Midland

The pilot was conducting a cross-country flight at a cruise altitude of 10,500 ft mean sea level when the left engine lost all power. He secured the engine and elected to continue to his destination. Shortly thereafter, the right engine lost all power. After selecting an airport for a forced landing, he overflew the runway and entered the pattern. The pilot stated that on short final, after extending the landing gear, "the plane quit flying and the airspeed went to nothing." The airplane landed 200 to 300 yards short of the runway threshold, resulting in substantial damage to the wings and fuselage. During a postaccident examination, only tablespoons of fuel were drained from the left tank. Due to the position of the airplane, the right tank could not be drained; however, when power was applied to the airplane, both fuel quantity gauges indicated empty fuel tanks. Neither fuel tank was breached during the accident, and there was no discoloration present on either of the wings or engine nacelles to indicate a fuel leak; therefore, the loss of engine power is consistent with fuel exhaustion.

The airline transport rated pilot and passenger departed on a cross-country business flight in a twin-engine, turbo-propeller-equipped airplane in day, visual meteorological conditions. Shortly after takeoff, the airplane banked left, descended, and impacted terrain about 1/2 mile from the end of the runway. There was not a post-crash fire and fuel was present on site. A postaccident airframe examination did not reveal any anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. Examination of the left engine found signatures consistent with the engine producing power at impact. Examination of the right engine revealed rotational scoring on the compressor turbine disc/blades, and rotational scoring on the upstream side of the power vane and baffle, which indicated that the compressor section was rotating at impact; however, the lack of rotational scoring on the power turbine disc assembly, indicated the engine was not producing power at impact. Testing of the right engine's fuel control unit, fuel pump, propeller governor, and overspeed governor did not reveal any abnormities that would have accounted for the loss of power. The reason for the loss of right engine power could not be determined based on the available information.

The aircraft collided with terrain while on an instrument approach to the Midland Airpark (MDD), near Midland, Texas. The commercial pilot, who was the sole occupant, sustained serious injuries. The airplane was registered to and operated by Quality Lease Air Services LLC., under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a positioning flight. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan had been filed for the cross-country flight. The flight originated from the Wharton Regional Airport (ARM), Wharton, Texas, about 0626. The pilot obtained a weather briefing for the flight to MDD. The briefing forecasted light freezing drizzle for the proposed time and route of flight. While on approach to MDD, the airplane was experiencing an accumulation of moderate to severe icing and the pilot stated that he had all the deicing equipment on. According to the pilot, the autopilot was flying the airplane to a navigational fix called JIBEM. He switched the autopilot to heading mode and flew to the final approach fix called WAVOK. He deployed the deice boots twice before approaching WAVOK. An Airport Traffic Control Tower (ATCT) controller informed the pilot, that according to radar, he appeared to be flying to JIBEM. The pilot responded that he was correcting back and there was something wrong with the GPS. The controller canceled the airplane's approach clearance and the controller issued the pilot a turning and climbing clearance to fly for another approach. The pilot stated that his copilot's window iced up at that point. The pilot was vectored for and was cleared for another approach attempt. The pilot said that his window was "halfway iced up." About two minutes after being cleared for the second approach, the controller advised the pilot that the airplane appeared to be "about a half mile south of the course." The pilot responded, "Yep ya uh I got it." The pilot was given heading and climb instructions in case of a missed approach and was subsequently cleared to change to an advisory frequency. The pilot responded with, "Good day." The pilot had configured the aircraft with approach flaps and extended the landing gear prior to reaching the final approach fix. The pilot stated the aircraft remained in this configuration and he did not retract the gear and flaps. The pilot stated that he descended to 3,300 feet and was just under the cloud deck where he was looking for the runway. The pilot's accident report, in part, said: Everything was flying smooth until I accelerated throttles from about halfway to about three quarters. At this point I lost roll control and the airplane rolled approximately 90 degrees to the left. I disengaged autopilot and began to turn the yoke to the right and holding steady. It was slow to respond and when I thought that I had it leveled off the airplane continued to roll approximately 90 degrees to the right. At this time I was turning the yoke back to the left and pulling back to level it off, but it continued to roll to the left again. I was turning the yoke to the right again as I continued to pull back and the airplane rolled level, and the stall warning horn came on seconds before impact on the ground. The pilot stated he maintained a target airspeed speed of 120 knots on approach and 100 knots while on final approach. He stated he was close to 80 knots when the aircraft was in the 90° right bank. Witnesses in the area observed the airplane flying. A witness stated that the airplane's wings were "rocking." Other witnesses indicated that the airplane banked to the left and then nosed down. The airplane impacted a residential house, approximately 1 mile from the approach end of runway 25, and a post crash fire ensued. The pilot was able to exit the airplane and there were no reported ground injuries.

The 18,000- hour pilot was cleared for takeoff in the vintage twin-engine tail wheel equipped airplane on a 9,501- foot by 50- foot runway. The pilot was aware that there was a tailwind from approximately 160 degrees at 10 knots. Shortly after starting the takeoff roll, the airplane swerved to the right. The pilot was able to correct back to the centerline utilizing rudder control. The airplane then swerved to the left, and full right rudder was applied but the swerve could not be corrected. By the time the airplane reached the left edge of the runway, the airplane had not reached its calculated V2 speed of 110 knots. The airplane departed the left side of the runway, went airborne and shortly thereafter, the right wing dropped and contacted the ground. The airplane then spun 180 degrees, impacted the ground, slid backward, and came to rest upright. A post-crash fire consumed the aft fuselage and left wing.

The airplane was en route to an air show and was making a refueling stop. The tower controller cleared the pilot to land. The airplane was observed on a 3-mile straight-in final approach when it began a left turn. The controller asked the pilot what his intentions were. The pilot replied, "We just lost our left engine." The pilot then reported that he wasn't going to make it to the airport. Witnesses observed the airplane flying "low to the ground and under-speed for [a] good 4 minutes." The right propeller was turning, but the left propeller was not turning. There was no fire or smoke coming from the left engine. The pilot was "obviously trying to pull up." The airplane "dipped hard left," then struck the ground left wing first. It slid through a chain link fence, struck a parked automobile, and collided with a school bus wash barn. The ensuing fire destroyed the airplane, parked car, and wash barn. Disassembly and examination of both engines disclosed no anomalies that would have been causal or contributory to the accident. According to the Airplane Flight Manual, "Maximum power will probably be required to maintain flight with one engine inoperative. Maximum power at slow air speed may cause loss of directional control."

The airplane departed Las Vegas, Nevada, approximately 0919, on an IFR flight plan to Midland, Texas. The pilot climbed to an initial cruising altitude of 13,000 feet. At 1005, the pilot contacted Albuquerque ARTCC (ZAB) and reported that he was level at 13,000 feet. At 1009, the pilot requested to climb to 15,000 and the ZAB controller approved the request. At 1013:55, the pilot contacted Albuquerque Flight Watch and reported that he was approximately 23 miles west of Flagstaff, Arizona at 15,000 feet, and that about 20 miles west of his position, at 13,000 feet, he encountered "light mixed icing." The pilot requested any PIREP's. Flight Watch reported that a PIREP for "a trace of rime icing at 12,000," was reported by an airplane climbing westbound out of Albuquerque. The pilot acknowledged and asked for the weather across New Mexico. Flight Watch advised the pilot to stand by while he gathered the reports. At 1015:15, the pilot contacted ZAB. He reported, "getting...mixed...right...now," and requested to climb to 17,000 feet. At 1015:57 the controller cleared the airplane to 17,000 feet. At 1016:35, the FW specialist repeated the report of trace icing near Albuquerque. The pilot did not reply. ZAB radar indicated the airplane climbed to 15,200 feet then entered a rapid descent. At 1017:08, a broken transmission was received. No further communications were received from the airplane. Radar contact was lost with the airplane at 1017:20. An examination of the airplane wreckage showed no anomalies.

About three hours and twenty minutes after departing Bellingham, Washington, for Midland, Texas, the pilot contacted Klamath Falls (Oregon) Tower and told the controller of his intention to land. About 10 minutes later, while about 30 miles north of Klamath Falls, the pilot reported he was low on fuel and was not able to find the city. The tower responded with instructions that would take the pilot south to the airport. But because the pilot seemed not to be following the instructions, but was instead continuing to the west, he was switched to Seattle Center. Center provided the pilot with a southeasterly heading direct to Klamath Falls, but less than a minute later radar and radio contact with the aircraft was lost. Other pilots overheard the pilot transmit that he had lost power in one engine, and later state that he had lost power in both. Soon thereafter the aircraft was seen to descend to about 200 to 300 feet above the surface of Lake of the Woods. The aircraft then began to slow and its nose began to rise. As it was slowing, one of the engines surged back to a high power setting, and the aircraft almost immediately rolled quickly to the side and dove nearly straight down into the lake. During the post-accident inspection of the airframe, the throttle for the right engine was found retarded to idle, but the throttle for the left engine was found in the full-forward (maximum power) position. A review of the Aerostar owner's manual revealed that the Engine Failure/Restart checklist called for the throttle for a failed engine (both engines in this case) to be retarded to the 'Cracked 1/2 inch open' position. Toxicological results indicate the presence in the pilot's blood of chlordiazepoxide and three of its active metabolites, norchlordiazepoxide, nordiazepam, and oxazepam. Chlordiazepoxide (Librium) is a tranquilizer often used to treat anxiety and tension. At sufficient levels it can have significant adverse effects on judgement, alertness, and performance. It is known to cause drowsiness, mental dullness, and euphoria. The results also indicate the presence of diphenhydramine in the pilot's blood. Diphenhydramine is a sedating antihistamine, and in sufficient quantities is known to produce drowsiness, impaired coordination, blurred vision, and reduced mental alertness.

Witnesses observed the aircraft approximately 250 feet above the ground heading towards the southwest. As the aircraft passed overhead, the 'engines were sputtering.' Approximately 3/4 mile from the witnesses, the aircraft made a 'sharp' right turn, nosed down, and impacted the ground. The engines 'quit' prior to the aircraft turning right. According to the operator, the flight was in preparation for a flight evaluation for the pilot-in-command by an FAA inspector. The pilot reported to Departure Control that he would be 'working on stalls and steep turns,' and the pilot was instructed to 'maintain VFR at or above five thousand five hundred.' The pilot-in-command had accumulated approximately 500 hours in the B-26. Prior to the accident flight, he had flown the B-26 once since October 8, 1993. That flight was on September 26, 1995, for a duration of 30 minutes. Prior to the flight the fuel tanks were 'sticked' and the total fuel was approximately 720 gallons of 100 octane low lead avgas. Examination of the airplane and engines did not disclose any pre mishap discrepancies. Due to the extent of damage, flight control continuity could not be established.

During the night before the accident, freezing rain followed later by snow, fell on the ramp where the airplane was parked. A witness reported that while assisting the pilot in removing snow from the airplane, he noted that 80% of the wing was covered with a coarse layer of ice, from 1/16 to 3/16 in thickness, that was not removed before flight. After the accident, a fireman from the city of lubbock fire department noted ice on the wing approximately 1/16th of an inch thick that had a rough texture that looked as if deposited by freezing rain. The pilot reported that shortly after take off she heard a power decrease and felt surges in the aircraft. The pilot then looked for a place to land. A detailed examination of the engine revealed no mechanical deficiencies.

Before takeoff, San Angelo AFSS briefer told the pilot computers were down in south Texas for 1.5 hours and no current weather info was available. Current weather info was available at nws at Midland and FSS's at Midland, McAlester and De Ridder, but the pilot didn't call these, nor did the briefer advise him to do so. Pilot didn't update weather in flight. About 38 minutes after takeoff, in area of potential icing, aircraft slowed from 270 to 150 knots ground speed in 4 minutes, then slowed to 100 knots in next 12 seconds. About 33 seconds before reaching 100 knots, pilot requested descent from 15,000 feet to 13,000 feet. At that time, true ground track was approximately 080° with wind aloft about 213° at 43 knots. Before ATC could clear descent, aircraft descended to 14,800 feet, then radar contact was lost after one return at 9,700 feet. Descent rate between last 2 altitudes: 12,750 fpm. No preimpact malfunction was found. IMC existed above 12,500 feet. Freezing level was forecasted at 10,000 feet to 12,000 feet. Aircraft was certified for flight in known icing conditions, but status of anti-ice/deice equipment wasn't determined due to impact/fire damage. Low levels of ethanol were found in tox samples from all occupants; however, there was evidence that the tox samples were unreliable. All five occupants were killed.