Region

Crash of a Boeing 747-412F in Bishkek: 39 killed

Date & Time: Jan 16, 2017 at 0719 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
TC-MCL
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Hong Kong - Bishkek - Istanbul
MSN:
32897/1322
YOM:
2003
Flight number:
TK6491
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
39
Captain / Total flying hours:
10808
Captain / Total hours on type:
820.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
5894
Copilot / Total hours on type:
1758
Aircraft flight hours:
46820
Aircraft flight cycles:
8308
Circumstances:
On 16.01.2017, the crew of the Boeing 747-412F TC-MCL aircraft was performing a THY6491 flight from Hong Kong via Bishkek (Manas Airport) to Istanbul (Ataturk Airport) in order to transport the commercial cargo (public consumer goods) of 85 618 kg. The cargo was planned to be offloaded in Istanbul (Ataturk Airport). Manas Airport was planned as a transit airport for crew change and refueling. From 12.01.2017 to 15.01.2017, the crew had a rest period of 69 h in a hotel in Hong Kong. The aircraft takeoff from the Hong Kong Airport was performed at 19:12 on 5.01.2017, with the delay of 2 h 02 min in respect to the planned takeoff time. During the takeoff, the climb and the on-route cruise flight, the aircraft systems operated normally. At 00:41, on 16.01.2017, the aircraft entered the Bishkek ATC Area Control Center over the reference point of KAMUD at flight level of 10 400 m (according to the separation system, established in the People's Republic of China). At 00:51, the crew requested a descent and reached the FL 220 (according to the separation system, established in the Kyrgyz Republic). At 00:59, the crew received the weather information for Manas Airport: "the RVR at the RWY threshold 400 m, the RWY midpoint and RWY end 300 m, the vertical visibility 130 ft". At 01:01, the crew received the specified data: " in the center of the runway RVR three zero zero meters, vertical visibility one five zero feet." At 01:03, the crew requested a descent, the controller cleared for the descent not below FL 180. At 01:05, the crew was handed over to the Approach Control. At 01:06, the crew was cleared for the descent to FL 60, TOKPA 1 ILS approach chart, RWY 26. At 01:10, the controller reported the weather: wind calm, visibility 50 m, RVR 300 m, freezing fog, vertical visibility 160 ft, and requested the crew if they would continue the approach. The crew reported that they would continue the approach. The crew conducted the approach to RWY 26 in accordance with the standard approach chart. At 01:11, the controller informed the crew: "… transition level six zero" and cleared them for the ILS approach to RWY 26. At 01:15, the crew contacted the Tower controller. The Tower controller cleared them for landing on RWY 26 and reported the weather: "…wind calm… RVR in the beginning of the runway four hundred meters, in the middle point three hundred two five meters and at the end of the runway four hundred meters and vertical visibility one six zero... feet". The aircraft approached the RWY 26 threshold at the height significantly higher than the planned height. Continuing to descend, the aircraft flew over the entire length of the RWY and touched the ground at the distance of 900 m away from the farthest end of the runway (in relation to the direction of the approach) (the RWY 08 threshold). After the touchdown and landing roll, the aircraft impacted the concrete aerodrome barrier and the buildings of the suburban settlement and started to disintegrate, the fuel spillage occurred. As a result of the impact with the ground surface and the obstacles, the aircraft was completely disintegrated, a significant part of the aircraft structure was destroyed by the post-crash ground fire. At 01.17 UTC, the Tower controller requested the aircraft position, but the crew did not respond.
Probable cause:
The cause of the Boeing 747-412F TC-MCL aircraft accident was the missing control of the crew over the aircraft position in relation to the glideslope during the automatic approach, conducted at night in the weather conditions, suitable for ICAO CAT II landing, and as a result, the measures to perform a go-around, not taken in due time with the aircraft, having a significant deviation from the established approach chart, which led to the controlled flight impact with terrain (CFIT) at the distance of ≈930 m beyond the end of the active RWY.
The contributing factors were, most probably, the following:
- the insufficient pre-flight briefing of the flight crew members for the flight to Manas aerodrome (Bishkek), regarding the approach charts, as well as the non-optimal decisions taken by the crew when choosing the aircraft descent parameters, which led to the arrival at the established approach chart reference point at a considerably higher flight altitude;
- the lack of the crew's effective measures to decrease the aircraft vertical position and its arrival at the established approach chart reference point while the crew members were aware of the actual aircraft position being higher than required by the established chart;
- the lack of the requirements in the Tower controllers' job instructions to monitor for considerable aircraft position deviations from the established charts while the pertinent technical equipment for such monitoring was available;
- the excessive psycho-emotional stress of the crew members caused by the complicated approach conditions (night time, CAT II landing, long-lasting working hours) and their failure to eliminate the flight altitude deviations during a long time period. Additionally, the stress level could have been increased due to the crew's (especially the PIC's) highly emotional discussion of the ATC controllers' instructions and actions. Moreover, the ATC controllers' instructions and actions were in compliance with the established operational procedures and charts;
- the lack of the crew members' monitoring for crossing the established navigational reference points (the glideslope capture point, the LOM and LIM reporting points);
- the crew's failure to conduct the standard operational procedure which calls for altitude verification at the FAF/FAP, which is stated in the FCOM and the airline's OM. On the other hand, the Jeppesen Route Manual, used by the crew, contains no FAF/FAP in the RWY 26 approach chart;
- the onboard systems' "capture" of the false glideslope beam with the angle of ≈9°;
- the design features of the Boeing 747-400 aircraft type regarding the continuation of the aircraft approach descent in the automatic mode with the constant descent angle of 3° (the inertial path) with the maintained green indication of the armed automatic landing mode (regardless of the actual aircraft position in relation to the RWY) while the aircraft systems detected that the glideslope signal was missing (after the glideslope signal "capture"). With that, the crew received the designed annunciation, including the aural and visual caution alerts;
- the absence of the red warning alert for the flight crew in case of a "false" glideslope capture and the transition to the inertial mode trajectory, which would require immediate control actions from the part of the crew;
- the lack of monitoring from the part of the crew over the aircraft position in regard to the approach chart, including the monitoring by means of the Navigation Display (ND), engaged in the MAP mode;
- the crew's failure to conduct the Airline's Standard Operational Procedures (SOPs), regarding the performance of the go-around procedure in case the "AUTOPILOT" (the AP switching to the inertial mode) and "GLIDESLOPE" (the EGPWS annunciation of the significant glideslope deviation) alerts during the automatic CAT II landing at true heights below 1000 ft (with no visual reference established with either the runway environment or with the lighting system);
- the delayed actions for initiating the go-around procedure with no visual reference established with the runway environment at the decision height (DH). In fact, the actions were initiated at the true height of 58 ft with the established minimum of 99 ft.
Final Report:

Crash of a Boeing 737-3Y0 in Osh

Date & Time: Nov 22, 2015 at 0800 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
EX-37005
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Krasnoyarsk – Osh
MSN:
24681/1929
YOM:
1990
Flight number:
AVJ768
Location:
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
148
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
10600
Captain / Total hours on type:
6362.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
16400
Copilot / Total hours on type:
3731
Aircraft flight hours:
50668
Aircraft flight cycles:
43958
Circumstances:
The crew departed Krasnoyarsk-Yemilianovo Airport on a night flight to Osh, Kyrgyzstan. En route, he was informed that a landing in Osh was impossible to due low visibility caused by foggy conditions. The captain decided to divert to Bishkek-Manas Airport where the aircraft landed safely at 0520LT. As weather conditions seems to improve at destination, the crew left Bishkek bound for Osh some ninety minutes later. On approach to Osh, the vertical visibility was reduced to 130 feet when the aircraft hit violently the runway 12 surface. Upon impact, the left main gear was sheared off, the aircraft slid for several yards, overran, hit obstacles and came to rest in a field located 529 meters past the runway end with its left engine detached and its right engine destroyed. All 154 occupants were evacuated, ten passengers were injured, six of them seriously. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
It was determined that the accident occurred in poor weather conditions with an horizontal visibility reduced to 50 meters and a vertical visibility limited to 130 feet. It was reported that the accident was caused by the combination of the following factors:
- the crew decided to leave Bishkek Airport for Osh without taking into consideration the weather forecast and the possibility of deteriorating weather,
- the competences of the captain for a missed approach procedure in poor weather conditions were limited to a simulator training despite the fact that he was certified for Cat IIIa approaches,
- failure of the crew to comply with the standard operating procedures for a missed approach,
- wrong actions on part of the pilot in command while crossing the runway threshold at a height of 125 feet and about five seconds after the initiation of the TOGA procedure, disrupting the go around trajectory and causing the aircraft to continue the descent,
- lack of reaction of the copilot who did not try to correct the wrong actions of the pilot in command,
- lack of concentration on part of the crew who failed to control the approach speed and failed to recognize the pitch angle that was increasing,
- it is possible that the crew suffered somatogravic illusions caused by fatigue due to a duty time period above 13 hours,
- a non proactive reaction of the crew when the GPWS alarm sounded.
Final Report:

Crash of a PZL-Mielec AN-2SX in Jyl-Kol: 3 killed

Date & Time: May 24, 2013 at 1002 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
EX-02015
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Tash Kumyr - Tash Kumyr
MSN:
1G153-56
YOM:
1974
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Captain / Total flying hours:
9818
Captain / Total hours on type:
6518.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
4334
Copilot / Total hours on type:
2401
Aircraft flight hours:
10995
Aircraft flight cycles:
34201
Circumstances:
The crew was engaged in a fumigation mission against locusts over plantation located near Jyl-Kol, in the Jalal-Abad Province. While flying at a height of about 15 metres, the aircraft hit power cables and crashed, bursting into flames. All three occupants were killed and aircraft was destroyed by post crash fire.
Probable cause:
In violation of Section 5.1.15 of the Guidelines for Aviation Chemical Works (ACW), the Aircrew Commander (AC) decided to combine the production flight with followed inspection of the new site, taking a representative of the Customer on board. In violation of Section 5, PPLS, the passenger was seating in the co-pilot seat and this is prohibited. Before making a decision to operate a flight, the Aircrew Commander received an indicative weather forecast from the hydro meteorology experts of Osh International Airport. The revised weather forecast was not drawn up and the crew did not receive it because the flight control officer did not send an actual weather data provided by the crew after take-off, in accordance with the requirements of paragraph 8.7.7, APKR-3 . The technology of air traffic controllers’ work at Osh International Airport does not include responsibility for the transfer of information about the actual weather obtained from the crews to base aerodrome meteorological office responsible for forecasting weather and it does not specifically define the actions of air traffic services in obtaining information about an aviation accident. No changes were made in the temperature regime when performing aviation chemical works in accordance with the Guidelines for the Implementation of ACW technology in Agriculture and Forestry” designed by the Civil Aviation Ministry, USSR, and issued on December 30, 1980, Number 668/Y (these instructions were entered into operation by the order of the Director of the Civil Aviation Department under the Kyrgyz Ministry of Transport and Communications on March 20, 2009, number 188/p in the “List of Legislative Acts Regulating the Civil Aviation Activities of the Kyrgyz Republic”). Portable emergency radio beacon, PARM -406, did not function at the time of the accident. The Statute of Aeronautical Search and Rescue Service of the Kyrgyz Republic has no changes related to its reorganization in 2007.
Final Report:

Crash of a Boeing KC-135R Stratotanker near Chaldovar: 3 killed

Date & Time: May 3, 2013 at 1448 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
63-8877
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Bishkek - Bishkek
MSN:
18725/708
YOM:
1964
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Circumstances:
On 3 May 2013, at approximately 1448 hours local time (L), a KC-135R, tail number 63-8877, assigned to the 22d Expeditionary Air Refueling Squadron, 376th Air Expeditionary Wing, Transit Center at Manas, Kyrgyz Republic, crashed in the foothills of mountains located 6 miles south of Chaldovar, Kyrgyz Republic. The mishap crew (MC), which consisted of the mishap pilot (MP), mishap co-pilot (MCP), and mishap boom operator (MBO), perished during the accident. The mishap aircraft (MA) exploded inflight, impacted the terrain at three main locations, and burned. The MA was completely destroyed with total loss to government property estimated at $66.3 million. Upon impact, approximately 228 cubic meters of soil were contaminated with jet fuel, and three distinct craters containing a burn pattern were created. The MA’s mission was to refuel coalition aircraft in Afghanistan and then return to the Transit Center at Manas. Immediately after takeoff, the MA experienced an unexpected rapid heading change from the direction of flight known as a crab. During climb, nearly continuous rudder hunting caused the MA’s nose to hunt slowly left and right about one degree in both directions. The MP commented on the lateral control challenges and possible series yaw damper (SYD) malfunction but continued the mission without turning off either the SYD or rudder power. Approximately nine minutes into the flight, the MA began a series of increasing yaw and roll oscillations known as a dutch roll, which was undiagnosed by the MC. The MCP attempted to decrease these oscillations using manual aileron controls, as well as two brief attempts with the autopilot. The manual corrective inputs kept the oscillations from growing. The autopilot use further exacerbated the situation, and the oscillations intensified. After the second autopilot use, the MP assumed control of the MA and used left rudder to start a left turn. A subsequent series of alternating small rudder inputs, caused by the MA’s dutch roll-induced acceleration forces varying the MP’s foot pressure on the rudder pedals, sharply increased the dutch roll oscillations. Within 30 seconds, the MP made a right rudder input to roll out of the turn, exacerbating the dutch roll condition. The cumulative effects of the malfunctioning SYD, coupled with autopilot use and rudder movements during the unrecognized dutch roll, generated dutch roll forces that exceeded the MA’s design structural limits. The tail section failed and separated from the aircraft, causing the MA to pitch down sharply, enter into a high-speed dive, explode inflight and subsequently impact the ground at approximately 1448L.
Crew:
Cpt Victoria Ann Pinckney,
Cpt Mark Tyler Voss,
T/Sgt Herman Mackey III.
Probable cause:
The board president found, by clear and convincing evidence, the cause of the mishap was the MA’s tail section separating due to structural overstress as a result of the MC’s failure to turn off either the SYD (Series Yaw Damper) or the rudder power and oscillating dutch roll-induced acceleration forces translating through the MP’s feet as the MP used rudder during the unrecognized dutch roll condition. Additionally, the board president found, by a preponderance of evidence, that the dutch roll was instigated by the MA’s malfunctioning Flight Control Augmentation System that caused directional instability or rudder hunting which substantially contributed to this mishap. Other substantially contributing factors include insufficient organizational training programs, crew composition, and cumbersome procedural guidance.
Final Report:

Crash of a Tupolev TU-134A-3 in Osh

Date & Time: Dec 28, 2011 at 1246 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
EX-020
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Bichkek - Osh
MSN:
61042
YOM:
1979
Flight number:
QH003
Location:
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
82
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Aircraft flight hours:
41313
Aircraft flight cycles:
25326
Circumstances:
Following an uneventful flight from Bishkek, the crew started the descent to Osh Airport. The approach was completed in reduced visibility due to foggy conditions. Not properly aligned with runway 12, the aircraft landed hard. It did not bounce but lost its right main gear due to excessive aerodynamic forces (2,5 g). Out of control, the aircraft veered off runway and came to rest upside down, bursting into flames. The aircraft was partially destroyed by fire. All 88 occupants were evacuated, among them 31 were injured, some seriously. At the time of the accident, the visibility was reduced to 300 metres horizontal and 200 metres vertical. RVR for runway 12 was 550 metres.
Probable cause:
On Apr 22nd 2013 a letter of Kyrgyzstan's Transport Prosecutor to Kyrgyzstan's Parliament of April 2012 became known indicating that the airport had been approved to operate in Category I weather minima without being properly equipped and should never have been approved to operate in these conditions, as a result of the investigation the aerodrome has been limited to operate according to visual flight rules only. The aircraft was not properly equipped to conduct the flight lacking a GPWS as well as passenger oxygen, the crew was not qualified to conduct the flight and the oversight by the airline's dispatch and chief pilot was insufficient, the Transport Prosecutor mentioned that the responsibles to oversee flight operation could not answer even the most basic questions. Kyrgyzstan's Civil Aviation Authority failed to oversee the operation of the airline as well. While on approach to Osh the crew was informed about weather conditions permitting an approach, the data transmitted however were incorrect and the actual weather did not even permit an approach. Instead of being established on the approach 10.5km/5.6nm before touchdown the aircraft was established on the extended centerline only about 4.02km/2.17nm before touchdown, however was above the glidepath. A steep dive to reach the runway resulted in a touch down at a high rate of descent and vertical forces beyond the design limit of the aircraft (more than 2.5G), as result of the high impact forces the aircraft did not even bounce but just started to disintegrate, reaching 58 degrees of right roll 270 meters past the runway threshold, between 270 and 550 meters past the threshold the tail fin separated, the aircraft was completely upside down 600 meters past the threshold and came to a stop about 1000 meters past the threshold of the runway. The main door was jammed, the occupants escaped through other doors and the overwing exits. No serious injury occurred, 6 people needed hospital treatment with minor injuries.

Crash of a PZL-Mielec AN-2R in Kadamdzhayskom

Date & Time: Jun 9, 2009 at 1300 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
EX-156
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
MSN:
1G183-50
YOM:
1979
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The crew was completing a crop-spraying mission in Kadamdzhayskom when the engine failed in flight. The aircraft crashed in an open field and both pilots were injured.
Probable cause:
Engine failure for unknown reasons.

Crash of a PZL-Mielec AN-2SX in Bishkek

Date & Time: Feb 22, 2009 at 1249 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
EX-68039
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Bishkek - Bukhara
MSN:
1G193-11
YOM:
1981
Flight number:
GRA4571
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
8215
Captain / Total hours on type:
7362.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
7613
Copilot / Total hours on type:
4985
Aircraft flight hours:
6132
Circumstances:
The single engine aircraft departed from a small airstrip in Bishkek on a charter service (flight GRA4571) to Bukhara with two passengers and two pilots on board. About a minute after takeoff, while in initial climb, the engine lost power. The crew informed ATC about the situation and was cleared for an immediate return. Shortly later, the engine failed and the crew attempted an emergency landing in an open field located near the aerodrome. Upon landing, the aircraft collided with a small drainage ditch, lost its left main gear and both left wings before coming to rest. All four occupants escaped with minor injuries and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
The reason for the loss of engine power in flight, most likely, was a reduction in the filing of the gasoline due to clogging of fuel filters. The appearance, structure and nature of the impurities found in the fuel on the aircraft were not characteristic of impurities accumulated in the fuel supply system in normal operating conditions. The source of the impurities in aircraft fuel system could not be found.
Final Report:

Crash of a Boeing 737-219 in Bishkek: 65 killed

Date & Time: Aug 24, 2008 at 2044 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
EX-009
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Bichkek - Tehran
MSN:
22088/676
YOM:
1980
Flight number:
IRC6895
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
85
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
65
Captain / Total flying hours:
18250
Captain / Total hours on type:
2337.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
4531
Copilot / Total hours on type:
881
Aircraft flight hours:
60014
Aircraft flight cycles:
56196
Circumstances:
On 24 August, 2008 the Boeing 737-200 aircraft registered ЕХ-009 and operated by a crew including a PIC and a Co-pilot of Itek Air was flying a scheduled passenger flight IRC 6895 from Bishkek to Tehran. Also on board there was the cabin crew (3 persons) as well as 85 passengers including two service passengers: a maintenance engineer and a representative of the Iran Aseman Airlines. Flight IRC 6895 was executed in compliance with the leasing agreement No. 023/05 of 15 July, 2005 for the Boeing 737-200 ЕХ-009 between the Kyrgyz airline, Itek Air, and the Iran Aseman Airlines. The crew passed a medical examination in the ground medical office of Manas Airport. The crew did not have any complaints of their health. The crew received a complete preflight briefing. The weather at the departure airport Manas, the destination airport and at alternate aerodromes was favourable for the flight. Total fuel was 12000 kg, the takeoff weight was 48371 kg with the CG at 24,8% MAC, which was within the B737-200 AFM limitations. After the climb to approximately 3000 m the crew informed the ATC about a pressurization system fault and decided to return to the aerodrome of departure. While they were descending for visual approach the aircraft collided with the ground, was damaged on impact and burnt. As a result of the crash and the following ground fire 64 passengers died. The passenger who was transferred on 29 August, 2008 to the burn resuscitation department of the Moscow Sklifasovsky Research Institute died of burn disease complicated by pneumonia on 23 October, 2008, two months after he got burn injuries. Thus, his death is connected with the injuries received due to the accident.
Probable cause:
The cause of the Itek Air B737-200 ЕХ-009 accident during the air-turn back due to the cabin not pressurizing (probably caused by the jamming of the left forward door seal) was that the crew allowed the aircraft to descend at night to a lower than the minimum descent altitude for visual approach which resulted in the crash with damage to the aircraft followed by the fire and fatalities. The combination of the following factors contributed to the accident:
- Deviations from the Boeing 737-200 SOP and PF/PM task sharing principles;
- Non-adherence to visual approach rules, as the crew did not keep visual contact with the runway and/or ground references and did not follow the prescribed procedures after they lost visual contact;
- Loss of altitude control during the missed approach (which was performed because the PIC incorrectly evaluated the aircraft position in comparison with the required descent flight path when he decided to perform visual straight-in approach);
- Non-adherence to the prescribed procedures after the TAWS warning was triggered.
Final Report:

Crash of a PZL-Mielec AN-2 in Dostuk

Date & Time: Aug 26, 2007 at 1100 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
EX-70292
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
MSN:
1G139-51
YOM:
1973
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
En route from Mramornoye, the crew encountered technical problems and was forced to attempt an emergency landing. The aircraft crash landed near Dostuk and came to rest, bursting into flames. All four occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was destroyed. The crew was supposed to complete a crop spraying flight while the real mission was illegal.

Crash of a Yakovlev Yak-40 near Naryn

Date & Time: Jun 23, 2007 at 1114 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
EX-901
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Site:
Schedule:
Bishkek – Issyk Kul – Naryn
MSN:
9411030A
YOM:
1974
Flight number:
KR4452
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
9
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The crew departed Bishkek on a special flight to Issyk Kul and Naryn to proceed with the calibration of the ILS systems. About 30 minutes into the flight from Issyk Kul to Naryn, the right engine started to vibrate while the left engine temperature increased. After the right engine was shut down, the captain asked the flight engineer to reduce the power on the left engine by 80%. While flying in the Karakuzhur Valley and unable to maintain a safe altitude, the pilot remembered he was using in the past an old dirt strip for agricultural operations as he was flying Antonov AN-2. He attempted to land on this airstrip located at an altitude of 2,700 metres. Upon landing, the aircraft collided with rocks (larger than 40 cm) and drainage ditches and came to rest, bursting into flames. All 14 occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was destroyed.