Indiana

The airline transport pilot arrived at the departure airport in the reciprocating engine-powered airplane where it was fueled with Jet A jet fuel by an airport employee/line service technician. A witness stated that she saw a "low flying" airplane flying from north to south. The airplane made a "sharp left turn" to the east. The left wing "dipped low" and she then lost sight of the airplane, but when she approached the intersection near the accident site, she saw the airplane on the ground. The airplane impacted a field that had dry, level, and hard features conducive for an off-airport landing, and the airplane was destroyed. The wreckage path length and impact damage to the airplane were consistent with an accelerated stall. Postaccident examination of the airplane found Jet A jet fuel in the airplane fuel system and evidence of detonation in both engines from the use of Jet A and not the required 100 low lead fuel. Use of Jet A rather than 100 low lead fuel in an engine would result in detonation in the cylinders and lead to damage and a catastrophic engine failure. According to the Airplane Flying Handbook, the pilot should witness refueling to ensure that the correct fuel and quantity is dispensed into the airplane and that any caps and cowls are properly secured after refueling.

The pilot was conducting a personal cross-country flight in a turbofan-powered airplane. Shortly after departure, the airplane entered a witness-estimated 90° left bank with the nose parallel to the horizon; as the airplane began to roll out of the turn, the nose remained at or below the horizon before it dropped and the airplane impacted the ground. Flight track data revealed that, shortly after departure, the airplane's ground speed immediately began decreasing from its maximum of 141 knots during takeoff and continued decreasing until the last recorded data point, which showed that the airplane had a ground speed of 100 knots. The surface wind reported about 10 minutes before the accident was from 170° at 9 knots, gusting to 14 knots, which resulted in a 1- to 2-knot tailwind component. Given this information and the airplane's configuration at the time of the accident, the airplane's indicated airspeed (IAS) would have been between about 86 and 93 knots. The airplane's stall speed was calculated to be 100 knots IAS (KIAS) with a bank angle of 45° and 118 KIAS with a bank angle of 60°. Thus, the pilot failed to maintain airspeed or accelerate after departure, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall A pilot who had flown with the accident pilot twice before the accident reported that, during these flights, the pilot had flown at reduced power settings and slower-than-normal airspeeds. During the flight 1 year before the accident, he reached over and pushed the power levers forward himself. He also stated that every time he had flown with the pilot, he was "very behind the airplane." Postaccident examination of the engines revealed no signs of preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation, and both engines exhibited circumferential rub marks on all rotating stages, blade tip bending opposite the direction of rotation, and debris ingestion through the gas path, indicating that the engine had power at impact. Further, the right engine full authority digital electronic control (FADEC) nonvolatile memory recorded no faults. (The left engine FADEC could not be downloaded due to damage.) The Airplane Flight Manual stated that the pilot must, in part, advance the throttle lever to the maximum takeoff detent for the FADEC's nonvolatile memory to record a logic trend snapshot 2 seconds after takeoff. The lack of a FADEC logic trend snapshot is consistent with the pilot not fully advancing the throttles during the takeoff and initial climb and is likely why he did not attain or maintain sufficient airspeed. The flight track data, pilot witness account, and airplane damage are consistent with the pilot failing to fully advance the power levers while maneuvering shortly after takeoff, which led to his failure to maintain sufficient airspeed and resulted in the exceedance of the airplane's critical angle of attack and a subsequent aerodynamic stall.

On November 30, 2018, about 1028 central standard time, a Cessna 525A (Citation) airplane, N525EG, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Memphis, Indiana. The pilot and two passengers were fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 business flight. The cross-country flight originated from Clark Regional Airport (JVY), Jeffersonville, Indiana, and was en route to Chicago Midway International Airport (MDW), Chicago, Illinois. The airplane was equipped with automatic dependent surveillance–broadcast (ADS-B), which recorded latitude and longitude from GPS, pressure and geometric altitude, and selected altitude and heading. The airplane was also equipped with a cockpit voice recorder (CVR), which recorded the accident flight and annunciations from the enhanced ground proximity warning system (EGPWS). It was not equipped with a flight data recorder (FDR) nor was it required to be. Review of the CVR transcript showed that the pilot operated as a single pilot but verbalized his actions as he configured the airplane before departure. He referenced items from the Before Taxi checklist and included in his crew briefing that in the event of a problem after takeoff decision speed, he would handle it as an in-flight emergency and “fly the airplane, address the problem, get the autopilot on, talk on the radios, divert over to Stanford.” The air traffic controller provided initial clearance for the pilot to fly direct to the STREP intersection and to climb and maintain 3,000 ft mean sea level. Before the departure from JVY, the pilot announced on the common traffic advisory frequency that he was departing runway 36 and verbalized in the cockpit “this is three six” before he advanced the throttles. The flight departed JVY about 1024:36 into instrument meteorological conditions. The CVR recorded the pilot state that he set power to maximum cruise thrust, switched the engine sync on, and turned on the yaw dampers. The pilot also verbalized his interaction with the autopilot, including navigation mode, direct STREP, and vertical speed climb up to 3,000 ft. According to the National Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB) airplane performance study, the airplane climbed to about 1,400 ft msl before it turned left onto a course of 330° and continued to climb. The CVR recorded the pilot state he was turning on the autopilot at 1025:22. At 1025:39, the pilot was cleared up to 10,000 ft and asked to “ident,” and the airplane was subsequently identified on radar. The pilot verbalized setting the autopilot for 10,000 ft and read items on the After Takeoff/Climb checklist. The performance study indicated that the airplane passed 3,000 ft about 1026, with an airspeed between 230 and 240 kts, and continued to climb steadily. At 1026:29, while the pilot was conducting the checklist, the controller instructed him to contact the Indianapolis Air Route Traffic Control Center; the pilot acknowledged. At 1026:38, the pilot resumed the checklist and stated, “uhhh lets seeee. Pressurization pressurizing anti ice de-ice systems are not required at this time.” The performance study indicated that, at 1026:45, the airplane began to bank to the left at a rate of about 5° per second and that after the onset of the roll, the airplane maintained airspeed while it continued to climb for 12 seconds, consistent with engine power not being reduced in response to the roll onset. At 1026:48, the CVR recorded the airplane’s autopilot disconnect annunciation, “autopilot.” The performance study indicated that about this time, the airplane was in about a 30° left bank. About 1 second later, the pilot stated, “whooooaaaaah.” Over the next 8 seconds, the airplane’s EGPWS annunciated six “bank angle” alerts. At 1026:57, the airplane reached its maximum altitude of about 6,100 ft msl and then began to descend rapidly, in excess of 11,000 ft per minute. At 1026:58, the bank angle was about 70° left wing down, and by 1027:05, the airplane was near 90° left wing down. At 1027:04, the CVR recorded a sound similar to an overspeed warning alert, which continued to the end of the flight. The performance study indicated that about the time of the overspeed warning, the airplane passed about 250 kts calibrated airspeed at an altitude of about 5,600 ft. After the overspeed warning, the pilot shouted three expletives, and the bank angle alert sounded two more times. According to the performance study, at 1027:18, the final ADS-B data point, the airplane was about 1,000 ft msl, with the airspeed about 380 kts and in a 53° left bank. At 1027:11, the CVR recorded the pilot shouting a radio transmission, “mayday mayday mayday citation five two five echo golf is in an emergency descent unable to gain control of the aircraft.” At 1027:16, the CVR recorded the EGPWS annunciating “terrain terrain.” The sound of impact was recorded about 1027:20. The total time from the beginning of the left roll until ground impact was about 35 seconds. The accident site was located about 8.5 miles northwest of JVY.

A single-engine airplane was taking off from runway 15 about the same time that a multi-engine business jet landed on a nearly perpendicular runway (runway 22). The single-engine airplane, piloted by a private pilot, was departing on a local flight. The jet, piloted by an airline transport pilot, was rolling down the runway following a straight-in visual approach and landing. The single-engine airplane collided with the empennage of the jet at the intersection of the two runways. Witnesses in the airport lounge area heard the pilot of the single-engine airplane announce on the airport's universal communications (UNICOM) traffic advisory frequency a few minutes before the accident that the airplane was back-taxiing on the runway. The pilot of the jet did not recall making any radio transmissions on the UNICOM frequency and review of the jet's cockpit voice recorder did not reveal any incoming or outgoing calls on the frequency. The pilots of both airplanes were familiar with the airport, and the airport was not tower controlled. The airport had signage posted on all runways indicating that traffic using the nearly perpendicular runway could not be seen and instructed pilots to monitor the UNICOM. A visibility assessment confirmed reduced visibility of traffic operating from the nearly perpendicular runways. The reported weather conditions about the time of the accident included clear skies with 4 miles visibility due to haze. Both airplanes were painted white. It is likely that the pilot of the jet would have been aware of the departing traffic if he was monitoring the UNICOM frequency. Although the jet was equipped with a traffic collision avoidance system (TCAS), he reported that the system did not depict any conflicting traffic during the approach to the airport. Although the visibility assessment showed reduced visibility from the departing and arrival runways, it could not be determined if or at what point during their respective landing and takeoff the pilot of each airplane may have been able to see the other airplane. In addition to the known reduced visibility of the intersecting runways, both airplanes were painted white and there was reported haze in the area, which could have affected the pilots' ability to see each other.

The airline transport pilot and two passengers departed in the twin-engine, pressurized airplane on a business flight in night instrument meteorological conditions. Shortly after takeoff, the airplane began to deviate from its assigned altitude and course. The controller queried the pilot, who responded that the airplane was "… a little out of control." After regaining control of the airplane, the pilot reported that he had experienced a "trim issue." The airplane continued on course and, about 13 minutes later, the pilot again reported a trim malfunction and said that he was having difficulty controlling the airplane. The flight's heading and altitude began to deviate from the course for the last 8 minutes of radar data and became more erratic for the last 2 minutes of radar data; radar and radio communication were subsequently lost at an altitude of about 18,300 ft in the vicinity of the accident site. Several witnesses reported hearing the airplane flying overhead. They all described the airplane as being very loud and that the engine sound was continuous up until they heard the impact. The airplane impacted a field in a relatively level attitude at high speed. The wreckage was significantly fragmented and the wreckage path extended about 1/4 mile over several fields. Examination of the available airframe and engine components revealed no anomalies that would have precluded normal operation of the airplane. The accident airplane was equipped with elevator, rudder, and aileron trim systems; however, not all components of the trim system and avionics were located or in a condition allowing examination. Although the airplane was equipped with an electric elevator trim and autopilot that could both be turned off in an emergency, the investigation could not determine which trim system the pilot was reportedly experiencing difficulties with. It is likely that the pilot was unable to maintain control of the airplane as he attempted to address the trim issues that he reported to air traffic control.

The pilot reported that, during the approach following a positioning flight, he saw that the runway had a light dusting of snow on it and that the airplane touched down on speed in the first 1,000 ft of the 4,100- ft-long runway. The copilot, who was the pilot flying, applied heavy braking, but there appeared to be no braking effectiveness, and the airplane did not slow down as expected. The pilot added that, when the airplane reached about two-thirds of the way down the runway, he knew that it was going to overrun the runway due to the loss of only half of its airspeed. He thought that if he aborted the landing, there was a small chance the airplane could become airborne within the remaining runway. The copilot added engine power to abort the landing, and the nose landing gear lifted off, but insufficient runway was remaining to take off. The copilot reduced the engine power to idle, and the airplane overran the runway and went through the airport fence and a guardrail, across a highway, and into a field. Postaccident examination revealed no flat spots or evidence of skidding on the landing gear tires. The flaps were found in the “ground flaps” position, which is not allowed for takeoff. No evidence of any pre-accident mechanical malfunctions or failures were found with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. Based on an airplane weight of 11,000 lbs, the airplane’s stopping distance would have been about 4,400
ft. The flight crew’s improper decision to land on a snow-covered runway that was too short to accommodate the landing in such conditions led to a runway overrun and impact with obstacles.

The airline transport pilot, who was the pilot flying, and commercial pilot, who was the pilot not flying and was acting as a safety pilot and was not expected to know the airplane's systems, limitations, or characteristics, were preparing to depart for a personal flight with eight passengers on board. When the pilot arrived at the airport, he determined that the airplane had 900 lbs of fuel onboard. He instructed the lineman to fuel the airplane with 211 gallons of fuel (1,413.7 lbs) for a fuel total of 2,313.7 lbs. The pilot reported that he was aware that the total weight of the eight passengers, their bags, and the fuel caused the airplane to be overweight but that he did not complete a weight and balance form or determine the expected takeoff performance before the flight. He informed the other pilot that the flight would be heavy, but he did not tell him how much the airplane exceeded the airplane's maximum gross takeoff weight. After the accident, the pilot determined that the airplane was 623 lbs over the maximum gross takeoff weight. The pilot reported that the airplane's flight controls and engines were operating normally during the pretakeoff check and that the elevator pitch trim was positioned in the "green" range. The pilot taxied the airplane onto the runway and applied the brakes and increased the throttles to takeoff power before releasing the brakes for the takeoff roll. However, he did not confirm the power settings that he applied when he advanced the throttles. The airplane did not accelerate as quickly as the pilot expected during the takeoff roll. When the airplane was about halfway down the runway, the airspeed was 80 kts, so the pilot continued the takeoff roll, but the airplane was still not accelerating as expected. He stated that he heard the other pilot say "redline," so he decreased the power. At this point, the airplane had reached the last third of the runway, and the pilot pulled back on the control yoke to lift the airplane off the runway, but the stall warning sounded. He lowered the nose, but the airplane was near the end of the runway. He added that he did not get "on" the brakes or put the propellers into reverse pitch and that the airplane then departed the runway. The pilot veered the airplane right to avoid the instrument landing system antenna, which was 500 ft from the end of the 5,500-ft-long runway, but the left wing struck the antenna, the left main landing gear and nose gear collapsed, and both propellers contacted the ground. The airplane then skidded left before stopping about 680 ft from the end of the runway. The pilot reported that the airplane did not have any preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures. The evidence indicates that the pilot decided to depart knowing that the airplane was over its maximum gross takeoff weight and without determining the expected takeoff performance. During the takeoff roll, he did not check his engine instruments to determine if he had applied full takeoff power, although the acceleration may have been sluggish because of the excess weight onboard. The other pilot was not trained on the airplane and was not able to provide the pilot timely performance information during the takeoff. Neither the pilot nor the other pilot called out for an aborted takeoff, and when they recognized the need to abort the takeoff, it was too late to avoid a runway excursion.

According to the cockpit voice recorder (CVR), during cruise flight, the unqualified pilot-rated passenger was manipulating the aircraft controls, including the engine controls, under the supervision and direction of the private pilot. After receiving a descent clearance to 3,000 feet mean sea level (msl), the pilot told the pilot-rated passenger to reduce engine power to maintain a target airspeed. The cockpit area microphone subsequently recorded the sound of both engines spooling down. The pilot recognized that the pilot-rated passenger had shutdown both engines after he retarded the engine throttles past the flight idle stops into the fuel cutoff position. Specifically, the pilot stated "you went back behind the stops and we lost power." According to air traffic control (ATC) radar track data, at the time of the dual engine shutdown, the airplane was located about 18 miles southwest of the destination airport and was descending through 6,700 feet msl. The pilot reported to the controller that the airplane had experienced a dual loss of engine power, declared an emergency, and requested radar vectors to the destination airport. As the flight approached the destination airport, the cockpit area microphone recorded a sound similar to an engine starter spooling up; however, engine power was not restored during the attempted restart. A review of the remaining CVR audio did not reveal any evidence of another attempt to restart an engine. The CVR stopped recording while the airplane was still airborne, with both engines still inoperative, while on an extended base leg to the runway. Subsequently, the controller told the pilot to go-around because the main landing gear was not extended. The accident airplane was then observed to climb and enter a right traffic pattern to make another landing approach. Witness accounts indicated that only the nose landing gear was extended during the second landing approach. The witnesses observed the airplane bounce several times on the runway before it ultimately entered a climbing right turn. The airplane was then observed to enter a nose low, rolling descent into a nearby residential community. The postaccident examinations and testing did not reveal any anomalies or failures that would have precluded normal operation of the airplane. Although the CVR did not record a successful engine restart, the pilot was able to initiate a go-around during the initial landing attempt, which implies that he was able to restart at least one engine during the initial approach. The investigation subsequently determined that only the left engine was operating at impact. Following an engine start, procedures require that the respective generator be reset to reestablish electrical power to the Essential Bus. If the Essential Bus had been restored, all aircraft systems would have operated normally. However, the battery toggle switch was observed in the Standby position at the accident site, which would have prevented the Essential Bus from receiving power regardless of whether the generator had been reset. As such, the airplane was likely operating on the Standby Bus, which would preclude the normal extension of the landing gear. However, the investigation determined that the landing gear alternate extension handle was partially extended. The observed position of the handle would have precluded the main landing gear from extending (only the nose landing gear would extend). The investigation determined that it is likely the pilot did not fully extend the handle to obtain a full landing gear deployment. Had he fully extended the landing gear, a successful single-engine landing could have been accomplished. In conclusion, the private pilot's decision to allow the unqualified pilot-rated passenger to manipulate the airplane controls directly resulted in the inadvertent dual engine shutdown during cruise descent. Additionally, the pilot's inadequate response to the emergency, including his failure to adhere to procedures, resulted in his inability to fully restore airplane systems and ultimately resulted in a loss of airplane control.

The instrument-rated private pilot was executing a non precision instrument approach procedure at night in deteriorating weather conditions. According to GPS track data, the pilot executed the approach as published but descended below the missed approach point's minimum altitude before executing a climbing right turn. This turn was not consistent with the published missed approach procedure. The airplane then began a series of left and right ascending and descending turns to various altitudes. The last few seconds of recorded data indicated that the airplane entered a descending left turn. Two witnesses heard the airplane fly overhead at a low altitude and described the weather as foggy. Reported weather at a nearby airport about 26 minutes before the accident was visibility less than 2 miles in mist and an overcast ceiling of 300 feet. A friend of the pilot flew the same route in a similarly equipped airplane and arrived about 30 minutes before the accident airplane. He said he performed the same approach to the missed approach point but never broke out of the clouds, so he executed a missed approach and diverted to an alternate airport. A postaccident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. Federal Aviation Administration Flight Training Handbook Advisory Circular 61-21A cautions that pilots are particularly vulnerable to spatial disorientation during periods of low visibility due to conflicts between what they see and what their supporting senses, such as the inner ear and muscle sense, communicate. The accident airplane's maneuvering flightpath, as recorded by the GPS track data, in night instrument meteorological conditions is consistent with the pilot's loss of airplane control due to spatial disorientation.

A witness reported that, despite the darkness, he was able to see the navigation lights on the airplane as it flew over the south end of the airport at an altitude of 150 to 200 feet above the ground. The airplane made a left turn to the downwind leg of the traffic pattern and continued a descending turn until the airplane impacted the ground in a near-vertical attitude. Due to the airplane’s turn, the 10- to 20-knot quartering headwind became a quartering tailwind. The airplane was also turned toward a rural area with very little ground lighting. A postaccident examination of the airplane and engines did not reveal any preimpact anomalies that would have precluded normal operation of the airplane.