Crash of a Boeing 747-121 in Karachi

Date & Time: Aug 4, 1983 at 0438 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N738PA
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
New Delhi – Karachi – London – New York
MSN:
19645
YOM:
1970
Flight number:
PA073
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
16
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
227
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Aircraft flight hours:
53324
Circumstances:
Flight PA073 was cleared to land on runway 25R of Karachi International Airport (KHI), Pakistan. The approach speed just prior to touchdown was 152 knots. After touchdown reverse thrust was applied on engines n°1, 2 and 3. Engine No.4 which had an unserviceable reverser was left in forward idle. Seventy knots was called and some three seconds later reverse power was decreased. At this stage EPR on n°4 engine increased rapidly. The aircraft veered to the left of the centerline at about 7400 feet from the approach end of runway 25R and departed the runway edge at 8000 feet from the approach end of runway 25R with 2,500 feet of runway remaining. Shortly before the aircraft departed the runway, the pilot flying (copilot) reported that he had no brakes and no nose wheel steering. The captain stated that he got on the brakes and tiller at this time to assist. After departing the runway surface the aircraft travelled 380 feet through soft mud before it came to rest at a point about 2100 feet from the end of runway 25R, heading about 160 degrees on the Southern side of the runway with the tail of the aircraft 120 feet from the runway edge. Shortly after the aircraft departed the runway, the nose gear struck a VASI light installation and its concrete base causing the nose gear to collapse backwards and to the left, resulting in total destruction of the VASI light installation and damage to the forward cargo hold, floor of the first class section and the stairway leading to the upper deck. Damage to the aircraft was substantial and it was not repaired. All 243 occupants evacuated safely.
Source: ASN
Probable cause:
Loss of directional control as the result of inadvertent application of forward thrust on n°4 engine at the time the pilot flying was coming out of reverse thrust on engines n°1, 2 and 3 during the landing roll, and subsequent failure of the crew to recognize the asymmetric power condition. Contributing were failure of the crew to monitor the engines, and failure to follow specified procedures during the landing.

Crash of a Boeing 747-121 in Tenerife: 335 killed

Date & Time: Mar 27, 1977 at 1706 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N736PA
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Los Angeles – New York – Las Palmas
MSN:
19643
YOM:
1969
Flight number:
PA1736
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
16
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
380
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
335
Captain / Total flying hours:
21043
Captain / Total hours on type:
564.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
10800
Copilot / Total hours on type:
2796
Aircraft flight hours:
25725
Aircraft flight cycles:
7195
Circumstances:
The KLM Boeing 747, registration PH-BUF, took off from Schipol Airport (Amsterdam) at 0900 hours on 27 March 1977, en route to Las Palmas de Gran Canaria. This flight was part of the Charter Series KL4805/4806 Amsterdam-Las Palmas (Canary Islands) - Amsterdam operated by KLM on behalf of the Holland International Travel Group (H.I.N.T.), Rijswijk-Z.H. The Boeing 747 registration N736PA, flight number 1736, left Los Angeles International Airport, California, United States, on 26 March 1977, local date, at 0129Z hours, arriving at John F. Kennedy International Airport at 0617Z hours. After the aeroplane was refuelled and a crew change effected, it took off for Las Palmas de Gran Canaria (Spain) at 0742Z. While the aeroplanes were en route to Las Palmas, a bomb exploded in the airport passenger terminal. On account of this incident and of a warning regarding a possible second bomb, the airport was closed. Therefore, KLM 4805 was diverted to Los Rodeos (Tenerife) Airport, arriving at 1338Z on 27 March 1977. For the same reason, PAA1736 proceeded to the same airport, which was its alternate, landing at 1415. At first the KLM passengers were not allowed to leave the aeroplane, but after about twenty minutes they were all transported to the terminal building by bus. On alighting from the bus, they received cards identifying them as passengers in transit on Flight KL 4805. Later, all the passengers boarded KLM 4805 expect the H.I.N.T. Company guide, who remained in Tenerife. When Las Palmas Airport was opened to traffic once more, the PAA 1736 crew prepared to proceed to Las Palmas, which was the flight's planned destination. When they attempted to taxi on the taxiway leading to runway 12, where they had been parked with four other aeroplanes on account of the congestion caused by the number of flights diverted to Tenerife, they discovered that it was blocked by KLM Boeing 747, Flight 4805, which was located between PAA 1736 and the entrance to the active runway. The first officer and the flight engineer left the aeroplane and measured the clearance left by the KLM aircraft, reaching the conclusion that it was insufficient to allow PAA 1736 to pass by, obliging them to writ until the former had started to taxi. The passengers of PAA 1736 did not leave the aeroplane during the whole time that it remained in the airport. KLM 4805 called the tower at 1656 requesting permission to taxi. It was authorized to do so and at 1658 requested to backtrack on runway 12 for take-off on runway 30. The tower controller first cleared the KLM flight to taxi to the holding position for runway 30 by taxiing down the main runway and leaving it by the (third) taxiway to its left. KLM 4805 acknowledged receipt of this message from the tower, stating that it was at that moment taxiing on the runway, which it would leave by the first taxiway in order to proceed to the approach end of runway 30. The tower controller immediately issued an amended clearance, instructing it to continue to taxi to the end of the runway, where it should proceed to backtrack. The KLM flight confirmed that it had received the message, that it would backtrack, and that it was taxiing down tile main runway. The tower signalled its approval, whereupon KLM 4805 immediately asked the tower again if what they had asked it to do was to turn left on taxiway one. The tower replied in the negative and repeated that it should continue on to the end of the runway and there backtrack. Finally, at 1659, KLM 4805 replied, "O.K., sir." At 1702, the PAA aeroplane called the tower to request confirmation that it should taxi down the runway. The tower controller confirmed this, also adding that they should leave the runway by the third taxiway to their left. At 1703:00, in reply to the tower controller's query to KLM 4805 as to how many runway exits they had passed, the latter confirmed that at that moment they were passing by taxiway C4. The tower controller told KLM 4805, "O.K., at the end of the runway make one eighty and report ready for ATC clearance ." In response to a query from KLM 4805, the tower controller advised both aeroplanes - KLM 4805 and PAA 1736 - that the runway centre line lights were out of service. The controller also reiterated to PAA 1736 that they were to leave the main runway via the third taxiway to their left and that they should report leaving the runway. At the times indicated, the following conversations took place between the tower and the KLM 4805 and PAA 1736 aeroplanes. Times taken from KLM CVR.
1705:44.6 KLM 4805: The KLM four eight zero five is now ready for take-off and we are waiting for our ATC clearance. (1705:50.77).
1705:53.41 Tower: KLM eight seven zero five you are cleared to the Papa Beacon, climb to and maintain flight level nine zero, right turn after take-off, proceed with heading four zero until intercepting the three two five radial from Las Palmas VOR. (1706 :08.09).
1706:09.61 KLM 4805: Ah - Roger, sir, we are cleared to the Papa Beacon, flight level nine zero until intercepting the three two five. We are now (at take-off). (1706:17.79).
1706:18.19 Tower : O.K..... Stand by for take-off, I will call you. (1706: 21.79).
Note: A squeal starts at: 1706:19.39 The squeal ends at: 1706:22.06
1706:21.92 PAA 1736: Clipper one seven three six. (1706 : 23.39).
1706:25.47 Tower: Ah - Papa Alpha one seven three six report the runway clear. (1706: 28.89).
1706:29.59 PAA 1736: O.K., will report when we're clear. (1706:30.69).
1706:31.69 Tower: Thank you.
Subsequently, KLM 4805, which had released its brakes to start take-off run 20 seconds before this communication took place, collided with the PAA aeroplane. The control tower received no further communications from PAA 1736, nor from KLM 4805. There were no eyewitnesses to the collision. All 248 occupants on board the KLM 747 were killed. Among the 396 people on board the Pan Am 747, 335 were killed (among them nine crew members) and 61 others were injured.
Probable cause:
The KLM aircraft had taken off without take-off clearance, in the absolute conviction that this clearance had been obtained, which was the result of a misunderstanding between the tower and the KLM aircraft. This misunderstanding had arisen from the mutual use of usual terminology which, however, gave rise to misinterpretation. In combination with a number of other coinciding circumstances, the premature take-off of the KLM aircraft resulted in a collision with the Pan Am aircraft, because the latter was still on the runway since it had missed the correct intersection.
Final Report:

Crash of a Boeing 747-131F in Huete: 17 killed

Date & Time: May 9, 1976 at 1535 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
5-283
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Tehran - Madrid - McGuire
MSN:
19677/73
YOM:
1970
Flight number:
ULF48
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
10
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
7
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
17
Circumstances:
The airplane was completing a military logistic flight from Tehran to McGuire AFB via Madrid, carrying Iranian and US officers. The flight took off from Tehran at 08:20 GMT and climbed to a cruising altitude of FL330. After establishing contact with Madrid control, clearance was received to CPL VOR via Castejon. At 14:25 the flight was cleared to FL100. At 14:30 the crew advised Madrid that they were diverting to the left because of thunderstorm activity, and at 14:32 Madrid cleared ULF48 to 5,000 feet and directed him to contact Madrid approach control. At 14:33 the crew contacted approach control and advised them that there was too much weather activity ahead and requested to be vectored around it. Last radio contact was when ULF48 acknowledged the 260° heading instructions and informed Madrid that they were descending to 5,000 feet. The aircraft was later found to have crashed in farmland at 3,000 feet msl following left wing separation. The aircraft was totally destroyed and all 17 occupants have been killed.
Probable cause:
After analyzing all of the available evidence, it is concluded that the most probable sequence of events which culminated with multiple structural failures and separation of the wing began with an ignition of the fuel vapors in the n°1 fuel tank. The damage to the structure in the area of the tank provided positive indications of an explosion. The possibility that the explosion was a secondary result of structural failure caused by excessive aerodynamics forces developed during high velocity gusts and turbulence cannot be completely dismissed; however, the evidence and the probabilities of an aircraft's encountering these unique environmental conditions make this hypothesis less supportable.
Final Report:

Ground fire of a Boeing 747-128 in Bombay

Date & Time: Jun 12, 1975 at 0215 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N28888
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Hong Kong - Bombay - Tel Aviv - Paris
MSN:
20542/201
YOM:
1972
Flight number:
AF193
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
18
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
384
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The crew was completing a 180 turn on runway 27 threshold to prepare for takeoff when the fire alarm sounded in the cockpit panel. The crew stopped the aircraft and ordered all 402 occupants to evacuate the aircraft. Fire spread quickly on the right side of the airplane that was destroyed. All 402 occupants escaped, 10 of them were slightly injured.
Probable cause:
It was determined that tires n°11 & 12 located on the right main gear burst while the aircraft was completing a 180 turn on the runway, causing the wheel to struck the ground. Initial delay in shutting down the engines and an improper deployment of fire services caused the fire to spread.

Crash of a Boeing 747-130 in Nairobi: 59 killed

Date & Time: Nov 20, 1974 at 0754 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
D-ABYB
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Frankfurt - Nairobi - Johannesburg
MSN:
19747/29
YOM:
1970
Flight number:
LH540
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
17
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
140
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
59
Captain / Total flying hours:
10464
Captain / Total hours on type:
1619.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
3418
Copilot / Total hours on type:
2237
Aircraft flight hours:
16781
Circumstances:
The four engine airplane named 'Hessen' lifted off from runway 24 at a speed of 145 knots. During initial climb, at a height of 100 feet, the airplane stalled and struck the ground 1,120 meters past the runway end. It flew again for about 114 meters then struck an embankment and crashed in flames 340 meters further. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire. 55 passengers and 4 crew members were killed while 98 other occupants were injured.
Probable cause:
Wrong takeoff configuration on part of the flying crew. The accident was caused by the crew initiating a take-off with the leading edge flaps retracted because the pneumatic system which operates them had not been switched on. This resulted in the aircraft becoming airborne in a partially stalled condition which the pilots did not identify in the short time available to them for recovery. Major contributory factors were the lack of warning of a critical condition of leading edge flap position and the failure of the crew to complete satisfactorily their checklist items.
Final Report: