiently clear about high-risk, aerial work operations, such as aerial application.
2. Transport Canada was not advised of the fish-dropping operations and was unaware that the passenger in the cabin was unrestrained during high-risk operations.
3. Canadian regulations do not require specific training in aerial application techniques, such as fish-dropping.
4. The installation of the fish-hopper equipment constituted an aircraft modification, which had not been approved by Transport Canada.
Other Findings:
1. The operator did not maintain a proper logbook.