Swearingen SA226 Metro II

After takeoff from Lago Argentino Airport, a red warning light came on in the cockpit panel, informing the crew about the incomplete retraction of the left main gear. The crew proceeded to a visual inspection and after confirmation that the left main gear was properly secured in its wheel well, the crew decided to continue to Río Gallegos. On approach, the left main gear did not deploy. After the crew failed to extend it manually, he raised the other landing gear and completed a belly landing. On short final, just prior to flare, both engines were shut down and their propellers were feathered. The aircraft landed on its belly, slid for few dozen metres and came to rest. All seven occupants escaped uninjured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

On the morning of 18 June 1998, Propair 420, a Fairchild-Swearingen Metro II (SA226-TC), C-GQAL, took off for an instrument flight rules flight from Dorval, Quebec, to Peterborough, Ontario. The aircraft took off from Runway 24 left (L) at 0701 eastern daylight time. During the ground acceleration phase, the aircraft was pulling to the left of the runway centreline, and the right rudder was required to maintain take-off alignment. Two minutes later, Propair 420 was cleared to climb to 16 000 feet above sea level (asl). At 0713, the crew advised the controller of a decrease in hydraulic pressure and requested to return to the departure airport, Dorval. The controller immediately gave clearance for a 180° turn and descent to 8000 feet asl. During this time, the crew indicated that, for the moment, there was no on-board emergency. The aircraft initiated its turn 70 seconds after receiving clearance. At 0713:36, something was wrong with the controls. Shortly afterward came the first perceived indication that engine trouble was developing, and the left wing overheat light illuminated about 40 seconds later. Within 30 seconds, without any apparent checklist activity, the light went out. At 0718:12, the left engine appeared to be on fire, and it was shut down. Less than one minute later, the captain took the controls. The flight controls were not responding normally: abnormal right aileron pressure was required to keep the aircraft on heading. At 0719:19, the crew advised air traffic control (ATC) that the left engine was shut down, and, in response to a second suggestion from ATC, the crew agreed to proceed to Mirabel instead of Dorval. Less than a minute and a half later, the crew informed ATC that flames were coming out of the 'engine nozzle'. Preparations were made for an emergency landing, and the emergency procedure for manually extending the landing gear was reviewed. At 0723:10, the crew informed ATC that the left engine was no longer on fire, but three and a half minutes later, they advised ATC that the fire had started again. During this time, the aircraft was getting harder to control in roll, and the aileron trim was set at the maximum. Around 0727, when the aircraft was on short final for Runway 24L, the landing gear lever was selected, but only two gear down indicator lights came on. Near the runway threshold, the left wing failed upwards. The aircraft then rotated more than 90° to the left around its longitudinal axis and crashed, inverted, on the runway. The aircraft immediately caught fire, slid 2500 feet, and came to rest on the left side the runway. When the aircraft crashed, firefighters were near the runway threshold and responded promptly. The fire was quickly brought under control, but all occupants were fatally injured.

Few minutes after a night takeoff from Barcelona Airport, en route to Brussels, the copilot informed ATC about technical problems and was cleared to return for an emergency landing. After been cleared for an approach to runway 07, the crew descended to 6,000 feet and 3,000 feet successively. At 0000:15 seconds, the aircraft passed over the outer marker at an altitude of 1,500 feet and a speed of 170 knots. At a distance of six km from the runway threshold, the aircraft started to deviate from the approach path to the right and one minute later, it struck the ground at a speed of 130 knots, crashing in a palmgrove located 3,2 km short of runway and bursting into flames. The aircraft was destroyed by a post crash fire and both pilots were killed.

After takeoff from runway 01/19 at La Vertiente Airport, both engines lost power. The aircraft lost height, struck trees and crashed in a field some 300 metres past the runway end. A crew member and nine passengers were killed while nine other occupants were injured. The aircraft was completing a charter flight to Santa Cruz-Viru Viru Airport on behalf of Servicios Aéreos Vargas de España (SAVE), carrying employees of the Tesoro Bolivia Petroleum Company based in San Antonio, Texas.

Following a firm touchdown on a gravel airstrip at Island Lake Airport, the crew heard a noise when the left wing dropped. Suspecting a left main gear failure, the captain initiated a go-around procedure and decided to divert to another airport with better facilities. Shortly later, the hydraulic pressure was lost and fuel quantity began to drop rapidly. The crew decided to return to land at Island Lake. Upon touchdown, the left main gear collapsed and the aircraft veered off runway to the left before coming to rest. All 11 occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. slid off the runway. The pilot reported a very strong cross wind and that he touched down with crab.

During a landing approach, the pilot noted that the right engine remained at a high power setting, when he moved the power levers to reduce power. He executed a missed approach and had difficulty keeping the airplane straight and level. The pilot maneuvered for a second approach to land. After landing, he could not maintain directional control of the airplane and tried to go around, but the airplane went off the end of the runway and impacted the localizer antenna. The pilot did not advise ATC of the problem nor did he declare an emergency. The Pilot's Operating Handbook stated that for a power plant control malfunction, the affected engine should be shut down, and a single engine landing should be made. The power control cable was found disconnected from the anchoring point. A safety tab was broken off the housing, allowing it to unscrew. About one month before the accident, maintenance had been performed on the right engine to correct a discrepancy about the right engine power lever being stiff. The mechanic re-rigged the right engine power cable.

The flight crew were properly licensed and certified to conduct the flight. The pilot had a total flying time of approximately 2,240 hours, of which 1,930 were on the occurrence aircraft type. The co-pilot received his commercial pilots license in 1988 and had approximately 500 hours total flying time. He completed his instrument rating on 15 December 1996 and his initial training on the SA226-TC was completed in March 1997 in British Columbia with a different company. He had not flown for 44 days at the time his recurrent training was completed on 09 June 1997. This was the co-pilot=s third day of operational flying for the company; he had accumulated approximately 55 hours total time on the aircraft type. The co-pilot was flying the aircraft for a radar-vectored, localizer/back-course approach to runway 25 of the Ottawa/Macdonald-Cartier airport. Descending out of 10,000 feet above sea level, the crew completed a briefing for the approach. The weather conditions at the time did not necessitate a full instrument approach briefing because the crew expected to fly the approach in visual conditions. Air traffic control requested that the crew fly the aircraft at a speed of 180 knots or better to the Ottawa non-directional beacon (NDB), which is also the final approach fix (FAF) for the approach to runway 25. At approximately eight nautical miles from the airport the aircraft was clear of cloud and the crew could see the runway. In order to conduct some instrument approach practice, the pilot, who was also the company training pilot, placed a map against the co-pilot=s windscreen to temporarily restrict his forward view outside the aircraft. The approach briefing was not amended to reflect the simulated instrument conditions for the approach. The co-pilot accurately flew the aircraft on the localizer to the FAF, at which point, he began to slow the aircraft to approximately 140 knots and requested that the pilot set 2 flap, which he did. Once past the FAF, the copilot=s workload increased, and he had difficulty flying the simulated approach. On short final to runway 25, the pilot removed the map from the co-pilot=s windscreen. The co-pilot noted that the aircraft was faster and higher than normal and he tried to regain the proper approach profile. By the time the aircraft reached the threshold of the runway 25, it was approximately 500 feet above ground, and at a relatively high speed, so the pilot took control of the aircraft for the landing. The pilot attempted to descend and slow the aircraft as it proceeded down the length of the runway and stated that he had just initiated an overshoot when he heard the first sounds of impact. Runway 25 is 8,000 feet long. The first signs of impact on the runway were made by the propellers, with propeller marks beginning about 4,590 feet from the threshold of runway 25. The aircraft came to rest about 6,770 feet from the threshold, and a fire broke out in the area of the right engine. The co-pilot opened the main door of the aircraft while the pilot shut down the aircraft systems, and both exited the aircraft uninjured. The maximum speed for extending the landing gear on this aircraft is 176 knots, and the company standard operating procedures (SOPs) for a normal instrument approach stipulate that the aircraft should cross the final approach fix at a speed of 140 knots, with a 2-flap setting, and with the landing gear lowered. The company SOPs require that all checklist items, from the after start checks through to the after landing checks inclusive, be actioned through a challenge and response method with each item called individually. The first item of the before landing checks is a landing gear .....Down/3 greens@. The co-pilot did not recall being challenged for the landing gear check, and the pilot could not remember selecting the landing gear switch to the down position. Neither pilot checked for the three green lights prior to the occurrence. The pilot stated that it was his habit to check if the landing lights were on prior to landing because it was his habit to turn them on only after the landing gear had been extended. He remembered checking to see that the landing lights were on and so was satisfied that the gear was down. The co-pilot assumed that, because the aircraft had passed the NDB, the before landing checks had been completed; they are normally completed before or at that point during an approach. Neither pilot recalled hearing a gear warning horn prior to the impact. When the aircraft systems were inspected, the landing gear selector was found in the up position. Tests were conducted on the landing gear warning system which revealed that the gear warning horn did not function. A closer examination of the system revealed a faulty diode. The diode was replaced and when the warning system was checked again, it functioned properly. The pilot stated that the gear warning horn on the aircraft had functioned properly during the training for the co-pilot one week earlier.

After touchdown at Uruapan-General Ignacio López Rayón Airport, the crew started the braking procedure and activated the reverse thrust systems when control was lost. The aircraft veered off runway to the right, lost a landing gear and came to rest. All 12 occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.