Piper PA-31-350 Navajo Chieftain

The Piper Navajo Chieftain PA-31-350, serial number 31-7952072, departed Edmonton, Alberta, on an instrument flight rules charter flight to Stony Rapids, Saskatchewan, with one pilot and six passengers on board. The pilot conducted a non-directional beacon approach at night in Stony Rapids, followed by a missed approach. He then attempted and missed a second approach. At about 2200 central standard time, while manoeuvring to land on runway 06, the aircraft struck trees 3.5 nautical miles west of the runway 06 button and roughly one quarter nautical mile left of the runway centreline, at an altitude of 1200 feet above sea level. The aircraft sustained substantial damage, but no fire ensued. The pilot and one passenger were seriously injured, and the remaining five passengers sustained minor injuries. Canadian Forces search and rescue specialists were air-dropped to the site at 0300 and provided assistance to the pilot and passengers. Local ground search parties later assisted with the rescue.

The pilot of a Piper PA-31-350 Navajo Chieftain, serial number 31-7752151, encountered an area of heavy snow and reduced visibility while on a visual flight rules flight from Bear Valley, British Columbia, logging camp to Tsay Keh. The pilot was unable to maintain visual references and executed a 180-degree turn in an attempt to regain visual flight. Shortly after completing the turn, at about 1055 Pacific standard time, the aircraft collided with the ice on the Peace Reach Arm of Williston Lake, British Columbia. The pilot was the sole occupant of the aircraft and received serious injuries. There was no fire. The aircraft was destroyed during the collision.

The charter operator was involved in a weekly operation to transport computer programmers and training staff, from a Johannesburg company, from Rand Airport to Oranjemund in Namibia. The outward leg of the flights to Oranjemund took place on the Monday morning and the pilot and aircraft stayed at Oranjemund for the week. The return flight to Johannesburg usually took place on the Friday afternoon. On the morning of the accident flight the set time of departure was 0500z. The passengers were assisted through the process of passport control, boarding and settling in by the operator's staff. The baggage was put next to the aircraft. According to a witness the pilot carried out the loading of the baggage. An instrument flight plan was filed and the pilot obtained departure clearance before the aircraft was taxied to the holding point. According to the air traffic controller, the take-off run was normal for this type of aircraft. Shortly after take-off the pilot declared an engine failure and requested to be routed back to land on the runway. Seconds later the pilot communicated they were going to crash. Several witnesses stated that the aircraft was very low when it passed over the highway close to the accident site. One of the witnesses stated that he noticed the right-hand engine stopped and he could see the blades of the propeller. The fire fighting services were alerted. It was apparent by the smoke that the aircraft crashed on an extended line of Runway 29. The accident took place at 0506z in daylight conditions. All 10 occupants were killed.

The airplane collided with mountainous terrain during climb to cruise on a night departure. The pilot of the on-demand cargo flight was brought in off reserve to replace the scheduled pilot who was ill. The flight was behind schedule because the cargo was late. When the instrument flight release created further delay, the pilot opted to depart into the clear, dark night under visual flight rules (VFR) with the intention of picking up his instrument clearance when airborne. When clearing the flight for takeoff, the tower controller issued a suggested heading of 340 degrees, which headed the aircraft toward mountainous terrain 11 miles north of the airport. The purpose of the suggested heading was never stated to the pilot as required by FAA Order 7110.65L. After a frequency change to radar departure control, the controller asked the pilot 'are you direct [the initial (route) fix] at this time?' and the pilot replied, 'we can go ahead and we'll go direct [the initial fix].' A turn toward the initial fix would have headed the aircraft away from high terrain. The controller then diverted his attention to servicing another VFR aircraft and the accident aircraft continued to fly heading 340 degrees until impacting the mountain. ATC personnel said the 340-degree heading was routinely issued to departing aircraft to avoid them entering Class B airspace 3 miles from the airport. The approach control supervisor said this flight departs daily, often VFR, and routinely turns toward the initial fix, avoiding mountainous terrain. When the pilot said that he would go to the initial fix, the controller expected him to turn away from the terrain. Minimum Safe Altitude Warning (MSAW) was not enabled for the flight because the original, instrument flight plan did not route the aircraft through this approach control's airspace and the controller had not had time to manually enter the flight data. High terrain was not displayed on the controller's radar display and no safety alert was issued.

On September 25, 1999, about 1726 Hawaiian standard time, Big Island Air flight 58, a Piper PA-31-350 (Chieftain), N411WL, crashed on the northeast slope of the Mauna Loa volcano near Volcano, Hawaii. The pilot and all nine passengers on board were killed, and the airplane was destroyed by impact forces and a postimpact fire. The sightseeing tour flight was operating under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 as an on-demand air taxi operation. A visual flight rules flight plan was filed, and visual meteorological conditions existed at the Keahole-Kona International Airport, Kona, Hawaii, from which the airplane departed about 1622. The investigation determined that instrument meteorological conditions prevailed in the vicinity of the accident site.

The flight was cleared for a localizer approach to runway 32 at Newnan-Coweta County Airport during dark night conditions. About 8 minutes later the pilot reported to air traffic control that he had missed approach and would like to try another approach. The flight was radar vectored to the final approach course and again cleared for the localizer runway 32 approach. The flight was observed on radar to continue the approach until a point about 4 nautical miles from the airport, at which time radar contact was lost. The last observed altitude was 1,600 feet msl. The aircraft collided with 80-foot tall trees, while established on the localizer for runway 32, about 1.3 nautical miles from the runway. About the time of the accident the weather at the airport was reported as a cloud ceiling 200 feet agl, and visibility .75 statute miles. Post crash examination of the aircraft structure, flight controls, engines, propellers, and systems showed no evidence of pre-crash failure or malfunction.