Crash of a Piper PA-60 Aerostar (Ted Smith 600) in South Haven: 2 killed

Date & Time: Aug 2, 2022
Registration:
N9784Q
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
South Haven - South Haven
MSN:
60-0416-143
YOM:
1977
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Circumstances:
The twin engine airplane was engaged in a local training flight at South Haven Airport, carrying two pilots. After takeoff from runway 05, while climbing, the aircraft went out of control and crashed in a wooded area located a mile north of the airfield. The aircraft was destroyed and both occupants were killed.

Crash of a Piper PA-60 Aerostar (Ted Smith 600) in Wichita

Date & Time: Jul 1, 2021 at 1908 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N10HK
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Sioux Falls – Wichita
MSN:
60-0715-8061222
YOM:
1980
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
420
Captain / Total hours on type:
95.00
Aircraft flight hours:
2744
Circumstances:
The pilot was conducting a cross-country flight when, about 8 miles north of his intended destination, he reduced engine power, pitched for level flight, and waited for indicated airspeed to drop below 174 kts to add 20° of flaps. As soon as the drag was introduced, the airplane began to “buck back and forward,” and the two engines were “throttling up and down on their own.” He noted that the right engine seemed to be “sputtering and popping” more than the left engine, so he decided to raise the flaps and to shut down and feather the right engine. He declared an emergency to air traffic control. The pilot then noticed that the left engine was “slowly spooling down” and the airplane was not able to maintain airspeed and altitude. The pilot performed a forced landing to a flat, muddy wheat field about 4 nautical miles from the airport. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage and to both wings. A Federal Aviation Administration inspector traveled to the accident site to examine the airplane. Flight control and engine control continuity were confirmed. The master switch was turned on and the fuel gauges showed a zero indication. There was no evidence of fuel at the accident site or in the airplane. During the recovery of the airplane from the field, no fuel was found in the three intact fuel tanks, nor in any of the engine fuel lines. The pilot later stated that he ran the airplane out of fuel during the accident flight. The pilot reported that, during the preflight checks and twice during the accident flight, he activated the low fuel warning light, and no anomalies were noted. Postaccident testing of the low fuel warning light in an exemplar Piper Aerostar 602P revealed no anomalies.
Probable cause:
The pilot’s improper fuel planning and management, which resulted in a total loss of engine power due to fuel exhaustion.
Final Report:

Crash of a Piper PA-60 Aerostar (Ted Smith 600) in LaBelle: 1 killed

Date & Time: May 6, 2021 at 1520 LT
Registration:
C-FAAZ
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Site:
Schedule:
LaBelle - LaBelle
MSN:
60-0148-065
YOM:
1973
Location:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
10000
Captain / Total hours on type:
65.00
Aircraft flight hours:
5252
Circumstances:
The pilot, who was the owner of the airplane, and the pilot-rated passenger, whose maintenance facility had recently completed work on the airplane, departed on the second of two local flights on the day of the accident as requested by the pilot, since he had not flown the airplane recently. Flight track and engine monitor data indicated that, about 15 minutes after takeoff, fuel flow and engine exhaust gas temperature (EGT) values were consistent with a total loss of left engine power at an altitude about 2,500 ft. Engine power was fully restored about 4 minutes later. Between the time of the power loss and subsequent restoration, the airplane directly overflew an airport and was in the vicinity of a larger airport. It is likely that the left engine was intentionally shut down to practice one engine inoperative (OEI) procedures. Had the loss of power been unanticipated, the pilot would likely have initiated a landing at one of these airports in accordance with the airplane’s published emergency procedure, which was to land as soon as possible if engine power could not be restored; however, data indicated that engine power was restored, and the flight continued back to the departure airport. About 7.5 minutes later, about 6 nautical miles from the departure airport, engine data indicated a total loss of right engine power, followed almost immediately by a total loss of left engine power, at an altitude about 3,500 ft. A battery voltage perturbation consistent with starter engagement was recorded about 1 minute later, followed by a slight increase in left engine fuel flow; however, the data did not indicate that left engine power was fully restored during the remainder of the flight. The airplane continued in the direction of the departure airport as it descended and ultimately impacted a tree and terrain and came to rest upright. A witness saw the airplane flying toward her with the landing gear extended and stated that it appeared as though neither of the two propellers was turning. A doorbell security camera near the accident site captured the airplane as it passed overhead at low altitude. Sound spectrum analysis of the footage indicated that one engine was likely operating about 1,600 rpm while the other was operating at less than 1,000 rpm. The right propeller was found feathered at the accident site. An examination and test run of the right engine revealed no anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. The left propeller blades exhibited bending, twisting, and chordwise polishing consistent with the engine producing some power at the time of impact. Examination of the left engine and engine-driven fuel pump did not reveal any anomalies. Based on the available information, it is likely that the pilots were conducting practice OEI procedures and intentionally shut down the right engine. The loss of left engine power immediately after was likely the result of the pilot’s failure to properly identify and verify the “failed” engine before securing it, which resulted in an inadvertent shutdown of the left engine. Although partial left engine power was restored before the accident (as indicated by fuel flow values, damage to the left propeller, and sound spectrum analysis of security camera video), the left engine power available was inadequate to maintain altitude for reasons that could not be determined, and it is likely that the pilot was performing a forced landing when the accident occurred. It is also likely that the pilot’s decision to conduct intentional OEI flight at low altitude resulted in reduced time and altitude available for troubleshooting and restoration of engine power following the inadvertent shutdown of the left engine. The 67-year-old pilot was a Canadian national and had never applied for a Federal Aviation Administration medical certificate. According to the Transportation Safety Board of Canada, the pilot was issued a category 1 license with knowledge of a previous condition and knowledge of currently taking Xarelto (rivaroxabam). No acute or historical cardiovascular event was found on autopsy. Toxicology testing detected the sedating antihistamine cetirizine just below therapeutic levels in the pilot’s blood. A very low concentration of the narcotic pain medication codeine was detected in the pilot’s blood and urine; codeine’s metabolite morphine was also detected in his urine. The mood stabilizing medication lamotrigine was detected but not quantified in the pilot’s blood and urine. Thus, the pilot was taking some impairing medications and likely had a psychiatric condition that could impact decision-making and performance; however, given the circumstances of the accident, including the presence of the pilot-rated passenger to operate the airplane, the effects from the pilot’s use of cetirizine, codeine, and lamotrigine were not likely factors in this accident.
Probable cause:
The pilot's inadvertent shutdown of the left engine following an intentional shutdown of the right engine while practicing one engine inoperative (OEI) procedures. Contributing to the accident was the pilot’s decision to conduct OEI training at low altitude.
Final Report:

Crash of a Piper PA-60 Aerostar (Ted Smith 602P) in Pamplona: 1 killed

Date & Time: Feb 20, 2020 at 1819 LT
Operator:
Registration:
EC-HRJ
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Sabadell - Pamplona
MSN:
62P-0897-8165027
YOM:
1981
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Aircraft flight hours:
3049
Circumstances:
On Thursday, 20 February 2020, the Piper PA-60-602P aircraft, with registration EC-HRJ, took off from Sabadell Airport (LELL) bound for Pamplona Airport (LEPP). At 17:51:43 hours local time, when the aircraft was in the vicinity of the SURCO waypoint, a sudden change in course from 300º to 317º was observed on the aircraft's radar trace. Moments later, at 17:53:12, the pilot of the aircraft contacted the Madrid air control units to report problems with one of his engines, adding verbatim: “I’m not sure if I’ve lost the turbo”. In a subsequent communication with the same air traffic controller, at 17:57:22 h, the pilot stated: "I’ve lost an engine”. At 17:57:58 h, the pilot contacted the controller of the Pamplona control tower. The controller asked him if he required any assistance, and the pilot replied that he did not. At 18:16:15 h, the pilot told the control tower controller that he was on right base for runway 33. The controller cleared him to land and asked him to notify him when he was on final. At 18:19:40 h, the control tower controller alerted the airport Fire Extinguishing Service (SEI) when he saw the aircraft crash and a column of smoke coming from the wreckage area. The aircraft had impacted the ground during the final approach manoeuvre. As it fell, it hit and severed a power line. The pilot, who was the sole occupant of the aircraft, was killed during the accident. The impact and subsequent fire completely destroyed the aircraft.
Probable cause:
The investigation concluded the probable cause of the accident was that the aircraft lost control on final approach to runway 33 as a result of flying with asymmetrical power.
Final Report:

Crash of a Piper PA-60-602P Super 700 Aerostar on Gabriola Island: 3 killed

Date & Time: Dec 10, 2019 at 1805 LT
Operator:
Registration:
C-FQYW
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Cabo San Lucas – Chino – Bishop – Nanaimo
MSN:
60-8265-020
YOM:
1982
Country:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Captain / Total flying hours:
320
Aircraft flight hours:
5752
Circumstances:
On 09 December 2019, a private Piper Aerostar PA-60-602P aircraft (registration C-FQYW, serial number 60-8265020), departed Cabo San Lucas International Airport (MMSL), Baja California Sur, Mexico, with 3 people on board, for a 2-day trip to Nanaimo Airport (CYCD), British Columbia (BC). As planned the aircraft stopped for an overnight rest at Chino Airport (KCNO), California, U.S. At 1142, on 10 December 2019, the aircraft departed KCNO on a visual flight rules (VFR) flight plan to Bishop Airport (KBIH), California, U.S., for a planned fuel stop. The aircraft departed KBIH at approximately 1425 on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan to CYCD. On 10 December 2019, night started at 1654. At 1741, the Vancouver area control centre air traffic controller advised the pilot that an aerodrome special meteorological report (SPECI) had been issued for CYCD at 1731. The SPECI reported visibility as 2 ½ statute miles (SM) in light drizzle and mist, with an overcast ceiling of 400 feet above ground level (AGL). The pilot informed the controller that he would be conducting an instrument landing system (ILS) approach for Runway 16. At 1749, when the aircraft was approximately 32 nautical miles (NM) south of CYCD, the pilot contacted the controller to inquire about the weather conditions at Victoria International Airport (CYYJ), BC. The controller informed the pilot that a SPECI was issued for CYYJ at 1709 and it reported the visibility as 5 SM in mist, a broken ceiling at 600 feet AGL, and an overcast layer at 1200 feet AGL. The controller provided the occurrence flight with pilot observations from another aircraft that had landed at CYCD approximately 15 minutes before. That crew had reported being able to see the Runway 16 approach lights at minimums, i.e., at 373 feet AGL. Between 1753 and 1802, the controller provided vectors to the pilot in order to intercept the ILS localizer. At 1803, the controller observed that the aircraft had not intercepted the localizer for Runway 16. The aircraft had continued to the southwest, past the localizer, at an altitude of 2100 feet above sea level (ASL) and a ground speed of 140 knots. The controller queried the pilot to confirm that he was still planning to intercept the ILS for Runway 16. The pilot confirmed that he would be intercepting the ILS as planned. The aircraft made a heading correction and momentarily lined up with the localizer before beginning a turn to the west. At 1804:03, the pilot requested vectors from the controller and informed him that he “just had a fail.” The controller responded with instructions to “turn left heading zero nine zero, tight left turn.” The pilot asked the controller to repeat the heading. The controller responded with instructions to “…turn right heading three six zero.” The pilot acknowledged the heading; however, the aircraft continued turning right beyond the assigned heading while climbing to 2500 feet ASL and slowing to a ground speed of 80 knots. The aircraft then began to descend, picking up speed as it was losing altitude. At 1804:33, the aircraft descended to 1800 feet ASL and reached a ground speed of 160 knots. At 1804:40, the pilot informed the air traffic controller that the aircraft had lost its attitude indicator.Footnote6 At the same time, the aircraft was climbing into a 2nd right turn. At 1804:44, the air traffic controller asked the pilot what he needed from him; the pilot replied he needed a heading. The controller provided the pilot with a heading of three six zero. At 1804:47, the aircraft reached an altitude of 2700 feet ASL and a ground speed of 60 knots. The aircraft continued its right turn and began to lose altitude. The controller instructed the pilot to gain altitude if he was able to; however, the pilot did not acknowledge the instruction. The last encoded radar return for the aircraft was at 1805:26, when the aircraft was at 300 feet ASL and travelling at a ground speed of 120 knotsControl of the aircraft was lost. The aircraft collided with a power pole and trees in a wooded park area on Gabriola Island, BC, and then impacted the ground. The aircraft broke into pieces and caught fire. The 3 occupants on board received fatal injuries. As a result of being damaged in the accident, the emergency locator transmitter (Artex ME406, serial number 188-00293) did not activate.
Probable cause:
The occurrence aircraft was equipped with a BendixKing KI 825 electronic horizontal situation indicator (HSI) that was interfaced to the flight control system and GPS (global positioning system) Garmin GNS530W/430W. The HSI also supplies the autopilot system with heading information. The investigation determined that the HSI had failed briefly during operation on 22 November 2019 and a 2nd time, 3 days later, on 26 November 2019. The KI 825 HSI is electrically driven and therefore is either on and working, or off and dark with no display. The aircraft owner was in contact with an aircraft maintenance organization located at Boundary Bay Airport (CZBB), BC, and an appointment to bring the occurrence aircraft in for troubleshooting of the 2 brief HSI malfunctions had been made for 11 December 2019, i.e., the day after the accident. In total, 13 flights had been conducted after the 1st failure of the HSI. There were no journey log entries for defects with the HSI or evidence of maintenance completed. RegulationsFootnote9 require that defects that become apparent during flight operations be entered in the aircraft journey logbook, and advisory guidance in the regulatory standardsFootnote10 states that all equipment required for a particular flight or type of operation, such as the HSI in this case, be functioning correctly before flight. The HSI was destroyed in the accident and the investigation was unable to determine if it was operational on impact. Similarly, it could not be determined if the HSI was supplying the autopilot with heading information, or if the autopilot was engaged during the approach.
Final Report:

Crash of a Piper PA-60-602P in Kokomo: 1 killed

Date & Time: Oct 5, 2019 at 1637 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N326CW
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Kokomo - Kokomo
MSN:
60-0869-8165008
YOM:
1981
Location:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
7500
Aircraft flight hours:
3002
Circumstances:
The airline transport pilot arrived at the departure airport in the reciprocating engine-powered airplane where it was fueled with Jet A jet fuel by an airport employee/line service technician. A witness stated that she saw a "low flying" airplane flying from north to south. The airplane made a "sharp left turn" to the east. The left wing "dipped low" and she then lost sight of the airplane, but when she approached the intersection near the accident site, she saw the airplane on the ground. The airplane impacted a field that had dry, level, and hard features conducive for an off-airport landing, and the airplane was destroyed. The wreckage path length and impact damage to the airplane were consistent with an accelerated stall. Postaccident examination of the airplane found Jet A jet fuel in the airplane fuel system and evidence of detonation in both engines from the use of Jet A and not the required 100 low lead fuel. Use of Jet A rather than 100 low lead fuel in an engine would result in detonation in the cylinders and lead to damage and a catastrophic engine failure. According to the Airplane Flying Handbook, the pilot should witness refueling to ensure that the correct fuel and quantity is dispensed into the airplane and that any caps and cowls are properly secured after refueling.
Probable cause:
The pilot's exceedance of the airplane’s critical angle of attack following a dual engine power loss caused by the line service technician fueling the airplane with the wrong fuel, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall and subsequent loss of control. Contributing was the pilot's inadequate supervision of the fuel servicing.
Final Report:

Crash of a Piper PA-60-602P Aerostar (Ted Smith 600) in Greenville: 3 killed

Date & Time: Jul 30, 2018 at 1044 LT
Operator:
Registration:
C-GRRS
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Pembroke – Charlottetown
MSN:
60-8265-026
YOM:
1982
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Captain / Total flying hours:
590
Captain / Total hours on type:
136.00
Aircraft flight hours:
4856
Circumstances:
The private pilot of the multiengine airplane was in cruise flight at 23,000 ft mean sea level (msl) in day visual meteorological conditions when he reported to air traffic control that the airplane was losing altitude due to a loss of engine power. The controller provided vectors to a nearby airport; about 7 minutes later, the pilot reported the airport in sight and stated that he would enter a downwind leg for runway 14. By this time, the airplane had descended to about 3,200 ft above ground level. Radar data indicated that the airplane proceeded toward the runway but that it was about 400 ft above ground level on short final. The airplane flew directly over the airport at a low altitude before entering a left turn to a close downwind for runway 21. Witnesses stated that the airplane's propellers were turning, but they could not estimate engine power. When the airplane reached the approach end of runway 21, it entered a steep left turn and was flying slowly before the left wing suddenly "stalled" and the airplane pitched nose-down toward the ground. Postaccident examination of the airplane and engines revealed no mechanical deficiencies that would have precluded normal operation at the time of impact. Examination of both propeller systems indicated power symmetry at the time of impact, with damage to both assemblies consistent with low or idle engine power. The onboard engine monitor recorded battery voltage, engine exhaust gas temperature, and cylinder head temperature for both engines. A review of the recorded data revealed that about 14 minutes before the accident, there was a jump followed by a decrease in exhaust gas temperature (EGT) and cylinder head temperature (CHT) for both engines. The temperatures decreased for about 9 minutes, during which time the right engine EGT data spiked twice. Both engines' EGT and CHT values then returned to normal, consistent with both engines producing power, for the remaining 5 minutes of data. It is possible that a fuel interruption may have caused the momentary increase in both engines' EGT and CHT values and prompted the pilot to report the engine power loss; however, the engine monitor did not record fuel pressure or fuel flow, and examination of the airplane's fuel system and engines did not reveal any mechanical anomalies. Therefore, the reason for the reported loss of engine power could not be determined. It is likely that the pilot's initial approach for landing was too high, and he attempted to circle over the airport to lose altitude. While doing so, he exceeded the airplane's critical angle of attack while in a left turn and the airplane entered an aerodynamic stall at an altitude too low for recovery.
Probable cause:
The pilot's exceedance of the airplane's critical angle of attack while maneuvering to land, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall.
Final Report: