Colorado

The air traffic controller had cleared the flight for the instrument approach and the pilot acknowledged the clearance. Radar data depicted the airplane turning toward the final approach course and then continuing the turn 180 degrees before disappearing from radar at 11,200 feet. The wreckage was located at an elevation of 10,725 feet. Examination of the terrain and ground scars indicated the airplane impacted terrain in a nose down, right turn. Impact forces and a postimpact fire resulted in substantial damage to the airplane. Examination of the airplane, engines, and de-icing systems revealed no mechanical anomalies. Weather at the time of the accident was depicted as overcast skies, reduced visibility, with snow showers in the area. An icing probability chart depicted a probability of moderate rime and mixed icing. Both AIRMETs and SIGMENTs advised of moderate icing between the freezing level and flight level 220 and occasional severe rime and mixed icing below 16,000 feet. During his weather briefing, the pilot stated that he was aware of the adverse weather conditions.

During taxi the airplane was observed to run over a tire chock with the left main gear tire. During a turn out of the ramp, the left main gear was observed to run over the nose gear chock that had been removed from the nose gear by the pilot during pre-flight. During the departure roll, the left main gear tire failed and the pilot elected to abort the takeoff attempt. The airplane did not stop on the remaining runway surface and departed the runway overrun area, coming to rest in snow-covered terrain. An examination of the airplane's systems revealed no anomalies.

The airplane, a Rockwell Grand Commander 690C Jetprop 840, was "cleared for the approach" and approximately eight minutes later was observed emerging from the clouds, flying from west to east. Witnesses reported that the nose of the airplane dropped and the airplane subsequently impacted terrain in a near vertical attitude. Impact forces and a post impact fire destroyed the airplane. Examination of the airplane's systems revealed no anomalies. Weather at the time of the accident was depicted as overcast with three to six miles visibility. An icing probability chart depicted the probability for icing during the airplane's descent as 76 percent. AIRMETS for moderate icing and instrument meteorological conditions had been issued for the airplane’s route of flight. Another airplane in the vicinity reported light to moderate mixed icing. It could not be confirmed what information the pilot had obtained in a weather briefing, as a briefing was not obtained through a recorded source. A weight and balance calculation revealed that the accident airplane was 1,000 pounds over gross weight at the time of departure and 560 pounds over gross weight at the time of the accident. It was estimated that the center of gravity was at or just forward of design limitations.

The pilot had filed an instrument flight rules flight plan with a planned departure time of 0700 in order to arrive at his intended destination in time for a planned engagement. He and his passenger arrived at the airport approximately 0800 and requested that the airplane be fueled. The airplane was pulled from its heated hangar into heavy snowfall and fueled at 0917. As the airplane sat outside in the heavy snowfall, a measurable amount of wet slushy snow accumulated on the airplane. The Fixed Base Operator manager suggested to the pilot that the airplane be deiced, but he declined. The airplane was then pulled out to the taxiway in an effort to prevent it from becoming stuck in the snow. At 0939, approximately 22 minutes after the airplane was pulled out if its hangar, the pilot departed with a visibility of 3/4 of a mile in snow and with a 4-knot direct tailwind. The pilot then made a right turn and announced that he was heading to his first waypoint. The airplane continued into an ever tightening right turn until it impacted the ground while in an inverted position about one mile north-northwest of the runway. An examination of the airplane’s wreckage revealed no anomalies with either the engine or airframe that would have contributed to the loss of control. The airplane’s Pilot Operating Handbook and Airplane Flight Manual contained the following limitation: "The aircraft must be clear of all deposits of snow, ice and frost adhering to the lifting surfaces immediately prior to takeoff."

The airplane and two-person crew departed on a positioning flight. The pilot-in-command was not flying the airplane and sat in the right seat. The second-in-command was the pilot flying and sat in the left seat. The accident occurred on the second attempt to land at the destination airport on a snow-covered runway. While descending for the airport, the pilot not flying the airplane called the runway in sight. After assessing that they were too high the pilot not flying convinced the pilot flying to circle the airplane down to land on the runway. Circling at speeds greater than allowed by the approach categories, the crew performed a 360-degree turn to align themselves with the runway. The pilot flying did not have the runway in sight, and was verbally assisted by the pilot not flying. Both pilots stated that they were aligned with the center of the runway. During the flare to touchdown the pilot flying reported an unexpected gust of wind from the left requiring a correction. The airplane touched down about 20 feet off and to the right of the runway edge. Substantial damage was sustained to the airplane's wing and fuselage.

Radar data showed the airplane proceeding outbound for the procedure turn. The pilot reported that they were having trouble extending the landing gear and stated, " ... we’re trying to turn back in and do our gear here all at the same time." Shortly thereafter, the other pilot reported that they had extended the gear and had "three good, three green lights, so we’re hoping the gear is down." The pilot also said, "we are now turned inbound." She was told to contact Unicom. This was the last recorded radio transmission from the flight. The Unicom operator said that she heard the pilot say that they were "coming in." Radar data indicated the airplane crossed the localizer at almost a 90-degree angle and continued turning right until it started to intercept the localizer. The data then indicated that the airplane made a left turn away from the localizer that continued and terminated near the accident site. The turn was captured by six plots. The first plot showed the airplane had descended from 9,400 feet to 9,200 feet and its ground speed had increased from 85 knots to 152 knots. The second plot showed the altitude had increased to 9,700 feet and ground speed had decreased to 132 knots. The third plot showed the altitude had increased further to 10,200 feet and ground speed had dropped to 76 knots. The fourth plot showed the airplane had made almost a 180-degree turn and was at 8,900 feet and at a ground speed of 120 knots. The fifth plot showed the airplane was at 8,700 feet and 20 knots. The sixth and final plot showed the airplane at 8,400 feet and 38 knots. An examination of the airplane showed both wing flap jackscrews retracted and the landing gear actuators extended. The landing gear control switch was in the down position and the emergency gear extension knob was pulled out to full travel. Reduced visibility and clouds were in the vicinity of the airport at the time of the accident.

On December 20, 2008, about 1818 mountain standard time, Continental Airlines flight 1404, a Boeing 737-500, N18611, departed the left side of runway 34R during takeoff from Denver International Airport (DEN), Denver, Colorado. A postcrash fire ensued. The captain and 5 of the 110 passengers were seriously injured; the first officer, 2 cabin crewmembers, and 38 passengers received minor injuries; and 1 cabin crewmember and 67 passengers (3 of whom were lap-held children) were uninjured. The airplane was substantially damaged. The scheduled, domestic passenger flight, operated under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, was departing DEN and was destined for George Bush Intercontinental Airport, Houston, Texas. At the time of the accident, visual meteorological conditions prevailed, with strong and gusty winds out of the west. The flight operated on an instrument flight rules flight plan.

According to radar and Global Positioning System data, the pilot overflew the airport from the southwest and turned to the west to maneuver into position for landing on runway 9. Several witnesses observed the airplane to the west of the airport at a low altitude, appearing to enter a turn that was followed by a "rapid descent" and impact with the ground. The ground scars and
damage to the airplane were consistent with a near-vertical descent and impact. An examination of the airplane and its systems revealed no preaccident anomalies. The moon was obscured by an overcast sky and dark night conditions were prevalent.

The pilot contacted air traffic control, using the wrong call sign, requesting radar flight following. The airplane initially climbed to 13,500 feet, descended to 11,500 feet, climbed to 13,500 feet, and then began a descent until it impacted terrain at 11,900 feet. One minute prior to impact, the pilot asked the air traffic controller about various minimum altitudes for his route of flight. The controller responded with a minimum instrument altitude of 15,000 to 15,300 feet. A review of the handling of the accident flight showed that the controller was aware of the airplane's position, altitude, general route of flight, and its proximity to terrain. No safety alert was issued to the accident flight. Weather depiction charts, infrared satellite imagery, and local weather observations indicate instrument meteorological conditions prevailed along the route of flight, closest to the accident location. The moon had set at 1539 on the day of the accident. The pilot reported a planned flight altitude of 12,500 feet to his dispatcher. No record of a preflight weather briefing was located. An examination of the airplane, engines, and related systems revealed no anomalies.

During the instructional flight, the instructor shut down the right engine and feathered the propeller. It was subsequently restarted, but the left engine started running rough and began to vibrate. The left engine was shut down and the propeller feathered. Level flight was maintained from power produced by the right engine. The left engine was then restarted but instead of producing thrust, the engine produced more drag so it was secured again. Then the right engine began losing power. Full power was applied but the airplane continued to descend. The instructor lowered the landing gear and while in-transit, the airplane clipped the tops of trees. He was able to guide the airplane between two houses and impacted an open field. The airplane bounced across the road, struck a power pole, and caught fire. The two pilots evacuated the airplane via the main cabin door. Examination at the airport of departure disclosed two pools of oil at the approximate positions of the two engines. There were two trails of oil leading from the parking spot down the taxiway and onto the runway. Both engines were partially disassembled and examined. There was evidence that both engines had failed catastrophically due to oil starvation. The left engine crankshaft was broken and all the piston heads were at the tops of their cylinders. Pieces of metal were recovered from the right engine oil sump. According to the operator, the engine rocker box recovery system must be drained during preflight to avoid hydraulic lock. The instructor stated that when they preflighted the airplane, the drain valves were open (the drained oil is captured and recycled). He thought they had closed both valves. According to the operator, either the pilot's failed to close the drain valves or they were jammed in the open position. The operator said the latter was unlikely "because you can feel it move when you close it."