Korean Air

Korean Air Flight 801 was a regular flight from Seoul to Guam. The Boeing 747-300 departed the gate about 21:27 and was airborne about 21:53. The captain was pilot-flying. Upon arrival to the Guam area, the first officer made initial contact with the Guam Combined Center/Radar Approach Control (CERAP) controller about 01:03, when the airplane was level at 41,000 feet and about 240 nm northwest of the NIMITZ VOR/DME. The CERAP controller told flight 801 to expect to land on runway 06L. About 01:10, the controller instructed flight 801 to "...descend at your discretion maintain two thousand six hundred." The first officer responded, "...descend two thousand six hundred pilot discretion." The captain then began briefing the first officer and the flight engineer about the approach and landing at Guam: "I will give you a short briefing...ILS is one one zero three...NIMITZ VOR is one one five three, the course zero six three, since the visibility is six, when we are in the visual approach, as I said before, set the VOR on number two and maintain the VOR for the TOD [top of descent], I will add three miles from the VOR, and start descent when we're about one hundred fifty five miles out. I will add some more speed above the target speed. Well, everything else is all right. In case of go-around, since it is VFR, while staying visual and turning to the right...request a radar vector...if not, we have to go to FLAKE...since the localizer glideslope is out, MDA is five hundred sixty feet and HAT [height above touchdown] is three hundred four feet...." About 01:13 the captain said, "we better start descent;" shortly thereafter, the first officer advised the controller that flight 801 was "leaving four one zero for two thousand six hundred." During the descent it appeared that the weather at Guam was worsening. At 01:24 requested a deviation 10 miles to the left to avoid severe weather. At 01:31 the first officer reported to the CERAP controller that the airplane was clear of cumulonimbus clouds and requested "radar vectors for runway six left." The controller instructed the flight crew to fly a heading of 120°. After this transmission, the flight crew performed the approach checklist and verified the radio frequency for the ILS to runway 06L. About 01:38 the CERAP controller instructed flight 801 to "...turn left heading zero nine zero join localizer;" the first officer acknowledged this transmission. At that time, flight 801 was descending through 2,800 feet msl with the flaps extended 10° and the landing gear up. One minute later the controller stated, "Korean Air eight zero one cleared for ILS runway six left approach...glideslope unusable." The first officer responded, "Korean eight zero one roger...cleared ILS runway six left;" his response did not acknowledge that the glideslope was unusable. The flight engineer asked, "is the glideslope working? glideslope? yeh?" One second later, the captain responded, "yes, yes, it's working." About 01:40, an unidentified voice in the cockpit stated, "check the glideslope if working?" This statement was followed 1 second later by an unidentified voice in the cockpit asking, "why is it working?" The first officer responded, "not useable." The altitude alert system chime sounded and the airplane began to descend from an altitude of 2,640 feet msl at a point approximately 9 nm from the runway 06L threshold. About 01:40:22, an unidentified voice in the cockpit said, "glideslope is incorrect." As the airplane was descending through 2,400 feet msl, the first officer stated, "approaching fourteen hundred." About 4 seconds later, when the airplane was about 8 nm from the runway 06L threshold, the captain stated, "since today's glideslope condition is not good, we need to maintain one thousand four hundred forty. please set it." An unidentified voice in the cockpit then responded, "yes." About 01:40:42, the CERAP controller instructed flight 801 to contact the Agana control tower. The first officer contacted the Agana tower: "Korean air eight zero one intercept the localizer six left." The airplane was descending below 2,000 feet msl at a point 6.8 nm from the runway threshold (3.5 nm from the VOR). About 01:41:01, the Agana tower controller cleared flight 801 to land. About 01:41:14, as the airplane was descending through 1,800 feet msl, the first officer acknowledged the landing clearance, and the captain requested 30° of flaps. The first officer called for the landing checklist and at 01:41:33, the captain said, "look carefully" and "set five hundred sixty feet" (the published MDA). The first officer replied "set," the captain called for the landing checklist, and the flight engineer began reading the landing checklist. About 01:41:42, as the airplane descended through 1,400 feet msl, the ground proximity warning system (GPWS) sounded with the radio altitude callout "one thousand [feet]." One second later, the captain stated, "no flags gear and flaps," to which the flight engineer responded, "no flags gear and flaps." About 01:41:46, the captain asked, "isn't glideslope working?" The captain then stated, "wiper on." About 01:41:53, the first officer again called for the landing checklist, and the flight engineer resumed reading the checklist items. About 01:41:59, when the airplane was descending through 1,100 feet msl at a point about 4.6 nm from the runway 06L threshold (approximately 1.3 nm from the VOR), the first officer stated "not in sight?" One second later, the GPWS radio altitude callout sounded: "five hundred [feet]." About 01:42:14, as the airplane was descending through 840 feet msl and the flight crew was performing the landing checklist, the GPWS issued a "minimums minimums" annunciation followed by a "sink rate" alert about 3 seconds later. The first officer responded, "sink rate okay". At that time the airplane was descending 1,400 feet per minute. About 01:42:19, as the airplane descended through 730 feet msl, the flight engineer stated, "two hundred [feet]," and the first officer said, "let's make a missed approach." About one second later, the flight engineer stated, "not in sight," and the first officer said, "not in sight, missed approach." About 01:42:22, as the airplane descended through approximately 680 feet msl, the nose began to pitch up and the flight engineer stated, "go around." When the captain stated "go around" power was added and airspeed began to increase. As the airplane descended through 670 feet msl, the autopilot disconnect warning sounded. The GPWS radio altitude callouts continued: "one hundred...fifty...forty...thirty...twenty [feet]." About 01:42:26, the airplane impacted hilly terrain at Nimitz Hill, Guam, about 660 feet msl and about 3.3 nm from the runway 06L -threshold. It struck trees and slid through dense vegetation before coming to rest. A post-impact fire broke out. It was established a.o. that the software fix for the Minimum Safe Altitude Warning (MSAW) system at Agana Center Radar Approach Control (CERAP) had rendered the program useless. A software patch had been installed since there had been complaints of the high rate of false MSAW alarms at Guam. This made KAL801's descent below MDA go undetected at the Agana CERAP.

The descent and approach to Jeju Airport was completed in poor weather conditions with turbulences and heavy rain falls as typhoon 'Doug' was passing over. On final approach, flaps were deployed at 15°/20° as the captain was suspecting windshear and microburst conditions. Twice, the copilot informed the captain about the approach speed of 147 knots which was acknowledged. The captain continued the approach but too high on the glide, the aircraft landed too far down the runway, about 1,773 metres past its threshold. On a wet runway surface, the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance (1,227 metres remaining), overran at a speed of 104 knots and eventually collided with a concrete wall and military barracks, bursting into flames. All 160 occupants were quickly evacuated, among them seven were slightly injured.

On final approach to Daegu Airport, the crew failed to follow the approach checklist and did not select gear down. An alarm sounded in the cockpit but the crew thought this was an error and pulled out the circuit breaker so the alarm stopped. Despite the situation, the crew failed to double check the three landing gear lights that remained red and continued the approach when the aircraft landed on its belly before coming to rest. All 127 occupants were evacuated, among them 7 passengers were slightly injured. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The crew was completing a local training at Jeju-Jungseok Airport. On approach via 'White 2' airway, the captain cancelled his IFR flight plan and continued under VFR when, at an altitude of 2,300 feet, the aircraft struck east side of Mt Hallasan (1,950 meters high). The wreckage was found about 8 km west of the airport at an altitude of about 700 meters. All three crew members were injured and the aircraft was destroyed.

During the takeoff roll at Seoul-Gimpo Airport, the left engine lost power and severe vibrations were encountered. The captain decided to abandon the takeoff and initiated an emergency braking procedure. Unable to stop within the remaining distance, the aircraft overran, lost its undercarriage, cartwheeled and came to rest, bursting into flames. All 48 occupants were evacuated, among them 21 were injured. The aircraft was totally destroyed.

The approach to Tripoli Intl Airport was completed in below weather minima as the visibility was varying between 100 and 800 feet and the ILS on runway 27 was unserviceable. On short final, the crew failed to realize his altitude was too low when the aircraft struck the roof of a house, stalled and crashed in a residential area located 2,4 km short of runway. Three crew members and 72 passengers were killed as well as six people on the ground. 124 people in the aircraft were injured as well as few dozen on the ground.

A Boeing 707-300 passenger plane, registered HL7406, was destroyed in an accident in the Indian Ocean, some 100 km off the coast of Myanmar. All 104 passengers and eleven crew members were killed. Korean Air flight 858 departed Baghdad, Iraq on a scheduled service to Seoul, South Korea. En route stops were planned at Abu Dhabi, UAE and Bangkok, Thailand. At 00:01 UTC Flight 858 departed Abu Dhabi, climbing to a cruising altitude of FL370. Last radio contact was at 05:01 UTC when the crew reported that they estimated reaching the TAVOY waypoint over the Andaman Sea at 05:22. Flight 858 was declared missing when it failed to arrive at the destination. On December 13, 1987 a local schooner found pieces of wreckage floating northwest off Tavoy, Myanmar. Korean Authorities, suspecting sabotage after the aircraft became missing, started checking on passengers who disembarked at Abu Dhabi and traced the suspects Mr.Hachiya Shinichi and Miss Hachiya Mayumi to Bahrain where they were apprehended while going through exit formalities at the airport. It was reported that they were found to be holding false Japanese Passports. While being held for interrogation, both committed suicide by taking poison capsules hidden in the cigarettes and Mr.Hachiya Shinichi died. Miss Hachiya Mayumi who survived the attempt was extradited to South Korea. It was reported that the passengers were found to be named Mr. Kim Sung-il and Miss Kim Hyon-hui of North Korean origin. For her role in the bombing Kim Hyun Hui was sentenced to death in March 1989. However, South Korean president Roh Tae-woo pardoned her in 1998.

While taxiing out in fog, the KAL crew became disoriented and ended up on the wrong runway. During the takeoff run, the aircraft collided head-on with South Central Air Flight 59, a Piper PA-31 which was taking off from runway 06L-24R for a flight to Kenai. The 9 occupants of N35206 were injured. The DC-10 overran the runway by 1434 feet and came to rest 40 feet right of the extended centreline.

On 31 August 1983, a Korean Air Lines (KAL) Boeing 747, designated KE 007, departed John F. Kennedy International Airport, New York, United States, on a one-stop scheduled flight for Kimpo International Airport, Seoul, Republic of Korea. The en-route stop occurred at Anchorage International Airport, Alaska, United States. At Anchorage, the aircraft was refuelled and serviced for the remainder of the flight to Seoul and, in accordance with company practice, the flight and cabin crews were changed. The flight departed at the planned time of departure which, in keeping with Korean Air Lines' procedure, was calculated for each KE 007 flight. The departure from Anchorage was flexible to ensure arrival in Seoul at the scheduled arrival time of 21:00 hours* (06:00 hours local time). The actual departure time of 13:00 hours on 31 August would have resulted in an on-time arrival of KE 007 in Seoul, had the flight been completed in accordance with its flight plan. On departing Anchorage, the flight had 269 persons on board consisting of 240 passengers, 3 flight crew members, 20 cabin attendants, and 6 crew members of KAL being repositioned to Seoul. Soon after departure from Anchorage, KE 007 deviated to the right (north) of its direct track to Bethel. This deviation resulted in a progressively greater lateral displacement to the right of its planned route which, ultimately, resulted in its penetration of adjacent high seas airspace in flight information regions (FIR_s) operated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), as well as of sovereign USSR airspace overlying Kamchatka Peninsula and Sakhalin Island and their surrounding territorial waters. No evidence was found during the investigation to indicate that the flight crew of KE 007 was, at any time, aware of the flight's deviation from its planned route in spite of the fact that it continued for over five hours. According to representatives of the United States, military radar installations in Alaska were not aware in real time that the aircraft was proceeding west with an increasing northerly deviation from the recognized airways system. The military radar installations of the Japanese Defence Agency were aware that an aircraft was tracking in USSR airspace over Sakhalin Island. According to representatives of Japan, they were not a\vare that it was a civil aircraft off its intended track. Approximately between 16:40 and 17:08 hours military aircraft operated by the USSR attempted to intercept KE 007 over Kamchatka Peninsula. The interception attempts were unsuccessful. From about 18:00 hours when KE 007 was approaching Sakhalin Island, USSR, the flight was intercepted by USSR military aircraft. At 18:26:02 hours the aircraft was hit by at least one of t\\'o air-to-air missiles fired by the pilot of one of the USSR interceptor aircraft who had been directed, by his ground command and control units, to shoot down an aircraft which they assumed to be a United States RC-135. As a result of the attack, KE 007 collided with the sea and sank off the southwest coast of Sakhalin Island. There were no survivors. The flight recorders, fragmentary pieces of the aircraft and a small number of items of personal property were salvaged by divers from the USSR during a two month period following the accident. In addition, some flotsam from the aircraft was dispersed by tidal currents and recovered later. The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) and the digital flight data recorder (DFDR) tapes were recovered by the USSR in 1983 and were handed over to ICAO in January 1993 by the representatives of the Russian Federation. They also made available recordings and transcripts of the communications between the pilots of the intercepting fighter aircraft and their ground controllers as well as the communications between the command centres. The representatives of the United States made available certified copies and transcripts of the Anchorage ATC tapes, and the representatives of Japan made available the Tokyo ATC tape. In the course of the investigation, all practical steps were taken to confirm the authenticity of the communications tapes. A comprehensive assessment of the physical characteristics of the CVR and the DFDR tapes and the information recorded thereon was made to ensure that they contained authentic records. The material on the communications tapes and the CVR and DFDR tapes showed no evidence of contradiction with known information and correlated well with other sources of data. There was no evidence to suggest that the crew of flight KE 007 was aware that their aircraft was flying to the north of its planned route or that they knew of the presence of the intercepting fighter aircraft. The DFDR record established that flight KE 007 maintained a constant magnetic heading from soon after departure from Anchorage until the attack by the fighter aircraft. The maintenance of the constant magnetic heading was so accurate it could only have resulted from the autopilot controlling the aircraft. The CVR and the DFDR records also established that the aircraft did not sustain an extensive avionics or navigation systems failure or malfunction prior to the attack by the USSR fighter aircraft. The evidence obtained supported the first hypothesis of those listed in the 1983 ICAO report, Le. that the crew inadvertently flew virtually the entire flight on a constant magnetic heading. The maintenance of a constant magnetic heading and the resulting track deviation was due to the KE 007 crew's failure to note that the autopilot had either been left in heading mode or had been switched to INS when the aircraft was beyond the range (7.5 NM) for the INS to capture the desired track.
Concerning the interception and associated identification, signalling and communications the investigation found the following:

1) Interceptions of KE 007 were attempted by USSR military aircraft over Kamchatka Peninsula and made in the vicinity of Sakhalin Island.

2) The USSR command centre personnel assumed that KE 007 was a United States RC-135 aircraft. KE 007's climb from FL 330 to FL350 during the time of the interception over Sakhalin Island was interpreted as being an evasive action, thus further contributing to the USSR presumption that it was an RC-135 aircraft.

3) No attempt was made by the USSR to contact the crew of KE 007 by radio on the distress frequency 121.5 MHz or on any other VHF or HF frequency. However, the interceptor pilot was instructed by his ground control to attempt to attract the attention of the crew of the intruding aircraft by firing his aircraft's cannon and flashing its navigation lights. It was not possible to assess the distance of the interceptor aircraft from the intruder nor their relative positions when the interceptor's lights were flashed and the cannon fired.

4) The USSR command centre personnel on Sakhalin Island were concerned with the position of the intruder aircraft in relation to USSR sovereign airspace as well as its identity. The time factor became paramount as the intruder aircraft was .about to coast out from Sakhalin Island. Therefore, exhaustive efforts to identify the intruder aircraft were not made, although apparently some doubt remained regarding its identity. .5) It was not possible to determine the position of KE 007 at the time of the missile attack in relation to USSR sovereign airspace.

Following an uneventful flight from Los Angeles via Anchorage, the crew started the approach to Seoul-Gimpo Airport in the early morning, just after sunset. On final to runway 14, with a limited visibility of 1,000 meters due to patches of fog, the crew failed to realize his altitude was insufficient when the airplane landed 90 meters short of runway threshold. Then the aircraft struck a concrete wall, causing all main gears to be torn off or to pushed back in their respective wheel well, except the nose gear which remained intact. The airplane slid on its belly for about 1,200 metres before coming to rest in flames on the left side of the runway. 14 occupants escaped uninjured while 198 others were injured. Unfortunately, eight passengers and six crew members, among them both pilots, were killed. The aircraft was destroyed by a fire that probably ignited in a cargo compartment.