Crash of an Embraer EMB-121A1 Xingu II in Campinas

Date & Time: Apr 2, 2019 at 2315 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
PT-FEG
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Sorocaba - Palmas
MSN:
121-057
YOM:
1982
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The twin engine airplane departed Sorocaba-Estadual Bertram Luiz Leupolz Airport at 2300LT on a flight to Palmas, Tocantins, carrying three passengers and a crew of two. Few minutes after takeoff, the crew encountered technical difficulties and was cleared to divert to Campinas-Viracopos Airport. On final, he realized he could not make it so he attempted an emergency landing in a prairie located about 6 km short of runway 15 threshold. The wreckage was found less than a km from the Jardim Bassoli condominium and all five occupants, slightly injured, were evacuated. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Crash of an Embraer EMB-820C Navajo in Santa Isabel

Date & Time: Feb 16, 2016 at 1430 LT
Operator:
Registration:
PT-WZA
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Jacarepaguá – Campinas
MSN:
820-020
YOM:
1976
Country:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
En route, the pilot encountered an unexpected situation and attempted an emergency landing. After landing on a road in Santa Isabel, the airplane collided with various obstacles and came to rest. All three occupants evacuated safely and the airplane was damaged beyond repair.

Crash of a McDonnell Douglas MD-11F in Campinas

Date & Time: Oct 13, 2012 at 1852 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N988AR
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Miami - Campinas
MSN:
48434/476
YOM:
1991
Flight number:
CWC425
Country:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
12900
Copilot / Total flying hours:
5198
Copilot / Total hours on type:
1368
Circumstances:
The airplane took off from Miami International Airport (KMIA), destined for Viracopos Airport (SBKP), with two pilots and a mechanic on board, on a non-regular cargo transport flight. The flight was uneventful up to the moment its landing in SBKP. On the approach for landing on runway 15, the crew performed the IFR ILS Z procedure. The weather conditions were VMC, with the wind coming from 140º at 19kt. When the aircraft was granted clearance to land, the wind strength was 20kt, gusting up to 29kt. The copilot was the Pilot Flying (PF), and the captain was the Pilot Monitoring (PM) at the moment of landing. When the aircraft touched down on the runway after the flare, the left main landing gear collapsed, causing the aircraft to skid on the runway for approximately 800 meters before stopping. There was substantial damage to the left main gear assembly, to the left wing, and left engine. The aircraft stopped within the runway limits. All three crew members were uninjured.
Probable cause:
It was determined that the “the landing gear failed due to overload in the cylinder structure”. The fracture started in the rear section of the cylinder in a connection hole which served as a tension concentration point, and ended in the front part of the cylinder with its breakage into two parts. Following a failure of the right main gear upon landing in Montevideo on 20 October 2009, the right main landing gear was replaced by VARIG Engineering & Maintenance (VEM), but the organization responsible for the research of damage, the specification of the services necessary for the restoration of airworthiness, and the provision of the services that enabled the restoration of the aircraft to an airworthy condition was not identified. The same aircraft parts were subjected to metallurgical analysis at the Boeing Long Beach Materials, Processing and Physics [MP&P] Laboratories, in Huntington Beach, California, USA; and the technical report issued by Boeing highlighted that in one of the points of origin of the failure, the analysis had identified characteristics similar to a pre-crack point, which would have begun earlier, probably due to overload. In the tasks that led to the restoration of the aircraft airworthiness after the accident in Uruguay in 2009 (Hard-Landing), and also in subsequent periodic inspections, the existence of pre-crack traces resulting from a previous overload condition may not have been identified, something that could have resulted in a point of stress concentration.
Final Report:

Crash of a Fokker 100 in Campinas

Date & Time: Aug 30, 2002 at 1205 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
PT-MRL
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Salvador – São Paulo
MSN:
11441
YOM:
1993
Flight number:
JJ3499
Country:
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
33
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
6500
Captain / Total hours on type:
3600.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
4300
Copilot / Total hours on type:
145
Circumstances:
The aircraft departed Salvador-Deputado Luís Eduardo Magalhães Airport at 0846LT on a schedule service JJ3499 to São Paulo-Guarulhos Airport, carrying 33 passengers and five crew members. En route, while cruising at an altitude of 35,000 feet, the crew encountered technical problems with the primary hydraulic system. He contacted ATC and was cleared to divert to Campinas-Viracopos Airport for an emergency landing. On approach, the crew was unable to lower the undercarriage that remained blocked in their wheel well. The crew elected to lower the gear manually and several troubleshootings were unsuccessful. The decision was taken to complete a belly landing on runway 33. After touchdown, the aircraft slid for few dozen metres and eventually came to rest. All 38 occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. It was later transferred to the TAM Museum.
Probable cause:
A loss of hydraulic fluids occurred on a hose separating a fitting from a pump on the right engine, causing the malfunction of the primary hydraulic system and resulting in the degradation of the mechanical system of the landing gear control command.
Final Report:

Crash of an Embraer ERJ-145 in Curitiba

Date & Time: Dec 28, 1998 at 0847 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
PT-SPE
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Campinas - Curitiba
MSN:
145-032
YOM:
1997
Flight number:
SL310
Country:
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
36
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
5200
Captain / Total hours on type:
100.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
4700
Copilot / Total hours on type:
800
Circumstances:
On final approach to runway 15, after passing through the last cloud layer, the pilot-in-command realized he was too high on the glide. Rather than initiating a go-around procedure, the captain increased the rate of descent at 1,800 feet per minute and continued with a wrong approach configuration. The aircraft landed with a positive acceleration of 11 gm causing the fuselage to break in two after the wings. The crew continued the braking procedure and vacated the runway before stopping the aircraft on a taxiway. All 40 occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
The following findings were identified:
- There was the participation of factors, with their own characteristics, that caused failures of attention, judgment and perceptual evaluation of distances and temporality. The qualitative training deficiency, the lack of cabin resource management and the low situational alert were significant contributing factors to the accident.
- PF has performed poorly in the use of the correct piloting technique in the combination of Speed x Ratio of Descent parameters.
- The instructor assigned by the company to supervise the acquisition of operational experience on route had not received specific instruction for the performance of this task. Technical and operational supervision was lacking.
- PF had good flight experience, but not in this type of aircraft. It was in the phase of acquiring operational experience in route. The inadequate action was also due to the little experience in the aircraft and in the circumstance of the operation, which required a quick correction close to the ground.
- The pilots did not adequately utilize the resources available in the cockpit for the proper operation of the aircraft. PF did not make the necessary corrections to modify the aircraft's trajectory, which was its assignment. The instructor (PNF), in turn, did not effectively correct or interfere with the PF flight, which would have been his responsibility since he was the supervisor of the operation. The pilots did not observe, yet, the technical-operational procedure foreseen in the Flight Operations Manual (MOV), regarding the GPWS warning. The crew did not observe that the warning determined an unsafe condition close to the touch. It was characterized an ineffective fulfillment of the tasks assigned to each crew member, besides the non-observance of the operational rules.
- On the IMC approach made, the PF varied the parameters, remaining high on the ramp. Upon reaching visual conditions, the PF increased the descent rate of the aircraft. The PNF, concerned with locating the runway, did not consider an inadequate PF correction.
- The PF, with the intention of reducing the drop ratio, did not apply correctly, in amplitude and in time, the power available in the engines. Near the touch, the PF increased the pitch angle, trying to reduce the drop ratio. Considering the low height (approximately 80 ft) and engine power (IDLE), the aircraft continued with a high rate of descent (approximately 1,800 ft/min), without the action taken by the PF altering its path. The PNF did not interfere in the application of the commands. Therefore, there was inadequate use of the aircraft commands by the crew members, in conditions for which they were qualified.
- The PF, even being alerted by the PNF about the low speed and high rate of descent, thought it was applying an adequate correction, however it kept the aircraft in an incompatible performance for landing. The PNF, despite having experience in flight and in the aircraft, showed a lack of knowledge of its limits regarding the point of irreversibility of an unsafe situation. The PNF was limited to alerting the PF about the situation, not guiding it on the correct way to make the corrections.
The PNF overestimated PF's capacity and did not take or try to take over the controls.
- The pilots were not aware of the maximum rate of descent during the touch for which the aircraft was certified, nor were they aware of the variation of that rate with respect to weight. The availability of the autopilot to the MDA could have minimized the ramp deviation observed.
Final Report:

Crash of a Douglas DC-8-55F in Asunción: 22 killed

Date & Time: Feb 4, 1996 at 1412 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
HK-3979X
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Barranquilla - Asunción - Campinas
MSN:
45882
YOM:
1966
Flight number:
ALA028
Country:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
22
Captain / Total flying hours:
9100
Captain / Total hours on type:
5919.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
3500
Copilot / Total hours on type:
3158
Aircraft flight hours:
66326
Aircraft flight cycles:
20567
Circumstances:
The aircraft was completing a positioning flight from Asunción to Campinas on behalf of Alas Paraguayas, under flight number ALA028. As there was no cargo on board, the crew decided to make profit of the situation to perform training upon takeoff. During the takeoff roll on runway 02, at Vr speed, the captain reduced the power on engine n°1 and after liftoff, he reduced power on engine n°2. With the undercarriage still down and the flaps at 15°, the aircraft became unstable, lost height and crashed in the district of Mariano Roque Alonso, about 1,500 metres past the runway end. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and all four occupants were killed as well as 18 people on ground, most of them children taking part to a volleyball game.
Probable cause:
It was determined that the loss of control during initial climb was the consequence of the decision of the crew to perform training upon takeoff, intentionally reducing power on both engines n°1 and 2. This decision was taken at a critical phase of flight and the copilot-in-command was unable to maintain control of the aircraft, causing the aircraft to lose speed and to stall.
The following contributing factors were reported:
- The captain's experience in such configuration was low,
- Lack of flight safety doctrine in the cockpit during all flight,
- Execution of unauthorized takeoff training under uncontrolled conditions,
- Execution of such take-off training by a person who was not qualified as an instructor.
Final Report:

Crash of a Boeing 707-324C in São Paulo

Date & Time: Oct 9, 1994 at 1742 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
HK-3355X
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Campinas - Santa Cruz
MSN:
18886
YOM:
1965
Country:
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
After takeoff from Campinas-Viracopos Airport, while climbing, the crew informed ATC about technical problems and was cleared to divert to São Paulo-Guarulhos Airport for an emergency landing. On final, both main landing gears were lowered but apparently not locked while the nose gear remained stuck in its main wheel. Upon touchdown on runway 09L, the aircraft sank on its belly and slid for few dozen metres before coming to rest. All five occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
It was determined that the hydraulic pump n°2 on the engine n°3 failed after takeoff, causing an oil leak and a loss of hydraulic pressure. The undercarriage could be lowered but not locked down while the crew attempted to lower the nose gear manually but doing so, caused the locking pin to obstruct and damage the landing gear extension system. It was also reported that several seals located on hydraulic lines were broken and have not been replaced during the last C check.

Crash of a Britten-Norman BN-2A-6 Islander near Campinas: 7 killed

Date & Time: May 13, 1980 at 1245 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
PT-KHK
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Rio de Janeiro - Campinas
MSN:
208
YOM:
1970
Country:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
6
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
7
Circumstances:
The twin engine airplane departed Rio de Janeiro-Santos Dumont Airport at 1231LT on a special flight to Campinas-Viracopos, carrying six passengers and a pilot. The goal of the mission was a survey flight on behalf of the 'Rondon Project (Projeto Rondon) of the Ministry of Defence. At 1251LT, the pilot cancelled his IFR flight plan and informed ATC he was continuing under VFR mode. This was the last radio contact. As the airplane failed to land at Viracopos Airport, SAR operations were initiated but eventually abandoned 19 days later as no trace of the aircraft nor the 7 occupants was found.

Crash of a Learjet 24D in Campinas-Viracopos

Date & Time: Aug 23, 1979
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
PT-DZU
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
MSN:
24-244
YOM:
1971
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
After landing at Campinas-Viracopos Airport, the twin engine airplane was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran and came to rest few dozen meters further. Both pilots escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Crash of a BAc 111-520FN in Campinas

Date & Time: Jan 4, 1977 at 2230 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
PP-SDS
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Vitória – Rio de Janeiro – Campinas
MSN:
236
YOM:
1971
Flight number:
TR203
Country:
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
38
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The approach to Campinas-Viracopos Airport was completed in heavy rain falls. After touchdown on runway 32, a tire burst. The airplane went out of control, veered off runway to the left and came to rest in a muddy ground about 360 metres further. All 43 occupants were evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.