Crash of an Antonov AN-26 in Almaty: 4 killed

Date & Time: Mar 13, 2021 at 1722 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
02 white
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Nursultan - Almaty
MSN:
72 01
YOM:
1978
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
4
Circumstances:
Following an uneventful flight from Nursultan Nazarbayev Airport on behalf of the National Security Committee of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the crew was approaching Almaty Airport runway 23R in marginal weather conditions with a ceiling at 300 feet and a visibility limited to 5 km in freezing drizzle. On short final, the aircraft struck the ground and crashed 600 metres short of runway, bursting into flames. Two crew members were rescued while four others were killed.
Those killed were:
Major Gabit Esimdaevich Barlykbayev,
Captain Doszhan Galymbekovich Baimuratov,
1st Lt Mukhtar Hadzhimukanovich Sagimbayev,
Sgt Vasilkov Evgeny Borisovich.

Crash of a Fokker 100 in Almaty: 12 killed

Date & Time: Dec 27, 2019 at 0722 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
UP-F1007
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Almaty - Astana
MSN:
11496
YOM:
1996
Flight number:
Z92100
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
93
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
12
Circumstances:
The Fokker 100 departed runway 05R at Almaty Airport on a regular schedule service (flight Z9/BEK2100) to Astana-Nursultan Nazarbayev Airport, carrying 93 passengers and a crew of five. Shortly after liftoff, while in initial climb at an altitude of 50-100 feet, the airplane lost height and veered to the right, struck a concrete wall then crashed onto a house located in a residential area, about 500 meters south of the runway 23R threshold. The airplane broke into several parts and 12 occupants were killed, among them the captain. At the time of the accident, the visibility was about one km with smoke and mist.

Crash of a PZL-Mielec AN-28 in Mezhdurechenskoye: 5 killed

Date & Time: Oct 4, 2017 at 0758 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
UP-A2807
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Almaty - Shymkent
MSN:
1AJ007-14
YOM:
1990
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
5
Circumstances:
The aircraft departed Almaty Airport at 1835LT on an ambulance mission to Shymkent, carrying two doctors, two pilots and one flight mechanic. Twelve minutes later, the twin engine aircraft crashed in flames near the village of Mezhdurechenskoye located about 25 km northwest of Almaty Airport. The aircraft was totally destroyed by impact forces and post crash fire and all five occupants were killed.

Crash of a Canadair RegionalJet CRJ-200ER in Almaty: 21 killed

Date & Time: Jan 29, 2013 at 1310 LT
Operator:
Registration:
UP-CJ006
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Kokshetau - Almaty
MSN:
7413
YOM:
2000
Flight number:
VSV760
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
16
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
21
Captain / Total flying hours:
18194
Captain / Total hours on type:
1010.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
3507
Copilot / Total hours on type:
132
Aircraft flight hours:
25707
Aircraft flight cycles:
22975
Circumstances:
Following an uneventful flight from Kokshetau, the crew started the descent to Almaty Airport and was cleared for an ILS approach (Cat IIIb approach) to runway 23R. At this time, the horizontal visibility was 200 metres, the vertical visibility 40 metres and the RVR for runway 23R was 275-250-225 metres respectively. Due to this poor weather conditions at destination, the captain got stressed, creating a strong emotional reaction. On short final, at an altitude of 180 metres, the captain decided to abandon the landing procedure and initiated a go-around manoeuvre. The automatic pilot system was deactivated and the TO/GA mode was activated. Four seconds later, the captain pushed the control column forward, causing the aircraft to descend. The EGPWS alarm sounded in the cockpit but there was no response from the flying crew. In a pitch angle of -16° and with a descent rate of about 20-30 metres per second, the aircraft impacted ground and disintegrated in a snow covered field. The wreckage was found some 1,400 metres short of runway. All 21 occupants were killed. Due to the actual weather conditions, the crew should perform a Cat IIIc approach.
Probable cause:
The accident with aircraft CRJ-200 UP-CJ006 occurred during the execution of a go-around, in instrument meteorological conditions, without the possibility of visual contact with ground reference points (vertical visibility in the fog did not exceed 40 m), the necessity of which was caused by the mismatch between the actual weather conditions and the minimum conditions for which the crew was certified to land. As a result, the deflection of the elevator towards a dive of the aircraft caused a descent and collision with the ground. It was not possible to uniquely identify the causes of the aircraft's transfer to a dive from the available data. The Commission did not find evidence of failures of aviation equipment, as well as external to the aircraft (icing, wind shear, wake turbulence) when trying to perform a go-around.
The most likely factors that led to the accident, were:
- Partial loss performance of the pilot in command, which at the time of aircraft impact with the ground was not in a working position;
- The lack of CRM levels in the crew, and violation of the Fly-Navigate-Communicate principle, which manifested itself in diverting attention by the co-pilot to conduct external radio communication and lack of control of the flight instrument parameters;
- The lack of response to the EGPWS and the actions required;
- The impact somatogravic illusions of perception of the pitch angle (a nose-up illusion);
- Increased emotional stress by the crew members associated with the unjustified expectations of improved weather conditions at the time of landing;
- Failure to comply with the requirements for health examination of flight personnel, which led to the pilot in command flying without the rehabilitation period and without assessment of his health status after undergoing surgery.
Final Report:

Crash of a Canadair CL-604-2B16 Challenger in Almaty: 1 killed

Date & Time: Dec 26, 2007 at 0302 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
D-ARWE
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Hanovre – Almaty – Macao
MSN:
5454
YOM:
2000
Flight number:
JCX826
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
7200
Captain / Total hours on type:
1258.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
2650
Copilot / Total hours on type:
60
Aircraft flight hours:
7882
Aircraft flight cycles:
4556
Circumstances:
On December 25, 2007 a crew of JetConnection Businessflight AG airline including the PIC, the co-pilot and a flight attendant was conducting a charter flight JCX826 routed Hannover (Germany), Astana (Republic of Kazakhstan) – Macao (China) on a CL-604 aircraft (registration D-ARWE). Apart from the crew there was one passenger on board. At 12:10 (hereinafter UTC time is used) on December 25, 2007 the crew took off at Hannover Airport. During the flight the crew was informed that there was no fuel available for refueling the aircraft at Astana Airport. Due to this the crew decided to change the flight route and refuel the aircraft at Almaty International Airport (Republic of Kazakhstan). The flight from Hannover to Almaty in accordance with the PIC explanations was normal. No faults in the operation of the aircraft systems or equipment were detected. At 18:46 the crew landed at Almaty Airport. The ground handling service at Almaty Airport was provided by Bercut Air Services KZ based at the airport. The departure from Almaty to Macao according to the schedule was planned for 20:50 on December 25, 2007. The ground handling and servicing was provided by Bercut Air Services KZ Company. In accordance with the work order the Almaty ground services conducted refueling and anti-icing. The Pre-Flight Check was conducted by the PIC. He also monitored the refueling and stabilizer and wing anti-icing. According to the PIC interrogation there were no faults detected in the operation of aircraft systems and equipment. 8460 liters (6827 kg) of TC-1 condition fuel was refueled. According to the estimations, total fuel on board was 7605 kg. The refueled fuel was distributed in the fuel tanks in accordance with the AFM of the CL-604 aircraft. In accordance with the estimations the aircraft weight was 20659 kg, CG 33,1%, which was within the CL-604 AFM limitations. During the pre-flight preparation for the flight to Macao the crew of the CL-604 D-ARWE did not receive the meteorological consultation or documentation at the Almaty Meteorological Center. According to BFU information the crew of the JCX826 flight had received the integrated meteorological consultation for the flight to Macao before the takeoff from Hannover. In Almaty PIC has received updated data through the Internet from the website of the German Meteorological Service (DWD) and also from the PPS provider of the JetConnection Businessflight AG (Billund, Denmark). According to the ATC tape recorder data containing the communication of the СL-604 D-ARWE crew with the ATC offices of Almaty airport, at 20:17:55 the crew informed the Ground Control that they were ready to startup and taxi right after the completion of the anti-icing procedure. At 20:18:24 the Ground Control instructed the crew: “JCX826, expect start up in 5 minutes.” At 20:20:48 in reply to the Controller’s request if they were ready for start-up the crew reported: “We are expecting anti-icing which is about to start now”. While waiting for the anti-icing the crew received the ATC clearance for departure. In accordance with the DE-ICING\ANTI-ICING REQUEST from the 25.12.2007, signed by the PIC and the Bercut Air Servises KZ manager the processing with using Type 1 and Type 2 fluids was conducted in two steps. On the first stage Type 1 deicing fluid (Killfrost DF Plus) was applied to remove the icing with the estimated fluid to water ratio of 70/30%. According to the enquiry of the de-icing operator the temperature of the Type 1 fluid in the tank of the SIMON GLOBAL 2110 machine used for the fluid application was about + 80˚ С, and at the outlet of the sprayer it was not less than +60˚ С. Note: The check of the SIMON GLOBAL 2110 machine conducted by the investigation team after the accident revealed that the temperature of the Type 1 fluid at the outlet of the sprayer is +66˚ С, which complies with the СL-604 OM (Part 1, page 06-12-17). On the second stage of the anti-icing procedure the Type 2 anti-icing fluid was used (Killfrost ABC 2000) with the estimated fluid to water ratio of 100/0%. Note: In the fluid Type 1 and Type 2 delivery receipt No.4002014 by mistake was shown unreal concentration 70/00 for the Type 2 fluid instead of its real concentration 100/00. The OM of the CL-604 does not suggest preliminary heating and heating monitoring of Type 2 fluid. According to the record in the aircraft fuelling receipt the amount of the applied Type 2 fluid was 250 liters. According to the requirements of Annex A, page XXI of the AEA, Training Recommendation and background Information for de-icing/anti-icing of aircraft on the ground, Edition 2, September 2005 the recommended anti-icing fluid minimum for the wing and stabilizer of a CL-604 type aircraft was 100 liters. Thus enough Type 2 fluid was applied for the anti-icing of CL-604 D-ARWE. The inspection of the fluid samples used for the de-icing/anti-icing of the CL-604 D-ARWE aircraft conducted at Almaty airport laboratory revealed that the Type 1 fluid had an actual fluid to water ratio of 67/33% while the Type 2 fluid 99/1%. Provided the OAT at Almaty airport at the time of the fluid application was minus 13˚ С, the mentioned ratios were within the requirements of the CL-604 OM (Part 1, Section VI, Cold Weather Operations). The actual weather at Almaty airport according to the request of the Approach Control for 20:49 was as follows: surface wind 360˚ 2 m/sec, RVR 2900 m, light snow, mist, clouds 8 oktas, nimbostratus, fractonimbus, cloudbase 150 m, QFE 718 mm mercury, OAT minus 12,9˚ С, dewpoint minus 13,7˚, moisture content 93%, QFE 718 mm mercury. In accordance with the de-icing/anti-icing operator the de-/anti-icing procedure was conducted in compliance with the CL-604 OM recommendations in the following order: stabilizer, left wing, right wing. Every surface was applied first with Type 1 and then Type 2 fluid. The time between the completion of the Type 1 application and the beginning of the Type 2 application in accordance with the operator’s explanations did not exceed 1.5-2 minutes which is suggested in Section VI of the CL0604 OM. According to the estimations conducted by the investigation team the application of the Type 2 fluid was started at 20:37. Note: In accordance with the CL-604 OM (Part 1, page 06-12-13), the holdover time of the Type 2 fluid with the fluid to water ration of 100/0 in the OAT range of -3…-20˚ С, with precipitation in the form of snow and snow grain is 15…30 minutes. According to the information recorded by the FDR, during the de-/anti-icing the aircraft flaps were retracted while the stabilizer deflection was minus 4,7˚. By 20:43 the de-/anti-icing procedure was completed. On leaving the aircraft the PIC made a visual and tactile (by touching the wing surface) inspection of the anti-icing quality, admitted that it was satisfactory by signing in the de-/anti-icing receipt. After that the PIC returned to the aircraft and the crew began the engine start-up. In accordance with the FDR information, by 20:46 the crew had started up first the right engine and then the left engine. The N2 of the right and left engine in the idle mode was 61,5 % and 62,0 % respectively. In 10 seconds after the left engine start-up the Cowl Anti-Ice was engaged. In accordance with the CVR information, a check at a stage After Engine Start was performed by the flight crew in a volume which stipulated by the JetConnection Businessflight AG “ABBRIVIATED CHECKLIST”. However a comparison of this checklist with the CL-604 D-ARWE AFM checklist (Chapter 4 “Normal Procedures” Section “Consolidated Checklists” Item L “After Engine Start Check”) shows the absences of WAI and CAI systems checks. Note: For a number of other preflight preparation stages the JetConnection Businessflight AG “ABBRIVIATED CHECKLIST” also doesn’t cover all procedures stipulated by the CL-604 AFM. At 20:47:42 the crew reported the Ground Control that they were ready for taxiing. At 20:48:25 the Ground Control cleared the crew for the holding point following the leader van. Within 20:51:17 – 20:51:45, the crew checked the rudder, the ailerons and elevators and extended the flaps to the takeoff position (Flaps 20). The stabilizer position (-4,7˚) did not change. At 20:51:55 the crew was instructed by the Ground Control to expect further instructions at the holding point and contact the Tower Control. At 20:52:17 after contacting the Tower Control the crew was instructed to wait on the holding point as there was an MD-83 aircraft making Flight UKM 109 on final at a distance of 14 km. At 20:57:15, after the MD-83 landed the Tower Control cleared the CL-604 D-ARWE to line up at RWY 05 and at 21:01:30 they were cleared for takeoff. During the takeoff an increasing right bank started developing. As the aircraft was banking to the right it touched the right runway edge with its right wing tip. Then the aircraft, leaning on the right wing, moved to the graded airfield to the right of the runway and hit its surface with the right main landing gear and nose landing gear. During the further movement the aircraft hit the reinforced fence of the airdrome and shifting on the ground 190 m beyond the airdrome finally stopped. At the final stage of movement a fire occurred which was extinguished by the airport fire brigades. The actual weather at Almaty airport checked after the accident alert at 21:04 was as follows: wind 350° 4 m/sec, visibility 1200 m (RVR 2500 m), snow, mist, clouds 8 oktas, nimbostratus, fractonimbus, cloudbase 120 m, OAT minus 14° С, dewpoint minus 15° С, moisture content 92%, pressure 718 mm mercury. Runway 05 condition – dry snow up to 10 mm, friction factor 0.32. The accident occurred on December 25, 2007 at 21:02 UTC (26.12.2007 at 03:02 local time).
Probable cause:
The accident involving a CL-604 aircraft registered D-ARWE was caused by the asymmetric lift loss at takeoff which led to aircraft stall right after the liftoff, collision with the ground and obstacles, aircraft destruction and ground fire. The lift loss was most probably caused by the contamination of the wing leading edge with precipitation in the form of snow after the anti-icing which occurred as the crew did not engage the Wing Anti-Ice before the takeoff which is a mandatory requirement of the CL-604 AFM in the actual weather conditions (moderate snow, OAT minus 14° С, moisture content 92 %, dewpoint minus 15° С, dry snow on the runway, 10 mm thick). Significant violation of the CL-604 AFM/OM limitations concerning the rate of rotation (pitch rate) when taking off with contaminated wing provided it was impossible to monitor this parameter instrumentally could have contributed to the situation. The inefficiency of the availably stall protection system at takeoff due to the hypersensitive wing as to contamination of its leading edge cannot completely guarantee prevention of similar accidents in the future.
Final Report:

Ground fire of an Ilyushin II-62M in Istanbul

Date & Time: Apr 24, 1998 at 0015 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
YR-IRD
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Istanbul - Almaty
MSN:
47 27 5 4 6
YOM:
1977
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
9
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
64
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
At Istanbul-Atatürk Airport, while preparing for takeoff, one of the engine caught fire and exploded. All 73 occupants (64 passengers and nine crew members) evacuated the aircraft and were uninjured. A fire erupted, destroying the rear part of the airplane.
Probable cause:
Engine fire and explosion.

Crash of a Boeing 737-2H4 in Almaty

Date & Time: Apr 12, 1998 at 1448 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
P4-NEN
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Aktyubinsk - Almaty
MSN:
20925
YOM:
1974
Flight number:
OEG717
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
8
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
80
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Aircraft flight hours:
71160
Aircraft flight cycles:
84935
Circumstances:
After touchdown on a wet runway surface, the crew aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran at a speed of 80 knots, lost its right main gear and right engine before coming to rest few dozen metres further. All 88 occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Crash of a Tupolev TU-154B-2 in Karachi

Date & Time: Jan 21, 1995
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
UN-85455
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Karachi - Almaty
MSN:
80A455
YOM:
1980
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
12
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
105
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
During the takeoff roll at Karachi-Quaid-e-Azam Airport, at a speed of 270-280 km/h, the pilot-in-command pulled up on the control column to start the rotation but the aircraft failed to respond. The crew decided to abandon the takeoff procedure and initiated an emergency braking procedure. Unable to stop within the remaining distance, the aircraft overran, rolled for about 500 metres then lost its nose gear and came to rest. All 117 occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
It was determined that the crew failed to prepare the flight according to published procedures. The mass and balance sheet was incorrect. At the time of the accident, the total weight of the aircraft was six tons above MTOW and the CofG as too far forward.

Ground accident of an Ilyushin II-22M-15 in Almaty

Date & Time: Jan 15, 1995
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
UN-75915
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
MSN:
29640 17101
YOM:
1983
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
0
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The II-22 operated by the Kazakh government collided with an Antonov AN-12 at Almaty Airport. The accident occurred in unknown circumstances and while the AN-12 suffered minor damages, the II-22 was damaged beyond repair. There were no casualties. The accident occurred somewhere in January 1995, exact date unknown.

Crash of an Antonov AN-12 in Almaty: 8 killed

Date & Time: Nov 26, 1990
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Tashkent - Almaty
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
8
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
8
Circumstances:
On final approach to Almaty Airport, the crew decided to initiate a go-around for unknown reasons when the aircraft lost height and crashed. All eight occupants were killed. There were low clouds and rain falls at the time of the accident.