Nice

It was determined that at the time of the accident, the total weight of the aircraft was 5,935 kg, about 250 kg above the MTOW. It was also reported that the crew failed to prepare the flight properly and that a lack of coordination was considered as a contributing factor.

A landing gear collapsed during takeoff.

It is believed the accident was the consequence of icing conditions.

The aircraft was allowed to lose height and flying speed with the result that the pilot was no longer able to exercise asymmetric control. The conduct of the pilot and the whole course of events outlined were contributed to by the deliberate policy of this Company, which was to keep its aircraft in the air and gainfully employed regardless of the regulations or of the elementary requirements which should enjoin consideration for the conditions of working of its employees or the maintenance of its aircraft. Any responsibility of the captain is to be viewed in the light of his position as an employee upon whose shoulders an intolerable burden was placed. At the time of the accident, the airplane was overloaded and the captain was overduty as he had been on duty for 31 hours 30 minutes, a gross breach of Article 34E of the Order, since the maximum permissible flying duty period for a two-pilot crew is 16 hours.

The accident was the result of the captain allowing the aircraft to stall when making a single engine approach to land. A contributory factor was distraction of the captain's attention by the flickering of the undercarriage red indicator lights during a critical stage of the approach. The starboard engine was also damaged by fire and was removed for detailed examination by the Engine Division of the Bristol Aeroplane Company Ltd. Their report stated that the rear of the crankcase had been almost consumed by fire and that a number of cylinder barrels were severely burned. A detailed strip examination did not disclose any mechanical defect and no reason for the failure was established.

At the time of the accident, the aircraft was not following the track that has been assigned and was off course for unknown reason. It was understood that the airplane deviated from the prescribed flight plan, maybe following a navigation error, but this was not determined with certainty. Thus, the accident is the result of a controlled flight into terrain.

It was decided that the unusual path of the aircraft immediately following the take-off, was due to the blocking of the ailerons to the left at an angle of approximately 10 degrees. It was determined on the basis of analysis that the probable cause of the blocking was the unclamping of a link cheek of the upper rear chain of the co-pilot's control column, as a result of which the chain slipped off the sprocket and jammed against the internal boss of the pin which locks the ailerons in the neutral position. More broadly, the investigation brought to light the difficulty of setting and inspecting the chains inside the dual control columns. This difficulty is directly attributable to the design, and may cause certain chains which have not been properly studied in relation to the type of service for which they are intended, to become unclamped by torsion during maintenance and setting work.

Imprudence on the part of the pilot, who failed to maintain a greater safety altitude during flight over Sicily, and that, particularly, in consideration of the thundery formations present over the area. A contributory factor was the pilot's ignorance of real wind conditions on the route which led to a displacement of the actual track by 3° with reference to that intended. The Commission finds that the flight safeguarding service provided by the D/F stations of Rome and Cagliari was accomplished with due care and that, without being asked to do so other D/F stations (Milan and Venice) transmitted bearing information.