Cessna 207 Skywagon/Stationair

The pilot reported that the approach appeared normal, but during the landing on the 1,500 feet long gravel strip, the airplane firmly struck the runway and bounced. He added that the bounce was high and that the remaining runway was too short to correct the landing with power. The pilot chose to go around, applying full power and 20° of flaps for the balked landing procedure. During the climb, the airplane drifted left toward 50-ft-tall trees about 150 ft from the departure end of the runway. Unable to climb over the trees, the airplane struck the tree canopy, the nose dropped, and the pilot instinctively reduced power as the airplane descended through the trees and impacted terrain. The wings and fuselage were substantially damaged. The pilot reported no preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.

The single engine aircraft was completing a charter flight from Trujillo to Pucallpa, carrying two pilots and pilot. While cruising over the Cajamarca Province, the pilot encountered poor weather conditions with heavy rain falls. He modified his route and was able to continue under VFR mode in good weather conditions. Nevertheless, he continued at an insufficient altitude when the aircraft impacted ground and crashed in a mountainous area. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and all three occupants were killed. There was no fire.

On approach to Santa Rosa de Yacuma Airport, the pilot encountered poor weather conditions and initiated a go-around as the visibility was poor due to rain falls. Few minutes later, during a second attempt to land, the aircraft passed over the runway threshold when the pilot decided to initiate a second go-around procedure. He made a left turn when he lost control of the airplane that crashed 500 metres past the runway threshold, bursting into flames. The aircraft was destroyed and all six occupants were killed.

During cruise flight through an area of mountainous terrain, the commercial pilot became geographically disoriented and selected the incorrect route through the mountains. Upon realizing it was the incorrect route, he initiated a steep climb while executing a 180° turn. During the steep climbing turn, the airplane inadvertently entered instrument meteorological conditions, and the airplane subsequently impacted an area of rocky, rising terrain. The pilot reported there were no mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation of the airplane.

Shortly after takeoff from a grassy airstrip located just outside from the town of Taylor, some 15 km southeast of Fort St John, the single engine aircraft crashed in an open field, bursting into flames. The aircraft was totally destroyed by a post crash fire and both occupants, a father and his son, were killed.

The company flight coordinator on duty when the pilot got her "duty-on" briefing reported that, during the "duty-on" briefing, he informed the commercial pilot that most flights to the intended destination had been cancelled in the morning due to poor weather conditions and that one pilot had turned around due to weather. No record was found indicating that the pilot used the company computer to review weather information before the flight nor that she had received or retrieved any weather information before the flight. If she had obtained weather information, she would have seen that the weather was marginal visual flight rules to instrument flight rules conditions, which might have affected her decision to initiate the flight. The pilot subsequently departed for the scheduled commuter flight with four passengers on board; the flight was expected to be 20 minutes long. Review of automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast data transmitted by the airplane showed that the airplane's flight track was farther north than the typical track for the destination and that the airplane did not turn south toward the destination after crossing the channel. Data from an on board multi-function display showed that, as the airplane approached mountainous terrain on the west side of the channel, the airplane made a series of erratic pitch-and-roll maneuvers before it impacted trees and terrain. Post-accident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. One of the passengers reported that, after takeoff, the turbulence was "heavy," and there were layers of fog and clouds and some rain. Based on the weather reports, the passenger statement regarding the weather, and the flight's erratic movement just before impact, it is likely that the flight encountered instrument meteorological conditions as it approached the mountainous terrain and that the pilot then lost situational awareness and flew into trees and terrain. According to the company's General Operations Manual (GOM), operational control was delegated to the flight coordinator for the accident flight, and the flight coordinator and pilot-in-command (PIC) were jointly responsible for preflight planning, flight delay, and flight release, which included completing the flight risk assessment (FRA) process. This process required the PIC to fill out an FRA form and provide it to the flight coordinator before flight. However, the pilot did not fill out the form. The GOM stated that one of the roles of the flight dispatcher (also referred to as "flight coordinator") was to assist the pilot in flight preparation by gathering and disseminating pertinent information regarding weather and any information deemed necessary for the safety of flight. It also stated that the dispatcher was to assist the PIC as necessary to ensure that all items required for flight preparation were accomplished before each flight. However, the flight coordinator did not discuss all the risks and weather conditions associated with the flight with the pilot, which was contrary to the GOM. When the flight coordinator who was on duty at the time the airplane was ready to depart did not receive a completed FRA, he did not stop the flight from departing, which was contrary to company policy. By not completing an FRA, it is likely the total risks associated with the accident flight were not adequately assessed. Neither the pilot nor the flight coordinator should have allowed the flight to be released without having completed an FRA form, which led to a loss of operational control and the failure to do so likely contributed to the accident. Interviews with company personnel and a review of a sampling of FRA forms revealed that company personnel, including the flight coordinators, lacked a fundamental knowledge of operational control theory and practice and operational practices (or lack thereof), which led to a loss of operational control for the accident flight. The company provided no formal flight coordinator training nor was a formal training program required. All of the company's qualified flight coordinators were delegated operational control and, thus, were required by 14 Code of Federal Regulations Section 119.69 to be qualified through training, experience, and expertise and to fully understand aviation safety standards and safe operating practice with respect to the company's operation and its GOM. However, the company had no formal method of documenting these requirements; therefore, it lacked a method of determining its flight coordinators' qualifications. In post-accident interviews, the previous Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) principal operations inspector (POI), who became the frontline manager over the certificate, stated that the company used the minimum regulatory standard when it came to ceiling and visibility requirements and that the company did not have any company minimums in place. He further stated that a cloud ceiling of 500 ft and 2 miles visibility would not allow for power-off glide to land even though the company was required to meet this regulation. When asked if he believed the practice of allowing the pilot to decide when to fly was adequate, he said it was not and there should have been route altitudes. However, no action was taken to change SeaPort's operations. The POI at the time of the accident stated that she was also aware that the company was operating contrary to federal regulatory standards for gliding distance to shore. A review of FAA surveillance activities of the company revealed that the POI provided surveillance of the company following the accident, including an operational control inspection, and noted deficiencies with the company's operational procedures; however, the FAA did not hold the company accountable for correcting the identified operational deficiencies. If the FAA had conducted an investigation or initiated an enforcement action pertaining to the company's apparent disregard of the regulatory standard for maintaining glide distance before the accident similar to the inspection conducted following the accident, it is plausible the flight would not have departed or continued when glide distance could not be maintained. The FAA's failure to ensure that the company corrected these deficiencies likely contributed to this accident which resulted, in part, from the company's failure to comply with its GOM and applicable federal regulations, including required glide distance to shore. The company was the holder of a Medallion Shield until they voluntarily suspended the Shield status but retained the "Star" status and continued advertising as a Shield carrier. Medallion stated in an email "With this process of voluntarily suspension, there will be no official communication to the FAA…" Given that Medallion advertises that along with the Shield comes recognition by the FAA as an operator who incorporates higher standards of safety, it seems contrary to safety that they would withhold information pertaining to a suspension of that status.

The pilot departed on a postmaintenance test flight during day visual meteorological conditions. According to the operator, the purpose of the flight was to break in six recently installed engine cylinders, and the flight was expected to last 3.5 hours. Recorded automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast data showed that the airplane was operating at altitudes of less than 500 ft mean sea level for the majority of the flight. The data ended about 3 hours after takeoff with the airplane located about 23 miles from the accident site. There were no witnesses to the accident, which occurred in a remote area. When the airplane did not return, the operator reported to the Federal Aviation Administration that the airplane was overdue. Searchers subsequently discovered the fragmented wreckage submerged in a swift moving river, about 40 miles southeast of the departure/destination airport. Postmortem toxicology tests identified 21% carboxyhemoglobin (carbon monoxide) in the pilot's blood. The pilot was a nonsmoker, and nonsmokers normally have no more than 3% carboxyhemoglobin. There was no evidence of postimpact fire; therefore, it is likely that the pilot's elevated carboxyhemoglobin level was from acute exposure to carbon monoxide during the 3 hours of flight time before the accident. As the pilot did not notify air traffic control or the operator's home base of any problems during the flight, it is unlikely that he was aware that there was carbon monoxide present. Early symptoms of carbon monoxide exposure may include headache, malaise, nausea, and dizziness. Carboxyhemoglobin levels between 10% and 20% can result in confusion, impaired judgment, and difficulty concentrating. While it is not possible to determine the exact symptoms the pilot experienced, it is likely that the pilot had symptoms that may have been distracting as well as some degree of impairment in his judgment and concentration. Given the low altitudes at which he was operating the airplane, he had little margin for error. Thus, it is likely that the carbon monoxide exposure adversely affected the pilot's performance and contributed to his failure to maintain clearance from the terrain. According to the operator, the airplane had a "winter heat kit" installed, which modified the airplane's original cabin heat system. The modification incorporated an additional exhaust/heat shroud system designed to provide increased cabin heat during wintertime operations. Review of maintenance records revealed that the modification had not been installed in accordance with Federal Aviation Administration field approval procedures. Examination of the recovered wreckage did not reveal evidence of any preexisting mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal operation of the airplane. Examination of the airplane's right side exhaust/heat exchanger did not reveal any leaks or fractures that would have led to carbon monoxide in the cabin. Because the left side exhaust/heat exchanger was
not recovered, it was not possible to determine whether it was the source of the carbon monoxide.

The single engine aircraft departed Bucaramanga-Palonegro Airport on a charter flight to Málaga-Jerónimo de Aguayo Airport, carrying six passengers and one pilot. En route, the aircraft started a descent then a turn to the left when it impacted the slope of a mountain and crashed near Piedecuesta. The wreckage was found the following day and all seven occupants were killed. There was no fire.

The single engine aircraft departed Lima-Callao-Jorge Chávez Airport bound for Pisco. While cruising in foggy conditions east of Lima, the airplane collided with a mountain located between La Molina and Villa Maria del Triunfo. The wreckage was found in the evening, around 1840LT, and all three occupants were killed.

During a local sightseeing flight, the pilot noticed that the engine had lost partial power, and he initiated a turn back toward the airport while troubleshooting the loss of power. Despite the pilot's attempts, the engine would not regain full power and was surging and sputtering randomly. The pilot entered the airport's traffic pattern on the downwind leg, and, while on final approach to the runway, the airplane encountered multiple downdrafts and wind gusts. It is likely that, due to the downdrafts and the partial loss of engine power, the pilot was not able to maintain airplane control. The airplane subsequently landed hard short of the runway surface and nosed over, coming to rest inverted. The reported wind conditions around the time of the accident varied between 20 and 70 degrees right of the runway heading and were 14 knots gusting to greater than 20 knots. In addition, a company pilot who landed about 8 minutes before the accident reported that he encountered strong downdrafts and windshear while on final approach to the runway and that he would not have been able to reach the runway if he had a partial or total loss of engine power. Postaccident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no evidence of any preexisting mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. The engine was subsequently installed on a test stand and was successfully run through various power settings for several minutes. The reason for the partial loss of engine power could not be determined.