Crash of an Antonov AN-32 in Jorhat

Date & Time: Dec 15, 2011
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
K2721
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
MSN:
06 06
YOM:
1985
Location:
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
0
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The twin engine aircraft suffered an accident upon landing at Jorhat-Rowriah Airport, Assam. There were no casualties but the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. The exact circumstances of the mishap remain unknown.

Crash of a Pilatus PC-12/45 in Faridabad: 10 killed

Date & Time: May 25, 2011 at 2243 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
VT-ACF
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Patna - New Delhi
MSN:
632
YOM:
2005
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
5
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
10
Captain / Total flying hours:
1521
Captain / Total hours on type:
1300.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
300
Copilot / Total hours on type:
70
Aircraft flight hours:
1483
Circumstances:
M/s Air Charter Services Pvt Ltd. offered their aircraft VT-ACF for operating medical evacuation flight to pick one critically ill patient from Patna on 25/05/2011. The Aircraft took off from Delhi to Patna with two crew members, two doctors and one male nurse. The Flight to Patna was uneventful. The Air Ambulance along with patient and one attendant took off from Patna at 20:31:58 IST, the aircraft during arrival to land at Delhi crashed near Faridabad on a Radial of 145 degree and distance of 15.2 nm at 22:42:32 IST. Aircraft reached Patna at 18:31 IST. Flight Plan for the flight from Patna to Delhi was filed with the ATC at Patna via W45-LLK-R594 at FL260, planned ETD being 22:00 hours IST and EET of 2hours for a planned ETA at VIDP being 24:00 hours IST. The crew took self-briefing of the weather and same “Self Briefing” was recorded on the flight plan submitted at ATC Patna. The passenger manifest submitted at Patna indicated a total of 2 crew and 5 passengers inclusive of the patient. Weather at Patna at the time of departure was 3000m visibility with Haze. Total fuel on board for departure at Delhi was 1516 lts. The preflight/transit inspection of the aircraft at Patna was carried out by the crew as per laid down guidelines. The crew requested for startup at 20:21 IST from Patna ATC and reported airborne at 20:33:43 IST. The aircraft climbed and maintained FL 260 for cruise. On handover from Varanasi Area Control (Radar), the aircraft came in contact with Delhi Area Control (East) Radar at 21:53:40 IST at 120.9 MHz. At 21:53:40 IST aircraft was identified on Radar by squawking code 3313. At 22:02:05 IST the crew requested for left deviation of 10° due to weather, the same was approved by the RSR controller. At 22:05:04 IST the crew informed that they have a critical patient on board and requested for priority landing and ambulance on arrival. The same was approved by the RSR controller. The aircraft was handed over to Approach Control on 126.35 MHz at 22:28:03 IST. At 22:28:18 IST VT-ACF contacted TAR (Terminal Approach Radar) on 126.35 MHz and it was maintaining FL160. At 22:32:22 IST, VT-ACF was asked to continue heading to DPN (VOR) and was cleared to descend to FL110. At 22:36:34 IST, the TAR controller informed VT-ACF about weather on HDG 330°, the crew replied in “Affirmative” and requested for left heading. At 22:38:12 IST, TAR controller gave aircraft left heading 285° which was copied by the aircraft. The aircraft started turning left, passing heading 289, it climbed from FL125 to FL141. At 22:40:32 IST the TAR controller gave 3 calls to VT-ACF. At 22:40:43 IST aircraft transmitted a feeble call “Into bad weather”, at that instance the aircraft had climbed FL 146.Thereafter the aircraft was seen turning right in a very tight turn at a low radar ground speed and loosing height rapidly from FL146 to FL 016. Again at 22:41:32 IST TAR controller gave call to VT-ACF, aircraft transmitted a feeble call “Into bad weather. Thereafter the controller gave repeated calls on both 126.35 MHz and also 121.5 MHz, before the blip on radar became static on a radial of 145 degree at 15.2 nm from DPN VOR at 22:42:32 IST. All attempts to raise contact with the aircraft failed. The TAR controller then informed the duty WSO and also the ATC Tower. At 22:50:00 IST, the tower informed the WSO that they have got a call from the City Fire Brigade confirming that an aircraft has crashed near Faridabad in a congested residential area known as Parvatia Colony. After the accident, local residents of the area and police tried to put off the fire and extricate the bodies from the wreckage of the aircraft.
Probable cause:
The probable cause of the accident could be attributed to departure of the aircraft from controlled flight due to an external weather related phenomenon, mishandling of controls, spatial disorientation or a combination of the three.
Final Report:

Crash of a Boeing 737-800 in Mangalore: 158 killed

Date & Time: May 22, 2010 at 0605 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
VT-AXV
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Dubai - Mangalore
MSN:
36333/2481
YOM:
2007
Flight number:
IX812
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
160
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
158
Captain / Total flying hours:
10215
Captain / Total hours on type:
2844.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
3620
Copilot / Total hours on type:
3319
Aircraft flight hours:
7199
Aircraft flight cycles:
2833
Circumstances:
Air India Express flight IX-811/812 is a daily round trip between Mangalore and Dubai. The outbound flight IX-811 was uneventful and landed at Dubai at 23:44 hours Local Time. The airplane was serviced and refuelled. The same flight crew operated the return leg, flight IX-812. The airplane taxied out for departure at 01:06 LT (02:36 IST). The takeoff, climb and cruise were uneventful. There was no conversation between the two pilots for about 1 hour and 40 minutes because the captain was asleep. The First Officer was making all the radio calls. The aircraft reported position at IGAMA at 05:33 hours IST and the First Officer was told to expect an ILS DME Arc approach to Mangalore. At about 130 miles from Mangalore, the First Officer requested descent clearance. This was, however, denied by the ATC Controller, who was using standard procedural control, to ensure safe separation with other air traffic. At 05:46 IST, the flight reported its position when it was at 80 DME as instructed by Mangalore Area Control. The aircraft was cleared to 7000 ft and commenced descent at 77 DME from Mangalore at 05:47 IST. The visibility reported was 6 km. Mangalore airport has a table top runway. As the AIP India states "Aerodrome located on hilltop. Valleys 200ft to 250ft immediately beyond paved surface of Runway." Owing to the surrounding terrain, Air India Express had made a special qualification requirement that only the PIC shall carry out the take off and landing. The captain on the accident flight had made a total of 16 landings in the past at this airport and the First Officer had operated as a Co-pilot on 66 flights at this airport. While the aircraft had commenced descent, there was no recorded conversation regarding the mandatory preparation for descent and landing briefing as stipulated in the SOP. After the aircraft was at about 50 miles and descending out of FL295, the conversation between the two pilots indicated that an incomplete approach briefing had been carried out. At about 25 nm from DME and descending through FL184, the Mangalore Area Controller cleared the aircraft to continue descent to 2900 ft. At this stage, the First Officer requested, if they could proceed directly to Radial 338 and join the 10 DME Arc. Throughout the descent profile and DME Arc Approach for ILS 24, the aircraft was much higher than normally expected altitudes. The aircraft was handed over by the Mangalore Area Controller to ATC Tower at 05:52 IST. The Tower controller, thereafter, asked the aircraft to report having established on 10 DME Arc for ILS Runway 24. Considering that this flight was operating in WOCL (Window Of Circadian Low), by this time the First Officer had also shown signs of tiredness. This was indicated by the sounds of yawning heard on the CVR. On having reported 10 DME Arc, the ATC Tower had asked aircraft to report when established on ILS. It appears that the captain had realized that the aircraft altitude was higher than normal and had selected Landing Gear 'DOWN' at an altitude of approximately 8,500 ft with speed brakes still deployed in Flight Detent position, so as to increase the rate of descent. As indicated by the DFDR, the aircraft continued to be high and did not follow the standard procedure of intercepting the ILS Glide Path at the correct intercept altitude. This incorrect procedure led to the aircraft being at almost twice the altitude as compared to a Standard ILS Approach. During approach, the CVR indicated that the captain had selected Flaps 40 degrees and completed the Landing Check List. At 06:03 hours IST at about 2.5 DME, the Radio Altimeter had alerted an altitude of 2500 ft. This was immediately followed by the First Officer saying "It is too high" and "Runway straight down". In reply, the captain had exclaimed "Oh my god". At this moment, the captain had disconnected the Auto Pilot and simultaneously increased the rate of descent considerably to establish on the desired approach path. At this stage, the First Officer had queried "Go around?" To this query from the First Officer, the captain had called out "Wrong loc .. ... localiser .. ... glide path". The First Officer had given a second call to the captain for "Go around" followed by "Unstabilized". However, the First Officer did not appear to take any action, to initiate a Go Around. Having acquired the runway visually and to execute a landing, it appears that the captain had increased the rate of descent to almost 4000 ft per minute. Due to this, there were numerous warnings from EGPWS for 'SINK RATE' and 'PULL UP'. On their own, the pilots did not report having established on ILS Approach. Instead, the ATC Tower had queried the same. To this call, the captain had forcefully prompted the First Officer to give a call of "Affirmative". The Tower controller gave landing clearance thereafter and also indicated "Winds calm". The aircraft was high on approach and touched down on the runway, much farther than normal. The aircraft had crossed the threshold at about 200 ft altitude with indicated speed in excess of 160 kt, as compared to 50 ft with target speed of 144 kt for the landing weight. Despite the EGPWS warnings and calls from the First Officer to go around, the captain had persisted with the approach in unstabilized conditions. Short of touchdown, there was yet another (Third) call from the First Officer, "Go around captain...We don't have runway left". However, the captain had continued with the landing and the final touchdown was about 5200 ft from the threshold of runway 24, leaving approximately 2800 ft of remaining paved surface. The captain had selected Thrust Reversers soon after touchdown. Within 6 seconds of applying brakes, the captain had initiated a 'Go Around', in contravention of Boeing SOP. The aircraft overshot the runway including the strip of 60 metres. After overshooting the runway and strip, the aircraft continued into the Runway End Safety Area (RESA) of 90 metres. Soon after which the right wing impacted the localiser antenna structure located further at 85 metres from the end of RESA. Thereafter, the aircraft hit the boundary fence and fell into a gorge.
Probable cause:
The Court of Inquiry determines that the cause of this accident was Captain's failure to discontinue the unstabilized approach and his persistence in continuing with the landing, despite three calls from the First Officer to go around and a number of warnings from the EGPWS.
Contributing Factors were:
1. In spite of availability of adequate rest period prior to the flight, the Captain was in prolonged sleep during flight, which could have led to sleep inertia. As a result of relatively short period of time between his awakening and the approach, it possibly led to impaired judgment. This aspect might have got accentuated while flying in the Window of Circadian Low (WOCL).
2. In the absence of Mangalore Area Control Radar (MSSR), due to unserviceability, the aircraft was given descent at a shorter distance on DME as compared to the normal. However, the flight crew did not plan the descent profile properly, resulting in remaining high on approach.
3. Probably in view of ambiguity in various instructions empowering the 'copilot' to initiate a 'go around ', the First Officer gave repeated calls to this effect, but did not take over the controls to actually discontinue the ill-fated approach.
Final Report:

Crash of an ATR72-212 in Mumbai

Date & Time: Nov 10, 2009 at 1640 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
VT-KAC
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Bhavnagar - Mumbai
MSN:
729
YOM:
2006
Flight number:
IT4124
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
38
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
7160
Captain / Total hours on type:
2241.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
973
Copilot / Total hours on type:
613
Aircraft flight hours:
9318
Circumstances:
As per the NOTAM, Runway 14/32 was under permanent maintenance on every Tuesdays since 10/11/2009 runway 27 was available only after runway intersection as runway 27A. To carry out operations on this reduced runway 27 a NOTAM ‘G’ No. G 0128/08 was issued by AAI on the same day of accident i.e. 10-11-2009 and designated as runway 27A for visual approach only. As per the NOTAM Landing Distance Available (LDA)/take off Distance available (TODA) was 1703 m. The weather conditions prevailing at the time of accident was winds 070/07 knots visibility 2800 m with feeble rain. Prior to Kingfisher aircraft, Air India aircraft IC-164, Airbus 319 had landed and reported to ATC that it had aquaplaned and broken two runway edge lights. The ATC acknowledged it and sent runway inspection vehicle to inspect the runway. The ATC person was not familiar with the terminology of ‘aquaplaning’ and not realizing the seriousness of it, cleared kingfisher aircraft for landing. At the time of accident there were water patches on the runway. ATC also did not transmit to the Kingfisher aircraft the information regarding aquaplaning reported by the previous aircraft. The DFDR readout revealed that kingfisher aircraft was not on profile as per localizer procedure laid down in NOTAM ‘G’ and was high and fast. The aircraft landed late on the runway and the runway length available was around 1000 m from the touchdown point. In the prevailing weather conditions this runway length was just sufficient to stop the aircraft on the runway. During landing the kingfisher aircraft aquaplaned and did not decelerate even though reversers and full manual braking was applied by both the cockpit crew. The aircraft started skidding toward the left of center line. On nearing the runway end, the pilot initiated a 45 ° right turn, after crossing ‘N 10’ Taxi track, the aircraft rolled into unpaved wet area. Aircraft rolled over drainage pipes & finally came to a stop near open drain. There was no fire. All the passenger safely deplaned after the accident.
Probable cause:
The accident occurred due to an unstabilized approach and decision of crew not to carry out a ‘Go-around’.
Contributory Factors:
i) Water patches on the runway 27
ii) Inability of the ATCO to communicate the aircraft about aquaplaning of the previous aircraft
iii) Lack of input from the copilot.
Final Report:

Crash of an Antonov AN-32 in Tato: 13 killed

Date & Time: Jun 8, 2009 at 1405 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
K3062
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Mechuka – Dibrugarh
MSN:
22 03
YOM:
1990
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
7
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
6
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
13
Circumstances:
Following a supply mission, the aircraft departed Kargong-Mechuka Airport (Mechuka Advanced Landing Ground) at 1400LT on a flight to Dibrugarh-Mohanbari Airport. Shortly after takeoff, while flying an altitude of 12,000 feet, the aircraft struck the slope of Mt Rinchi located near the village of Tato. The wreckage was found a day later about 25 km southeast of Mechuka. The aircraft was destroyed and all 13 occupants were killed.

Crash of a NAL Saras near Bangalore: 3 killed

Date & Time: Mar 6, 2009 at 1534 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
VT-XRM
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Bangalore - Bangalore
MSN:
SP002
YOM:
2007
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Captain / Total flying hours:
2414
Captain / Total hours on type:
310.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
2080
Copilot / Total hours on type:
315
Aircraft flight hours:
50
Aircraft flight cycles:
49
Circumstances:
On 06.3.2009 Saras Prototype PT2 aircraft VT-XRM manufactured and owned by National Aerospace Laboratories, Bangalore was scheduled for carrying out its test flight n°49. Test flight programme includes general a ir tests/handling checks to ascertain the aircraft flying characteristics after the 50 hrs Scheduled servicing, dummy approach in simulated single engine configuration at 5000' AMSL, go around at 300' AGL in a simulated one engine inoperative condition, landing in a simulated one engine inoperative condition and to carry out in-flight engine shut down and relight procedure at 10000' AMSL within 130 - 150 kts speed. Tests are to be carried out as per existing SOP and test procedures and limitations and pre flight test briefing meeting. Aircraft was cleared by approved inspectors of NAL after carrying out daily inspection on 6.3.2009 for test flight n°49 and was duly accepted by the Chief test pilot. Preflight briefing was taken by the Wg Cdr (22917-S), F(P), chief test pilot was on commander seat , Wg Cdr (23165-H), F(P) - test pilot was on co-pilot seat and Sqn Ldr (24746-M), AE(M) was on Flight test engineer on board. The test team also accepted flight test schedule of flight n°49. Total duration of the tests was estimated to about 45 minutes. Engines were started at 0913 UTC at ASTE, dispersal area . All engine parameters were reported normal. After carrying out post startup and pre taxi checks, aircraft taxied out for Runway 09 at HAL airport. As pe r departure instructions after departure R/W 09 aircraft to climb on R/W heading 5000’, turn right set course to southwest -2 and in coordination with approach radar to operate upto 10 miles and level 100. Aircraft was cleared for takeoff from R/W 09 with surface wind 090º/06kts. Aircraft took-off at 0925 UTC and changed over to radar at 0926 UTC. There was no event. Aircraft was then cleared to level 100, operating up to 10 miles. After completing general handling checks at 9000’ AMSL without any events, Aircraft was stabilized with simulated single engine approach to the landing r/w 09. Single engine simulated approach was carried out. At about 0941 UTC aircraft was cleared for overshoot, wind 090/06 kts. Aircraft made overshoot at 300’ AGL. Aircraft was then changed over to radar again. At 0942 UTC aircraft was cleared to climb level 100 and proceed sector southwest 2. Aircraft right engine was throttled up to match left engine and aircraft climbed out to 9000’ AMSL in sector southwest. At about 0948 UTC aircraft reported 15 miles and FL90 and reported turning around. But HAL radar as well as BIAL radar showing level was 72 for which aircraft replied that it has descended and climbing back to 9000’ AMSL. At about 0955 UTC aircraft reported “OPS NORMAL” at 20 Nm in sector southwest 2. This was the last contact by aircraft with radar. After 0955 UTC Radar contact with the aircraft was completely lost. As per ASTE Telemetry, after turned round to point towards HAL airfield aircraft was observed about 20 miles at 9000’ AMSL with 140 kts speed. Telemetry link was good at this position Left engine was then shut down and secured following the test procedure at about 10:00:40 UTC. Pilot was in touch with Flight test director on R/T at telemetry desk. After about 47 secs, left engine relight procedure was initiated at around 9200’ AMSL. Pilot also reported to Telemetry the start of relight of the engine. Telemetry indications also showed the rise in Ng and ITT. At about 100 secs prior to crash aircraft went into sudden dive from 9200’ to 7300’ for about 13 secs. Meanwhile During the relighting of left engine, FTD desk also lost RT contact with aircraft about 37 secs prior to crash and telemetry link with the aircraft was also intermittent. At 37 secs prior to crash when Telemetry called aircraft “ can you call up. What is going on”, aircraft replied “Standby” this was the last contact of Telemetry with aircraft. After that there was no contact from the pilot. Just before 7 secs of crash when the telemetry data signal was restored aircraft already lost to the height of 4260’ AMSL(1900’AGL) and in continuous loss of height and Ng was about 31%. There was no response from pilots even after repeated calls from FTD desk. Aircraft was rapidly losing the height without any control. Cockpit voice recording clearly showed that on last moments just 10 secs prior to crash ,commander called out “ Aircraft has departed” indicating aircraft completely gone out of control. During the last moment of crash telemetry recorded Ng : about 54% (63% as per FDR), Engine oil pressure 88, fuel flow 94%,ITT 647 deg C, indicating engine relight was successful. But by the time aircraft was almost on ground. Aircraft crashed at about 1004 UTC (10:03:44). All possible communication means including through en -route traffic to contact the aircraft went in vain. Search operation by ALH helicopter (A67) ,Chetak(T45) and T55 was effected. At about 1033 UTC police control room reported that an aircraft had crashed near Bidadi. After extensive search efforts, at about 1100 UTC, A67 found out the crash site having bearing 251° and 17 Nm from HAL airport. Later it was affirmed that the aircraft crashed at a village called Sehsagirihalli (close to wonderland amusement park) near Bidadi and 37 km by road(off Mysore road) Southwest of HAL airport, Bangalore. The crash site was a wide -open residential plot area of uneven hard terrain surrounded by poles and wild plants. It was on a radial of 251° /17 NM from HAL, Bangalore airport having coordinates LAT : N12° 50’56”, LONG: E077° 23’46”). All the three persons on board were charred to death and were on their seats. There was post impact fire. Aircraft fuselage was broken from rear of the main plane and found in an inverted position. The vertical fin leading edge was facing the ground and the respective tail mounted engines by the side of it. The nose portion of the aircraft was facing East direction. Aircraft was completely destroyed due impact and fire.
Probable cause:
Incorrect relight procedure devised by the designer and adopted by the crew at insufficient height leading to rapid loss of altitude and abnormal behavior of aircraft resulted into accident.
Contributory factors:
a) Lack of crew coordination and cockpit procedures,
b) Handling of the controls,
c) Non-aborting of flight by the crew in coordination with the flight test Director after failure of first relight attempt,
d) Devising engine relight procedures by NAL without consulting the propeller manufacturer.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft C90 King Air in Chandigarh: 2 killed

Date & Time: Oct 29, 2008 at 1125 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
VT-EHY
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Chandigarh - Ludhiana
MSN:
LJ-1008
YOM:
1982
Location:
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
3152
Captain / Total hours on type:
9.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
664
Copilot / Total hours on type:
13
Aircraft flight hours:
6530
Circumstances:
On 29.10.2008 Punjab Government King Air C90 aircraft, VT-EHY met with an accident while operating flight from Chandigarh to Ludhiana. This accident was notified to DGCA by ATC at Ludhiana and Punjab Government officials shortly after the occurrence. The accident occurred when the aircraft was in the process of making second attempt for landing at Ludhiana Airport. The accident was investigated by Inspector of Accident under Rule 71 of Aircraft Rules, 1937. As per the obligations under ICAO Annex 13, notification was sent to USA, the country of aircraft manufacture, Canada, the country of engine manufacture and ICAO. Transport Safety Board Canada appointed an accredited representative and authorized engine manufacturer M/s P&W to associate with investigation of engines. Low visibility conditions were prevailing at Ludhiana at the time of accident. Due to which the crew located the runway late. They were estimating their position based on GPS. Though they did spot the runway at some stage of the approach, they lost sight of it again and were unable to locate it subsequently. They carried out orbits on the right side (East Side) of R/w 12 in an effort to visually locate the runway and then followed non standard procedure to land. Not comfortable with the approach, the crew decided to go around. Due to low visibility and that they probably did not want to lose the sight of the airfield, carried out non-standard go around. In their anxiety not to lose the sight of the field they descended in three orbits in the vicinity of the airfield on the west side of R/w 12, perhaps to land after making the short circuit from the right. However, due to smoke in the cockpit, severe disorientation, lack of qualification & experience on type of aircraft and on sighting the communication tower, the panic gripped the crew. In their anxiety, the control was lost and aircraft impacted the ground in the steep left bank. Aircraft was destroyed in the crash due to impact and post impact fire. Both the occupant on board died due to fire and collapsing aircraft structure.
Probable cause:
The accident occurred due to loss of control while in base leg for landing at R/W 12 after executing go around on R/W 12.
Contributory Factors:
1) Low visibility reduced the margin of safety, may have caused severe disorientation, influenced their decision and played on crew for use of non standard procedures.
2) Both the crew lacked qualification/experience and familiarity with the type of aircraft and terrain.
3) Smoke in the cockpit further reduced the margin of safety and distracted the attention of the crew.
4) Obstruction in the flight path made the crew to take severe action and led to loss of control.
5) Lack of operational control and supervision by the organisation.
Final Report:

Crash of a Raytheon Premier in Udaipur

Date & Time: Mar 19, 2008 at 1507 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
VT-RAL
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Jodhpur - Udaipur
MSN:
RB-23
YOM:
2001
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
5
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
2900
Captain / Total hours on type:
40.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
896
Copilot / Total hours on type:
58
Aircraft flight hours:
989
Aircraft flight cycles:
812
Circumstances:
The aircraft, after necessary met and ATC briefing took off at 0940 UTC from Jodhpur on direct route W58 at cruise FL 100 and sector EET 20 minutes as per Flight Plan. No abnormality was reported / recorded by the pilot during take off from Jodhpur. The crewmember of the aircraft while operating Jodhpur–Udaipur were the same who operated flight Delhi-Jodhpur on 18.3.2008. There were five passengers also on board the aircraft. The aircraft climbed to the assigned level where the pilot was experiencing continuous turbulence at FL100. The pilot communicated the same to the ATC Jodhpur and requested for higher level which was not granted and advised to continue at same level and contact ATC Udaipur for level change. It came in contact with Udaipur at 0944 UTC, approx 50 NM from Udaipur. At 0948 the weather passed by ATC was winds 180/07 kts. Vis 6 km. Temp 34, QNH 1006 Hpa and advised for ILS approach on runway 26. Consequently the pilot requested to make right base Rwy 26 visual approach, which was approved by the ATC. Aircraft did not report any defect/snag. Pilot further stated that during approach to land at Udaipur when flap 10 degree was selected, the flap didn’t respond and ‘Flaps-Fail’ message flashed. Thereafter he carried out the check list for flapless landing. At 1004 UTC when the aircraft reported on final the ATC cleared the aircraft to land on runway 26 with prevailing wind 230/10 Kts. The same was acknowledged by the crew and initiated landing. At about 20 to 30 feet above ground the pilot stated to have experienced sudden down-draft thereby the aircraft touched down heavily on the runway. The touch-down was on the centerline, at just before the touchdown Zone (TDZ), on the paved runway, after the threshold point. Consequent to the heavy impact both the main wheel tyre got burst; first to burst was right tyre. The aircraft rolled on the runway centerline for a length of about 1,000 feet in the same condition. Thereafter it gradually veered to the right of the runway 26 at distance of approx 2,200 feet runway length from the threshold of the runway. The aircraft left the runway shoulder and after rolling almost straight for another 90 ft it stopped after impact with the airport boundary wall.
Probable cause:
The approach speed for flapless landing was about 149 knots against the calculated speed 130-135 knots approx. Incident occurred as the aircraft impacted runway with higher speed while carrying out flapless approach and landing.
Final Report:

Crash of a Partenavia P.68C Victor in Bangalore: 4 killed

Date & Time: Sep 8, 2007 at 1520 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
VT-JOY
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Bangalore – Cochin
MSN:
436
YOM:
2004
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
4
Captain / Total flying hours:
3140
Circumstances:
The aircraft departed Bangalore-Hindustan Airport runway 27 at 1514LT on a flight to Cochin with 3 passengers and one pilot on board. Six minutes after takeoff, the pilot reported technical problems and elected to return for an emergency landing. However, the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in the lakebed of the Gawdanapalya Lake located about 9 km southwest of the airport. The aircraft was destroyed and all four occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
Engine power loss during initial climb after the aircraft had been refueled with Jet fuel instead of Avgas 100LL.
The following contributing factors were identified:
- The low experience of the pilot on type,
- The non-compliance of correct refueling procedure and its supervision by IOC personnel and pilot or operator's representative.
Final Report:

Crash of an ATR72-212A in Indore

Date & Time: Jul 1, 2007 at 1946 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
VT-JCE
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Bhopal - Indore
MSN:
640
YOM:
2000
Flight number:
JAI3307
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
49
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
10169
Circumstances:
The flight up-till approach to land at Indore was normal. On coming to the runway the aircraft touched down moderately hard and bounced high. The pilots were perhaps determined to salvage the abnormal situation and added power to the engines with intention to cushion the sink-rate and settle the runway. On the contrary, the aircraft came hard on the runway and bounced once again. This got followed with a series of bounces in succession. While bouncing the aircraft migrated from the runway and finally came to full halt on right side close to the airport boundary wall. There was no fire in the accident. All 53 occupants evacuated safely.
Probable cause:
The pilot-in-command in absence of bounce recovery guidance adopted self-perceived technique and kept on adding engine power along with aircraft pitch manipulations to salvage the aircraft from the bounce on landing, and gravely damaged the aircraft structure.
Final Report: