Crash of a De Havilland DHC-2 Beaver near Naivasha: 1 killed

Date & Time: Jul 12, 2021 at 1245 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
5Y-BCL
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Nairobi - Lodwar
MSN:
1552
YOM:
1964
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
534
Captain / Total hours on type:
217.00
Aircraft flight hours:
9034
Circumstances:
On 12 July 2021 at about 1245 (1545) a Viking Air Ltd DHC-2 Beaver MK1A aircraft registration 5Y-BCL operated by the Desert Locust Control Organization of Eastern Africa (DLCO-EA) with three on board crashed at Kosovo area of Ndabibi in Naivasha, Nakuru County. The accident site is located near the edge of the hilly eastern side of Eburru forest manned by the Kenya Forest Service (KFS). The flight originated from Wilson airport, Nairobi County and was enroute to Lodwar airport, Turkana County. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and largely consumed by the ensuing fire. A passenger suffered fatal injuries while the pilot and the other passenger suffered serious injuries requiring more than 48 hours of hospitalization. At the time of the accident the area in the vicinity of the accident site had near overcast cloudy conditions.

Crash of a Boeing 737 MAX 8 near Debre Zeit: 157 killed

Date & Time: Mar 10, 2019 at 0844 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
ET-AVJ
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Addis Ababa – Nairobi
MSN:
62450/7243
YOM:
2018
Flight number:
ET302
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
8
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
149
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
157
Captain / Total flying hours:
8122
Captain / Total hours on type:
1417.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
361
Copilot / Total hours on type:
207
Aircraft flight hours:
1330
Aircraft flight cycles:
382
Circumstances:
On March 10, 2019, at 05:38 UTC, Ethiopian Airlines flight 302, Boeing 737-8(MAX), ET-AVJ, took off from Addis Ababa Bole International Airport bound to Nairobi, Kenya Jomo Kenyatta International Airport. ET302 was being operated under the provisions of the Ethiopian Civil Aviation Regulations (ECARAS) as a scheduled international flight between Addis Ababa Bole International Airport (HAAB), Ethiopia and Jomo Kenyatta Int. (HKJK) Nairobi, Kenya. It departed Addis Ababa with 157 persons on board: 2 flight crew (a Captain and a First Officer), 5 cabin crew and one IFSO, 149 regular passengers. At 05:36:12 the Airplane lined up on runway 07R at field elevation of 7,656 ft with flap setting of 5 degrees and a stabilizer trim setting of 5.6 units. Both flight directors (F/D) were ON with LNAV and VNAV modes armed. At 05:37:17the F/O reported to Tower ready for takeoff and at 05:37:36ATC issued take off clearance to ET-302 and advised to contact radar on 119.7MHz. The takeoff roll and lift-off was normal, including normal values of left and right angle-of-attack (AOA). During takeoff roll, the engines stabilized at about 94% N1. Shortly after liftoff, the left Angle of Attack sensor recorded value became erroneous and the left stick shaker activated and remained active until near the end of the recording. In addition, the airspeed and altitude values from the left air data system began deviating from the corresponding right side values. The left and right recorded AOA values began deviating. Left AOA decreased to 11.1° then increased to 35.7° while the right AOA indicated 14.94°. Then after, the left AOA value reached 74.5° in ¾ seconds while the right AOA reached a Maximum value of 15.3°, the difference between LH and RH AOA was59°and near the end of the recording it was 490. At 05:39:30, the radar controller identified ET-302 and advised to climb FL 340 and when able to turn right direct to RUDOL. At 5:39:51, the selected heading increased from 072° to 197°. After the flaps were fully retractedthe1stautomatic nose-down trim activated and engaged for 9 seconds positioning the stabilizer trim to 2.1 units. The pilot flying pulled to pitch up the Airplane with a force more than 90lbs. He then applied electric trim-up inputs. Five seconds after the end of these inputs a second automatic nose-down trim activated. At 5:40:22, the second automatic nose-down trim activated. Following nose-down trim activation GPWS DON’T SINK sounded for 3 seconds and “PULL UP” also displayed on PFD for 3 seconds. At 05:40:43, approximately five seconds after the end of the crew manual electrical trim up inputs, a third automatic trim nose-down was recorded but with no associated movement of the stabilizer. At 05:40:50, the captain told the F/O: “advise we would like to maintain one four thousand. We have a flight control problem”. The F/O complied and the request was approved by ATC. Following the approval of the ATC, the new target altitude of 14,000ft was set on the MCP. The Captain was unable to maintain the flight path and requested to return back to the departure airport. At 05:43:21, approximately five seconds after the last main electric trim up input, an automatic nose-down trim activated for about 5s. The stabilizer moved from 2.3 to 1 unit. The rate of climb decreased followed by a descent in 3s after the automatic trim activation. One second before the end of the automatic trim activation, the average force applied by the crew decreased from 100 lbs to 78 lbs in 3.5 seconds. In these 3.5 seconds, the pitch angle dropped from 0.5° nose up to -7.8° nose down and the descent rate increased from -100 ft/min to more than -5,000 ft/min. Following the last automatic trim activation and despite calculated column force of up to 110lbs, the pitch continued decreasing. The descent rate and the airspeed continued increasing between the triggering of the 4th automatic trim activation and the last recorded parameter value. At the end of the flight, Computed airspeed values reached 500Kt, Pitch values were greater than 40° nose down and descent rate values were greater than 33,000 ft/min. Finally, both recorders stopped recording at around 05 h 43 min 44s. At 05:44 The Airplane impacted terrain 28 NM South East of Addis Ababa near Ejere (located 8.8770 N, 39.2516 E.) village at a farm field and created a crater approximately 10 meters deep (last Airplane part found) with a hole of about 28 meters width and 40 meters length. Most of the wreckage was found buried in the ground; small fragments of the Airplane were found scattered around the site in an area by about 200 meters width and 300 meters long. The damages to the Airplane were consistent with a high energy impact. All 157 persons on board: 2 flight crew (a Captain and a First Officer), 5 cabin crew and one IFSO, 149 regular passengers were fatally injured.
Probable cause:
Repetitive and uncommanded airplane-nose-down inputs from the MCAS due to erroneous AOA input, and its unrecoverable activation system which made the airplane dive with the rate of -33,000 feet per minute close to the ground was the most probable cause of the accident.
The following contributing factors were identified:
1. The MCAS design relied on a single AOA sensor, making it vulnerable to erroneous input from the sensor;
2. During the design process, Boeing failed to consider the potential for uncommanded activation of MCAS, but assumed that pilots would recognize and address it through normal use of the control column, manual electric trim, and the existing Runaway Stabilizer NNC. The OMB and Emergency AD issued after the Lion Air accident included additional guidance but did not have the intended effect of preventing another MCAS-related accident;
3. While Boeing considered the possibility of uncommanded MCAS activation as part of its FHA, it did not evaluate all the potential alerts and indications that could accompany a failure leading to an uncommanded MCAS;
4. The MCAS contribution to cumulative AOA effects was not assessed;
5. The combined effect of alerts and indications that impacted pilot’s recognition and procedure prioritization were not evaluated by the Manufacturer;
6. Absence of AOA DISAGREE warning flag on the flight display panels (PFD);
7. The B737 MAX Crew difference CBT training prepared by Boeing and delivered to Pilots did not cover the MCAS system;
8. Failure by the manufacturer to design simulator training for pilots with regards to safety critical systems like MCAS with catastrophic consequences during undesired activation.
9. The manufacturer failed to provide procedures regarding MCAS operation to the crew during training or in the FCOM;
10. Failure by the manufacturer to address the safety critical questions raised by the airline which would have cleared out crew confusion and task prioritization;
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 208B Grand Caravan in Mt Aberdare: 10 killed

Date & Time: Jun 5, 2018 at 1702 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
5Y-CAC
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Kitale – Nairobi
MSN:
208B-0525
YOM:
1996
Flight number:
EXZ102
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
8
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
10
Captain / Total flying hours:
2352
Circumstances:
The aircraft took-off from Kitale Airstrip (HKKT) at 16.05 hours and set course to Jomo Kenyatta International Airport (HKJK) after climbing to FL 110 with ten onboard. Once established, there were slight peripheral variations in groundspeed and track. The aircraft Flight Level was sustained at 110 with some occasional deviations. Aircraft height above ground level (AGL) varied between 1,102 feet and 4,187 feet. One minute before its impact with the cliff, the aircraft was at 11,100 feet or 3,000 feet AGL, 159 knots ground speed, and tracking radial 338 NV. Immediately before radar signal was lost, the elevation of the highest ground level was 12,876 feet, the aircraft altitude was 11,200 feet, the ground speed was 156 knots, and track was radial 339 NV. Information retrieved from the Radar transcript recorded various parameters of the aircraft from 1605hrs up to 1702hrs, the time radar signal was lost. This information was consistent with information extracted from the on-board equipment the ST3400 and the aera GPS. The radar system transmits information including aircraft position in relation to NV VOR, Flight Level or altitude, ground speed, vertical speed and heading. Information retrieved from the GPS captured the last recorded time, date and location as 14:00:52, on 06/05/2018 and elevation 3,555.57 metres. The aircraft impacted the bamboo-covered terrain at an elevation of 3,645 metres at 0.36’56’’S 36 42’44’’ where the wreckage was sited. The aircraft was totally destroyed by impact forces and all 10 occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
The flight crew's inadequate flight planning and the decision to fly instrument flight rules (IFR) at an altitude below the published Minimum Sector Altitude in the Standard Instrument Arrival Chart under instrument meteorological conditions (IMC), and their failure to perform an immediate escape maneuver following TAWS alert, which resulted in controlled flight into terrain (CFIT).
Contributing Factors:
1. Contributing to the accident were the operator's inadequate crew resource management (CRM) training, inadequate procedures for operational control and flight release.
2. Also contributing to the accident was the Kenya Civil Aviation Authority's failure to hold the operator accountable for correcting known operational deficiencies and ensuring compliance with its operational control procedures.
3. There was no requirement for crew to be trained in CFIT avoidance ground training tailored to the company’s operations that need to address current CFIT-avoidance technologies.
4. Use of non-documented procedure and Clearance by the ATC to fly below the published minimum sector altitude.
5. Lack of situational awareness by the radar safety controller while monitoring flights within the radar service section.
Final Report:

Crash of a Fokker 50 in Nairobi

Date & Time: Jan 4, 2015 at 1102 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
5Y-SIB
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Wajir – Nairobi
MSN:
20167
YOM:
1989
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
6
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
17000
Captain / Total hours on type:
1200.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
4143
Copilot / Total hours on type:
200
Circumstances:
On 4 January 2015, about 0840 local time, a Fokker 27-50 a cargo flight, registration 5Y-SIB, operated by Skyward Express Ltd, experienced a gear-up landing at Jomo Kenyatta International Airport (HKJK). The flight had diverted to HKJK due to a mechanical malfunction of the landing gear. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and the airplane was on an IFR flight plan. None of the ten persons on board were injured. The airplane was substantially damaged and there was no fire. The flight originated at Wajir (HKWJ) and the original destination was Nairobi-Wilson Airport (HKNW). During the departure from HKWJ, the flight sustained a bird-strike. After taking steps to confirm any aircraft system malfunction the aircraft systems were still operable and the flight crew elected to continue the flight. The flight en route was without any incident. While in the traffic pattern at Wilson, the landing gear was activated to extend and it resulted in an unsafe indication for the left main gear. During the period of about an hour while circling overhead the airport, the flight crew attempted to resolve the anomaly but they were unsuccessful. It prompted the crew to declare an emergency after they had confirmed that the left main landing gear was locked up in the air position and was not lowering. After declaring an emergency, the crew carried out an extensive consultation with the air traffic services and the company ground personnel and elected to divert the flight to Jomo Kenyatta International Airport (HKJK). The crew made a successful gear-up landing at Jomo Kenyatta International Airport (HKJK) runway 06 with no injury to those onboard the flight however the aircraft sustained substantial damage. The aircraft got disabled after landing and blocked both runways for more than four hours as the airport authorities struggled to remove it to pave way for other operations. According to the report obtained from post-accident interview with the flight crew at 0540 the aircraft took-off at Wajir (HKWJ) on runway 15 and immediately after take-off on passing 200ft at a speed of Vref +10 Knots the crew noticed a flock of birds and tried to evade them. While increasing the aircraft rate of climb they felt like a thud (hitting something). After clearing the flock they inspected the instruments and confirmed all aircraft systems were functioning satisfactorily. They then proceeded with their flight as intended. According to the air traffic control (ATC) transcript obtained from Wilson control tower upon entering Wilson aerodrome traffic circuit at 0641:41 the crew requested ATC to join downwind runway 07 and was immediately cleared. After five minutes (0646:50) the crew requested ATC to extend downwind and at 0648:03 the crew confirms to the ATC that they are checking the undercarriage. At 0654:08 the crew confirms to the ATC that they have an emergency on the left main landing gear and they have checked it is locked up in the air position. The crew requested for more time to trouble-shoot the problem and requested ATC to brief their company about the problem. At 0731:07 the crew confirmed to HKNW air traffic service unit that they are ready to do gear-up landing and they would prefer HKJK instead of HKNW. They are then cleared for HKJK to join left base runway 06. 30 seconds later the crew changes their intention to go to HKJK and confirms to HKNW ATC that they would do a gear-up landing at HKNW and requests for more time. At 0749:31 the crew consults with their company through HKNW ATC and agrees to carry out the gear-up landing at HKJK and the flight was cleared to proceed to HKJK. At 0802 the crew made a successful gear-up landing on runway 06 at HKJK.
Probable cause:
The cause of the accident was the failure of the left Main Landing Gear, MLG to extend during landing due to a bird strike which disabled proper functioning of the mechanical system that controls the opening and closing the door to the left MLG.
Final Report:

Crash of a Fokker F27 Friendship 500 near Kogatende: 3 killed

Date & Time: Aug 31, 2014 at 1945 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
5Y-SXP
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Mwanza - Nairobi
MSN:
10681
YOM:
1985
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Circumstances:
The aircraft departed Mwanza Airport at 1926LT on a cargo flight Nairobi. While passing FL169, the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent. It passed FL146 at an excessive speed of 430 knots and eventually crashed in an open field located near Kogatende. The wreckage was found the following morning. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all three occupants were killed.

Crash of a Fokker 50 in Nairobi: 4 killed

Date & Time: Jul 2, 2014 at 0417 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
5Y-CET
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Nairobi - Mogadishu
MSN:
20262
YOM:
26
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
4
Captain / Total flying hours:
14531
Captain / Total hours on type:
6821.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
823
Copilot / Total hours on type:
513
Aircraft flight hours:
27342
Aircraft flight cycles:
26358
Circumstances:
On 2 July 2014, about 01.14 UTC, 5Y-CET, a Fokker F50, an international cargo flight, operated by Skyward International, crashed shortly after takeoff from Jomo Kenyatta International Airport (JKIA), Nairobi, Kenya (JKIA). Instrument Meteorological Conditions prevailed at the time and the airplane was on an instrument flight plan. The four crewmembers were fatally injured. The airplane was destroyed and consumed by post-crash fire. The destination of the flight was Aden Adee International Airport, Mogadishu, Somalia. The airplane was repositioned from its home base at Wilson Airport in Nairobi, the day before. The accident captain (CAPT) and another first officer conducted the repositioning flight. (see Aircraft Information). At JKIA, the airplane was loaded with cargo in preparation for the accident flight. The accident crew consisted of the Capt and FO in addition to a maintenance engineer and loadmaster. According to air traffic control (ATC), the flight plan was filed for duration of 2.5 hours at an altitude of 19,000 feet along with 5 hours of fuel aboard. Based on flight recorder data, the Capt was the pilot-flying and the FO was the pilot-monitoring. The accident flight was reconstructed using data from air traffic control and flight recorder information. According to FDR data, engine start occurred at at 01.50.20. At about 01.10.59 the flight made initial contact with JKIA air traffic control tower and after routine communication, including the confirmation of the number of person and fuel endurance, the flight was cleared for takeoff at 0112.30. At 01.11.58, both engines accelerated to a high power setting with engine no. 1 stabilizing at 78% torque, 100% propeller speed and engine 2 stabilizing at 80% torque, 99% propeller speed. About six seconds later, the Capt indicates “power is set”. About 2 seconds afterwards the Capt indicated “the auto-feather is off, left” and then 5 seconds later, the FO calls out “seven eighty” (?). About 16 seconds after initial engine acceleration was applied, the first of a series of three chimes audio alerts occurred, and continued at 1 second interval throughout the CVR recording. Immediately after the initial chimes, the Capt said “you see” and “how much is that?”. The FO responded “okay niner”. The Capt then asked “it has gotten to?” The FO replied “thirty four thirty ninety two” and shortly afterward “the left one is thirty”. About 24 seconds after initial engine acceleration, engine 1 torque climbs over a period of 2 seconds to a recorded value of 119.9%, the maximum value the recorder is capable of recording. Simultaneously Engine 1 propeller speed falls from 100% to 57%. Other engine shaft speeds remain at approximately their original high power values. Airspeed at the point this change occurs was less than 30 knots. During this period, the FO called out “one twenty two now [pause] torque”. The Capt responded “it is rising eh? The FO then noted “torque one twenty six now”. About 31 seconds after initial engine acceleration, the FO called out “okay speed alive sixty”. About a second later the Capt asked “do we reduce or”? The FO responded “we can just cut”. The Capt inquired “do we abort or continue?” The FO responded, “okay one one twelve and nine four point three” and then “okay one sixteen [pause] ninety four.” The Capt acknowledged “yeah okay” About 47 seconds after initial engine acceleration, the Capt said twice “did I reduce it?”and the FO responded sequentially “yeah” and “okay”] About 52 seconds after initial engine acceleration, the Capt asked “how is it now?” and the FO replied “yeah one oh two [pause] ninety four”. About 7 seconds later the FO called out “okay, one sixteen ninety four”. About 1 minute after initial engine acceleration, the Capt inquired “Is it really going?” The FO replied “one oh one, ninety five”. The Capt acknowledged and shortly afterward he queried “is it going really, is the aircraft really moving”. The FO responded “okay, one oh one, ninety five”. About 4 seconds later, the Capt indicated “it is not giving power” About 1 minute 9 seconds after the initial engine acceleration the FO called out “okay speed has now reached about hundred”. The Capt responded “oh yeah” and immediately afterward the FO called out “okay one eleven, ninety five”. About 1 minute 18 seconds after the initial engine acceleration, the FO indicated “hundred now”. The Capt acknowledged. About 1 minute 26 seconds after the initial engine acceleration, the FO called out “V one V R rotate” About 1 minute 33 seconds after the initial engine acceleration a transition of the airplane from ground to air mode is recorded and the pressure altitude begins to climb along with the Capt immediately afterward expressing two exclamations. Following the transition to air mode there were 51 seconds of flight recorder data before the recording ended. During this time and over a period of about 3 seconds, the FO calls out “positive rate of climb” and the Capt responded “gear up”. About 3 second later, the Capt expressed “it doesn’t have power [pause] it’s on one side.” About 6 seconds afterward, the FO said “we can also turn back”. About 3 seconds later the first of seven “don’t sink” (GPWS aural warning alerts) begins over a period of 23 seconds. After the second GPWS alert the Capt queried “ok, we’re ok?” After the third GPWS alert, the FO said “we can turn back” and the Capt immediately responded “let’s just go”. The FO replied “okay”. After the fifth GPWS alert, the Capt indicated “and this one is showing one fourteen” and then queried? “we can turn back?”. About 2 seconds later, the FO called out “okay speed is one hundred” and the Capt responded “but this one has nothing” About 1 second later and about the time of the sixth GPW alert, JKIA control tower radioed “five yankee charlie echo tango contact radar one two three decimal three. Good morning.” After the seventh GPWS alert the recording ended about 13 seconds later. During this time, the controller called the aircraft again. The Capt expressed “tell him [pause] tell him we have no power”. The last CVR data indicates the FO radioed, “ah tower charlie echo” and the transmission abruptly ended along with simultaneous sounds of distress. According to FDR data, about 15 seconds after the airplane transitioned from ground to air mode the recorded altitude peaked about 5060 feet and accompanied by a maximum airspeed of 100 knots. Along with a variation of airspeed between 90 knots and 100 knots for the remainder of the recording, during the following 20 seconds the altitude decreased to about 5000 feet and then increased to 5050 feet over the next 10 seconds where it remained until the recording ended at 1.14.27. Witness Accounts (Air Traffic Controller Civilians). The aircraft crashed during the hours of darkness at geographical coordinates of 01° 17’16”S, 36° 57’5”E.
Probable cause:
The probable cause of the accident was the decision by the crew to conduct the flight with a known mechanical problem and their failure to abort or reject the takeoff after receiving twenty seven cautions.
The following findings were identified:
- A three chime alert occurred during the positioning flight from HKNW to HKJK,
- Crew continued with the flight with a known fault,
- No evidence that remedial maintenance action was taken after landing from that flight prior to the event flight,
- No evidence of the anomaly being captured in the aircraft technical log,
- At least one of the occupants during the event flight, possibly the PIC, had been present during the positioning flight and thus was aware of the three chime alert that had occurred then,
- Twenty seven sound of three chime alert event occurred during the take off roll on the accident flight,
- The aforementioned alert occurred well before V1,
- The left engine exhibited high torque values (in excess of 120%) while the left propeller speed was reduced to the range between 45% to 55% rpm for most of the flight,
- Crew continued with take of roll and subsequent rotation despite the twenty seven chime alert,
- When airborne, crew contemplated turning back but eventually elected to continue with the flight,
- Cargo weight exceeded what was indicated in the load sheet 36,
- There was no evidence of any maintenance having been conducted on the aircraft since its Certificate of Airworthiness issue two months previously (9th May 2014).
Final Report:

Crash of a Boeing 737-8AL near Douala: 114 killed

Date & Time: May 5, 2007 at 0008 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
5Y-KYA
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Abidjan – Douala – Nairobi
MSN:
35069/2079
YOM:
2006
Flight number:
KQ507
Location:
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
108
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
114
Captain / Total flying hours:
8682
Copilot / Total flying hours:
831
Aircraft flight hours:
2100
Aircraft flight cycles:
734
Circumstances:
During the night of 4th May 2007, the B737-800, registration 5Y-KYA, operating as flight KQ507 from Abidjan international Airport, Ivory Coast, to the Jomo Kenyatta Airport in Nairobi (Kenya), made a scheduled stop-over at the Douala international Airport. The weather was stormy. The aircraft took off and climbed into the dark night. There were no external visual references, yet no instrument scanning was done by the crew. At 1000 feet climbing, the pilot flying released the flight controls for 55 seconds without having engaged the autopilot. The bank angle of the airplane increased continuously by itself very slowly up to 34° right and the captain appeared unaware of the airplane’s changing attitude. Just before the "Bank Angle" warning sounds, the captain grabbed the controls, appeared confused about the attitude of the airplane, and made corrections in an erratic manner increasing the bank angle to 50° right. At about 50° bank angle, the autopilot was engaged and the inclination tended to stabilize; then movements of the flight controls by the pilot resumed and the bank angle increased towards 70° right. A prolonged right rudder input brought the bank angle to beyond 90°. The aircraft descended in a spiral dive until it crashed at approximately 0008LT (May 5) in a mangrove swamp located 5,5 km southeast of Douala Airport. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all 114 occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
The airplane crashed after loss of control by the crew as a result of spatial disorientation (non recognized or subtle type transitioning to recognized spatial disorientation), after a long slow roll, during which no instrument scanning was done, and in the absence of external visual references in a dark night. Inadequate operational control, lack of crew coordination, coupled with the non-adherence to procedures of flight monitoring, confusion in the utilization of the AP, have also contributed to cause this situation.
Final Report:

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-5 Buffalo in Nairobi

Date & Time: Dec 30, 2006 at 0632 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
5Y-SRK
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Nairobi - Baidoa
MSN:
003
YOM:
1965
Flight number:
UNO448A
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The aircraft departed Nairobi-Jomo Kenyatta Airport on a cargo flight to Baidoa, Somalia, carrying 3 crew members and a load consisting of 20 drums of fuel for the Somali interim Government in place in Baidoa, on behalf of the International Red Cross. Shortly after takeoff from runway 06, at a height of about 100 feet, the left engine lost power. The captain contacted ATC, declared an emergency and was cleared for an immediate return. After the engine was secured and the propeller was feathered, the crew initiated a turn when the aircraft lost height, collided with a power line and crashed onto a house, 3 minutes after takeoff. All three crew members were injured while no one was injured on ground.
Probable cause:
Failure of the left engine during initial climb for undetermined reasons. Marginal weather conditions were considered as a contributing factor.

Crash of an Antonov AN-12BP in Lokichoggio

Date & Time: Nov 1, 2006 at 1344 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
9L-LFQ
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Nairobi – Lokichogio
MSN:
2 4 005 02
YOM:
1962
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
Upon landing on runway 27 at Lokichoggio Airport, the aircraft bounced three times then landed firmly. Upon impact, the nose gear collapsed and the aircraft slid on its nose before coming to rest about 100 metres before the runway end. All nine occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
Wrong approach configuration on part of the crew who completed the approach with an excessive rate of descent, causing the aircraft to land hard and to bounce three times. The high g loads upon impact caused the nose gear to collapse.

Crash of a Cessna 208 Caravan I in Nairobi: 4 killed

Date & Time: Nov 26, 1999 at 0526 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
5Y-RAN
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Nairobi - Dar es Salaam
MSN:
208-0037
YOM:
1985
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
4
Circumstances:
Shortly after a night takeoff from runway 24 at Nairobi-Jomo Kenyatta Airport, the single engine aircraft went out of control and crashed near the runway end. All four occupants were killed. The aircraft was completing a flight to Dar es Salaam on behalf of DHL. At the time of the accident, weather conditions were marginal with strong wind and fog.