Zone

Crash of a Boeing 737-275C off Honolulu

Date & Time: Jul 2, 2021 at 0145 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N810TA
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Honolulu – Kahului
MSN:
21116/427
YOM:
1975
Flight number:
MUI810
Location:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The aircraft departed Honolulu-Daniel K. Inouye International Airport at 0133LT on a cargo service (flight MUI810) to Kahului. While climbing by night, the crew contacted ATC and declared an emergency following the failure of the left engine, and was cleared to return. Due to the position of the aircraft, the crew was suggested to divert to Kalaeloa Airport located about 15 km west of Honolulu Intl Airport. Eventually, the crew elected to ditch the aircraft that came to rest about 3 km south of Kalaeloa Airport. Both pilots were seriously injured and rescued by USCG. The aircraft sank and was lost. Operations to recover the wreckage are under way.

Crash of a Partenavia P.68 Observer in Panda Ranch

Date & Time: Feb 27, 2014 at 1947 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N947MZ
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Honolulu - Panda Ranch
MSN:
316-12/OB
YOM:
1983
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
4433
Captain / Total hours on type:
1716.00
Aircraft flight hours:
8831
Circumstances:
The pilot stated that the flight was conducted at night and he used his GPS track to align with the runway. When the pilot activated the runway lights, the airplane was about 1/4 mile to the left of the runway and 1/2 mile from the approach end. The pilot made an aggressive right turn then hard left turn to make the runway for landing. While maneuvering on short final, at 50 feet above ground level (agl), the airplane's right wing impacted the tops of a number of trees that lined the southeast side of the runway. The airplane descended rapidly and landed hard, collapsing the landing gear and spinning the airplane around 180 degrees laterally, where it came to rest against some trees. The right wing's impact with trees and the hard landing resulted in substantial damage. The pilot reported no preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
Probable cause:
The pilot's inadequate decision to continue an unstable approach in dark night conditions, which resulted in a collision with trees and hard landing
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 208B Grand Caravan off Kalaupapa: 1 killed

Date & Time: Dec 11, 2013 at 1522 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N687MA
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Kalaupapa - Honolulu
MSN:
208B-1002
YOM:
2002
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
8
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
16000
Captain / Total hours on type:
250.00
Aircraft flight hours:
4881
Circumstances:
The airline transport pilot was conducting an air taxi commuter flight between two Hawaiian islands with eight passengers on board. Several passengers stated that the pilot did not provide a safety briefing before the flight. One passenger stated that the pilot asked how many of the passengers had flown over that morning and then said, “you know the procedures.” The pilot reported that, shortly after takeoff and passing through about 500 ft over the water, he heard a loud “bang,” followed by a total loss of engine power. The pilot attempted to return to the airport; however, he realized that the airplane would not be able to reach land, and he subsequently ditched the airplane in the ocean. All of the passengers and the pilot exited the airplane uneventfully. One passenger swam to shore, and rescue personnel recovered the pilot and the other seven passengers from the water about 80 minutes after the ditching. However, one of these passengers died before the rescue personnel arrived. Postaccident examination of the recovered engine revealed that multiple compressor turbine (CT) blades were fractured and exhibited thermal damage. In addition, the CT shroud exhibited evidence of high-energy impact marks consistent with the liberation of one or more of the CT blades. The thermal damage to the CT blades likely occurred secondary to the initial blade fractures and resulted from a rapid increase in fuel flow by the engine fuel control in response to the sudden loss of compressor speed due to the blade fractures. The extent of the secondary thermal damage to the CT blades precluded a determination of the cause of the initial fractures. Review of airframe and engine logbooks revealed that, about 1 1/2 years before the accident, the engine had reached its manufacturer-recommended time between overhaul (TBO) of 3,600 hours; however, the operator obtained a factory-authorized, 200-hour TBO increase. Subsequently, at an engine total time since new of 3,752.3 hours, the engine was placed under the Maintenance on Reliable Engines (MORE) Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) inspection program, which allowed an immediate increase in the manufacturer recommended TBO from 3,600 to 8,000 hours. The MORE STC inspection program documents stated that the MORE STC was meant to supplement, not replace, the engine manufacturer’s Instructions for Continued Airworthiness and its maintenance program. Although the MORE STC inspection program required more frequent borescope inspections of the hot section, periodic inspections of the compressor and exhaust duct areas, and periodic power plant adjustment/tests, it did not require a compressor blade metallurgical evaluation of two compressor turbine blades; however, this evaluation was contained in the engine maintenance manual and an engine manufacturer service bulletin (SB). The review of the airframe and engine maintenance logbooks revealed no evidence that a compressor turbine metallurgical evaluation of two blades had been conducted. The operator reported that the combined guidance documentation was confusing, and, as a result, the operator did not think that the compressor turbine blade evaluation was necessary. It is likely that, if the SB had been complied with or specifically required as part of the MORE STC inspection program, possible metal creep or abnormalities in the turbine compressor blades might have been discovered and the accident prevented. The passenger who died before the first responders arrived was found wearing a partially inflated infant life vest. The autopsy of the passenger did not reveal any significant traumatic injuries, and the autopsy report noted that her cause of death was “acute cardiac arrhythmia due to hyperventilation.” Another passenger reported that he also inadvertently used an infant life vest, which he said seemed “small or tight” but “worked fine.” If the pilot had provided a safety briefing, as required by Federal Aviation Administration regulations, to the passengers that included the ditching procedures and location and usage of floatation equipment, the passengers might have been able to find and use the correct size floatation device.
Probable cause:
The loss of engine power due to the fracture of multiple blades on the compressor turbine wheel, which resulted in a ditching. The reason for the blade failures could not be determined due to secondary thermal damage to the blades.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft 1900C in Lihue: 1 killed

Date & Time: Jan 14, 2008 at 0508 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N410UB
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Honolulu - Lihue
MSN:
UC-070
YOM:
1989
Flight number:
AIP253
Location:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
3098
Captain / Total hours on type:
1480.00
Aircraft flight hours:
19123
Circumstances:
The pilot was flying a night, single-pilot, cargo flight over water between two islands. He had routine contact with air traffic control, and was advised by the controller to maintain 6,000 feet at 0501 hours when the airplane was 11 miles from the destination airport. Two minutes later the flight was cleared for a visual approach to follow a preceding Boeing 737 and advised to switch to the common traffic advisory frequency at the airport. The destination airport was equipped with an air traffic control tower but it was closed overnight. The accident flight's radar-derived flight path showed that the pilot altered his flight course to the west, most likely for spacing from the airplane ahead, and descended into the water as he began a turn back toward the airport. The majority of the wreckage sank in 4,800 feet of water and was not recovered, so examinations and testing could not be performed. As a result, the functionality of the altitude and attitude instruments in the cockpit could not be determined. A performance study showed, however, that the airspeed, pitch, rates of descent, and bank angles of the airplane during the approach were within expected normal ranges, and the pilot did not make any transmissions during the approach that indicated he was having any problems. In fact, another cargo flight crew that landed just prior to the accident airplane and an airport employee reported that the pilot transmitted that he was landing on the active runway, and was 7 miles from landing. Radar data showed that when the airplane was 6.5 miles from the airport, at the location of the last recorded radar return, the radar target's mode C altitude report showed an altitude of minus 100 feet mean sea level. The pilot most likely descended into the ocean because he became spatially disoriented. Although visual meteorological conditions prevailed, no natural horizon and few external visual references were available during the visual approach. This increased the importance of monitoring flight instruments to maintain awareness of the airplane attitude and altitude. The pilot's tasks during the approach, however, included maintaining visual separation from the airplane ahead and lining up with the destination runway. These tasks required visual attention outside the cockpit. These competing tasks probably created shifting visual frames of reference, left the pilot vulnerable to common visual and vestibular illusions, and reduced his awareness of the airplane's attitude, altitude and trajectory.
Probable cause:
The pilot's spatial disorientation and loss of situational awareness. Contributing to the accident were the dark night and the task requirements of simultaneously monitoring the cockpit instruments and the other airplane.
Final Report:

Crash of a Partenavia P.68 in Panda Ranch

Date & Time: Apr 30, 2006 at 2000 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N4574C
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Panda Ranch - Honolulu
MSN:
310
YOM:
1983
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
4
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
2100
Captain / Total hours on type:
110.00
Aircraft flight hours:
1900
Circumstances:
The airplane descended into terrain during the takeoff initial climb from a private airstrip in dark night conditions. The four passengers had been flown to the departure airport earlier in the day. After several hours at the destination, the pilot and passengers boarded the airplane and waited for two other airplanes to depart. During the initial climb, the pilot banked the airplane to the right, due to the upsloping terrain in the opposite direction (left) and noise abatement concerns; this maneuver was a standard departure procedure. The airplane collided with the gradually upsloping terrain, coming to rest upright. The pilot did not believe that he had experienced a loss of power. The accident occurred in dark night conditions, about 1 hour after sunset. In his written report, the pilot said he only had 10 hours of total night flying experience.
Probable cause:
The pilot's failure to attain a proper climb rate and to maintain adequate clearance from the terrain during the initial climb in dark night conditions, which resulted in an in-flight collision with terrain.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 414A Chancellor in Kahului: 3 killed

Date & Time: Mar 8, 2006 at 1913 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N5601C
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Honolulu - Kahului
MSN:
414A-0113
YOM:
1978
Location:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Captain / Total flying hours:
3141
Aircraft flight hours:
8734
Circumstances:
The twin-engine medical transport airplane was on a positioning flight when the pilot reported a loss of power affecting one engine before impacting terrain 0.6 miles west of the approach end of the runway. The airplane was at 2,600 feet and in a shallow descent approximately 8 miles northwest of the airport when the pilot checked in with the tower and requested landing. Three and a half minutes later, the pilot reported that he had lost an engine and was in a righthand turn. Radar data indicated that the airplane was 2 miles southwest of the airport at 1,200 feet msl. The radar track continued to depict the airplane in a descent and in a right-hand turn, approximately 1.9 miles west of the approach end of the runway. The altitude fluctuated between 400 and 600 feet, the track turned right again, and stabilized on an approximate 100- degree magnetic heading, which put the airplane on a left base for the runway. The track entered a third right-hand turn at 500 feet. The pilot's last transmission indicated that one engine was not producing power. The last radar return was 6 seconds later at 200 feet, in the direct vicinity of where the wreckage was located. Using the radar track data, the average ground speed calculations showed a steady decrease from 134 knots at the time of the pilot's initial report of a problem, to 76 knots immediately before the airplane impacted terrain. The documented minimum controllable airspeed (VMC) for this airplane is 68 knots. The zero bank angle stall speed varied from 78 knots at a cruise configuration to 70 knots with the gear and flaps down. A sound spectrum study using recorded air traffic control communications concluded that one engine was operating at 2,630 rpm, and one engine was operating at 1,320 rpm. Propeller damage was consistent with the right engine operating at much higher power than the left engine at the time of impact, and both propellers were at or near the low pitch stops (not feathered). Examination and teardown of both engines did not reveal any evidence of mechanical malfunction. Investigators found that the landing gear was down and the flaps were fully deployed at impact. In this configuration, performance calculations showed that level flight was not possible with one engine inoperative, and that once the airspeed had decreased below minimum controllable airspeed (VMC), the airplane could stall, roll in the direction of the inoperative engine, and enter an uncontrolled descent. The pilot had been trained and had demonstrated a satisfactory ability to operate the airplane in slow flight and single engine landings. However, flight at minimum controllable airspeed with one engine inoperative was not practiced during training. The operator's training manual stated that during single engine training an objective was to ensure the pilot reduced drag; however, there was no procedure to accomplish this objective, and the ground training syllabus did not specifically address engine out airplane configuration performance as a dedicated topic of instruction. The operator's emergency procedures checklist and manufacturer's information manual clearly addressed the performance penalties of configuring the airplane with an inoperative engine, propeller unfeathered, the landing gear down, and/or the flaps deployed. The engine failure during flight procedure checklist and the engine inoperative go-around checklist, if followed, configure the airplane for level single engine flight by feathering the propeller, raising the flaps, and retracting the landing gear.
Probable cause:
The failure of the pilot to execute the published emergency procedures pertaining to configuring the airplane for single engine flight, which would have allowed him to maintain minimum controllable airspeed (VMC) and level flight. The pilot's failure to maintain minimum controllable airspeed (VMC) led to a stall and subsequent VMC roll at a low altitude. Contributing to the accident was the operator's inadequate pilot training in the single engine flight regime, and the loss of power from the left engine for undetermined reasons.
Final Report:

Crash of a Piper PA-31-325 Navajo C/R in Kahului

Date & Time: Feb 18, 2004 at 1352 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
C-GPTE
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Honolulu – Oakland – Brooks
MSN:
31-7712059
YOM:
1977
Location:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Aircraft flight hours:
7923
Circumstances:
The airplane collided with terrain 200 yards short of the runway during an emergency landing following a loss of engine power. The pilot was on an intermediate leg of a ferry trip. Approximately 300 miles from land, the fuel flow and boost pump lights illuminated. Then, the right engine failed. The pilot flew back to the nearest airport; however, approximately 200 yards from the runway, the airplane stalled and the right wing dropped and collided with the ground. The fuel system had been modified a few months prior to the accident to allow for a ferry fuel tank installation. Post accident examination of the airplane could not find a reason for the power loss.
Probable cause:
The pilot's failure to maintain an adequate airspeed while maneuvering for landing on one engine, which resulted in an inadvertent stall. The loss of power in one engine for undetermined reasons was a factor.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 414A Chancellor in Laupahoehoe: 3 killed

Date & Time: Jan 31, 2004 at 0140 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N5637C
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Honolulu – Hilo
MSN:
414A-0118
YOM:
1978
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Captain / Total flying hours:
8230
Captain / Total hours on type:
1037.00
Aircraft flight hours:
11899
Circumstances:
The airplane collided with trees and mountainous terrain at the 3,600-foot-level of Mauna Kea Volcano during an en route cruise descent toward the destination airport that was 21 miles east of the accident site. The flight departed Honolulu VFR at 0032 to pickup a patient in Hilo, on the Island of Hawaii. The inter island cruising altitude was 9,500 feet and the flight was obtaining VFR flight advisories. At 0113, just before the flight crossed the northwestern coast of Hawaii, the controller provided the pilot with the current Hilo weather, which was reporting a visibility of 1 3/4 miles in heavy rain and mist with ceiling 1,700 feet broken, 2,300 overcast. Recorded radar data showed that the flight crossed the coast of Hawaii at 0122, descending through 7,400 feet tracking southeast bound toward the northern slopes of Mauna Kea and Hilo beyond. The last recorded position of the aircraft was about 26 miles northwest of the accident site at a mode C reported altitude of 6,400 feet. At 0130, the controller informed the pilot that radar contact was lost and also said that at the airplane's altitude, radar coverage would not be available inbound to Hilo. The controller terminated radar services. A witness who lived in the immediate area of the accident site reported that around 0130 he heard a low flying airplane coming from the north. He alked outside his residence and observed an airplane fly over about 500 feet above ground level (agl) traveling in the direction of the accident site about 3 miles east. The witness said that light rain was falling and he could see a half moon, which he thought provided fair illumination. The area forecast in effect at the time of the flight's departure called for broken to overcast layers from 1,000 to 2,000 feet, with merging layers to 30,000 feet and isolated cumulonimbus clouds with tops to 40,000 feet. It also indicated that the visibility could temporarily go below 3 statute miles. The debris path extended about 500 feet along a magnetic bearing of 100 degrees with debris scattered both on the ground and in tree branches. Investigators found no anomalies with the airplane or engines that would have precluded normal operation. Pilots for the operator typically departed under VFR, even in night conditions or with expectations of encountering adverse weather, to preclude ground holding delays. The pilots would then pick up their instrument flight rules (IFR) clearance en route. The forecast and actual weather conditions at Hilo were below the minimums specified in the company Operations Manual for VFR operations.
Probable cause:
The pilot's disregard for an in-flight weather advisory, his likely encounter with marginal VFR or IMC weather conditions, his decision to continue flight into those conditions, and failure to maintain an adequate terrain clearance altitude resulting in an in-flight collision with trees and mountainous terrain. A contributing factor was the pilot's failure to adhere to the VFR weather minimum procedures in the company's Operations Manual.
Final Report:

Crash of a Piper PA-31-310 Navajo off Monterey

Date & Time: Apr 14, 1999 at 1800 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N141CM
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Honolulu – Long Beach
MSN:
31-234
YOM:
1968
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
427
Captain / Total hours on type:
42.00
Aircraft flight hours:
4882
Circumstances:
The pilot reported that about 150 miles southwest of Monterey, the right engine made unusual noises, began to run rough, and exhibited high cylinder head temperature at the limits of the gauge. He advised Oakland Center of his position and situation, but did not declare an emergency. The pilot attempted to open the right engine cowl flap; however, it malfunctioned. He then increased fuel flow to the right engine in order to cool it and eventually had to reduce power on that side to keep it running. To compensate for the power loss in the right engine, he had to add power to the left engine. The combination of remedial actions increased the fuel consumption beyond his planned fuel burn rate. The flight attitude required by the asymmetric power also induced a periodic unporting condition in the outboard fuel tank pickups. The pilot said he was forced to switch to the inboard tanks until that supply was exhausted and then attempted to feed from the outboard tanks. The pilot said he was unsuccessful in maintaining consistent engine power output and was forced to ditch 20 miles short of the coastline. The pilot's VFR flight plan indicated that the total time en route would be 13 hours 10 minutes and total fuel onboard was 14 hours. The lapsed time from departure until the aircraft ditching was approximately 13 hours 12 minutes.
Probable cause:
An undetermined system malfunction in the right engine, which led to an increase in fuel usage beyond the pilot's planned fuel consumption rate and eventual fuel supply exhaustion.
Final Report:

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-6 Twin Otter 300 in the Pacific Ocean

Date & Time: Apr 12, 1997 at 2204 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N242CA
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Oakland - Honolulu
MSN:
342
YOM:
1972
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
25000
Captain / Total hours on type:
1000.00
Aircraft flight hours:
9873
Circumstances:
On a ferry flight from Oakland, California, to Honolulu, Hawaii, the pilot declared a low fuel emergency and diverted toward Hilo, Hawaii. Approximately 2.5 hours later, the aircraft was ditched in the Pacific ocean. The pilot evacuated the aircraft before it sank and was rescued by the U.S. Coast Guard. He stated that, under flight planned conditions, the aircraft departed Oakland with sufficient fuel onboard to reach the intended destination with a 2-hour fuel reserve. However, the winds at flight altitude, which were reported as light and variable at the preflight weather briefing, developed into a significant headwind during the flight. At a point 7 hours and 10 minutes into the flight, the pilot determined that his fuel remaining was 8 hours and 40 minutes, with 7 hours and 40 minutes remaining to destination. Three hours later, the pilot determined that his 2-hour reserve was gone. He declared an emergency and diverted toward the closest airport, which was Hilo. Prior to fuel system exhaustion, the pilot elected to ditch the aircraft with power.
Probable cause:
The pilot's inadequate en route fuel consumption calculations, which led to his failure to recognize a deteriorating fuel duration versus time-to-go situation in a more timely way.
Final Report: