code

HI

Crash of a Beechcraft C90A King Air off Hana: 3 killed

Date & Time: Dec 15, 2022 at 2127 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N13GZ
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Kahului – Waimea
MSN:
LJ-1590
YOM:
2000
Location:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Circumstances:
The twin engine airplane was completing an ambulance flight from Kahului to Waimea, carrying two doctors and one pilot. While approaching Maui Island at night, the airplane went out of control and crashed into the sea some 15 miles south off Hana. All three occupants were killed.

Crash of a Boeing 737-275C off Honolulu

Date & Time: Jul 2, 2021 at 0145 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N810TA
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Honolulu – Kahului
MSN:
21116/427
YOM:
1975
Flight number:
MUI810
Location:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The aircraft departed Honolulu-Daniel K. Inouye International Airport at 0133LT on a cargo service (flight MUI810) to Kahului. While climbing by night, the crew contacted ATC and declared an emergency following the failure of the left engine, and was cleared to return. Due to the position of the aircraft, the crew was suggested to divert to Kalaeloa Airport located about 15 km west of Honolulu Intl Airport. Eventually, the crew elected to ditch the aircraft that came to rest about 3 km south of Kalaeloa Airport. Both pilots were seriously injured and rescued by USCG. The aircraft sank and was lost. Operations to recover the wreckage are under way.

Crash of a Beechcraft 65-A90 King Air in Dillingham: 11 killed

Date & Time: Jun 21, 2019 at 1822 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N256TA
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Dillingham - Dillingham
MSN:
LJ-256
YOM:
1967
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
10
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
11
Captain / Total flying hours:
1086
Captain / Total hours on type:
214.00
Aircraft flight hours:
15104
Aircraft flight cycles:
24569
Circumstances:
On June 21, 2019, about 1822 Hawaii-Aleutian standard time, a Beech King Air 65-A90 airplane, N256TA, impacted terrain after takeoff from Dillingham Airfield (HDH), Mokuleia, Hawaii. The pilot and 10 passengers were fatally injured, and the airplane was destroyed. The airplane was owned by N80896 LLC and was operated by Oahu Parachute Center (OPC) LLC under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 as a local parachute jump (skydiving) flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. OPC had scheduled five parachute jump flights on the day of the accident and referred to the third through fifth flights of the day as “sunset” flights because they occurred during the late afternoon and early evening. The accident occurred during the fourth flight. The accident pilot was the pilot-in-command (PIC) for each of the OPC flights that departed on the day of the accident. The pilot and 8 of the 10 passengers initially boarded the airplane. These eight passengers comprised three OPC tandem parachute instructors, three passenger parachutists, and two OPC parachutists performing camera operator functions. The pilot began to taxi the airplane from OPC’s location on the airport. According to a witness (an OPC tandem instructor who was not aboard the accident flight), the two other passengers—solo parachutists who had been on the previous skydiving flight and were late additions to the accident flight—“ran out to the airplane and were loaded up at the last minute.” The pilot taxied the airplane to runway 8 about 1820, and the airplane departed about 1822. According to multiple witnesses, after the airplane lifted off, it banked to the left, rolled inverted, and descended to the ground. One witness stated that, before impact, the airplane appeared to be intact and that there were no unusual noises or smoke coming from the airplane. A security camera video showed that the airplane was inverted in a 45° nose-down attitude at the time of impact. The airplane impacted a grass and dirt area about 630 ft northeast of the departure end of the runway, and a postcrash fire ensued. The airplane was not equipped, and was not required to be equipped, with a cockpit voice recorder or a flight data recorder. The accident flight was not detected by radar at the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) Hawaii Control Facility, which was the air traffic control (ATC) facility with jurisdiction of the airspace over HDH. The FAA found no audio communications between the accident airplane and ATC on the day of the accident.
Probable cause:
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the pilot’s aggressive takeoff maneuver, which resulted in an accelerated stall and subsequent loss of control at an altitude that was too low for recovery.
Contributing to the accident were
1) the operation of the airplane near its aft center of gravity limit and the pilot’s lack of training and experience with the handling qualities of the airplane in this flight regime;
2) the failure of Oahu Parachute Center and its contract mechanic to maintain the airplane in an airworthy condition and to detect and repair the airplane’s twisted left wing, which reduced the airplane’s stall margin; and
3) the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) insufficient regulatory framework for overseeing parachute jump operations. Contributing to the pilot’s training deficiencies was the FAA’s lack of awareness that the pilot’s flight instructor was providing substandard training.
Final Report:

Crash of a Partenavia P.68 Observer in Panda Ranch

Date & Time: Feb 27, 2014 at 1947 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N947MZ
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Honolulu - Panda Ranch
MSN:
316-12/OB
YOM:
1983
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
4433
Captain / Total hours on type:
1716.00
Aircraft flight hours:
8831
Circumstances:
The pilot stated that the flight was conducted at night and he used his GPS track to align with the runway. When the pilot activated the runway lights, the airplane was about 1/4 mile to the left of the runway and 1/2 mile from the approach end. The pilot made an aggressive right turn then hard left turn to make the runway for landing. While maneuvering on short final, at 50 feet above ground level (agl), the airplane's right wing impacted the tops of a number of trees that lined the southeast side of the runway. The airplane descended rapidly and landed hard, collapsing the landing gear and spinning the airplane around 180 degrees laterally, where it came to rest against some trees. The right wing's impact with trees and the hard landing resulted in substantial damage. The pilot reported no preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
Probable cause:
The pilot's inadequate decision to continue an unstable approach in dark night conditions, which resulted in a collision with trees and hard landing
Final Report:

Crash of a Piper PA-31-350 Navajo Chieftain in Lanai: 3 killed

Date & Time: Feb 26, 2014 at 2130 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N483VA
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Lanai – Kahului
MSN:
31-7552124
YOM:
1975
Location:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
5
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Captain / Total flying hours:
4570
Aircraft flight hours:
12172
Circumstances:
The airplane departed during dark (moonless) night conditions over remote terrain with few ground-based light sources to provide visual cues. Weather reports indicated strong gusting wind from the northeast. According to a surviving passenger, shortly after takeoff, the pilot started a right turn; the bank angle continued to increase, and the airplane impacted terrain in a steep right bank. The accident site was about 1 mile from the airport at a location consistent with the airplane departing to the northeast and turning right about 180 degrees before ground impact. The operator's chief pilot reported that the pilot likely turned right after takeoff to fly direct to the navigational aid located southwest of the airport in order to escape the terrain induced turbulence (downdrafts) near the mountain range northeast of the airport. Examination of the airplane wreckage revealed damage and ground scars consistent with a high-energy, low-angle impact during a right turn. No evidence was found of preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. It is likely that the pilot became spatially disoriented during the right turn. Although visual meteorological conditions prevailed, no natural horizon and few external visual references were available during the departure. This increased the importance for the pilot to monitor the airplane's flight instruments to maintain awareness of its attitude and altitude. During the turn, the pilot was likely performing the additional task of engaging the autopilot, which was located on the center console below the throttle quadrant. The combination of conducting a turn with few visual references in gusting wind conditions while engaging the autopilot left the pilot vulnerable to visual and vestibular illusions and reduced his awareness of the airplane's attitude, altitude, and trajectory. Based on toxicology findings, the pilot most likely had symptoms of an upper respiratory infection but the investigation was unable to determine what effects these symptoms may have had on his performance. A therapeutic level of doxylamine, a sedating antihistamine, was detected, and impairment by doxylamine most likely contributed to the development of spatial disorientation.
Probable cause:
The pilot's spatial disorientation while turning during flight in dark night conditions and terrain-induced turbulence, which resulted in controlled flight into terrain. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's impairment from a sedating antihistamine.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 208B Grand Caravan off Kalaupapa: 1 killed

Date & Time: Dec 11, 2013 at 1522 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N687MA
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Kalaupapa - Honolulu
MSN:
208B-1002
YOM:
2002
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
8
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
16000
Captain / Total hours on type:
250.00
Aircraft flight hours:
4881
Circumstances:
The airline transport pilot was conducting an air taxi commuter flight between two Hawaiian islands with eight passengers on board. Several passengers stated that the pilot did not provide a safety briefing before the flight. One passenger stated that the pilot asked how many of the passengers had flown over that morning and then said, “you know the procedures.” The pilot reported that, shortly after takeoff and passing through about 500 ft over the water, he heard a loud “bang,” followed by a total loss of engine power. The pilot attempted to return to the airport; however, he realized that the airplane would not be able to reach land, and he subsequently ditched the airplane in the ocean. All of the passengers and the pilot exited the airplane uneventfully. One passenger swam to shore, and rescue personnel recovered the pilot and the other seven passengers from the water about 80 minutes after the ditching. However, one of these passengers died before the rescue personnel arrived. Postaccident examination of the recovered engine revealed that multiple compressor turbine (CT) blades were fractured and exhibited thermal damage. In addition, the CT shroud exhibited evidence of high-energy impact marks consistent with the liberation of one or more of the CT blades. The thermal damage to the CT blades likely occurred secondary to the initial blade fractures and resulted from a rapid increase in fuel flow by the engine fuel control in response to the sudden loss of compressor speed due to the blade fractures. The extent of the secondary thermal damage to the CT blades precluded a determination of the cause of the initial fractures. Review of airframe and engine logbooks revealed that, about 1 1/2 years before the accident, the engine had reached its manufacturer-recommended time between overhaul (TBO) of 3,600 hours; however, the operator obtained a factory-authorized, 200-hour TBO increase. Subsequently, at an engine total time since new of 3,752.3 hours, the engine was placed under the Maintenance on Reliable Engines (MORE) Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) inspection program, which allowed an immediate increase in the manufacturer recommended TBO from 3,600 to 8,000 hours. The MORE STC inspection program documents stated that the MORE STC was meant to supplement, not replace, the engine manufacturer’s Instructions for Continued Airworthiness and its maintenance program. Although the MORE STC inspection program required more frequent borescope inspections of the hot section, periodic inspections of the compressor and exhaust duct areas, and periodic power plant adjustment/tests, it did not require a compressor blade metallurgical evaluation of two compressor turbine blades; however, this evaluation was contained in the engine maintenance manual and an engine manufacturer service bulletin (SB). The review of the airframe and engine maintenance logbooks revealed no evidence that a compressor turbine metallurgical evaluation of two blades had been conducted. The operator reported that the combined guidance documentation was confusing, and, as a result, the operator did not think that the compressor turbine blade evaluation was necessary. It is likely that, if the SB had been complied with or specifically required as part of the MORE STC inspection program, possible metal creep or abnormalities in the turbine compressor blades might have been discovered and the accident prevented. The passenger who died before the first responders arrived was found wearing a partially inflated infant life vest. The autopsy of the passenger did not reveal any significant traumatic injuries, and the autopsy report noted that her cause of death was “acute cardiac arrhythmia due to hyperventilation.” Another passenger reported that he also inadvertently used an infant life vest, which he said seemed “small or tight” but “worked fine.” If the pilot had provided a safety briefing, as required by Federal Aviation Administration regulations, to the passengers that included the ditching procedures and location and usage of floatation equipment, the passengers might have been able to find and use the correct size floatation device.
Probable cause:
The loss of engine power due to the fracture of multiple blades on the compressor turbine wheel, which resulted in a ditching. The reason for the blade failures could not be determined due to secondary thermal damage to the blades.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft 1900C in Lihue: 1 killed

Date & Time: Jan 14, 2008 at 0508 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N410UB
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Honolulu - Lihue
MSN:
UC-070
YOM:
1989
Flight number:
AIP253
Location:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
3098
Captain / Total hours on type:
1480.00
Aircraft flight hours:
19123
Circumstances:
The pilot was flying a night, single-pilot, cargo flight over water between two islands. He had routine contact with air traffic control, and was advised by the controller to maintain 6,000 feet at 0501 hours when the airplane was 11 miles from the destination airport. Two minutes later the flight was cleared for a visual approach to follow a preceding Boeing 737 and advised to switch to the common traffic advisory frequency at the airport. The destination airport was equipped with an air traffic control tower but it was closed overnight. The accident flight's radar-derived flight path showed that the pilot altered his flight course to the west, most likely for spacing from the airplane ahead, and descended into the water as he began a turn back toward the airport. The majority of the wreckage sank in 4,800 feet of water and was not recovered, so examinations and testing could not be performed. As a result, the functionality of the altitude and attitude instruments in the cockpit could not be determined. A performance study showed, however, that the airspeed, pitch, rates of descent, and bank angles of the airplane during the approach were within expected normal ranges, and the pilot did not make any transmissions during the approach that indicated he was having any problems. In fact, another cargo flight crew that landed just prior to the accident airplane and an airport employee reported that the pilot transmitted that he was landing on the active runway, and was 7 miles from landing. Radar data showed that when the airplane was 6.5 miles from the airport, at the location of the last recorded radar return, the radar target's mode C altitude report showed an altitude of minus 100 feet mean sea level. The pilot most likely descended into the ocean because he became spatially disoriented. Although visual meteorological conditions prevailed, no natural horizon and few external visual references were available during the visual approach. This increased the importance of monitoring flight instruments to maintain awareness of the airplane attitude and altitude. The pilot's tasks during the approach, however, included maintaining visual separation from the airplane ahead and lining up with the destination runway. These tasks required visual attention outside the cockpit. These competing tasks probably created shifting visual frames of reference, left the pilot vulnerable to common visual and vestibular illusions, and reduced his awareness of the airplane's attitude, altitude and trajectory.
Probable cause:
The pilot's spatial disorientation and loss of situational awareness. Contributing to the accident were the dark night and the task requirements of simultaneously monitoring the cockpit instruments and the other airplane.
Final Report:

Crash of a Partenavia P.68 in Panda Ranch

Date & Time: Apr 30, 2006 at 2000 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N4574C
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Panda Ranch - Honolulu
MSN:
310
YOM:
1983
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
4
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
2100
Captain / Total hours on type:
110.00
Aircraft flight hours:
1900
Circumstances:
The airplane descended into terrain during the takeoff initial climb from a private airstrip in dark night conditions. The four passengers had been flown to the departure airport earlier in the day. After several hours at the destination, the pilot and passengers boarded the airplane and waited for two other airplanes to depart. During the initial climb, the pilot banked the airplane to the right, due to the upsloping terrain in the opposite direction (left) and noise abatement concerns; this maneuver was a standard departure procedure. The airplane collided with the gradually upsloping terrain, coming to rest upright. The pilot did not believe that he had experienced a loss of power. The accident occurred in dark night conditions, about 1 hour after sunset. In his written report, the pilot said he only had 10 hours of total night flying experience.
Probable cause:
The pilot's failure to attain a proper climb rate and to maintain adequate clearance from the terrain during the initial climb in dark night conditions, which resulted in an in-flight collision with terrain.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 414A Chancellor in Kahului: 3 killed

Date & Time: Mar 8, 2006 at 1913 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N5601C
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Honolulu - Kahului
MSN:
414A-0113
YOM:
1978
Location:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Captain / Total flying hours:
3141
Aircraft flight hours:
8734
Circumstances:
The twin-engine medical transport airplane was on a positioning flight when the pilot reported a loss of power affecting one engine before impacting terrain 0.6 miles west of the approach end of the runway. The airplane was at 2,600 feet and in a shallow descent approximately 8 miles northwest of the airport when the pilot checked in with the tower and requested landing. Three and a half minutes later, the pilot reported that he had lost an engine and was in a righthand turn. Radar data indicated that the airplane was 2 miles southwest of the airport at 1,200 feet msl. The radar track continued to depict the airplane in a descent and in a right-hand turn, approximately 1.9 miles west of the approach end of the runway. The altitude fluctuated between 400 and 600 feet, the track turned right again, and stabilized on an approximate 100- degree magnetic heading, which put the airplane on a left base for the runway. The track entered a third right-hand turn at 500 feet. The pilot's last transmission indicated that one engine was not producing power. The last radar return was 6 seconds later at 200 feet, in the direct vicinity of where the wreckage was located. Using the radar track data, the average ground speed calculations showed a steady decrease from 134 knots at the time of the pilot's initial report of a problem, to 76 knots immediately before the airplane impacted terrain. The documented minimum controllable airspeed (VMC) for this airplane is 68 knots. The zero bank angle stall speed varied from 78 knots at a cruise configuration to 70 knots with the gear and flaps down. A sound spectrum study using recorded air traffic control communications concluded that one engine was operating at 2,630 rpm, and one engine was operating at 1,320 rpm. Propeller damage was consistent with the right engine operating at much higher power than the left engine at the time of impact, and both propellers were at or near the low pitch stops (not feathered). Examination and teardown of both engines did not reveal any evidence of mechanical malfunction. Investigators found that the landing gear was down and the flaps were fully deployed at impact. In this configuration, performance calculations showed that level flight was not possible with one engine inoperative, and that once the airspeed had decreased below minimum controllable airspeed (VMC), the airplane could stall, roll in the direction of the inoperative engine, and enter an uncontrolled descent. The pilot had been trained and had demonstrated a satisfactory ability to operate the airplane in slow flight and single engine landings. However, flight at minimum controllable airspeed with one engine inoperative was not practiced during training. The operator's training manual stated that during single engine training an objective was to ensure the pilot reduced drag; however, there was no procedure to accomplish this objective, and the ground training syllabus did not specifically address engine out airplane configuration performance as a dedicated topic of instruction. The operator's emergency procedures checklist and manufacturer's information manual clearly addressed the performance penalties of configuring the airplane with an inoperative engine, propeller unfeathered, the landing gear down, and/or the flaps deployed. The engine failure during flight procedure checklist and the engine inoperative go-around checklist, if followed, configure the airplane for level single engine flight by feathering the propeller, raising the flaps, and retracting the landing gear.
Probable cause:
The failure of the pilot to execute the published emergency procedures pertaining to configuring the airplane for single engine flight, which would have allowed him to maintain minimum controllable airspeed (VMC) and level flight. The pilot's failure to maintain minimum controllable airspeed (VMC) led to a stall and subsequent VMC roll at a low altitude. Contributing to the accident was the operator's inadequate pilot training in the single engine flight regime, and the loss of power from the left engine for undetermined reasons.
Final Report:

Crash of a Piper PA-31-325 Navajo C/R in Kahului

Date & Time: Feb 18, 2004 at 1352 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
C-GPTE
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Honolulu – Oakland – Brooks
MSN:
31-7712059
YOM:
1977
Location:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Aircraft flight hours:
7923
Circumstances:
The airplane collided with terrain 200 yards short of the runway during an emergency landing following a loss of engine power. The pilot was on an intermediate leg of a ferry trip. Approximately 300 miles from land, the fuel flow and boost pump lights illuminated. Then, the right engine failed. The pilot flew back to the nearest airport; however, approximately 200 yards from the runway, the airplane stalled and the right wing dropped and collided with the ground. The fuel system had been modified a few months prior to the accident to allow for a ferry fuel tank installation. Post accident examination of the airplane could not find a reason for the power loss.
Probable cause:
The pilot's failure to maintain an adequate airspeed while maneuvering for landing on one engine, which resulted in an inadvertent stall. The loss of power in one engine for undetermined reasons was a factor.
Final Report: