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Crash of a Convair CV-440F in Toledo: 2 killed

Date & Time: Sep 11, 2019 at 0238 LT
Registration:
N24DR
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Millington-Memphis - Toledo
MSN:
393
YOM:
1957
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Circumstances:
The Convair, owned and operated by Douglas R. Taylor, departed Millington-Memphis Airport on a cargo flight to Toledo-Express Airport. On approach to runway 25, the airplane crashed in flames on a truck parking lot located about 3,000 feet from runway 25 threshold, to the left of its extended centerline. The aircraft was totally destroyed and both pilots were killed.

Crash of a Cessna 421B Golden Eagle II in Delaware: 1 killed

Date & Time: Mar 17, 2019 at 1745 LT
Registration:
N424TW
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Dayton - Delaware
MSN:
421B-0816
YOM:
1974
Location:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Circumstances:
On March 17, 2019, about 1745 eastern daylight time, a Cessna 421B airplane, N424TW impacted terrain near Plain City, Ohio. The commercial rated pilot, sole occupant, was fatally injured and the airplane was destroyed. The airplane was registered to Classic Solutions, Inc. and operated by Phoenix Test Flight, LLC, as a 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 flight. The flight departed Dayton (KDAY), Dayton, Ohio about 1720, en route to (KDLZ) Delaware, Ohio. A preliminary review of radio communications revealed the pilot was in contact with air traffic control and there was no record of a distress call. The pilot requested runway 28 RNAV approach at KDLZ. The pilot also reported that he was encountering icing. The controller cleared the flight to 2,500 ft. Shortly afterwards, the airplane made a left turn, and radar and radio communication were lost. The airplane impacted a rural field about 8 miles southwest of the KDLZ airport. Ground impact scars and wreckage were consistent with a left-wing low impact. The wreckage path was orientated on about a 140-degree heading. From the initial impact point, the airplane crossed a two-lane road before impacting two wooden utility poles. The main part of the wreckage came to rest at the base of the second utility pole, about 395 ft from the initial impact point. The wreckage path was about 850 ft long with the wreckage highly fragmented along the wreckage path. There was not a post-crash fire. After documentation of the accident site, the airplane was recovered for further examination.

Crash of a Piper PA-31-350 Navajo Chieftain in Madeira: 1 killed

Date & Time: Mar 12, 2019 at 1516 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N400JM
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Cincinnati - Cincinnati
MSN:
31-8152002
YOM:
1981
Location:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Circumstances:
On March 12, 2019, at 1516 eastern daylight time, a Piper PA-31-350, N400JM, was substantially damaged when it impacted terrain in Madeira, Ohio. The commercial pilot was fatally injured. The airplane was operated by Marc, Inc. under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a commercial aerial surveying flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for the local flight that originated from Cincinnati Municipal Airport-Lunken Field (LUK), Cincinnati, Ohio, at 1051. Review of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) preliminary air traffic control (ATC) and radar data revealed that the airplane flew several surveying tracks outside of Cincinnati before proceeding north to fly tracks near Dayton. The pilot reported to ATC that he was having a fuel problem and requested "direct" to LUK and a lower altitude. The controller provided the position of Dayton-Wright Brothers Airport (MGY), which was located 8 miles ahead. The pilot reported MGY in sight but requested to continue to LUK. When the pilot checked in with the subsequent ATC facility, he reported that the fuel issue was resolved. Seven miles north of LUK, the pilot established radio contact with the LUK tower controller. He advised the controller that the airplane was experiencing a fuel problem and he did not think it was going to reach the airport. The airplane slowed to a ground speed of 80 knots before the air traffic controller noted a simultaneous loss of radar and radio contact about 5 nautical miles north of LUK. A relative of the pilot reported that the pilot told him the airplane "had a fuel leak and it was killing his sinuses" about 1 week prior to the accident. A company employee revealed that the airplane had a fuel leak in the left wing, and that the airplane was due to be exchanged with another company PA-31-350 the week before the accident occurred so that the fuel leak could be isolated and repaired. The accident airplane remained parked for a few days, was not exchanged, and then the accident pilot was brought in to continue flying the airplane. According to witnesses, the airplane flew "very low" and the engine sputtered before making two loud "pop" or "back-fire" sounds. One witness reported that after sputtering, the airplane "was on its left side flying crooked." Another witness reported that the "unusual banking" made the airplane appear to be flying "like a stunt in an airshow." Two additional witnesses reported that the airplane was flying 100-120 ft above ground level in a southerly direction before it turned to the left and "nosedived." Another witness reported that he could see the entire belly of the airplane and the airplane nose was pointing down toward the ground just prior to the airplane impacting a tree. A witness from an adjacent residence reported that there was a "whitish gray smoke coming from the left engine" after the accident, and that a small flame began rising" from that area when he was on the phone with 9-1-1 about 3 minutes after the accident. According to FAA airmen records, the pilot held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single and multi-engine land and instrument airplane. The pilot also held a flight instructor certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine and instrument airplane and a ground instructor certificate. His most recent FAA first-class medical certificate was issued November 8, 2018. Examination of pilot's logbooks revealed 6,392 total hours of flight experience as of February 19, 2019, including 1,364 hours in the accident airplane make and model. His most recent logged flight review was completed January 31, 2017. According to FAA airworthiness records, the twin-engine airplane was manufactured in 1981. It was powered by two Lycoming, 350-horsepower engines, which drove two 3-bladed, constant speed, counter-rotating propellers. Examination of the accident site and wreckage revealed that the airplane impacted a tree and private residence before it came to rest upright on a 335° heading. All major portions of the airplane were located on site. The fuselage was substantially damaged. The instrument panel was fragmented and destroyed. The engine control levers were fire damaged and all levers were in the full forward position. Control continuity was established from the flight controls to the flight control surfaces except for one elevator cable attachment, which exhibited a tensile overload fracture. The left wing remained attached to the fuselage. The outboard leading edge of the left wing was crushed upward and aft, and the inboard section displayed thermal and impact damage. The right wing outboard of the right nacelle was impact separated, and a section of the right wing came to rest on the roof of the home. The leading edge of the right wing section displayed a semi-circular crush area about 1 ft in diameter. The left horizontal stabilizer and elevator were dented. The right horizontal stabilizer and elevator were bet upward at the tip. Measurement of the rudder trim barrel revealed a nose-right trim setting. Both engines remained attached to their respective wings. The left engine remained attached at the mount, however the mount was bent and fractured in multiple locations. The engine was angled upward about 75°. All but 4 inches of the left propeller was buried and located at initial ground impact point, which was about 13 ft from the left engine. The right engine was found attached to the right wing and its respective engine mounts, however the engine mounts were fractured in multiple locations. All but 6 inches of the right propeller was buried and located at the initial ground impact point, which was about 18 ft from the right engine. The left engine crankshaft would not rotate upon initial examination. Impact damage was visible to ignition harness leads on both sides of the engine. Both magnetos remained secured and produced sparks at all leads when tested. Less than 2 ounces of fuel was observed within the fuel inlet of the fuel servo upon removal of the servo. The sample tested negative for water. The fuel servo was disassembled and both diaphragms were present and damage free with no signs of tears. The fuel inlet screen was found unobstructed. Rotation of the engine crankshaft was achieved through the vacuum pump drive after the removal of impact damaged pushrods. Spark plugs showed coloration consistent with normal operation and electrodes remained mechanically undamaged. A borescope inspection of all cylinders did not reveal any anomalies. The oil filter was opened, inspected, and no debris was noted. Fuel injectors were removed and unobstructed. Residual or no fuel was found during the examination and removal of components such as fuel lines, injector lines and the fuel pump. The right engine crankshaft would not rotate upon initial examination. Minor impact damage was visible to ignition harness leads. Cylinder Nos. 2, 4, and 6 displayed varying degrees of impact damage to their top sides. The alternator mount was found fractured and the alternator was not present at the time of engine examination. Spark plugs showed coloration consistent with normal operation and electrodes remained mechanically undamaged. Both magnetos produced sparks at all leads when tested. The fuel servo was dissembled and both diaphragms were present and free of damage with no signs of tears. Engine crankshaft rotation was achieved through the vacuum pump drive after the removal of impact damaged pushrods. A borescope inspection of all cylinders did not reveal any anomalies. The oil filter was opened, inspected and no debris was noted. Fuel injectors were removed and were unobstructed. The oil suction screen was found unobstructed but contained nonferrous pieces of material. Fuel was found during examination of the right engine fuel lines, injector lines, and the fuel pump. Both propellers were separated from the engine mounting flanges. Examination of the right propeller revealed that all blades exhibited aft bending and bending opposite rotation, twisting leading edge down, and chordwise rotational scoring on both face and camber sides. Examination of the left propeller revealed that two blades exhibited aft bending with no remarkable twist or leading-edge damage. One blade exhibited no remarkable bending or twisting. All three blades exhibited mild chordwise/rotational abrasion. The wreckage was retained by the NTSB for further examination.

Crash of an AMI DC-3-65TP in Kidron: 2 killed

Date & Time: Jan 21, 2019 at 0912 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N467KS
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Kidron - Akron
MSN:
20175
YOM:
1944
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
4
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Circumstances:
On January 21, 2019, about 0912 eastern standard time, a Douglas DC3C airplane, N467KS, impacted terrain while departing from Stoltzfus Airfield (OH22), Kidron, Ohio. The captain and first officer were fatally injured and the airplane sustained substantial damage. The airplane was registered to Priority Air Charter LLC and operated by AFM Hardware Inc. under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the positioning flight, which was destined for Akron-Canton Regional Airport (CAK), North Canton, Ohio. A witness at OH22 noticed the airplane lift off about a third of the way down runway 19. Soon after becoming airborne, white smoke was noticed coming out of the left engine. The airplane began to veer to the left and did not climb normally. The witness watched the airplane descend over a building until he lost sight of it. The airplane struck power lines and trees before impacting the ground and came to rest about 200 yards from the end of runway 19. The main wreckage was upright and oriented on a northwesterly heading, with the fuselage separated forward of the wings. The left wing was broken aft and upward and the inboard leading edge of the right wing was crushed aft. The left engine was broken aft and outboard of the wing's leading edge. The right engine was broken downward at the nacelle. The nose of the airplane was located forward and left of the airplane main wreckage. The airplane wreckage, to include both engines, the cockpit voice recorder, and the aircraft data acquisition module, was retained for further examination.

Crash of a Cessna 525C CitationJet CJ4 off Cleveland: 6 killed

Date & Time: Dec 29, 2016 at 2257 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N614SB
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Cleveland – Columbus
MSN:
525C-0072
YOM:
2012
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
5
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
6
Captain / Total flying hours:
1205
Captain / Total hours on type:
56.00
Aircraft flight hours:
861
Circumstances:
The airplane entered a right turn shortly after takeoff and proceeded out over a large lake. Dark night visual conditions prevailed at the airport; however, the airplane entered instrument conditions shortly after takeoff. The airplane climb rate exceeded 6,000 fpm during the initial climb and it subsequently continued through the assigned altitude of 2,000 ft mean sea level. The flight director provided alerts before the airplane reached the assigned altitude and again after it had passed through it. The bank angle increased to about 62 degrees and the pitch attitude decreased to about 15 degrees nose down, as the airplane continued through the assigned heading. The bank angle ultimately decreased to about 25 degrees. During the subsequent descent, the airspeed and descent rate reached about 300 knots and 6,000 fpm, respectively. The enhanced ground proximity warning system (EGPWS) provided both "bank angle" and "sink rate" alerts to the pilot, followed by seven "pull up" warnings. A postaccident examination of the recovered wreckage did not reveal any anomalies consistent with a preimpact failure or malfunction. It is likely that the pilot attempted to engage the autopilot after takeoff as he had been trained. However, based on the flight profile, the autopilot was not engaged. This implied that the pilot failed to confirm autopilot engagement via an indication on the primary flight display (PFD). The PFD annunciation was the only indication of autopilot engagement. Inadequate flight instrument scanning during this time of elevated workload resulted in the pilot allowing the airplane to climb through the assigned altitude, to develop an overly steep bank angle, to continue through the assigned heading, and to ultimately enter a rapid descent without effective corrective action. A belief that the autopilot was engaged may have contributed to his lack of attention. It is also possible that differences between the avionics panel layout on the accident airplane and the airplane he previously flew resulted in mode confusion and contributed to his failure to engage the autopilot. The lack of proximal feedback on the flight guidance panel might have contributed to his failure to notice that the autopilot was not engaged.The pilot likely experienced some level of spatial disorientation due to the dark night lighting conditions, the lack of visual references over the lake, and the encounter with instrument meteorological conditions. It is possible that once the pilot became disoriented, the negative learning transfer due to the differences between the attitude indicator display on the accident airplane and the airplane previously flown by the pilot may have hindered his ability to properly apply corrective control inputs. Available information indicated that the pilot had been awake for nearly 17 hours at the time of the accident. As a result, the pilot was likely fatigued which hindered his ability to manage the high workload environment, maintain an effective instrument scan, provide prompt and accurate control inputs, and to respond to multiple bank angle and descent rate warnings.
Probable cause:
Controlled flight into terrain due to pilot spatial disorientation. Contributing to the accident was pilot fatigue, mode confusion related to the status of the autopilot, and negative learning transfer due to flight guidance panel and attitude indicator differences from the pilot's previous flight experience.
Final Report:

Crash of a BAe 125-700A in Akron: 9 killed

Date & Time: Nov 10, 2015 at 1453 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N237WR
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Dayton – Akron
MSN:
257072
YOM:
1979
Flight number:
EFT1526
Location:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
7
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
9
Captain / Total flying hours:
6170
Captain / Total hours on type:
1020.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
4382
Copilot / Total hours on type:
482
Aircraft flight hours:
14948
Aircraft flight cycles:
11075
Circumstances:
The aircraft departed controlled flight while on a non precision localizer approach to runway 25 at Akron Fulton International Airport (AKR) and impacted a four-unit apartment building in Akron, Ohio. The captain, first officer, and seven passengers died; no one on the ground was injured. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and post crash fire. The airplane was registered to Rais Group International NC LLC and operated by Execuflight under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135 as an on-demand charter flight. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed. The flight departed from Dayton-Wright Brothers Airport, Dayton, Ohio, about 1413 and was destined for AKR. Contrary to Execuflight’s informal practice of the captain acting as pilot flying on flights carrying revenue passengers, the first officer was the pilot flying, and the captain was the pilot monitoring. While en route, the flight crew began preparing for the approach into AKR. Although company standard operating procedures (SOPs) specified that the pilot flying was to brief the approach, the captain agreed to the first officer’s request that the captain brief the approach. The ensuing approach briefing was unstructured, inconsistent, and incomplete, and the approach checklist was not completed. As a result, the captain and first officer did not have a shared understanding of how the approach was to be conducted. As the airplane neared AKR, the approach controller instructed the flight to reduce speed because it was following a slower airplane on the approach. To reduce speed, the first officer began configuring the airplane for landing, lowering the landing gear and likely extending the flaps to 25° (the airplane was not equipped with a flight data recorder, nor was it required to be). When the flight was about 4 nautical miles from the final approach fix (FAF), the approach controller cleared the flight for the localizer 25 approach and instructed the flight to maintain 3,000 ft mean sea level (msl) until established on the localizer. The airplane was already established on the localizer when the approach clearance was issued and could have descended to the FAF minimum crossing altitude of 2,300 ft msl. However, the first officer did not initiate a descent, the captain failed to notice, and the airplane remained level at 3,000 ft msl. As the first officer continued to slow the airplane from about 150 to 125 knots, the captain made several comments about the decaying speed, which was well below the proper approach speed with 25° flaps of 144 knots. The first officer’s speed reduction placed the airplane in danger of an aerodynamic stall if the speed continued to decay, but the first officer apparently did not realize it. The first officer’s lack of awareness and his difficulty flying the airplane to standards should have prompted the captain to take control of the airplane or call for a missed approach, but he did not do so. Before the airplane reached the FAF, the first officer requested 45° flaps and reduced power, and the airplane began to descend. The first officer’s use of flaps 45° was contrary to Execuflight’s Hawker 700A non precision approach profile, which required the airplane to be flown at flaps 25° until after descending to the minimum descent altitude (MDA) and landing was assured; however, the captain did not question the first officer’s decision to conduct the approach with flaps 45°. The airplane crossed the FAF at an altitude of about 2,700 ft msl, which was 400 ft higher than the published minimum crossing altitude of 2,300 ft msl. Because the airplane was high on the approach, it was out of position to use a normal descent rate of 1,000 feet per minute (fpm) to the MDA. The airplane’s rate of descent quickly increased to 2,000 fpm, likely due to the first officer attempting to salvage the approach by increasing the rate of descent, exacerbated by the increased drag resulting from the improper flaps 45° configuration. The captain instructed the first officer not to descend so rapidly but did not attempt to take control of the airplane even though he was responsible for safety of the flight. As the airplane continued to descend on the approach, the captain did not make the required callouts regarding approaching and reaching the MDA, and the first officer did not arrest the descent at the MDA. When the airplane reached the MDA, which was about 500 ft above the touchdown zone elevation, the point at which Execuflight’s procedures dictated that the approach must be stabilized, the airspeed was 11 knots below the minimum required airspeed of 124 knots, and the airplane was improperly configured with 45° flaps. The captain should have determined that the approach was unstabilized and initiated a missed approach, but he did not do so. About 14 seconds after the airplane descended below the MDA, the captain instructed the first officer to level off. As a result of the increased drag due to the improper flaps 45° configuration and the low airspeed, the airplane entered a stalled condition when the first officer attempted to arrest the descent. About 7 seconds after the captain’s instruction to level off, the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) recorded the first sounds of impact.
Probable cause:
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the flight crew’s mismanagement of the approach and multiple deviations from company standard operating procedures, which placed the airplane in an unsafe situation and led to an unstabilized approach, a descent below minimum descent altitude without visual contact with the runway environment, and an aerodynamic stall. Contributing to the accident were Execuflight’s casual attitude toward compliance with standards; its inadequate hiring, training, and operational oversight of the flight crew; the company’s lack of a formal safety program; and the Federal Aviation Administration’s insufficient oversight of the company’s training program and flight operations.
Final Report:

Crash of a Socata TBM-850 in Salem

Date & Time: May 19, 2011 at 0843 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N1UL
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Valparaiso - Salem
MSN:
564
YOM:
2010
Location:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
932
Captain / Total hours on type:
76.00
Aircraft flight hours:
187
Circumstances:
The pilot reported that he flew an instrument approach and was clear of clouds about 650 feet above ground level when he proceeded visually to the airport. About 1/2 mile from the runway, he thought the airplane was too high, but a few seconds later the airplane felt like it had an excessive rate of descent. His attempts to arrest the rate of descent were unsuccessful, and the left main landing gear struck the ground about 120 feet prior to the runway threshold. The recorded data downloaded from the airplane's non-volatile memory showed that the airplane's airspeed varied from about 71 - 81 knots indicated airspeed (IAS) during the 10 seconds prior to ground impact. The data also indicated that there was about a 3 - 5 knot tailwind during the final landing approach. The airplane's stall speed with the airplane in the landing configuration with landing flaps was 64 knots IAS at maximum gross weight. The pilot reported that there was no mechanical malfunction or system failure of the airplane.
Probable cause:
The pilot's failure to maintain a stabilized glide path which resulted in the airplane touching down short of the runway.
Final Report:

Crash of a Rockwell Aero Commander 500 in Columbus

Date & Time: Dec 27, 2010 at 2246 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N888CA
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Jeffersonville - Columbus
MSN:
500B-1318-127
YOM:
1963
Location:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
5700
Captain / Total hours on type:
3525.00
Circumstances:
Prior to the flight, the pilot preflighted the airplane and recalled observing the fuel gauge indicating full; however, he did not visually check the fuel tanks. The airplane departed and the en route portion of the flight was uneventful. During the downwind leg of the circling approach, the engines began to surge and the pilot added full power and turned on the fuel boost pumps. While abeam the approach end of the runway on the downwind leg, the engines again started to surge and subsequently lost power. He executed a forced landing and the airplane impacted terrain short of the runway. A postaccident examination by Federal Aviation Administration inspectors revealed the fuselage was buckled in several areas, and the left wing was crushed and bent upward. The fuel tanks were intact and approximately one cup of fuel was drained from the single fuel sump. Fueling records indicated the airplane was fueled 3 days prior to the accident with 135 gallons of fuel or approximately 4 hours of operational time. Flight records indicated the airplane had flown approximately 4 hours since refueling when the engines lost power.
Probable cause:
The pilot’s improper fuel management which resulted in a loss of engine power due to fuel exhaustion.
Final Report:

Crash of a Mitsubishi MU-2 Marquise in Elyria: 4 killed

Date & Time: Jan 18, 2010 at 1405 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N80HH
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Gainesville - Elyria
MSN:
0732
YOM:
1978
Location:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
4
Captain / Total flying hours:
2010
Captain / Total hours on type:
1250.00
Aircraft flight hours:
6799
Circumstances:
On his first Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach, the pilot initially flew through the localizer course. The pilot then reestablished the airplane on the final approach course, but the airplane’s altitude at the decision height was about 500 feet too high. He executed a missed approach and received radar vectors for another approach. The airplane was flying inbound on the second ILS approach when a witness reported that he saw the airplane about 150 feet above the ground in about a 60-degree nose-low attitude with about an 80-degree right bank angle. The initial ground impact point was about 2,150 feet west of the runway threshold and about 720 feet north (left) of the extended centerline. The cloud tops were about 3,000 feet with light rime or mixed icing. The flap jack screws and flap indicator were found in the 5-degree flap position. The inspection of the airplane revealed no preimpact anomalies to the airframe, engines, or propellers. A radar study performed on the flight indicated that the calibrated airspeed was about 130 knots on the final approach, but subsequently decreased to about 95–100 knots during the 20-second period prior to loss of radar contact. According to the airplane’s flight manual, the wings-level power-off stall speed at the accident aircraft’s weight is about 91 knots. The ILS approach flight profile indicates that 20 degrees of flaps should be used at the glide slope intercept while maintaining 120 knots minimum airspeed. At least 20 degrees of flaps should be maintained until touchdown. The “No Flap” or “5 Degrees Flap Landing” flight profile indicates that the NO FLAP Vref airspeed is 115 knots calibrated airspeed minimum.
Probable cause:
The pilot's failure to maintain adequate airspeed during the instrument approach, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall and impact with terrain.
Final Report:

Crash of a Convair CV-580 in Columbus: 3 killed

Date & Time: Sep 1, 2008 at 1206 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N587X
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Columbus-Mansfield
MSN:
361
YOM:
1956
Flight number:
HMA587
Location:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Captain / Total flying hours:
16087
Aircraft flight hours:
71965
Circumstances:

Shortly after take off from Columbus-Rickenbacker airport, crew informed ATC about technical problem and intended to return immediately. The aircraft crashed and burst into flames in a corn field, five minutes after take off. All three occupants were killed.