Australia

The aircraft had been chartered for a return flight from Perth to Bellevue Mine, Kalgoorlie and Nevoria Mine. The aircraft departed Perth on 15 December and arrived at Bellevue Mine after an uneventful flight. The following morning the pilot telephoned Kalgoorlie Flight Service Unit (FSU) and obtained brief details of expected winds for the flight to Kalgoorlie, as well as a forecast of the weather for the aircraft's arrival. He then submitted details of the flight to the flight service officer (FSO), at the same time commenting that there was some adverse weather in the Bellevue Mine area. The flight plan indicated that the pilot intended to climb to flight level (FL) 195 after take-off, with a time interval of 27 min to pass Leonora and a further 22 min to reach Kalgoorlie. The flight plan was amended after take-off to include a brief stop at Leinster. At 0940 hours the aircraft departed for Leinster, 5 km from Bellevue Mine. (This short flight was conducted to pick up passenger baggage.) At 0957 hours the pilot reported to the Kalgoorlie FSU that the aircraft had departed Leinster at 0955 hours and was climbing to FL 195. At 1008 hours he requested traffic information for a climb to FL 210 and, after being advised that there was no traffic, replied that he was climbing to that level. He also remarked that there were some big clouds in the area. No further communications were received from the aircraft. At approximately 1015 hours the aircraft crashed on Sturt Meadows Station. The crash site was approximately 1200 ft above sea level. All 10 occupants were killed.

The aircraft reported departing Bundaberg for Monduran Dam on a no SAR flight at 1135 hrs EST with three persons on board and an endurance of 270 minutes. The purpose of the flight was to complete the endorsement of the pilot under check and to assess the suitability of an area of water on the coast to where the passenger, who was the regular pilot of the aircraft, was to fly the aircraft the following day. The pilot in command had flown 27 hours in the previous three months, of which 9 were on type. The pilot under check had flown only one hour in the last three months. This flight had been in VH-BSL. At approximately 1200 hrs, the aircraft was observed in the Lake Monduran area. It flew two left hand circuits, landing into wind towards the dam wall each time. After the second takeoff, it turned left and was seen heading north from the lake. Nothing further was heard or seen of the aircraft. Following an extensive search, the wreckage was located six days later lying inverted in 15 metres of water approximately 2 km WNW of the dam wall in the area of the junction of the main east-west channel and a northsouth channel of the lake. Both floats had separated from the aircraft and the right float was severely torn for about half its length. There was substantial water impact damage to the windshield frame/cockpit roof area and to the upper leading edge surfaces of both wings.

The aircraft had been modified by the installation of an air driven winch for the purpose of towing gunnery targets and was operating in conjunction with a warship for scheduled sea/air gunnery practise. Weather conditions in the area were reported as overcast at 4000 feet, wind 060 degrees / 15-20 knots and visibility of 15-20 kilometres. At about 1717 hours the aircraft was instructed to commence carrying out gunnery tracking runs at an altitude of 1000 feet with the sleeve target not deployed. Between 1720 and 1735 hours the aircraft carried out two such runs from the west and east. The aircraft then tracked to the south, away from the ship, to a distance of about 10 kilometres. At about 1738 the aircraft was instructed to turn inbound for a run from astern. At about 1739 hours the pilot reported engine problems and about one minute later advised "I've got problems, Mayday, I'm going in". Crewmen stationed near the stern of the ship, reported seeing the aircraft dive into the sea. The warship was immediately turned back towards the crash position. Other warships and aircraft were also ordered to the crash position. The only wreckage sighted was at the crash datum and was believed to have been a section of wing. This wreckage was located about two metres below the surface and sank before it could be recovered. The approximate depth of water at the crash position is 450 fathoms. No trace of the aircraft or its occupants has been discovered to date.

The pilot had been conducting superphosphate spreading operations in the area two days prior to the accident and had completed approximately 60 trips during that operation. On the morning of the accident, he had just completed the sixth load when the outboard section of the right wing struck powerlines. The right wing was torn from its attachment points and separated from the aircraft. The aircraft then impacted the ground in a steep nose down attitude and came to rest 169 metres from the powerlines.

The Taroom aerodrome had recently been equipped with a pilot activated lighting (PAL) system which was due to be commissioned on the evening of 15 October 1988. The pilot, who is a local Council member had flown from his property "Kolane" to Taroom late in the afternoon, to check that the PAL system was functional. He had intended to fly to Taroom the following evening to activate the lights for the official opening celebration, which was planned to be held at the aerodrome. After checking that the system was working the pilot decided to take the opportunity to practice some night circuits and landings before returning to his property. Before departing Taroom he arranged to have two vehicles positioned at his property landing area to illuminate the strip which is 850 metres long, aligned 235/055 degrees magnetic, and 1000 feet above sea level. He apparently intended to check the suitability of the strip for a night landing on his return. The aircraft was observed to fly over the strip in a north-easterly direction and then make a left turn. The aircraft was then seen to descend and the sound of impact was heard by the occupant of a vehicle near the strip. The aircraft had impacted the ground whilst in a descending left turn at a ground speed of approximately 125 knots. Initial impact was in a clearing near trees. The aircraft slid 91 metres before the left wing struck a large tree and was torn off. The aircraft slid another 45 metres before coming to rest and catching fire. The pilot was thrown from the aircraft while still strapped to his seat and was able to move himself away from the immediate vicinity of the fire before help arrived.

The pilot was conducting superphosphate spreading operations in fine and clear weather conditions. The paddock being treated sloped uphill, and there were heavily timbered peaks beyond the paddock. The pilot had spread the paddock the previous day under similar conditions. On this occasion the aircraft was apparently performing normally as the first swath run was completed, but the aircraft did not appear to gain any appreciable height as it approached the hills. It was then seen to adopt a steep nose-up attitude and commence a wingover type manoeuvre. During this manoeuvre the aircraft struck trees and then impacted the ground. A fierce fire broke out and engulfed the wreckage. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

The King Island aerodrome weather was forecast to include temporary periods of moderate to heavy rain showers, six eighths of cloud cover base 800 feet and visibility reduced to 3000 metres. The forecast surface wind was 340 degrees at 20-30 knots. The pilot's qualifications required a minimum visibility of 5000 metres for operation at night in Visual Meteorological Conditions, (NGT VMC). It was planned that another pilot, qualified for Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) operations, would act as pilot in command, but he became unavailable. The flight plan submitted by the pilot indicated he would be operating under the IFR category and when queried on taxiing he confirmed that this was so. Shortly after DEPARTURE, the pilot requested a weather report from an IFR pilot who had just landed at King Island. This gave a cloud base of 2000 feet, heavy rain showers and visibility of 2000 metres. Flares had been laid to allow the other pilot to use Runway 35 because of the strong northerly wind. The pilot of VH-CAY activated the electric lighting for Runway 28. He reported that the weather was satisfactory enroute and he could see lights ahead on the island. On crossing the coast flight conditions became rough in moderate to severe turbulence. The pilot advised he arrived over the aerodrome at 1500 feet above mean sea level and observed the lighted wind sock was horizontal, with the direction fluctuating rapidly between north and west. He turned to the south and broadcast his intention to land on Runway 28. Neither the pilot nor the passenger had any further recall of the events leading to the accident. VH-CAY was heard passing over the aerodrome and the engine sound was very loud, suggesting to the listener that the aircraft was low. It had been raining continuously for more than an hour, sometimes very heavily, and it was still raining at the time. The aircraft was subsequently seen flying at a very low height some six kilometres south of the aerodrome, tracking approximately north. It was raining very heavily in that area and the wind was very strong. Soon afterwards there was a sound of impact and a flash of light. The aircraft had struck the tops of trees 30 feet high, then descended to the ground. After the aircraft came to rest it was destroyed by a fire. Both occupants were seriously injured.

The pilot was temporarily replacing the pilot who normally flew the aircraft. After arriving at Kidston he checked the fuel quantity gauge and decided that there was sufficient fuel on board for the return flight. As the aircraft approached top of climb, the pilot found that the fuel gauge indicated a lower fuel quantity than he had expected. He re-checked the indicated quantity after the aircraft was established in cruise and decided that sufficient fuel still remained to complete the planned flight. Shortly after passing Mt Garnet both engine fuel flow gauges began to fluctuate and the engines began to surge. The pilot immediately turned the aircraft towards the Mt Garnet strip, but shortly afterwards both engines failed. The pilot attempted to glide the aircraft to the strip, but it collided with trees and came to rest about one kilometre from the runway 27 threshold. All three occupants escaped with minor injuries and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The aircraft was operating a scheduled service from Brisbane to Port Macquarie with planned intermediate stops at Coolangatta and Coffs Harbour. Weather conditions over the route were influenced by a widespread unstable airmass. The terminal forecast for Coffs Harbour indicated a surface wind of 360/15, visibility in excess of 10 km, 5 octas stratus at 1000 ft, 5 octas cumulus at 2000 ft. Thunderstorms, associated with visibility reduced to 2000 metres were also forecast for periods of up to 30 minutes. The actual weather conditions at Coffs Harbour were generally consistent with the terminal forecast. Runway 03 was in use throughout the evening. Coffs Harbour airport was equipped with NDB, VOR and domestic DME radio navigation aids. A VOR/DME procedure was published for runway 03 approaches. For aircraft not equipped with DME, a VOR or NDB approach was available using common tracking and minimum altitude criteria. Runway 03 was also equipped with a 6 stage T-VASIS and 3 stage runway lighting. All facilities were reported as functioning normally, with the exception of the VOR which was experiencing intermittent power failures due to the effects of heavy rain. The VOR was able to be reset manually from the Coffs Harbour control tower. Although the tower was scheduled to be unmanned before the arrival of VH-HOX, the duty air traffic controller elected to man the tower until the aircraft had landed. The controller also called out a technician to attend to the VOR. The aircraft was equipped with dual ILS/VOR and ADF receivers, plus International DME. Domestic DME equipment was not fitted to the aircraft, although required by ANO 20.8. After descending in the VOR/NDB holding pattern, the aircraft was cleared for an instrument approach. The pilot had been told of the intermittent operation of the VOR and had said he would revert to the NDB. At that time the weather conditions were fluctuating about the circling minima of 950 feet (QNH) and five km visibility. The controller advised the aircraft of a heavy shower to the south of the field. The aircraft subsequently completed the approach and the pilot reported "visual". The controller said he saw the lights of the aircraft in a position consistent with a right downwind leg for a landing on runway 03. The aircraft was then cleared to land. Shortly after, the controller saw the lights of the aircraft disappear briefly, consistent with the aircraft passing through a localised area of rain/cloud. The lights then reappeared briefly, as though the aircraft was turning onto finals, before disappearing. This was immediately followed by short series of "clicks" on the tower frequency. The aircraft was called immediately but failed to respond to any calls. The accident site was located about 1070 metres short of the landing threshold, and about 750 metres to the right of the extended runway centreline. The aircraft was found to have initially struck a nine metre high tree in a nose low attitude, steeply banked to the right, on a track of 050 degrees. After striking the tree with the outboard section of the right wing, the aircraft struck other trees before hitting the ground and overturning. A fire broke out shortly after the aircraft came to rest. As a result of his remaining on duty, the controller was able to provide immediate notification of the accident to the emergency services. This action facilitated the rescue of survivors.

The pilot was conducting a freight charter flight, and witness evidence confirmed that on DEPARTURE he was occupying the left-hand seat. The pilot was accompanied by a friend who was also a commercial pilot, but not endorsed on this type of aircraft. Approximately 18 minutes prior to the estimated time of arrival at the destination, the pilot reported leaving the cruising altitude of 6500 feet on descent. Several minutes after the descent report had been made, a witness about 50 kilometres from the destination reported seeing the aircraft pull-up into a very steep climb from an extremely low height with its wings level, and then become inverted. It then entered what was described by the witness as a spin or spiral dive, before impacting the ground in a near vertical descent. The pilot was found in the right-hand seat, and the passenger had been thrown clear of the wreckage. It was established that neither seat belt had been fastened at the time of the impact. Although it could not be determined which pilot was flying the aircraft at the time of the pull-up, medical evidence suggested that the pilot occupying the right-hand seat position was handling the controls at the time of ground impact. The weather at the time of the accident was fine and clear, with 10-15 knot winds.