Bordeaux

The accident was the consequence of a late decision by the crew to abandon the takeoff procedure completed with the parking brake not fully released. The following contributing factors were reported:
- Imperfect application of the checklist, not allowing the crew identify the anomaly when starting up or rolling.
- Bad weather conditions, which led the crew to concentrate on maintaining the runway centerline to the detriment of other checks, and make it impossible to see sufficiently early the landmarks likely to attract his attention to the insufficient acceleration of the aircraft.
- The position of the "BRAKE" warning light outside the pilot's normal visual circuit while taking off.

It appears that the radio guidance system at Lisbon Airport failed for about 15 minutes while the crew was approaching the city from the west. At that time, the visibility was reduced due to foggy conditions and the crew was unable to locate his position with certainty. Due to poor visibility and lack of ground assistance, the crew did not realize his altitude was insufficient.

The accident was due to the following chain of circumstances:
- The weather conditions encountered throughout the flight.
- Bad crewing, as a result of which three of the four operational members of the crew were unfamiliar with the route London - Bordeaux (and Toulouse).
- The captain's failure to ensure that he had all the necessary navigational and landing aid information for that part of the route. In this respect the navigator cannot be considered blameless.
- The unfortunate chance intervention of the York at Bordeaux but for which it seems likely the aircraft would have landed there. In spite of this delay the aircraft could, in fact, have landed as it was then the only one in the vicinity and all radio facilities were at its disposal.
- The captain's decision to go to Le Bourget before ascertaining the weather conditions there in preference to returning to the UK. His navigator had given him ETA's at London and Le Bourget of 1518LT and 1443LT respectively, and he knew Le Bourget. In the light of the evidence it is clear the aircraft would have had more than half an hour's fuel remaining it he had returned direct to England.
- The captains failure to inform Le Bourget of his 1440LT ETA until six minutes earlier. This gave the French station very short notice at a time when much traffic was being handled there in QBI conditions.
- The inability of Cormeilles-en-Vexin to handle two aircraft at once owing to the lack of a second channel, as stated in the French Notice to Airmen No. 49 of 21.10.46.
- The captain's failure to ask Regional Control for further guidance after the failure to establish contact with Cormeilles-en-Vexin between 1447LT, when he acknowledged the diversion and 1514LT when he asked for a QDM.
- The decision of the captain then to try and reach England having regard to his fuel situation at that stage of the flight.

Too low approach in foggy conditions.

Shot down by the German Flak.