Brazil

Wrong approach configuration on part of the crew who completed an unstabilized approach and landed too far down the runway (about a half way down) at an excessive speed. In such conditions, the aircraft could not be stopped within the remaining distance. The following contributing factors were identified:
- The crew did not make any approach briefing,
- The crew failed to follow the approach checklist,
- The aircraft had deficiencies in maintenance, particularly with regard to the brakes systems,
- The techlogs were out of date,
- Maintenance was periodic but insufficient,
- Although the runway 36 was in use, the captain preferred to land on runway 18,
- The aircraft was unstable on short final and landed too far down the runway, reducing the landing distance available,
- The aircraft' speed upon landing was excessive, preventing the reverse thrust systems to be activated,
- The captain took over control and activated the reverse thrust system on the right engine only,
- Poor crew coordination,
- The crew was operating in a conflict environment after touchdown,
- Poor judgment of the situation,
- Poor flight planning,
- Lack of crew discipline.

It was determined that both engines were running normally at impact and no technical anomalies were found on the aircraft and its equipments. Both pilots were properly licenced and experienced on this type of aircraft. At the time of the accident, weather conditions were poor with CB's, rains falls, severe turbulences, strong winds and probable windshear that may have been a contributing factor.

The right engine suffered a oil leak in flight following the failure of a hose due to poor maintenance. The following contributing factors were identified:
- Both pilots did not have sufficient experience nor training on this type of aircraft,
- The copilot was flying for this operator for the first time,
- The operator was unable to provide any maintenance documentation nor crew training documentation to investigators,
- Both engines were running at impact but with limited power,
- The right propeller was feathered at impact.

Wrong approach configuration on part of the crew who continued the descent while the aircraft was unstable and moreover with a tailwind component. The aircraft landed at an excessive speed about 450 metres past the runway threshold, reducing the landing distance available. The tailwind component and the crew inexperience was contributing factors.

Poor approach configuration on part of the flying crew who continued the approach after passing the MDA at 1,150 feet while the aircraft was not stabilized and the crew did not establish a visual contact with the obstacles on short final. The following contributing factors were identified:
- Following the first impact with trees, branches and pieces of wood entered the engines, causing a loss of power followed by a loss of speed and altitude,
- Complacency on the part of the crew,
- Pressure and stress,
- Visual perception issues,
- Violation of the standard operating procedures,
- Loss of situational awareness,
- Lack of crew resources management,
- Poor approach and landing planning,
- Poor weather conditions,
- Relative low experience of the copilot.

Double engine failure caused by a fuel exhaustion. It was determined that the crew did not prepare the flight according to procedures and took off with an insufficient fuel quantity on board.

Poor approach configuration on part of the crew who landed the aircraft 750 metres past the runway threshold, reducing the landing distance available. The following contributing factors were identified:
- The crew completed an unstabilized approach,
- Poor approach planning,
- Limited visibility due to the night and poor weather conditions,
- The braking action was low because the runway surface was wet,
- The crew failed to initiate a go-around procedure.

The following findings were identified:
- The visibility was reduced by rain falls,
- The runway surface was wet,
- The braking action was poor,
- The crew landed the aircraft too far down the runway, about 400 metres past the runway threshold, reducing the landing distance available,
- The aircraft's speed at touchdown was excessive,
- The copilot was inexperienced and did not have any training of qualification on such type of aircraft,
- Lack of crew coordination,
- Poor crew resources management,
- Uncomplete approach briefing.

The following findings were identified:
- The pilots' perception about the situation was affected by lack of specific training and procedures, which, coupled with the limited time available for action and lack of clarity in communications, influenced the time elapsed for taking corrective actions.
- Communication between the crew was not clear at the time of emergency, making the co-pilot did not understand at first, the action to be performed, which increased the time spent to disarm the CB. Such facts, however, can not be separated from the situation experienced by pilots with inadequate training for emergency and in a short time to identify the problem and take the corrective actions.
- The company had not provided a regular CRM training to pilots. Furthermore, the captain did not receive simulator training for over one year. It was impossible to determine, however, if the regular training and updating of the CRM simulator training of the pilot would have prevented the accident.
- The removal of the pilot from his seat at the time of the emergency may have increased the time spent in identifying the crash and taking corrective actions, but it was not possible to establish whether the accident would be avoided if he would have been in the cockpit. The copilot was slow to understand the situation and initiate corrective actions, although the alarm 'whooler' has sounded, also increasing the elapsed time.
- The operational testing under J IC 27-32-00 allowed the partial completion of the procedures due to lack of clarity, which allowed the release of the aircraft for flight with a defective relay.
Furthermore, although the elevator trim system has been certified, no procedure for emergency triggering of the compensator in the manuals provided by the manufacturer, no replacement intervals of the components of the elevator trim system in "Time Limits" systems normal and reserves were not independent and the system had a low tolerance for errors.

The exact cause of the accident could not be determined with certainty. However, it is believed that the accident was the consequence of a controlled flight into terrain after the crew continued the approach in poor weather conditions and descended below the MDA until the aircraft, in a flaps and gear down configuration, impacted ground. The following contributing factors were identified:
- A difference of 70 feet in the settings was noted between both pilot's altimeters,
- Poor crew coordination,
- Complacency on part of the flying crew caused several deviations from procedures during the approach,
- Lack of crew resources management,
- The crew failed to check the altitude during the final stage of the approach,
- Poor weather conditions.