Zone

Crash of a Cessna 208B Grand Caravan in Victoria: 1 killed

Date & Time: Dec 9, 2019 at 2010 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N4602B
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Victoria – Houston
MSN:
208B-0140
YOM:
1988
Flight number:
MRA679
Location:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Circumstances:
The single engine airplane, en route to Houston-George W. Bush Intl Airport, crashed in unknown circumstances shortly after takeoff from Victoria Airport, Texas. The wreckage was found in a wooded area and the pilot, sole on board, was killed.

Crash of a Piper PA-31 Navajo Chieftain in Vancouver: 2 killed

Date & Time: Jul 9, 2009 at 2208 LT
Operator:
Registration:
C-GNAF
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Vancouver – Nanaimo – Victoria – Vancouver
MSN:
31-8052130
YOM:
1980
Flight number:
APEX511
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
2300
Copilot / Total flying hours:
400
Circumstances:
The Canadian Air Charters Piper PA-31-350 Chieftain (registration C-GNAF, serial number 31-8052130) was operating under visual flight rules as APEX 511 on the final leg of a multi-leg cargo flight from Vancouver to Nanaimo and Victoria, British Columbia, with a return to Vancouver. The weather was visual meteorological conditions and the last 9 minutes of the flight took place during official darkness. The flight was third for landing and turned onto the final approach course 1.5 nautical miles behind and 700 feet below the flight path of a heavier Airbus A321, approaching Runway 26 Right at the Vancouver International Airport. At 2208, Pacific Daylight Time, the target for APEX 511 disappeared from tower radar. The aircraft impacted the ground in an industrial area of Richmond, British Columbia, 3 nautical miles short of the runway. There was a post-impact explosion and fire. The 2 crew members on board were fatally injured. There was property damage, but no injuries on the ground. The onboard emergency locator transmitter was destroyed in the accident and no signal was detected.
Probable cause:
APEX 511 turned onto the final approach course within the wake turbulence area behind and below the heavier aircraft (Airbus A321) and encountered its wake, resulting in an upset and loss of control at an altitude that precluded recovery. The proximity of the faster trailing traffic limited the space available for APEX 511 to join the final approach course, requiring APEX 511 not to lag too far behind the preceding aircraft.
Final Report:

Crash of a Piper PA-31 Cheyenne in San Fernando: 2 killed

Date & Time: Dec 18, 2008 at 0557 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
LV-MYX
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
San Fernando-Victoria
MSN:
31-7904045
YOM:
1979
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Circumstances:

After departure, crew informed ATC about technical problem and elected to return to San Fernando airport. The twin engine aircraft crashed into a parking lot and burst into flames. Both occupants were killed.

Crash of a Cessna 525 CitationJet CJ1 off Coupeville

Date & Time: Jul 22, 2003 at 1015 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N996JR
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Victoria - Boise
MSN:
525-0147
YOM:
1996
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
8500
Captain / Total hours on type:
2689.00
Aircraft flight hours:
590
Circumstances:
The corporate jet airplane experienced a loss of elevator trim control (runaway trim) that resulted in an uncommanded nose-low pitch attitude. The pilot reported that following the loss of elevator trim authority the airplane was extremely difficult to control and the elevator control forces were extremely high. The pilot continued to maneuver the airplane, but eventually ditched it into a nearby marine cove. The runaway trim condition was not immediately recognized by the pilot and he stated that, by that point in the event sequence, the control forces were so great that he had little time to troubleshoot the system and elected to continue on his established heading and ditch the airplane. Pulling the circuit breaker, which is called for by the checklist in the event of a trim runaway, would have arrested the trim movement. Post accident examination and functional testing of the airplane's electric pitch trim printed circuit board (PCB) showed a repeatable fault in the operation of the PCB's K6 relay, resulting in the relay contacts remaining closed. This condition would be representative of the autopilot pitch trim remaining engaged, providing an electrical current to drive continuous nose-down trim to the elevator trim motor. Examination of the airplane's maintenance records showed that the PCB was removed and replaced in conjunction with the
phase inspection prior to the accident. Further examination of the airplane's maintenance records revealed that the replacement PCB was originally installed in an airplane that experienced an "electric trim runaway on the ground." Following the trim runaway, the PCB was removed and shipped to the manufacturer. After receiving the PCB the manufacturer tested the board and no discrepancies were noted. The unit was subsequently approved for return to service and later installed on the accident airplane. The investigation revealed a single-point failure of trim runaway (failed K6 relay) and a latent system design anomaly in the autopilot/trim disconnect switch on the airplane's pitch trim PCB. This design prohibited the disengagement of the electric trim motor during autopilot operation. As a result of the investigation, the FAA issued three airworthiness directives (AD 2003-21-07, AD 2003-23-20, and AD 2004-14-20), and the pitch trim printed circuit board was redesigned and evaluated for compliance with safety requirements via system safety assessment.
Probable cause:
The loss of airplane pitch control (trim runway and mistrim condition) resulting from a failure in the airplane's electric pitch trim system. Factors that contributed to the accident were the manufacturer's inadequate design of the pitch trim circuitry that allowed for a single-point failure mode, and the absence of an adequate failure warning system to clearly alert the pilot to the pitch trim runaway condition in sufficient time to respond in accordance with the manufacturer's checklist instructions.
Final Report:

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-6 Twin Otter 100 off Vancouver

Date & Time: Nov 1, 2000 at 1510 LT
Operator:
Registration:
C-GGAW
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Vancouver - Victoria
MSN:
086
YOM:
1967
Flight number:
8O151
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
15
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
4000
Captain / Total hours on type:
2500.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
2000
Copilot / Total hours on type:
1650
Circumstances:
A de Havilland DHC-6-100 float-equipped Twin Otter (serial number 086), operated by West Coast Air Ltd., was on a regularly scheduled flight as Coast 608 from Vancouver Harbour water aerodrome, British Columbia, to Victoria Harbour water aerodrome. The flight departed at about 1510 Pacific standard time with two crew members and 15 passengers on board. Shortly after lift-off, there was a loud bang and a noise similar to gravel hitting the aircraft. Simultaneously, a flame emanated from the forward section of the No. 2 (right-hand) engine, and this engine completely lost propulsion. The aircraft altitude was estimated to be between 50 and 100 feet at the time. The aircraft struck the water about 25 seconds later in a nose-down, right wing-low attitude. The right-hand float and wing both detached from the fuselage at impact. The aircraft remained upright and partially submerged while the occupants evacuated the cabin through the main entrance door and the two pilot doors. They then congregated on top of the left wing and fuselage. Within minutes, several vessels, including a public transit SeaBus, arrived at the scene. The SeaBus deployed an inflatable raft for the occupants, and they were taken ashore by several vessels and transported to hospital for observation. There were no serious injuries. The aircraft subsequently sank. All of the wreckage was recovered within five days.
Probable cause:
Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors:
1. A planetary gear disintegrated in the propeller reduction gearbox of the No. 2 engine and caused the engine drive shaft to disconnect from the propeller, resulting in a loss of propulsion from this engine.
2. The planetary gear oil strainer screen wires fractured by fatigue as a consequence of the installation at the last overhaul. This created an unsafe condition and it is most probable that the release of wire fragments and debris from this strainer screen subsequently initiated or contributed to distress of the planetary gear bearing sleeve and resulted in the disintegration of the planetary gear.
3. Although airspeed was above Vmc at the time of the power loss, the aircraft became progressively uncontrollable due to power on the remaining engine not being reduced to relieve the asymmetric thrust condition until impact was imminent.
Findings as to Risk:
1. The propeller reduction gearboxes were inspected in accordance with the West Coast Air maintenance control manual. These inspections exceeded requirements of the de Havilland Equalized Maintenance Maximum Availability program. Since the last inspection, 46 hours of flight time before the accident, did not reveal any anomaly, a risk remains of adverse developments with
resulting consequences occurring during the unmonitored period between inspections.
2. Regulations require the installation of engine oil chip detectors, but not the associated annunciator system on the DHC-6. Without an annunciator system, monitoring of engine oil contamination is limited to the frequency and thoroughness of maintenance inspections. An annunciator system would have provided a method of continuous monitoring and may have warned the crew of the impending problem.
3. Although regulations do not require the aircraft to be equipped with an auto-feather system, its presence may have assisted the flight crew in handling the sudden loss of power by reducing the drag created by a windmilling propeller.
4. Since most air taxi and commuter operators use their own aircraft rather than a simulator for pilot proficiency training, higher-risk emergency scenarios can only be practiced at altitude and discussed in the classroom. As a result, pilots do not gain the benefit of a realistic experience during training.
Other Findings:
1. The fact that the aircraft remained upright and floating in daylight conditions contributed to the successful evacuation of the cabin without injury and enabled about half of the passengers to locate and don their life vests.
2. The aircraft was at low altitude and low airspeed at the time of power loss. The selection of full flaps may have contributed to a single-engine, high-drag situation, making a successful landing difficult.
Final Report:

Crash of a Douglas DC-3C in Mayne Island: 2 killed

Date & Time: Jan 13, 1999 at 0633 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
C-GWUG
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Vancouver - Victoria
MSN:
16215/32963
YOM:
1945
Flight number:
KFA301
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
18000
Captain / Total hours on type:
9500.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
9000
Copilot / Total hours on type:
430
Aircraft flight hours:
20123
Circumstances:
The accident aircraft, a Douglas DC-3C, C-GWUG, was owned and operated by Kelowna Flightcraft Air Charter Ltd. (Kelowna Flightcraft) and was under charter to Purolator Courier Ltd. (Purolator). Since April 1998, the aircraft had been dedicated to transporting cargo on a route between Vancouver and Nanaimo, British Columbia. On occasion, it was also used for flights to Victoria to meet Purolator=s scheduling or cargo-loading contingencies. On the day of the accident, the aircraft, operating as KFA300, was rerouted and tasked to fly from Vancouver to Victoria and then proceed to Nanaimo. This change was precipitated by the delayed arrival of Purolator=s Boeing 727 at Vancouver because of inclement weather in the Toronto/Hamilton, Ontario, area. Warning of this route change was passed to the crew members with their pre-flight planning package, which included filed instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plans for the Vancouver-to-Victoria and Victoria-to-Nanaimo legs of the trip. The captain of the occurrence flight cancelled his IFR flight plan and refiled visual flight rules (VFR) on first contact with air traffic control. Vancouver tower cleared KFA300 for take-off at 0622 Pacific standard time (PST) from runway 26L. After take-off, the aircraft turned left on a track toward Active Pass, as seen in Figure 1. During the departure climb, the captain requested an altitude of 1000 feet above sea level (asl); the tower controller approved this request. Recorded radar data indicate that the aircraft climbed to and levelled at 1000 feet asl and then accelerated to a steady en route ground speed of 130 knots. The aircraft left the Vancouver control zone at 0626 and entered Class E (controlled) airspace. There are no special requirements for VFR aircraft operating within this class of airspace, nor are any specific services required of the air traffic control system. As the aircraft approached the Gulf Islands, it descended slightly and remained level at 900 feet asl. It crossed about 0.25 nautical mile (nm) west of the Active Pass non-directional beacon (NDB) at 0632 while remaining steady at 130 knots (ground speed) and level at 900 feet asl. At 0633:04, the aircraft descended to 800 feet asl for about nine seconds. The last radar data show the aircraft at 900 feet asl and 130 knots. The last radar-depicted position of the aircraft is on a bearing of 189 degrees (true) and 21.8 nm from the Sea Island radar source, coincident with the crash location.
Probable cause:
Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors:
1. The accident flight was not conducted in accordance with the night obstacle clearance requirements of Canadian Aviation Regulation (CAR) 705.32.
2. The Kelowna Flightcraft company operations manual did not reflect the restrictive conditions imposed on night visual flight rules (VFR) flight by CAR 705.32. Such information might have
prevented the accident by ensuring the crew's awareness of those night obstacle clearance standards.
3. As the aircraft approached Mayne Island, it encountered a low cloud ceiling that was based about 800 feet and that reduced visual reference with the surface.
4. When the aircraft struck trees, it was being flown in controlled, level flight at an altitude below the surrounding terrain.
5. The aircraft was not equipped with a ground proximity warning system or any other similar system that could warn the crew of an impending collision with terrain. Such systems were not required by regulation.
Findings as to Risk:
1. Kelowna Flightcraft flight operations personnel were not aware that most of the DC-3 flights were being conducted under VFR.
2. First responders were not aware of the presence of the dangerous goods and were therefore at increased risk during their response activities on the site.
Other Findings:
1. Transport Canada officials responsible for monitoring this operation were not aware that most of the DC-3 flights were being conducted under VFR at night and below the required obstacle
clearance altitudes.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 208B Super Cargomaster in Victoria: 2 killed

Date & Time: Nov 23, 1998 at 0030 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N9352B
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Vancouver - Victoria
MSN:
208-0061
YOM:
1987
Flight number:
RXX434
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
1653
Captain / Total hours on type:
400.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
120
Aircraft flight hours:
6717
Circumstances:
Regency Express Air Operations Flight 434, a Cessna 208 Caravan (serial number 208B0061), was en route from Vancouver International Airport to Victoria International Airport, British Columbia, on a night visual flight rules (VFR) flight when it collided with trees on Saltspring Island, about five nautical miles (nm) north of the Victoria International Airport. The aircraft broke apart on impact and a post-crash fire occurred. The two pilots, who were the sole occupants of the aircraft, sustained fatal injuries, and the aircraft was destroyed. The accident occurred at 0030 Pacific standard time (PST).
Probable cause:
Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors:
A. Although weather information was available by radio from the Vancouver FSS specialists or from the Victoria Terminal controllers, there is no indication that the pilots requested weather updates from either of these units.
B. The crew of RXX434 would have encountered the lower ceiling in the vicinity of Beaver Point. This lower layer of cloud would have restricted the crew's view of the ground lighting and reduced the ambient lighting available to navigate by visual means.
C. With the loss of ground references, it is unlikely that the crew would have been able to perceive the divergence of the aircraft's flight path away from its intended track by visual means.
D. The crew was unable to maintain separation between the aircraft and the terrain by visual means.
E. The published VFR arrival and departure routes for Victoria were not consistent with obstacle clearance requirements for commercial operators.
F. Regency Express Air Operations' crew manual suggested an en route altitude of 1,500 feet for this particular flight. That route and altitude combination is not consistent with published obstacle clearance requirements.
Other Findings:
1. At the time the crew completed their flight planning, the weather at the departure airport of Vancouver and the arrival airport of Victoria was suitable for a night VFR flight.
2. An amended terminal forecast for Victoria indicating the presence of a temporary ceiling at 2,000 feet asl was issued after the crew had completed their preflight planning activities.
3. The regulation requiring GPWS equipment does not apply to air taxi operations because the aircraft used in those operations do not meet weight or propulsion criteria.
Final Report:

Crash of a Piper PA-31-310 Navajo in Castlegar: 1 killed

Date & Time: Dec 3, 1985
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
C-GZTD
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Victoria – Castlegar
MSN:
31-202
YOM:
1968
Country:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Circumstances:
The pilot, sole on board, was completing a positioning flight from Victoria to Castlegar-West Kootenay Airport. On final, the twin engine airplane struck trees and crashed in a wooded area located on Mt Sentinel, few km from the airfield. The aircraft was destroyed and the pilot was killed.

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-6 Twin Otter 200 off Vancouver: 11 killed

Date & Time: Sep 3, 1978 at 1742 LT
Operator:
Registration:
C-FAIV
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Victoria - Vancouver
MSN:
215
YOM:
1969
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
11
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
11
Captain / Total flying hours:
6000
Captain / Total hours on type:
3600.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
450
Circumstances:
Twin Otter C-FAIV, operating as a scheduled VFR flight, departed Victoria Harbour at 1718LT with Vancouver Harbour water-aerodrome as destination. The estimated time en route was 20 minutes. The flight proceeded normally and reported by Active Pass at 2,000 feet. This altitude was maintained in order to cross the Vancouver Control Zone in accordance with standard procedure; once out of the control zone, a slow descent was begun towards Vancouver Harbour. Normal radio procedures were followed as the flight reported by standard visual reporting points. Just before joining final approach, the transmission, "AIV, Third Beach", was made and landing clearance was given to the flight by the Harbour Tower. The approach continued, and when the aircraft reached approximately 175 feet above the surface, nine ground witnesses heard a loud noise from the aircraft. Two surviving witnesses also heard a noise. Power was subsequently applied and C-FAIV yawed left, rolled in the same direction and plunged into the harbour in a left-wing and nose-down attitude, 2 500 feet from the intended landing area. An ELT (Emergency Locator Transmitter) tone was heard by the tower controller 54 seconds after the radio call at Third Beach. The controller called the aircraft several times but there was no response. The flight had been of 24 minutes duration. Both pilots and nine passengers were killed while two others were injured. The aircraft was destroyed.
Probable cause:
The following findings were determined:
- The final approach to land was normal until an unusual noise occurred followed by loss of control,
- The aircraft dived into the water with left wing down, nose down and with some sideslip. Value of roll, pitch and yaw, at impact could not be estimated with useful accuracy,
- At impact, the complete left flap system was in the retracted position,
- The inboard span-wise push-pull flap control rod (inboard bell-crank to inboard rod, PT # C6CW-1029-1), was severely stress-corroded and had at least three longitudinal cracks; the rod had separated from its inboard fitting,
- It was deduced t h a t t h e in-flight failure of the left-hand inboard flap control rod led to sudden retraction of the complete left-hand flap system and sudden loss of control.
- The passengers had not been briefed in evacuation procedures,
- The crew was qualified for the type of operation in accordance with Transport Canada regulations. After the failure of the left flap control rod, no action by the pilot could have averted the accident.
Final Report:

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-6 Twin Otter 100 off Victoria

Date & Time: Dec 16, 1976
Operator:
Registration:
C-FAJB
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Vancouver - Victoria
MSN:
19
YOM:
1966
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
14
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
Approaching Victoria on a flight from Coal Harbour in Vancouver, the crew encountered limited visibility due to foggy conditions. The seaplane landed hard, causing both floats to be damaged. All 16 occupants were evacuated safely while the aircraft sank in the Juan de Fuca Strait, by a depth of 300 feet, about 4 miles south of Victoria Harbour.