Crash of a Boeing 747-251B in Agana

Date & Time: Aug 19, 2005 at 1418 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N627US
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Tokyo - Agana
MSN:
21709
YOM:
1979
Flight number:
NW074
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
16
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
324
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
7850
Captain / Total hours on type:
7850.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
9100
Copilot / Total hours on type:
8695
Aircraft flight hours:
95270
Circumstances:
During the initial approach, the red GEAR annunciator light above the gear lever illuminated, and the landing gear warning horn sounded after the gear handle was selected down and the flaps were selected to 25 degrees. During the go-around, the captain asked the second officer (SO), "what do you have for the gear lights?" The SO responded, "four here." When all gear are down and locked on the Boeing 747-200, the landing gear indication module located on the SO’s instrument panel has five green lights: one nose gear light above four main landing gear lights. The crew then read through the "Red Gear Light Remains On (After Gear Extension)" emergency/abnormal procedure from the cockpit operations manual to troubleshoot the problem. Although the checklist twice presented in boldface type that five lights must be present for the gear to be considered down and locked, the crew did not verbalize the phrase either time. The captain did not directly request a count, and the SO did not verbally confirm, the number of gear down annunciator lights that were illuminated; instead, the flight crew made only general comments regarding the gear, such as "all gear," "all green," or "got 'em all." Because the crew believed that all of the gear annunciator lights were illuminated, they considered all gear down and locked and decided not to recycle the landing gear or attempt to extend any of the gear via the alternate systems before attempting a second approach. During all communications with air traffic control, the flight crew did not specify the nature of the problem that they were troubleshooting. Although the checklist did not authorize a low flyby, if the flight crewmembers had verbalized that they had a gear warning, the controller most likely would have been able to notify the crew of the nose gear position before the point at which a go-around was no longer safe. Multiple gear cycles were conducted after the accident, and the nose gear extended each time with all nose gear door and downlock indications correctly displayed on the landing gear indication module. Post accident examination of the nose gear door actuator found that one of the two lock keys was installed 180 degrees backward. Although this improper configuration could prevent proper extension of the nose gear, the actuator had been installed on the accident airplane since 2001 after the actuator was overhauled by the operator. No anomalies were found with the landing gear indication module, the nose gear-operated door sequence valve, and the nose/body landing gear selector valve.
Probable cause:
The flight crews' failure to verify that the number of landing gear annunciations on the second officer’s panel was consistent with the number specified in the abnormal/emergency procedures checklist, which led to a landing with the nose gear retracted.
Final Report:

Crash of a Boeing 747-3B5 in Agana: 228 killed

Date & Time: Aug 6, 1997 at 0142 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
HL7468
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Seoul - Agana
MSN:
22487
YOM:
1984
Flight number:
KE801
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
17
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
237
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
228
Captain / Total flying hours:
8932
Captain / Total hours on type:
1718.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
4066
Copilot / Total hours on type:
1560
Aircraft flight hours:
50105
Aircraft flight cycles:
8552
Circumstances:
Korean Air Flight 801 was a regular flight from Seoul to Guam. The Boeing 747-300 departed the gate about 21:27 and was airborne about 21:53. The captain was pilot-flying. Upon arrival to the Guam area, the first officer made initial contact with the Guam Combined Center/Radar Approach Control (CERAP) controller about 01:03, when the airplane was level at 41,000 feet and about 240 nm northwest of the NIMITZ VOR/DME. The CERAP controller told flight 801 to expect to land on runway 06L. About 01:10, the controller instructed flight 801 to "...descend at your discretion maintain two thousand six hundred." The first officer responded, "...descend two thousand six hundred pilot discretion." The captain then began briefing the first officer and the flight engineer about the approach and landing at Guam: "I will give you a short briefing...ILS is one one zero three...NIMITZ VOR is one one five three, the course zero six three, since the visibility is six, when we are in the visual approach, as I said before, set the VOR on number two and maintain the VOR for the TOD [top of descent], I will add three miles from the VOR, and start descent when we're about one hundred fifty five miles out. I will add some more speed above the target speed. Well, everything else is all right. In case of go-around, since it is VFR, while staying visual and turning to the right...request a radar vector...if not, we have to go to FLAKE...since the localizer glideslope is out, MDA is five hundred sixty feet and HAT [height above touchdown] is three hundred four feet...." About 01:13 the captain said, "we better start descent;" shortly thereafter, the first officer advised the controller that flight 801 was "leaving four one zero for two thousand six hundred." During the descent it appeared that the weather at Guam was worsening. At 01:24 requested a deviation 10 miles to the left to avoid severe weather. At 01:31 the first officer reported to the CERAP controller that the airplane was clear of cumulonimbus clouds and requested "radar vectors for runway six left." The controller instructed the flight crew to fly a heading of 120°. After this transmission, the flight crew performed the approach checklist and verified the radio frequency for the ILS to runway 06L. About 01:38 the CERAP controller instructed flight 801 to "...turn left heading zero nine zero join localizer;" the first officer acknowledged this transmission. At that time, flight 801 was descending through 2,800 feet msl with the flaps extended 10° and the landing gear up. One minute later the controller stated, "Korean Air eight zero one cleared for ILS runway six left approach...glideslope unusable." The first officer responded, "Korean eight zero one roger...cleared ILS runway six left;" his response did not acknowledge that the glideslope was unusable. The flight engineer asked, "is the glideslope working? glideslope? yeh?" One second later, the captain responded, "yes, yes, it's working." About 01:40, an unidentified voice in the cockpit stated, "check the glideslope if working?" This statement was followed 1 second later by an unidentified voice in the cockpit asking, "why is it working?" The first officer responded, "not useable." The altitude alert system chime sounded and the airplane began to descend from an altitude of 2,640 feet msl at a point approximately 9 nm from the runway 06L threshold. About 01:40:22, an unidentified voice in the cockpit said, "glideslope is incorrect." As the airplane was descending through 2,400 feet msl, the first officer stated, "approaching fourteen hundred." About 4 seconds later, when the airplane was about 8 nm from the runway 06L threshold, the captain stated, "since today's glideslope condition is not good, we need to maintain one thousand four hundred forty. please set it." An unidentified voice in the cockpit then responded, "yes." About 01:40:42, the CERAP controller instructed flight 801 to contact the Agana control tower. The first officer contacted the Agana tower: "Korean air eight zero one intercept the localizer six left." The airplane was descending below 2,000 feet msl at a point 6.8 nm from the runway threshold (3.5 nm from the VOR). About 01:41:01, the Agana tower controller cleared flight 801 to land. About 01:41:14, as the airplane was descending through 1,800 feet msl, the first officer acknowledged the landing clearance, and the captain requested 30° of flaps. The first officer called for the landing checklist and at 01:41:33, the captain said, "look carefully" and "set five hundred sixty feet" (the published MDA). The first officer replied "set," the captain called for the landing checklist, and the flight engineer began reading the landing checklist. About 01:41:42, as the airplane descended through 1,400 feet msl, the ground proximity warning system (GPWS) sounded with the radio altitude callout "one thousand [feet]." One second later, the captain stated, "no flags gear and flaps," to which the flight engineer responded, "no flags gear and flaps." About 01:41:46, the captain asked, "isn't glideslope working?" The captain then stated, "wiper on." About 01:41:53, the first officer again called for the landing checklist, and the flight engineer resumed reading the checklist items. About 01:41:59, when the airplane was descending through 1,100 feet msl at a point about 4.6 nm from the runway 06L threshold (approximately 1.3 nm from the VOR), the first officer stated "not in sight?" One second later, the GPWS radio altitude callout sounded: "five hundred [feet]." About 01:42:14, as the airplane was descending through 840 feet msl and the flight crew was performing the landing checklist, the GPWS issued a "minimums minimums" annunciation followed by a "sink rate" alert about 3 seconds later. The first officer responded, "sink rate okay". At that time the airplane was descending 1,400 feet per minute. About 01:42:19, as the airplane descended through 730 feet msl, the flight engineer stated, "two hundred [feet]," and the first officer said, "let's make a missed approach." About one second later, the flight engineer stated, "not in sight," and the first officer said, "not in sight, missed approach." About 01:42:22, as the airplane descended through approximately 680 feet msl, the nose began to pitch up and the flight engineer stated, "go around." When the captain stated "go around" power was added and airspeed began to increase. As the airplane descended through 670 feet msl, the autopilot disconnect warning sounded. The GPWS radio altitude callouts continued: "one hundred...fifty...forty...thirty...twenty [feet]." About 01:42:26, the airplane impacted hilly terrain at Nimitz Hill, Guam, about 660 feet msl and about 3.3 nm from the runway 06L -threshold. It struck trees and slid through dense vegetation before coming to rest. A post-impact fire broke out. It was established a.o. that the software fix for the Minimum Safe Altitude Warning (MSAW) system at Agana Center Radar Approach Control (CERAP) had rendered the program useless. A software patch had been installed since there had been complaints of the high rate of false MSAW alarms at Guam. This made KAL801's descent below MDA go undetected at the Agana CERAP.
Probable cause:
The captain's failure to adequately brief and execute the nonprecision approach and the first officer's and flight engineer's failure to effectively monitor and cross-check the captain's execution of the approach. Contributing to these failures were the captain's fatigue and Korean Air's inadequate flight crew training. Contributing to the accident was the Federal Aviation Administration's intentional inhibition of the minimum safe altitude warning system and the agency's failure to adequately to manage the system.
Final Report:

Crash of a Boeing 727-92C on Yap Island

Date & Time: Nov 21, 1980 at 0952 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N18479
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Saipan – Agana – Yap – Palau
MSN:
19174
YOM:
1966
Flight number:
CO614
Region:
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
67
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
14000
Captain / Total hours on type:
700.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
7000
Copilot / Total hours on type:
5500
Aircraft flight hours:
30878
Aircraft flight cycles:
20788
Circumstances:
Air Micronesia Flight 614 departed Saipan at 07:30 for a flight to Palau with intermediate stops in Guam and Yap, Western Caroline Islands. The aircraft departed Guam at 08:30 and climbed to FL350. An en route descent to Yap was made from the north through broken to scattered clouds and the captain, who was flying the aircraft, turned onto a downwind leg at the northeast portion of the airport. The downwind leg was flown at an altitude of 600 feet above the runway 07 elevation while the crew checked to see if the runway was clear, to see if the fire truck was in place, and to see the direction of the windsock. The flaps were set at 30° on the base leg. Abeam the approach end of runway 07, the captain began a right 90° and a left turn manoeuvre to align the aircraft with the final approach to runway 07. During a portion of the downwind leg, the captain relinquished control of the aircraft to the first officer while the captain took pictures of the airport. He then resumed control and passed the camera to the second officer and asked him to take pictures of the runway. As the aircraft passed through 90deg from the runway heading, it had descended to about 300 feet above the runway elevation of 52 feet msl. When the aircraft was aligned with the runway heading, it was about 480 feet above runway elevation at a point 1.5 miles from the approach end of the runway. At 09:52 the aircraft touched down 13 feet short of runway 07. The right main landing gear immediately separated from the aircraft. The aircraft gradually veered off the runway and came to rest in the jungle about 1,700 feet beyond the initial touchdown. A severe ground fire erupted immediately along the right side of the aircraft as it came to rest. All occupants had evacuated within about 1 minute after the aircraft came to rest.
Probable cause:
The Captain's premature reduction of thrust in combination with flying a shallow approach slope angle to an improper touchdown aim point. These actions resulted in a high rate of descent and a touchdown on upward sloping terrain short of the runway threshold, which generated loads that exceeded the design strength and failed the right-hand landing gear. Contributing to the accident were the Captain's lack of recent experience in the B-727 aircraft and a transfer of his DC-10 aircraft landing habits and techniques to the operation of the B-727 aircraft.
Final Report:

Crash of a Lockheed L-188A Electra in Agana: 46 killed

Date & Time: Jun 5, 1976 at 0047 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
RP-C1061
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Wake - Agana - Manila
MSN:
1007
YOM:
1958
Flight number:
UM702
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
12
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
33
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
46
Captain / Total flying hours:
10016
Captain / Total hours on type:
2422.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
8906
Copilot / Total hours on type:
2037
Aircraft flight hours:
22895
Circumstances:
The aircraft lifted off the 10,015-foot runway about 7,500 feet down the runway. During or just after liftoff the n°3 propeller was feathered. The aircraft climbed to 100 feet while yawing to the right. The crew retracted the landing gear and flaps before the aircraft reached the apex of the climb. It then rotated to a nose-high attitude, appeared to become laterally unstable, and struck the rising terrain in a tail-low attitude. Impact was about 4,300 feet beyond the end of the runway. The aft portion of the aircraft fuselage dragged along the ground for 220 feet in a right wing down attitude, after which the aircraft slid off the brow of a 13-foot embankment, crashed through the chain link perimeter fence at Agana NAS, crossed a highway, and burst into flames. The aircraft came to rest in an open area between residential areas, about 4,900 feet beyond the end of runway 06L. As the aircraft slid across the highway, it struck an automobile on the highway; the driver of the car was killed. A woman and her son, who were standing outside their residence just south of the impact site, were seriously burned by the heat of the burning fuel and were seriously injured by flying debris. All 45 occupants on board the Electra were killed.
Probable cause:
he loss of climb capability after the crew retracted the flaps at too low an altitude to clear the rising terrain. The flaps were retracted after the no.3 propeller feathered as the aircraft lifted off the runway. Contributing to the accident was the captain's decision to continue the take-off after an engine failed before reaching the rotation speed.
Final Report:

Crash of a Lockheed C-130E Hercules in Agana: 6 killed

Date & Time: Apr 20, 1974 at 2100 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
62-1841
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Andersen - Agana
MSN:
3804
YOM:
1963
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
6
Circumstances:
The crew departed Andersen AFB on a night training flight. While approaching Agana-Antonio Borja Won Pat Airport, the instructor shut down both engines n°3 & 4 and continued the approach when the airplane lost height and landed hard on runway. On impact, all tires on the right main gear burst. Out of control, the airplane veered off runway to the right, went through the apron, collided with a parked fighter then came to rest in flames against an embankment. The aircraft was destroyed and all six crew members were killed.

Crash of a Convair CV-990-30A-5 Coronado in Agana

Date & Time: Sep 10, 1973 at 1616 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N7876
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Jakarta - Agana - Moffett
MSN:
30-10-4
YOM:
1963
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
13000
Captain / Total hours on type:
1621.00
Circumstances:
The crew was completing a ferry flight from Jakarta to Moffett AFB with an intermediate stop in Agana. On approach, the crew was informed by ATC about poor weather at destination with thunderstorm activity, strong crosswinds and heavy rain falls. The airplane landed 500 meters past the runway threshold then became uncontrollable. It veered off runway to the left then collided with various obstacles and came to rest. All four crew members escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
Improper in-flight decisions on part of the pilot-in-command. The following factors were reported:
- Turbulence associated with clouds and thunderstorms,
- Overload failure,
- No weather briefing received,
- Wind gusting up to 20 knots,
- Agana Tower advised the crew about large storm passing over the approach course.
Final Report:

Crash of a Lockheed C-130 Hercules in Agana: 5 killed

Date & Time: Dec 9, 1972
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
64-0505
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Agana - Agana
MSN:
3989
YOM:
1964
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
5
Circumstances:
The aircraft was completing a local training flight at Agana Airport, carrying five crew members and three passengers (two Army officers and one Pan Am flight attendant). On final approach, the airplane stalled and crashed in flames short of runway threshold. It was destroyed by a post crash fire and five occupants were killed while three others were injured. It was reported that one of the engine was not running on final, probably to simulate a failure.

Crash of a Douglas DC-6A in Agana: 80 killed

Date & Time: Sep 19, 1960 at 0602 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N90779
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Clark – Agana – Wake – Travis
MSN:
44914
YOM:
1956
Flight number:
WO830
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
8
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
86
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
80
Captain / Total flying hours:
15681
Captain / Total hours on type:
2548.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
6317
Copilot / Total hours on type:
217
Aircraft flight hours:
12746
Circumstances:
On September 19, 1960, at approximately 0602 local time, a Douglas DC-6AB, N 90779, operated by World Airways, Inc., as Military Air Transport Flight 830/18, bound for Wake Island and the United States. crashed and burned on Mt. Barrigada approximately two nautical miles from the departure end of runway 6L, Agana Naval Air Station, Guam, Mariana Islands. Of the 94 occupants on board, seven crew members and 73 passengers received fatal injuries; one crew member and 13 passengers survived. The flight received FAA Air Route Traffic Control route and departure clearances and took off into night VFR weather conditions. It made a right turn after takeoff and although making a-continuous climb over the distance flown. it struck Mt. Barrigada at a point approximately 300 feet above the elevation of the airport, and slid into the thick-underbrush cutting a Swath for nearly 1,1000 feet before it came to rest. Damage and injury were more attributable to fire than impact forces. The Board determines that this accident occurred because of the failure of the pilot to comply with published departure procedures applicable to runways 6 left and 6 right.
Probable cause:
The Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the failure of the pilot to comply with published departure procedures applicable to runways 6 left and 6 right. In addition, World Airways operations manual stated that radio facility charts, current flight information manuals and other documents which indicated the correct departure procedure for runway 06L must be carried in the airplane. These documents advise pilots when taking off in this direction to climb to an altitude of 1,000 feet before turning to the east. It is therefore difficult to understand why this procedure was not followed. Owing to the low intensity of the single red flashing beacon on the summit of the mountain and the likelihood of early morning mountain haze, it is questionable whether the beacon would have been visible to the crew, thus alerting them to their precarious position in sufficient time for evasive action to be taken.