code

NY

Crash of a Cessna T303 Crusader in Sky Acres: 2 killed

Date & Time: Aug 17, 2019 at 1613 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N303TL
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Site:
Schedule:
Sky Acres - Farmingdale
MSN:
303-00286
YOM:
1984
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Circumstances:
On August 17, 2019, about 1613 eastern daylight time, a Cessna T303, N303TL, was destroyed after impacting a house shortly after takeoff from Sky Acres airport (44N) in Lagrangeville, New York. The private pilot and one person in the house were fatally injured. Two passengers and one person in the house sustained serious injuries, one person in the house sustained minor injuries. Day visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for the business flight, which was conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. The flight departed 44N at 1612 and was destined for Republic Airport (FRG), Farmingdale, New York. According to the passenger seated in the copilot's seat, on the morning of the accident the pilot and two passengers departed FRG and flew to Orange County Airport (MGJ), Montgomery, New York where the pilot had a business meeting. After the meeting, they departed MGM with a final destination of FRG, which included a stop at 44N to purchase fuel. The passenger reported that those flights were uneventful. The pilot fueled the airplane at 44N, where fuel records indicate he purchased 100 gallons of 100LL aviation fuel, which was the only type of fuel available at 44N. After the fueling, surveillance video at the airport showed several unsuccessful attempts to start the left engine for about 30 seconds. Next, the pilot attempted to start the right engine several times over period of about 30 seconds, and on the last attempt, the engine started. The left engine was then started after about 10 seconds of engine cranking. The airplane remained in position with the engines idling for about 2 minutes before it taxied around to the opposite side of the fuel pump and stopped for about 45 seconds with the engines at or near idle. The airplane then taxied from the fuel pump to the beginning of runway 17 (3,830 x 60 ft) without stopping for an engine run-up and performed a rolling takeoff. The airplane lifted off the runway in the vicinity of the windsock, which is located on the left side of the runway about 2,100 feet from the threshold. According to the passenger in the copilot's seat, shortly after liftoff at an altitude of less than 50-100 ft, both engines lost partial power. They did not stop completely, they sounded as though they were "not getting full RPM" and they began "studdering", which continued until impact with the house. As the airplane proceeded down the runway, it began to drift toward the left until they were over the grass next to the runway. The pilot corrected the drift and the airplane then tracked straight and remained over the grass. As the airplane continued beyond the end of the runway, it was not climbing, and he noticed obstacles that he described as trees and a structure or building. The pilot pitched the airplane up to clear those obstacles. The airplane then began a left banked turn and as it reached the house the left wing struck the ground and the right wing struck a tree and the house. The airplane had "very little forward motion" after the initial impact. He estimated that the airplane remained below 100 ft of altitude for the entire flight.

Crash of a Piper PA-46-310P Malibu in Poughkeepsie

Date & Time: Jul 19, 2019 at 1430 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N811SK
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Akron - Poughkeepsie
MSN:
46-8508046
YOM:
1985
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
On final approach to Poughkeepsie-Hudson Valley (ex Dutchess County) Airport, the single engine airplane lost height and crashed in a wooded area located short of runway 24 threshold. All four occupants were injured while the aircraft was destroyed. It is believed that the pilot encountered fuel problems.

Crash of a Piper PA-31-350 Navajo Chieftain off Amagansett: 4 killed

Date & Time: Jun 2, 2018 at 1433 LT
Registration:
N41173
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
MSN:
31-8452017
YOM:
1984
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
4
Captain / Total flying hours:
3000
Aircraft flight hours:
5776
Circumstances:
On June 2, 2018, about 1433 eastern daylight time, a Piper PA-31-350 (Navajo), N41173, was destroyed when it impacted the Atlantic Ocean near Indian Wells Beach, Amagansett, New York. The commercial pilot and three passengers were fatally injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for the flight that originated from Newport State Airport (UUU), Newport, Rhode Island, destined for East Hampton Airport (HTO), East Hampton, New York. The personal flight was conducted under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. A pilot in another airplane, a Bonanza, was flying with the accident airplane. He stated that the two airplanes were in UUU to pick up a relative of the passengers flying in the Navajo and then fly to HTO. The relative boarded the Bonanza and both airplanes we utilized to transport her belongings. He further stated that he and the accident pilot talked for about 1 hour regarding the weather between them and the destination airport. They planned to both fly south to the Sandy Point VOR on Block Island, Rhode Island and then turn west and follow the shoreline to HTO. They looked at the weather online. It was visual flight rules (VFR) to the destination. The Bonanza departed first, and the Navajo was going to follow. After takeoff the Bonanza contacted Providence air traffic control (ATC) and was informed that there was a "bad storm" near HTO and it was moving slowly. The Bonanza pilot told ATC that he wanted to fly farther south over the ocean and try to miss the approaching storm, so he could stay VFR. He did not know what happened to the Navajo as he did not hear the accident pilot communicate on the radio. The Bonanza pilot stated he conducted the flight at 1,000 ft above ground level (agl) and slowed down due to turbulence, but landed at HTO under VFR conditions. Radar data provided by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) depicted the Navajo in front of the Bonanza by 5 miles over the Atlantic Ocean and south of HTO. The radar data revealed that the Navajo was at 432 ft agl about 6 miles from the airport. It climbed to 512 ft and then descended to 152 ft. The airplane's radar target momentarily disappeared and then reappeared and climbed to 532 ft before descending back to 152 ft. The airplane's last radar target indicated 325 ft about 2 miles south of Indian Wells Beach. The wreckage was located about 1 mile south of the Indian Wells Beach in 50 ft of water and was subsequently recovered. Examination of the wreckage was performed about 2 weeks after the accident by a National Transportation Safety Board investigator. The fuselage was impact damaged, fractured, and separated into multiple pieces. The cabin roof was separated into a portion extending from the windows on the left side around to the right-wing attachment and extending from the aft baggage compartment forward to about the middle of the cabin. There was another portion of the cabin roof extending from about the middle of the cabin forward to the windshield and from the windows on the left side around to the windows on the right side. The left and right wings were both separated from the fuselage at the wing root and were fragmented. One fuel cell was recovered on the left wing. The left and right engine remained partially attached to the airframe through the motor mounts. The oil sump was fractured and corroded on both engines. The No. 1 cylinder was impact damaged on both engines. The spark plugs were removed, and the engines were rotated by turning the propeller flange. Continuity to the rear gears and to the valve train was confirmed. Compression and suction were confirmed through thumb compression. The piston, valves and cylinders were examined using a lighted borescope. No anomalies were noted except corrosion and sand consistent with saltwater immersion. Both left and right propellers were fractured from their respective engine crankshaft mounting flanges and exhibited corrosion consistent with immersion in saltwater. Both propeller spinner domes were torn from the propeller assemblies and were not recovered. All four blades of the left and right propellers were bent aft in varying degrees and twisted toward low pitch. The seven seat, low-wing airplane, was manufactured in 1984. It was powered by two Lycoming TIO-540-J2B, 350-horsepower engines, equipped with four bladed Hartzell propellers. The airplane was equipped with a Garmin MX20 MFD and a Garmin 530 GPS, both capable of displaying on board weather. The last annual inspection was completed on November 3, 2017. At the time of the accident, the airframe total time was 5776.6 hours.. The left engine had 359.5 hours since major overhaul and the right engine had 535.7 hours since major overhaul. The airplane had flown 39 hours since the annual inspection. The pilot held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land, multiengine land and instrument airplane. He also held a flight instructor certificate. His most recent FAA second-class medical certificate was issued May 30, 2017. At the time of the medical examination, the pilot reported 3,000 total hours of flight experience. At 1335, the weather recorded at HTO, included: scattered clouds at 1,300 ft, wind calm, temperature 22°C, dew point 20°C, and an altimeter setting of 29.76 inches of mercury. Review of weather radar revealed that a low-pressure system associated with a frontal wave over Long Island Sound with a cold front stretching westward over Long Island into central New Jersey and a warm front turning back to a cold front eastward. The models also indicated scattered thunderstorms over the area of HTO. The engine and airframe were retained for further examination.

Crash of a Piper PA-31-310 Navajo C near Colton: 1 killed

Date & Time: May 3, 2017 at 2030 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
C-GQAM
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Quebec - Montreal
MSN:
31-7912093
YOM:
1979
Location:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Circumstances:
The pilot was completing a flight from Quebec-Jean Lesage Airport to Montreal-Saint-Hubert and was sole on board. Enroute, the twin engine aircraft crashed in unknown circumstances in a dense wooded area located near Colton, New York. The aircraft was destroyed on impact and the sole occupant was killed.

Crash of a McDonnell Douglas MD-88 in La Guardia

Date & Time: Mar 5, 2015 at 1102 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N909DL
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Atlanta – New York
MSN:
49540/1395
YOM:
1987
Flight number:
DL1086
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
125
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
15200
Captain / Total hours on type:
11000.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
11000
Copilot / Total hours on type:
3000
Aircraft flight hours:
71196
Aircraft flight cycles:
54865
Circumstances:
The aircraft was landing on runway 13 at LaGuardia Airport (LGA), New York, New York, when it departed the left side of the runway, contacted the airport perimeter fence, and came to rest with the airplane’s nose on an embankment next to Flushing Bay. The 2 pilots, 3 flight attendants, and 98 of the 127 passengers were not injured; the other 29 passengers received minor injuries. The airplane was substantially damaged. Flight 1086 was a regularly scheduled passenger flight from Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport, Atlanta, Georgia, operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121. An instrument flight rules flight plan had been filed. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. The captain and the first officer were highly experienced MD-88 pilots. The captain had accumulated about 11,000 hours, and the first officer had accumulated about 3,000 hours, on the MD-88/-90. In addition, the captain was previously based at LGA and had made many landings there in winter weather conditions. The flight crew was concerned about the available landing distance on runway 13 and, while en route to LGA, spent considerable time analyzing the airplane’s stopping performance. The flight crew also requested braking action reports about 45 and 35 minutes before landing, but none were available at those times because of runway snow clearing operations. The unavailability of braking actions reports and the uncertainty about the runway’s condition created some situational stress for the captain, who was the pilot flying. After runway 13 became available for arriving airplanes, the flight crews of two preceding airplanes (which landed on the runway about 16 and 8 minutes before the accident landing) reported good braking action on the runway, so the flight crew expected to see at least some of the runway’s surface after the airplane broke out of the clouds. However, the flight crew saw that the runway was covered with snow, which was inconsistent with their expectations based on the braking action reports and the snow clearing operations that had concluded less than 30 minutes before the airplane landed. The snowier-than-expected runway, along with its relatively short length and the presence of Flushing Bay directly off the departure end of the runway, most likely increased the captain’s concerns about his ability to stop the airplane within the available runway distance, which exacerbated his situational stress. The captain made a relatively aggressive reverse thrust input almost immediately after touchdown. Reverse thrust is one of the methods that pilots use to decelerate the airplane during the landing roll. Reverse thrust settings are expressed as engine pressure ratio (EPR) values, which are measurements of engine power (the ratio of the pressure of the gases at the exhaust compared with the pressure of the air entering the inlet). Both pilots were aware that 1.3 EPR was the target setting for contaminated runways.As reverse thrust EPR was rapidly increasing, the captain’s attention was focused on other aspects of the landing, which included steering the airplane to counteract a slide to the left and ensuring that the spoilers had deployed (a necessary action for the autobrakes to engage). The maximum EPR values reached during the landing were 2.07 on the left engine and 1.91 on the right engine, which were much higher than the target setting of 1.3 EPR. These high EPR values likely resulted from a combination of the captain’s stress; his relatively aggressive reverse thrust input; and operational distractions, including the airplane’s continued slide to the left despite the captain’s efforts to steer it away from the snowbanks alongside the runway. All of these factors reduced the captain’s monitoring of EPR indications. The high EPR values caused rudder blanking (which occurs on MD-80 series airplanes when smooth airflow over the rudder is disrupted by high reverse thrust) and a subsequent loss of aerodynamic directional control. Although the captain stowed the thrust reversers and applied substantial right rudder, right nosewheel steering, and right manual braking, the airplane’s departure from the left side of the runway could not be avoided because directional control was regained too late to be effective.
Probable cause:
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the captain’s inability to maintain directional control of the airplane due to his application of excessive reverse thrust, which degraded the effectiveness of the rudder in controlling the airplane’s heading. Contributing to the accident were the captain’s:
- situational stress resulting from his concern about stopping performance and
- attentional limitations due to the high workload during the landing, which prevented him from immediately recognizing the use of excessive reverse thrust.
Final Report:

Crash of a Grumman G-44 Widgeon off Catskill: 1 killed

Date & Time: May 2, 2013 at 1629 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N8AS
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Copake - Copake
MSN:
1315
YOM:
1943
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
5735
Captain / Total hours on type:
411.00
Aircraft flight hours:
2251
Circumstances:
Michael B. Braunstein, aged 72, was the owner of this vintage aircraft built in 1943 and was performing a local flight within the State of New York. Aircraft was destroyed when it impacted the waters of the Hudson River, near Catskill, New York. The certificated airline transport pilot was fatally injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan had been filed for the local personal flight conducted under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91, which departed from B Flat Farm Airport (3NK8), Copake, New York about 1600. Approximately 25 witnesses were interviewed. Witnesses reported observing the twin-engine amphibious airplane flying southbound low above a river and hearing the engine running. The airplane then made a 180-degree left turn, which was consistent with the pilot flying a tight traffic pattern before attempting a water landing. The airplane then descended, leveled off above the water, and suddenly banked left. The airplane’s nose and left pontoon then struck the water, and the airplane nosed over, caught fire, and sank. Postrecovery examination of the wreckage revealed that the landing gear was in the “up” position and that the flaps were extended, which indicates that the airplane had been configured for a water landing. No evidence of any preimpact failures or malfunctions of the airplane or engines was found that would have precluded normal operation. At the time of the accident, a light breeze was blowing, the river was at slack tide, and the water conditions were calm, all of which were conducive to glassy water conditions. It is likely that the glassy water conditions adversely affected the pilot’s depth perception and led to his inability to correctly judge the airplane’s height above the water. He subsequently flared the airplane too high, which resulted in the airplane exceeding its critical angle-of-attack, entering an aerodynamic stall, and impacting the water in a nose-low attitude.
Probable cause:
The pilot’s misjudgment of the airplane’s altitude above the water and early flare for a landing on water with a glassy condition, which led to the airplane exceeding its critical angle-of-attack and experiencing an aerodynamic stall.
Final Report:

Crash of a De Havilland Dash-8-Q402 in Buffalo: 50 killed

Date & Time: Feb 12, 2009 at 2217 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N200WQ
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Newark - Buffalo
MSN:
4200
YOM:
2008
Flight number:
CO3407
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
45
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
50
Captain / Total flying hours:
3379
Captain / Total hours on type:
111.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
2244
Copilot / Total hours on type:
774
Aircraft flight hours:
1819
Aircraft flight cycles:
1809
Circumstances:
Aircraft was on an instrument approach to Buffalo-Niagara International Airport, Buffalo, New York, when it crashed into a residence in Clarence Center, New York, about 5 nautical miles northeast of the airport. The 2 pilots, 2 flight attendants, and 45 passengers aboard the airplane were killed, one person on the ground was killed, and the airplane was destroyed by impact forces and a postcrash fire.
Probable cause:
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the captain’s inappropriate response to the activation of the stick shaker, which led to an aerodynamic stall from which the airplane did not recover.
Contributing to the accident were:
-the flight crew’s failure to monitor airspeed in relation to the rising position of the lowspeed cue,
-the flight crew’s failure to adhere to sterile cockpit procedures,
-the captain’s failure to effectively manage the flight,
-Colgan Air’s inadequate procedures for airspeed selection and management during approaches in icing conditions.
Final Report:

Crash of an Airbus A320 in New York

Date & Time: Jan 15, 2009 at 1531 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N106US
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
New York - Charlotte
MSN:
1044
YOM:
1999
Flight number:
US1549
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
150
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
19663
Captain / Total hours on type:
4765.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
15643
Copilot / Total hours on type:
37
Aircraft flight hours:
25241
Aircraft flight cycles:
16299
Circumstances:
Aircraft experienced an almost complete loss of thrust in both engines after encountering a flock of birds and was subsequently ditched on the Hudson River about 8.5 miles from La Guardia Airport (LGA), New York City, New York. The flight was en route to Charlotte Douglas International Airport, Charlotte, North Carolina, and had departed LGA about 2 minutes before the in-flight event occurred. The 150 passengers, including a lap held child, and 5 crew members evacuated the airplane via the forward and overwing exits. One flight attendant and four passengers were seriously injured, and the airplane was substantially damaged.
Probable cause:
The ingestion of large birds into each engine, which resulted in an almost total loss of thrust in both engines and the subsequent ditching on the Hudson River. Contributing to the fuselage damage and resulting unavailability of the aft slide/rafts were:
-the Federal Aviation Administration’s approval of ditching certification without determining whether pilots could attain the ditching parameters without engine thrust,
-the lack of industry flight crew training and guidance on ditching techniques,
-the captain’s resulting difficulty maintaining his intended airspeed on final approach due to the task saturation resulting from the emergency situation.
Contributing to the survivability of the accident was:
-the decision-making of the flight crew members and their crew resource management during the accident sequence,
-the fortuitous use of an airplane that was equipped for an extended overwater flight, including the availability of the forward slide/rafts, even though it was not required to be so equipped
-the performance of the cabin crew members while expediting the evacuation of the airplane,
-the proximity of the emergency responders to the accident site and their immediate and appropriate response to the accident.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 750 Citation X in New York-JFK

Date & Time: Apr 3, 2008 at 2014 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N750WM
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Orlando - New York-JFK
MSN:
750-0230
YOM:
2004
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
29000
Captain / Total hours on type:
915.00
Aircraft flight hours:
914
Circumstances:
The copilot (CP) was flying and air traffic control (ATC) was vectoring the airplane for an approach to a 10,000-foot long, 150-foot-wide runway, when an amber abnormal indicator light illuminated on the engine indicating and crew alert system (EICAS), indicating the hydraulic fluid on system A was low. The pilot-in-command (PIC) and the CP completed the checklist procedures down to the blow down of the landing gear. The flight crew did not follow the checklist sequence, and they did not evaluate the hydraulic pump to see if the hydraulic pump pressure could be restored. The flight crew turned on the A side pump, the power transfer unit was engaged, and the landing gear was lowered. The flight crew did not inform ATC of the loss of hydraulic fluid. The airplane touched down on the first 1,000 feet of runway 13L, and the CP informed the PIC that the brakes were not working. The PIC activated the emergency brakes one time, which appeared to work. The CP did not report any problems with nose wheel steering. The CP applied reverse thrust and the arm extend light illuminated on the right thrust reverser. The airplane started veering to the right and the CP could not maintain directional control. The PIC continued pulling the emergency brake handle as the airplane went off the right side of the runway, sheared off the left main landing gear, and came to a complete stop. Download of the EICAS system revealed the CP did not take the right thrust reverser out of reverse thrust. Review of airplane logbooks revealed the left hydraulic reservoir installed in the airplane was a repaired unit. The unit had been removed from another airplane due to an EICAS message stating it was empty when it was full. The switch was found to be out of adjustment. The unit was inspected and no anomalies were noted.
Probable cause:
The co-pilot's failure to maintain directional control during the landing roll. Contributing to the accident was a loss of system A hydraulic fluid for undetermined reasons and the flight crew's failure to follow the checklist sequence.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 411 in East Hampton: 1 killed

Date & Time: Oct 23, 2005 at 1345 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N7345U
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Jefferson-Nantucket
MSN:
411-0045
YOM:
1965
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
452
Aircraft flight hours:
2808
Circumstances:
Shortly after takeoff from East Hampton municipal airport, the twin engine aircraft crashed in a residential area. The pilot, sole on board, was killed and the aircraft was destroyed.