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Crash of a Mitsubishi MU-2B-60 Marquise in Sioux Falls: 1 killed

Date & Time: Jun 7, 2020 at 0415 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N44MX
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Everett – Huron
MSN:
1526
YOM:
1981
Flight number:
MDS44
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Circumstances:
The pilot departed Everett-Payne Field in the evening of June 6 on a cargo service to Huron, SD. En route, he was informed about the presence of thunderstorms in the Huron area and decided to divert to Sioux Falls Airport where he landed at 0140LT. Awaiting weather improvement, he left Sioux Falls around 0415LT to resume his flight to Huron. Upon takeoff, the twin engine aircraft crashed in unknown circumstances and was destroyed. The pilot was killed.

Crash of a Mitsubishi MU-2B-40 Solitaire in Ainsworth: 1 killed

Date & Time: Sep 23, 2017 at 1028 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N73MA
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Ainsworth – Bottineau
MSN:
414
YOM:
1980
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
3775
Captain / Total hours on type:
2850.00
Aircraft flight hours:
5383
Circumstances:
The instrument-rated private pilot departed on a cross-country flight in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) with an overcast cloud layer at 500 ft above ground level (agl)
and visibility restricted to 1 ¾ miles in mist, without receiving an instrument clearance or opening his filed instrument flight rules flight plan. There was an outage of the ground communications system at the airport and there was no evidence that the pilot attempted to open his flight plan via his cellular telephone. In addition, there was a low-level outage of the radar services in the vicinity of the accident site and investigators were unable to determine the airplane's route of flight before impact. The airport manager observed the accident airplane depart from runway 35 and enter the clouds. Witnesses located to the north of the accident site did not see the airplane but reported hearing an airplane depart about the time of the accident. One witness reported hearing a lowflying airplane and commented that the engines sounded as if they were operating at full power. The witness heard a thud as he was walking into his home but attributed it to a thunderstorm in the area. The airplane impacted a field about 3.5 miles to the northeast of the departure end of the runway and off the track for the intended route of flight. The airplane was massively fragmented during the impact and debris was scattered for about 300 ft. The damage to the airplane and ground scars at the accident site were consistent with the airplane impacting in a left wing low, nose low attitude with relatively high energy. A postaccident examination of the engines and propeller assemblies did not reveal any preimpact anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. Signatures were consistent with both engines producing power and both propellers developing thrust at the time of impact. While the massive fragmentation precluded functional testing of the equipment, there was no damage or failure that suggested preimpact anomalies with the airframe or flight controls.Several days before the accident flight, the pilot encountered a "transient flag" on the air data attitude heading reference system. The pilot reported the flag to both the co-owner of the airplane and an avionics shop; however, exact details of the flag are not known. The unit was destroyed by impact forces and could not be functionally tested. If the flag affecting the display of attitude information had occurred with the unit after takeoff, the instrument panel had adequate stand-by instrumentation from which the pilot could have continued the flight. It is not known if this unit failed during the takeoff and investigators were unable to determine what role, if any, this transient issue may have played in the accident. Based upon the reported weather conditions, the location of the wreckage, and the attitude of the airplane at the time of impact with the ground, it is likely that the pilot experienced spatial disorientation shortly after takeoff which resulted in a loss of control and descent into terrain.
Probable cause:
The pilot's loss of airplane control due to spatial disorientation.
Final Report:

Crash of a Mitsubishi MU-2B-26A Marquise near San Fernando: 3 killed

Date & Time: Jul 24, 2017 at 1440 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
LV-MCV
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
San Fernando – Las Lomitas
MSN:
361SA
YOM:
1977
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Circumstances:
Shortly after takeoff from San Fernando Airport in Buenos Aires, while in initial climb, the crew was contacted by ATC about an apparent transponder issue. The crew failed to report and the aircraft disappeared after it apparently crashed north of the airfield, five minutes after its departure. More than one week later, the authorities did not find any trace of the aircraft nor the three occupants. It is believed the aircraft crashed into the delta of Paraná.
Crew:
Matías Ronzano,
Emanuel Vega.
Passenger:
Matías Aristi, son of the aircraft's owner.

Crash of a Mitsubishi MU-2B-40 Marquise off Eleuthera Island: 4 killed

Date & Time: May 15, 2017 at 1329 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N220N
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Aguadilla – Space Coast
MSN:
450
YOM:
1981
Country:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
4
Captain / Total flying hours:
1483
Captain / Total hours on type:
100.00
Aircraft flight hours:
4634
Circumstances:
The commercial pilot and three passengers were making a personal cross-country flight over ocean waters in the MU-2B airplane. During cruise flight at flight level (FL) 240, the airplane maintained the same relative heading, airspeed, and altitude for about 2.5 hours before radar contact was lost. While the airplane was in flight, a significant meteorological information notice was issued that warned of frequent thunderstorms with tops to FL440 in the accident area at the accident time. Satellite imagery showed cloud tops in the area were up to FL400. Moderate or greater icing conditions and super cooled large drops (SLD) were likely near or over the accident area at the accident time. Although the wreckage was not located for examination, the loss of the airplane's radar target followed by the identification of debris and a fuel sheen on the water below the last radar target location suggests that the airplane entered an uncontrolled descent after encountering adverse weather and impacted the water. Before beginning training in the airplane about 4 months before the accident, the pilot had 21 hours of multi engine experience accumulated during sporadic flights over 9 years. Per a special federal aviation regulation, a pilot must complete specific ground and flight training and log a minimum of 100 flight hours as pilot-in-command (PIC) in multi engine airplanes before acting as PIC of a MU-2B airplane. Once the pilot began training in the airplane, he appeared to attempt to reach the 100-hour threshold quickly, flying about 50 hours in 1 month. These 50 hours included about 40 hours of long, cross-country flights that the flight instructor who was flying with the pilot described as "familiarization flights" for the pilot and "demonstration flights" for the airplane's owner. The pilot successfully completed the training required for the MU-2B, and at the time of the accident, he had accumulated an estimated 120 hours of multi engine flight experience of which 100 hours were in the MU-2B. Although an MU-2B instructor described the pilot as a good, attentive student, it cannot be determined if his training was ingrained enough for him to effectively apply it in an operational environment without an instructor present. Although available evidence about the pilot's activities suggested he may not have obtained adequate restorative sleep during the night before the accident, there was insufficient evidence to determine the extent to which fatigue played a role in his decision making or the sequence of events.The pilot's last known weather briefing occurred about 8 hours before the airplane departed, and it is not known if the pilot obtained any updated weather information before or during the flight. Sufficient weather information (including a hazardous weather advisory provided by an air traffic control broadcast message about 25 minutes before the accident) was available for the pilot to expect convective activity and the potential for icing along the accident flight's route; however, there is no evidence from the airplane's radar track or the pilot's communications with air traffic controllers that he recognized or attempted to avoid the convective conditions or exit icing conditions.
Probable cause:
The pilot's intentional flight into an area of known icing and convective thunderstorm activity, which resulted in a loss of control of the airplane.
Final Report:

Crash of a Mitsubishi MU-2B-60 Marquise in Le Havre-aux-Maisons: 7 killed

Date & Time: Mar 29, 2016 at 1230 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N246W
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Montreal - Le Havre-aux-Maisons
MSN:
1552
YOM:
1982
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
5
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
7
Captain / Total flying hours:
2500
Captain / Total hours on type:
125.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
834
Aircraft flight hours:
11758
Circumstances:
The twin engine aircraft left Montreal-Saint-Hubert Airport at 0930LT for a two hours flight to Le Havre-aux-Maisons, on Magdalen Islands. Upon arrival, weather conditions were marginal with low ceiling, visibility up to two miles, rain and wind gusting to 30 knots. During the final approach to Runway 07, when the aircraft was 1.4 nautical miles west-southwest of the airport, it deviated south of the approach path. At approximately 1230 Atlantic Daylight Time, aircraft control was lost,resulting in the aircraft striking the ground in a near-level attitude. The aircraft was destroyed and all seven occupants were killed, among them Jean Lapierre, political commentator and former Liberal federal cabinet minister of Transport. All passengers were flying to Magdalen Islands to the funeral of Lapierre's father, who died last Friday. The captain, Pascal Gosselin, was the founder and owner of Aérotechnik.
Crew:
Pascal Gosselin, pilot,
Fabrice Labourel, copilot.
Passengers:
Jean Lapierre,
Nicole Beaulieu, Jean Lapierre's wife,
Martine Lapierre, Jean Lapierre's sister,
Marc Lapierre, Jean Lapierre's brother,
Louis Lapierre, Jean Lapierre's brother.
Probable cause:
- The pilot’s inability to effectively manage the aircraft’s energy condition led to an unstable approach.
- The pilot “got behind” the aircraft by allowing events to control his actions, and cognitive biases led him to continue the unstable approach.
- A loss of control occurred when the pilot rapidly added full power at low airspeed while at low altitude, which caused a power-induced upset and resulted in the aircraft rolling sharply to the right and descending rapidly.
- It is likely that the pilot was not prepared for the resulting power-induced upset and, although he managed to level the wings, the aircraft was too low to recover before striking the ground.
- The pilot’s high workload and reduced time available resulted in a task-saturated condition, which decreased his situational awareness and impaired his decision making.
- It is unlikely that the pilot’s flight skills and procedures were sufficiently practised to ensure his proficiency as the pilot-in-command for single-pilot operation on the MU2B for the conditions experienced during the occurrence flight.
Final Report:

Crash of a Mitsubishi MU-2B-25 Marquise in Owasso: 1 killed

Date & Time: Nov 10, 2013 at 1546 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N856JT
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Salina - Tulsa
MSN:
306
YOM:
1974
Location:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
2874
Captain / Total hours on type:
12.00
Aircraft flight hours:
6581
Circumstances:
Radar and air traffic control communications indicated that the Mitsubishi MU-2B-25 was operating normally and flew a nominal flightpath from takeoff through the beginning of the approach until the airplane overshot the extended centerline of the landing runway, tracking to the east and left of course by about 0.2 nautical mile then briefly tracking back toward the centerline. The airplane then entered a 360-degree turn to the left, east of the centerline and at an altitude far below what would be expected for a nominal flightpath and intentional maneuvering flight given the airplane's distance from the airport, which was about 5 miles. As the airplane was in its sustained left turn tracking away from the airport, the controller queried the pilot, who stated that he had a "control problem" and subsequently stated he had a "left engine shutdown." This was the last communication received from the pilot. Witnesses saw the airplane spiral toward the ground and disappear from view. Examination of the wreckage revealed that the landing gear was in the extended position, the flaps were extended 20 degrees, and the left engine propeller blades were in the feathered position. Examination of the left engine showed the fuel shutoff valve was in the closed position, consistent with the engine being in an inoperative condition. As examined, the airplane was not configured in accordance with the airplane flight manual engine shutdown and single-engine landing procedures, which state that the airplane should remain in a clean configuration with flaps set to 5 degrees at the beginning of the final approach descent and the landing gear retracted until landing is assured. Thermal damage to the cockpit instrumentation precluded determining the preimpact position of fuel control and engine switches. The investigation found that the airplane was properly certified, equipped, and maintained in accordance with federal regulations and that the recovered airplane components showed no evidence of any preimpact structural, engine, or system failures. The investigation also determined that the pilot was properly certificated and qualified in accordance with applicable federal regulations, including Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) No. 108, which is required for MU-2B pilots and adequate for the operation of MU-2B series airplanes. The pilot had recently completed the SFAR No. 108 training in Kansas and was returning to Tulsa. At the time of the accident, he had about 12 hours total time in the airplane make and model, and the flight was the first time he operated the airplane as a solo pilot. The investigation found no evidence indicating any preexisting medical or behavioral conditions that might have adversely affected the pilot's performance on the day of the accident. Based on aircraft performance calculations, the airplane should have been flyable in a one engine-inoperative condition; the day visual meteorological conditions at the time of the accident do not support a loss of control due to spatial disorientation. Therefore, the available evidence indicates that the pilot did not appropriately manage a one-engine-inoperative condition, leading to a loss of control from which he did not recover. The airplane was not equipped, and was not required to be equipped, with any type of crash resistant recorder. Although radar data and air traffic control voice communications were available during the investigation to determine the airplane's altitude and flight path and estimate its motions (pitch, bank, yaw attitudes), the exact movements and trim state of the airplane are unknown, and other details of the airplane's performance (such as power settings) can only be estimated. In addition, because the airplane was not equipped with any type of recording device, the pilot's control and system inputs and other actions are unknown. The lack of available data significantly increased the difficulty of determining the specific causes that led to this accident, and it was not possible to determine the reasons for the left engine shutdown or evaluate the pilot's recognition of and response to an engine problem. Recorded video images from the accident flight would possibly have shown where the pilot's attention was directed during the reported problems, his interaction with the airplane controls and systems, and the status of many cockpit switches and instruments. Recorded flight data would have provided information about the engines' operating parameters and the airplane's motions. Previous NTSB recommendations have addressed the need for recording information on airplane types such as the one involved in this accident. Recorders can help investigators identify safety issues that might otherwise be undetectable, which is critical to the prevention of future accidents.
Probable cause:
The pilot's loss of airplane control during a known one-engine-inoperative condition. The reasons for the loss of control and engine shutdown could not be determined because the airplane was not equipped with a crash-resistant recorder and postaccident examination and testing did not reveal evidence of any malfunction that would have precluded normal operation.
Final Report:

Crash of a Mitsubishi MU-2B-25 Marquise in Cobb County

Date & Time: Sep 28, 2011 at 1715 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N344KL
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Huntsville - Cobb County
MSN:
257
YOM:
1973
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
11100
Captain / Total hours on type:
1500.00
Aircraft flight hours:
6196
Circumstances:
The pilot stated that after landing, the nose landing gear collapsed. Examination of the airplane nose strut down-lock installation revealed that the strut on the right side of the nose landing gear trunnion was installed incorrectly; the strut installed on the right was a left-sided strut. Incorrect installation of the strut could result in the bearing pulling loose from the pin on the right side of the trunnion, which could allow the nose landing gear to collapse. A review of maintenance records revealed recent maintenance activity on the nose gear involving the strut. The design of the strut is common for the left and right. Both struts have the same base part number, and a distinguishing numerical suffix is added for left side and right side strut determination. If correctly installed, the numbers should be oriented facing outboard. The original MU-2 Maintenance Manual did not address the installation or correct orientation of the strut. The manufacturer issued MU-2 Service Bulletin (SB) No. 200B, dated June 24, 1994, to address the orientation and adjustment. Service Bulletin 200B states on page 8 of 10 that the “Part Number may be visible in this (the) area from the out board sides (Inked P/N may be faded out).”
Probable cause:
The improper installation of the nose landing gear strut and subsequent collapse of the nose landing gear during landing.
Final Report:

Crash of a Mitsubishi MU-2 Marquise in Elyria: 4 killed

Date & Time: Jan 18, 2010 at 1405 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N80HH
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Gainesville - Elyria
MSN:
0732
YOM:
1978
Location:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
4
Captain / Total flying hours:
2010
Captain / Total hours on type:
1250.00
Aircraft flight hours:
6799
Circumstances:
On his first Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach, the pilot initially flew through the localizer course. The pilot then reestablished the airplane on the final approach course, but the airplane’s altitude at the decision height was about 500 feet too high. He executed a missed approach and received radar vectors for another approach. The airplane was flying inbound on the second ILS approach when a witness reported that he saw the airplane about 150 feet above the ground in about a 60-degree nose-low attitude with about an 80-degree right bank angle. The initial ground impact point was about 2,150 feet west of the runway threshold and about 720 feet north (left) of the extended centerline. The cloud tops were about 3,000 feet with light rime or mixed icing. The flap jack screws and flap indicator were found in the 5-degree flap position. The inspection of the airplane revealed no preimpact anomalies to the airframe, engines, or propellers. A radar study performed on the flight indicated that the calibrated airspeed was about 130 knots on the final approach, but subsequently decreased to about 95–100 knots during the 20-second period prior to loss of radar contact. According to the airplane’s flight manual, the wings-level power-off stall speed at the accident aircraft’s weight is about 91 knots. The ILS approach flight profile indicates that 20 degrees of flaps should be used at the glide slope intercept while maintaining 120 knots minimum airspeed. At least 20 degrees of flaps should be maintained until touchdown. The “No Flap” or “5 Degrees Flap Landing” flight profile indicates that the NO FLAP Vref airspeed is 115 knots calibrated airspeed minimum.
Probable cause:
The pilot's failure to maintain adequate airspeed during the instrument approach, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall and impact with terrain.
Final Report: