Columbus-John Glenn (Port Columbus)

The copilot's failure to maintain airspeed, and the captain's delayed remedial action, which resulted in an inadvertent stall and the subsequent hard landing.

The pilot's failure to maintain airspeed while maneuvering in icing conditions on a circling approach for landing resulting in an inadvertent stall and collision with trees and terrain. A factor in the accident was a partial loss of engine power due to the pilot's failure to activate the alternate induction air system, and exceeding the maximum landing weight of the airplane.

No investigations were conducted by the NTSB on this event.

The pilot's inadvertent shutdown of the wrong engine that resulted in the total loss of engine power. A factor was the loss of engine power due to fuel starvation when the left fuel boost pump failed.

The accident was the consequence of the following factors:
(1) An aerodynamic stall that occurred when the flightcrew allowed the airspeed to decay to stall speed following a very poorly planned and executed approach characterized by an absence
of procedural discipline;
(2) Improper pilot response to the stall warning, including failure to advance the power levers to maximum, and inappropriately raising the flaps;
(3) Flightcrew inexperience in 'glass cockpit' automatic aircraft, aircraft type, and in seat position, a situation exacerbated by a side letter of agreement between the company and its pilots;
(4) The company's failure to provide adequate crew resource management training, and the FAA's failure to require such training;
(5) The company's failure to provide adequate stabilized approach criteria, and the FAA's failure to require such criteria; and
(6) The unavailability of suitable training simulators that precluded fully effective flightcrew training.
Note: Items 1, 2, and 3 were approved by a Board vote of 4-0. Item 5 was adopted 3-1, with the dissenting Member believing the item was a contributory cause. The Board was divided 2-2 on items 4 and 6, two Members believing them causal and two Members, contributory.

The inherent limitations of the see-and-avoid concept of separation of aircraft operating under visual flight rules that precluded the pilots of the MU-2 and the PA-32 from recognizing a collision hazard and taking actions to avoid the midair collision. Contributing to the cause of the accident was the failure of the MU-2 pilot to use all the air traffic control services available by not activating his instrument flight rules flight plan before takeoff. Also contributing to the cause of the accident was the failure of both pilots to follow recommended traffic pattern procedures, as recommended in the airman's information manual, for airport arrivals and departures.

The pilot's improper execution of an emergency procedure, after an engine failure, which resulted in the loss of airplane control. Factors related to the accident were: the pilot's improper management of the fuel system; the pilot's lack of proficiency in emergency procedure; and the flight into known icing conditions.

The failure of the pilot to maintain visual reference with the runway during a landing, which resulted in a loss of directional control. Also causal to the accident was the pilot's failure to initiate a go-around, after he lost sight of the runway during the touchdown. Factors related to the accident were the heavy rain and the lack of runway centerline lights.