Trans World Airlines - TWA

During the takeoff roll on runway 01R at San Francisco Airport, after the V1 speed was reach, the crew noticed vibrations while the aircraft started to slow down. The captain decided to abort the takeoff but unable to stop within the remaining runway, the airplane overran, lost its nose gear and engine n°2 before coming to rest in the San Francisco Bay, broken in two. All three crew members were evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

During the takeoff roll from runway 30 at Tel Aviv-Lod Airport by night, just before V1 speed, the crew saw an Israel Air Force Boeing KC-97G Stratotanker that was towed across the active runway. The pilot-in-command initiated an immediate takeoff when the left wing struck the Stratotanker. On impact, both airplanes caught fire and exploded. While all three crew members on board the 707 survived, both technicians on board the KC-97 were killed.

The flight departed New York-JFK to carry out training and proficiency check manoeuvres at the National Aviation Facilities Experimental Center (NAFEC) at the Atlantic City Airport. The first captain to receive the proficiency check occupied the left seat. The instructor-pilot occupied the right seat, and a flight engineer occupied the flight engineer's position. The other two captains occupied the flight deck as observers while awaiting their turn at the controls. Flight 5787 landed on runway 13 then requested, and the tower approved, clearance to taxi to the end of the runway, execute a 180 degrees turn, and take off on runway 31. Prior to takeoff, the instructor pilot briefed the captain to expect a simulated engine failure after V1, to execute a three-engine climbout, and to request vectors for a precision ILS approach to runway 13, using the aircraft's flight director system. Take off was initiated at 12:20 and instructor pilot retarded the No. 4 engine to training idle thrust after V1 had been reached. The takeoff was continued and emergency procedures were executed in accordance with the TWA engine failure emergency checklist. The aircraft was leveled off at 1,500 feet and vectored to intercept the ILS course in the vicinity of the outer marker. The No. 4 engine remained in idle thrust and the instructor pilot directed the captain to execute a simulated three-engine ILS approach, and to expect a missed approach at the decision height. The landing gear was extended and after the aircraft passed the outer marker, flaps were placed full down (50deg). The tower cleared TWA 5787 to land. At the decision height, a missed approach was announced. The captain advanced power on engines 1, 2, and 3, and called for "25 Flaps," "Takeoff Power," "Up Gear." However, neither the flaps nor the landing gear moved from their previous positions. The aircraft was accelerated to 130 knots and a missed-approach climb was instituted. Approximately 16 t o 18 seconds after the start of the missed-approach procedure, one of the observer pilots commented, "Oh! Oh! Your hydraulic system's zeroed." At 300 feet agl and an airspeed of 127 knots all hydraulic pumps were shutdown, but power on the no. 4 engine was not restored. Directional control was lost and the aircraft struck the ground in a right-wing low nose down attitude. The Boeing 707 broke up and caught fire.

Flight 128 was a scheduled domestic flight from Los Angeles International Airport, California, to Boston, Massachusetts, with intermediate stops at Cincinnati, Ohio and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The departure from Los Angeles was delayed due to an equipment change but the aircraft was airworthy at the time of departure. The only carry- over discrepancy was an inoperative generator which had no bearing on this accident. The flight took off from Los Angeles at 1737 hours Eastern Standard Time. The descent into the Cincinnati area from cruising altitude was delayed due to conflicting traffic and was initiated closer to the destination than normal. It required the crew to conduct the descent with a higher than normal rate toward the initial approach fix. The crew discussed the technique they were going to use to increase the rate of descent, and evidence revealed that they were relaxed, unworried and operating within the established operating limits of the aircraft. As the flight reported leaving 15 500 ft remarks were made in the cockpit about the rapidity of the descent and the hope, apparently with reference to the underlying cloud conditions, that it would be a thin layer. The crew checked the anti-icing equipment and conversations after that time indicated that they were not aware of any discrepancies regarding that system. Control of the flight was normal until the flight was turned over to the approach controller who failed to provide the crew with the current altimeter setting of 30.07 in Hg instead of 30.06 previously given to the crew. However, shortly after the crew intercepted a transmission to another aircraft containing the current altimeter setting of 30.07 they set and cross-checked that setting on their altimeters. Throughout the descent, the co-pilot called out the appropriate warnings to the pilot-in-command as the aircraft approached assigned altitudes and apparently performed all of his assigned duties without prompting by the pilot-in-command. Crew coordination was very good during that portion of the flight. The weather conditions in the Cincinnati area were such that the crew should have established visual contact with the ground by the time they reached 3 000 to 4 000 ft. As the flight approached the final fix, approximately 7 minutes before the accident, the crew was given the latest reported weather which indicated that the ceiling was approximately 1 000 ft and the visibility was 13 miles in snow and haze. Approximately 1 minute later they were reminded that the ILS glide slope was out of service, as well as the middle marker beacon and the approach lights. The crew acknowledged receipt of this information and planned their approach to the proper minimum altitude of 1 290 ft AMSL, 400 ft above the ground, to allow for these outages. From this point in the approach to the outer marker, the aircraft altitudes and headings were in general agreement with altitudes reported by the crew and the headings they were instructed to fly. Operation of the aircraft was normal and the proper configuration was established for the approach to the outer marker in accordance with the company's operating instructions. The crew reported over the outer marker at 2056 hours and were cleared to land on runway 18 and advised that the wind was 090°/8 kt and the RVR more than 6 000 ft (see Fig. 22-1). The co-pilot reported to the pilot-in-command that they were past the marker and that there was no glide slope. The pilot-in-command acknowledged this and stated ". . . We gotta go down to, ah, four hundred, that would be, ah." At this point, the co-pilot supplied the information "twelve ninety" and the pilot-in-command repeated "twelve ninety." The flight had arrived at the outer marker with the landing gear down, the flaps set at 40' down at an altitude of approximately 2 340 it and at an airspeed of approximately 200 kt. (The prescribed minimum altitude over the outer marker beacon, 4 miles from the threshold, was 1 973 ft AMSL). After the aircraft passed the outer marker, a rate of descent of 1 800 ft/min was established at an airspeed of about 190 kt. The rate of descent was greater than that recommended by the company for an instrument approach and remained nearly constant until approximately 20 sec before the first recorded sound of impact. At that time the rate increased to approximately 3 000 ft/min coincident with a request for 50° flaps, and a decrease in thrust, and then decreased to about 1 800 ft/min until about 5 sec before the initial contact. Prior to initial contact, the aircraft was rotated to a virtually level attitude, the rate of descent was decreasing, the airspeed was about 191 kt, and the indicated altitude was about 900 ft AMSL. The aircraft first struck small tree limbs at an elevation of approximately 875 ft AMSL, 9 357 it short of the approach end of runway 18 and 429 it right of the extended runway centre line. After several more impacts with trees and the ground, the aircraft came to rest approximately 6 878 it from the runway and 442 ft right of the extended runway centre line and burst into flames. A stewardess who survived the accident stated that the first noticeable impact felt like a hard landing. None of the survivors recalled any increase of engine power or felt any rotation of the aircraft. The accident occurred at 2057 hours during darkness in an area where snow was falling. Five crew members and 65 passengers were killed while 12 other occupants were seriously injured.

TWA Flight 159 was a scheduled domestic flight from New York to Los Angeles with an intermediate stop at the Greater Cincinnati Airport. It departed the ramp at Cincinnati at 1833 hours Eastern Standard Time. As it was approaching runway 27L for take-off, Delta Air Lines, Inc., DC-9, N-3317L, operating as Flight DAL 379, was landing. As DAL 379 was completing its landing roll, the crew requested and received clearance for a 180° turnaround on the runway in order to return to the intersection of runway 18-36 which they had just passed. After turning through approximately 90°, the nosewheel slipped off the paved surface and the aircraft moved straight ahead off the runway during which time it became mired. The throttles were retarded to idle, and power was not increased again. At 1839:05 hours as DAL 379 was in the process of clearing the runway, TWA 159 was cleared for take-off. The local controller testified that before TWA 159 began moving, he observed that DAL 379 had stopped. He stated that although DAL 379 appeared to be clear of the runway, he requested confirmation from the crew who replied, "Yeah, we're in the dirt, though." Following this report the controller stated "TWA 159 he's clear of the runway, cleared for take-off, company jet on final behind you." Take- off performance had been computed as V1 132 knots, VR 140 knots, V2 150 knots. In fact DAL 379 was stopped on a heading of 004' and located 4 600 ft from the threshold of runway 27L with its aft-most point being approximately 7 ft north of the runway edge, the aft-most exterior lights located on the wing tip and the upper and lower anti-collision lights being approximately 45 ft from the runway edge. The crew of TWA 159 did not have DAL 379 in sight when they commenced the take-off roll. The co-pilot was performing the take-off and the pilot-in-command drew his attention to DAL 379 as the aircraft appeared in their landing lights they could see that it was off the runway by Some 5-7 ft. As TWA 159 passed abeam of DAL 379 the co-pilot experienced a movement of the flight controls and the aircraft yawed. Simultaneously there was a loud bang from the right side of the aircraft. The last airspeed he had observed was 120 knots and assuming that the aircraft was at or near V1, and that a collision had occurred, he elected to abort the take-off . He stated that he closed the power levers, placed them in full reverse, applied maximum braking, and called for the spoilers which the pilot-in-command operated. Directional control was maintained but the aircraft ran off the end of the runway, rolled across the terrain for approximately 225 ft, to the brow of a hill, and became airborne momentarily. It next contacted the ground approximately 67 ft further down the embankment, the main landing gear was torn off and the nosewheel was displaced rearward, forcing the cabin floor upward by approximately 15 in. The aircraft slid down the embankment and came to rest on a road approximately 421 ft from the end of the runway. The accident occurred at approximately 1841 hours, in darkness. A passenger was killed, another was seriously injured, five others were slightly injured. The aircraft was written off.

Flight 553 was a scheduled domestic passenger flight from New York to Chicago, Illinois, with en-route stops at Harrisburg, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and Dayton, Ohio. The flight departed Pittsburgh for Dayton at 1125 hours Eastern Standard Time on an IFR flight plan and was operated under radar surveillance for the duration of the flight. As the flight approached the Dayton terminal area it was cleared to descend from FL 200, its cruising altitude, to 5 000 ft, and a transfer of radar control from Indianapolis Air Route Traffic Control Centre (ARTCC) to the Dayton Radar Approach Control facility (RAPCON) was made when the flight was approximately 8 miles northeast of the Urbana Intersection on Victor Airway 12 North. The Dayton RAPCON approach controller established radio contact with the flight at 1152:36 hours. The flight was again cleared to 5 000 ft, instructed to take a heading of 240° for a vector to the final approach course (ILS) and to report leaving 6 000 ft. At 1153:22 hours, the controller cleared the flight to descend to and maintain 3 000 ft and turn left to a heading of 230'. This was correctly acknowledged by the pilot- in-command at 1153:28 hours. Immediately after the issuance of this clearance the controller observed for the first time an unidentified radar target ahead and slightly to the right of the flight and issued at 1153:32 hours the following traffic advisory: "TWA five fifty three, roger, and traffic at twelve thirty, one mile, southbound, slow moving." This was acknowledged by the pilot-in-command at 1153:36 hours. Approximately 14 seconds later, the flight and the unidentified radar target merged, separated, changed shape on the radar screen and then disappeared. At 1154:02 hours the controller advised the flight that it was clear of traffic but no reply was received. Subsequent efforts to establish contact with the flight were unsuccessful. The unidentified radar return was from a Beechcraft Baron B-55 on a company business flight, en route from Detroit, Michigan, to Springfield, Ohio. The aircraft had departed Detroit City Airport at 1101 hours on a special VFR clearance to leave the control zone 5 miles from the airport. No flight plan was filed, nor was one required. Approximately two minutes after take-off, the pilot reported on top of the smoke and haze and then left the Detroit tower frequency. No record of any further communication with any FAA communication facility or air traffic control facility could be found that related to the Beechcraft, nor was such communication required. The operator of Springfield Aviation Inc., at the Springfield Airport, testified that at approximately 1154 hours the pilot of the Beechcraft established radio contact with his office and requested a courtesy car. During this conversation the pilot stated that he would be landing shortly. There was no record of any subsequent radio contact with the aircraft. The aircraft collided at 1153:50 hours, in bright daylight, approximately 25 NM northeast of the Dayton Municipal Airport at an altitude of about 4 525 ft AMSL, and both aircraft crashed. The wreckage of the DC-9 was found in a wooded area. All 26 occupants in both aircraft were killed.

While rolling on a taxiway, the nose gear collapsed and the airplane sank on its belly and came to rest. All three technicians on board were uninjured while the aircraft christened 'Star of Chillon' was considered as damaged beyond repair.

The crew was completing a local training flight at Kansas City-Mid-Continent Airport, Missouri, consisting of touch and go manoeuvres. During the takeoff roll, when the aircraft reached the speed of 146 knots, the pilot-in-command started the rotation when the airplane banked right to an angle of 25° then struck the runway surface. It went out of control, veered of runway and came to rest in flames. All four crew members were evacuated while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Flight 800 was a scheduled international flight from Rome, Italy to Athens, Greece. It departed the parking area at 1300 hours GMT with the copilot at the controls and the take-off run on runway 25 started at 1307 hours. The aircraft bad reached a speed above 80 kt when the pilot-in-command noticed that the No. 4 engine pressure ratio gauge was reading 1 (zero thrust) and, immediately thereafter, the amber light indicating thrust reversal of No. 2 engine came on. Since the speed was still below V1 for the weights and runway conditions, he decided to abort take-off and took over the controls to carry out the required manoeuvre. The tower was advised of this decision when the aircraft had reached a point 800 to 900 m after the threshold. The aircraft started to decelerate but at a much slower rate than expected, and at the same time veered strongly to the right with the result that the right landing gear was grazing the runway edge. Reverse thrust on the two right engines was reduced in an attempt to bring the aircraft back to the centre Line. The aircraft continued travelling beyond the declared runway limit and struck with No. 4 engine a pavement roller which was being used for maintenance work on taxiway 16/34 in an authorized area. After travelling a further 260 m, the aircraft came to a stop with fire on board. After a series of explosions, it was engulfed in flames and completely destroyed. The accident occurred at 1309 hours GMT. Five crew members and 44 passengers were killed, 24 others occupants were injured, some of them seriously.

During engine runup, Flight 529 was given its air traffic control clearance which was: "cleared to the Las Vegas Airport via Victor 6 Naperville, Victor 8 flight plan route, maintain 5,000 feet." The clearance was acknowledged correctly and TWA Flight 529 departed on runway 22L at 0200, making a right turn out of traffic. The 0200 Midway Airport weather was: scattered clouds at 10,000 feet; high overcast, visibility three miles in haze and smoke; wind south eight knots. The Chicago O'Hare Airport weather at 0200 was: partial obscuration; scattered clouds 15,000 feet; high overcast; visibility two and one-half miles in ground fog and smoke; wind south six knots. Radar contact was established with the flight one minute and 34 seconds after the flight acknowledged takeoff clearance and as the aircraft proceeded outbound in a right turn. At 0204, Flight 529 was observed on radar by the departure controller to be five miles west of Midway Airport proceeding on course. Northwest Airlines Flight 105 was cleared for takeoff on runway 22L at Midway, and took off Immediately. The ground controller observed a flash west of Midway Airport at this time and asked Flight 105 if he had seen a flash. Flight 105 advised that they had seen a flash fire and would fly over the area. As Flight 105 reported over the fire, the radar range was noted to be nine miles west of Midway Airport and the radar return of TWA. Flight 529 had disappeared from the scope. It was later determined that Flight 529 had crashed at this site and that the observed ground fire was the result of the accident. The airplane disintegrated in a field and all 78 occupants have been killed.