Tripoli (طرابلس)

Flight Type:

Survivors:

Site:

De Havilland DHC-6 Twin Otter

Schedule:

Johannesburg - Tripoli - London

MSN:

1024

YOM:

2009

Flight number:

AAW771

Location:

Country:

Region:

Crew on board:

Crew fatalities:

Pax on board:

Pax fatalities:

Other fatalities:

Total fatalities:

103

Captain / Total flying hours:

17016

Captain / Total hours on type:

516.00

Copilot / Total flying hours:

4216

Copilot / Total hours on type:

516

Aircraft flight hours:

2175

Aircraft flight cycles:

572

Circumstances:

The aircraft was on a schedule flight from O. R. Tambo International Airport - Johannesburg (South Africa) to London, with an intermediate stop at Tripoli international Airport, Libya. The Aircraft took off on May 11th 2010 at 19:25 UTC as flight number 8U771/AAW771. There were three cockpit crew, eight cabin crew, and 93 passengers on board, with fifty thousand kg of fuel during takeoff role and the Aircraft mass was 187,501 kg. During final approach towards runway 09 at Tripoli international Airport, the crew announced go-around and initiated the miss approach procedure with the knowledge and confirmation of Tripoli tower. During the missed approach phase, the Aircraft responded to the crew’s inputs, velocity and altitude increased above the MDA, then the aircraft descended dramatically until collided with the ground about 1,200 meters from the threshold of the runway 09 and 150 meters to the right of its centerline, impact and post impact fire caused complete destruction to the Aircraft. A boy aged 8 was injured while 103 other occupants were killed.

Probable cause:

A final approach carried out in common managed guidance mode should have relieved the crew of their tasks. The limited coordination and cooperation between the two crew members, especially the change into vertical selected guidance mode by the PF, probably led to a lack of a common action plan. The lack of feedback from the 28 April 2010 flight, flown by the same crew on the same aircraft, did not allow them to anticipate the potential risks associated with managing non-precision approaches. The pilots’ performance was likely impaired because of fatigue, but the extent of their impairment and the degree to which it contributed to the performance deficiencies that occurred during the flight cannot be conclusively determined. During the go-around, the crew was surprised not to acquire visual references. On one hand the crew feared exceeding the aircraft’s speed limits in relation to its configuration, and on the other hand they were feeling the effects of somatogravic illusion due to the aircraft acceleration. This probably explains the aircraft handling inputs, mainly nose-down inputs, applied during the go-around. These inputs were not consistent with what is expected in this flight phase. The degraded CRM did not make it possible for either crew member to identify and recover from the situation before the collision with the ground, even when the TAWS warnings were activated close to the ground.
Based on elements from the investigation, the accident resulted from:
- The lack of common action plan during the approach and a final approach continued below the MDA, without ground visual reference acquired.
- The inappropriate application of flight control inputs during a go- around and on the activation of TAWS warnings,
- The lack of monitoring and controlling of the flight path.
These events can be explained by the following factors:
- Limited CRM on approach that degraded during the missed approach. This degradation was probably amplified by numerous radio-communications during the final approach and the crew’s state of fatigue,
- Aircraft control inputs typical in the occurrence of somatogravic perceptual illusions,
- Inappropriate systematic analysis of flight data and feedback mechanism within the AFRIQIYAH Airways.
- Non adherence to the company operation manual, SOP and standard terminology.
In addition, the investigation committee found the following as contributing factors to the accident:
- Weather available to the crew did not reflect the actual weather situation in the final approach segment at Tripoli International Airport.
- In adequacy of training received by the crew.
- Occupancy of tower frequency by both air and ground movements control.

Final Report:

Crash of an Antonov AN-26 near Tripoli

Date & Time: Oct 31, 2007

Type of aircraft:

Antonov AN-26

Operator:

Registration:

5A-DOZ

Flight Phase:

Flight Type:

Survivors:

Site:

MSN:

125 04

YOM:

1982

Location:

Country:

Region:

Crew on board:

Crew fatalities:

Pax on board:

Pax fatalities:

Other fatalities:

Total fatalities:

Circumstances:

Crashed in unknown circumstances in a desert area near Atoqah. There were no injuries but the aircraft was destroyed in the accident.

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-6 Twin Otter 300 in Tripoli: 1 killed

Date & Time: Mar 19, 1994

Type of aircraft:

Operator:

Light Air Transport

Registration:

5A-DJK

Flight Phase:

Flight

Flight Type:

Training

Survivors:

Site:

Schedule:

Tripoli - Tripoli

MSN:

775

YOM:

1981

Location:

Country:

Region:

Crew on board:

Crew fatalities:

Pax on board:

Pax fatalities:

Other fatalities:

Total fatalities:

Circumstances:

The crew was completing a local training flight at Tripoli Airport when the aircraft crashed in unknown circumstances near the airfield. The copilot was seriously injured while the captain/instructor was killed.

Crash of a Boeing 727-2L5 in Tripoli: 157 killed

Date & Time: Dec 22, 1992 at 0807 LT

Type of aircraft:

Boeing 727-200

Operator:

Registration:

5A-DIA

Flight Phase:

Flight Type:

Survivors:

Site:

Schedule:

Benghazi - Tripoli

MSN:

21050

YOM:

1975

Flight number:

LN1103

Location:

Country:

Region:

Crew on board:

Crew fatalities:

Pax on board:

147

Pax fatalities:

Other fatalities:

Total fatalities:

157

Circumstances:

Following an uneventful flight from Benghazi, the crew was cleared to start the descent to Tripoli Airport. Due to military traffic, the crew was instructed to hold over the Papa Echo beacon located 4,1 DME from runway 27 threshold. At an altitude of 3,000 feet, the Boeing 727 collided with a Libyan Air Force MiG-23 that just took off from Tripoli Airport. The fighter struck the tail of the Boeing that entered a dive and crashed 9 km from the airport after the tail separated. All 157 occupants were killed while both pilots on board the fighter ejected safely.

Crash of a Boeing 707-351C in Tripoli

Date & Time: Dec 7, 1991

Type of aircraft:

Boeing 707

Operator:

Registration:

5A-DJT

Flight Phase:

Takeoff (climb)

Flight Type:

Survivors:

Site:

Schedule:

Tripoli - Benghazi

MSN:

18888

YOM:

1965

Location:

Country:

Region:

Crew on board:

Crew fatalities:

Pax on board:

189

Pax fatalities:

Other fatalities:

Total fatalities:

Circumstances:

During the takeoff roll at Tripoli Airport, after a course of about 700 metres, the aircraft veered off runway to the left. While contacting soft ground, all undercarriage and all four engines were torn off. The aircraft slid for few dozen metres and came to rest, broken in three and bursting into flames. All 199 occupants were evacuated, among them 10 were injured.

Crash of a Douglas DC-10-30 in Tripoli: 81 killed

Date & Time: Jul 27, 1989 at 0725 LT

Type of aircraft:

Douglas DC-10

Operator:

Registration:

HL7328

Flight Phase:

Flight Type:

Survivors:

De Havilland DH.106 Comet

Site:

City

Schedule:

Seoul - Bangkok - Jeddah - Tripoli

MSN:

47887

YOM:

1973

Flight number:

KE803

Location:

Country:

Region:

Crew on board:

Crew fatalities:

Pax on board:

181

Pax fatalities:

Other fatalities:

Total fatalities:

111

Aircraft flight hours:

49025

Aircraft flight cycles:

11440

Circumstances:

The approach to Tripoli Intl Airport was completed in below weather minima as the visibility was varying between 100 and 800 feet and the ILS on runway 27 was unserviceable. On short final, the crew failed to realize his altitude was too low when the aircraft struck the roof of a house, stalled and crashed in a residential area located 2,4 km short of runway. Three crew members and 72 passengers were killed as well as six people on the ground. 124 people in the aircraft were injured as well as few dozen on the ground.

Probable cause:

The crew decided to continue the descent below the glide until the aircraft struck obstacles and crashed. The following contributing factors were reported:
- Lack of visibility due to foggy conditions,
- Below minima weather conditions,
- The crew failed to initiate a go-around while he did not establish a visual contact with the runway,
- The ILS system for runway 27 was unserviceable,
- The crew failed to follow the approach procedures,
- The crew ignored ATC warnings,
- The approach speed was excessive and the flaps were not deployed in the correct angle,
- The crew of a Russian aircraft diverted to Malta an hour before the accident due to unsafe landing conditions.

Crash of a Lockheed L-1329-25 JetStar II off Tripoli: 2 killed

Date & Time: Jan 16, 1983

Type of aircraft:

Lockheed L-1329 JetStar

Operator:

Libyan Government

Registration:

5A-DAR

Flight Phase:

Takeoff (climb)

Flight Type:

Government

Survivors:

Site:

Lake, Sea, Ocean, River

Schedule:

Mitiga - Algiers

MSN:

5221

YOM:

1977

Location:

Country:

Region:

Crew on board:

Crew fatalities:

Pax on board:

Pax fatalities:

Other fatalities:

Total fatalities:

Circumstances:

The crew was completing a positioning flight from Mitiga to Algiers. After takeoff from Mitiga Airport, while climbing to an altitude of 7,000 feet, the airplane disappeared from radar screens and the contact with ATC was interrupted. SAR operations were initiated but eventually abandoned after eight days as no trace of the aircraft nor the crew was found. It is believed that the aircraft crashed in the Mediterranean Sea and lost without trace.

Crash of a De Havilland DH.106 Comet 4C in Tripoli: 16 killed

Date & Time: Jan 2, 1971 at 0325 LT

Type of aircraft:

Operator:

Registration:

SU-ALC

Flight Phase:

Flight Type:

Survivors:

Site:

Schedule:

Algiers - Tripoli - Cairo

MSN:

6439

YOM:

1960

Flight number:

MS844

Location:

Country:

Region:

Crew on board:

Crew fatalities:

Pax on board:

Pax fatalities:

Other fatalities:

Total fatalities:

Aircraft flight hours:

25592

Circumstances:

Flight MS844 was a scheduled international flight from Algiers to Cairo with an intermediate stop at Tripoli. Departure on the outbound flight Cairo - Tripoli - Algiers had been delayed 29 hours due to adverse weather conditions along the route. At Algiers, following testing of the systems, the fire warning light of Zone I in n° 3 engine stayed "ON". Local personnel, who were not familiar with Comet aircraft, attempted to rectify the discrepancy and this caused a further delay of nearly 2 1/2 hours. The light eventually extinguished and the pilot-in-command, who had been considering cancellation of the flight and returning to Cairo without passengers, then decided to proceed with the service. There was no evidence that the crew had asked for, or received, a weather forecast before departing Algiers for Tripoli; however, it is possible that a verbal forecast was obtained. The QNH at Algiers was 1011 mb. As the aircraft entered the Tripoli Control Area, the crew was provided with a weather report which included a horizontal visibility of 1000 meters due to sand haze. This was below the minimum authorized by the airline; however, the vertical visibility was unlimited. The pilot-in-command checked Benina weather and then decided to attempt a landing at Tripoli wfth Malta as the alternative: he stated that he had 3 hours 50 minutes endurance. Both Tripoli Control and Tripoli Tower gave him a QNH of 1008 mb, additionally Tripoli Control gave an opinion that visibility was better than 1 000 m, and Tripoli Tower gave an opinion that he could see "3 kilometres". The airport's VOR was not available as it required calibration; the only ground aid available was the ADF facility. Coming from Algiers, the approach over the beacon located 0.6 NM north of Runway 18, the runway in use, involved joining the holding pattern in the opposite direction to the circuit so that a tear drop turn was necessary to re-approach the beacon on the outbound leg on an ADF procedure turn. Shortly after passing the beacon for the first time, the pilot-in-command reported at 3 000 ft. The last message received was when the aircraft was passing the beacon outbound for an ADF approach procedure turn. The altitude was not stated subsequent to entering the holding pattern.The flight path to Runway 18 crossed an expanse of sand dunes 160 ft AMSL rising steeply to 425 ft AMSL and then falling te the runway threshold elevation of 240 ft. The aircraft struck sand dunes at an elevation of 395 ft approximately 7 km before the threshold of the runway. The accident occurred at 01.25 hours GMT. The aircraft was destroyed and all 16 occupants were killed.

Probable cause:

The probable cause of the accident was the decision of the pilot-in-command to land while the prevailing visibility was below the Airline's minimum for that airport at night, and for undetermined reasons, the aircraft was lower than the altitude it ought to have been for an ADF approach to the runway in use. The weather was a contributing factor.

Final Report:

Crash of a Tupolev TU-104A in Tripoli: 13 killed

Date & Time: Jun 1, 1970 at 0512 LT

Type of aircraft:

Tupolev TU-104

Operator:

Registration:

OK-NDD

Flight Phase:

Flight Type:

Survivors:

Site: