Country
code

Oxfordshire

Crash of a GAF Nomad N.24A in Weston-on-the-Green

Date & Time: Apr 13, 2002 at 0830 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
OY-JRW
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Weston-on-the-Green - Weston-on-the-Green
MSN:
117
YOM:
1981
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
13
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
581
Captain / Total hours on type:
51.00
Circumstances:
A series of parachute flights had been planned from Weston-on-the-Green. The forecast conditions were good, predicting a surface wind of 360°/10 kt, visibility 30 km, with no significant weather and some strato-cumulus cloud with a base of 3,000 feet. The first flight, which consumed 144 lb of fuel, was completed successfully with 12 parachutists jumping from 12,000 feet. Thirteen parachutists boarded for the second flight and the aircraft was cleared to take off from the dry surface of grass Runway 01 (take off run available 3,194 feet). The surface wind at the time was 360°/15 kt with no significant weather and the temperature was 15°C. The pilot subsequently reported that he checked the condition levers were set to 100% N2, the flaps were set to 10° and that the trim was set in the take off range. He also reported that the company recommended power of 738°C turbine outlet temperature (TOT), and 89 pounds per square inch (psi) manifold pressure were set and achieved during the take off run. This power setting was equivalent to the 'Max Cruise Rating' as specified in the 'Operating Limits' section of the aircraft manual and no take off performance charts or data concerning 'take off distance required' (TODR) and 'accelerate stop distance required' (ASDR) information was available. The maximum take off power available (5 minute limit) was 810°C TOT and 102 psi. At approximately 80 to 83 kt (scheduled rotation speed 71 kt) the pilot pulled back on the control column. He reported that, 'the aircraft felt more nose heavy', 'the aircraft nose did not rise and he perceived that the aircraft was no longer accelerating'. He decided to abort the take off, commenced braking and set the condition levers to the full reverse position. As the aircraft decelerated he turned it to the right in order to avoid trees and bushes ahead. The aircraft struck a small earth mound, whilst still travelling at about 15-20 kt, and came to an abrupt halt. The pilot shut down both engines and selected the fuel and the battery to OFF. The crew and passengers evacuated the aircraft unaided.
Probable cause:
The pilot had successfully completed a similar flight in the same aircraft, in benign meteorological conditions and the available evidence suggests that the aircraft was serviceable. He reported that during the second take off run 'the company recommended take off power of 738°C TOT and 89 psi was set and achieved'. The take off was therefore attempted with only 89 -90% of the maximum power available. This would have had the effect of not only increasing the take off distance but also the 'ASDR' to achieve a successful rejected take off from a speed at or beyond normal rotate speed. With the flap position and trim set correctly for take off the pilot attempted to rotate the aircraft between 80 to 83 kt, at least 9 kt above the scheduled rotation speed of 71 kt. If the aircraft loading had been within the limits of mass and CG prompt rotation of the aircraft should have occurred. This however did not happen and instead the pilot felt the aircraft to be 'more nose heavy than normal'. The exact mass and CG for this flight are uncertain. If the CG position was at the forward limit for the calculated mass, control column forces would have been high but not sufficiently high to prevent a successful takeoff. Extreme forces would only have been encountered if the aircraft CG position was significantly in error. It is therefore considered that for the second takeoff of the day the aircraft CG was significantly forward of the forward CG limit.
Final Report:

Crash of a Bristol 170 Freighter Mk 31M in Enstone

Date & Time: Jul 18, 1996 at 1135 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
C-FDFC
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Enstone - Bristol
MSN:
13218
YOM:
1954
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
6
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
11000
Captain / Total hours on type:
1300.00
Copilot / Total hours on type:
60
Circumstances:
The weather at the departure airfield consisted of a light and variable wind, good visibility and a temperature of 20ºC. At the start of the take-off run the aircraft, which was being flown by the copilot, who is also an experienced pilot with some 60 hours on type, began to swing to the right. Corrective action caused it to swing to the left but, after further correction,the aircraft continued accelerating and swing to the right. The Bristol Freighter is well known for its tendency to swing on takeoff. The commander joined the co-pilot on the controls and attempted to assist in correcting the right-hand swing. It became apparent to the pilots that they would be unable to prevent the aircraft running over the edge of the runway and, as there were people standing by the edge and a small control tower building behind them, they applied full up-elevator in an effort to avoid a collision. Because of the low airspeed at which this occurred, the aircraft stalled and the left wing tip hit the ground. This caused the aircraft to turn so that it was then travelling sideways which resulted in the landing gear collapsing as it touched the runway. The aircraft then slid off the runway onto the grass. There was no fire and the only injuries were sustained by three of the aircraft passengers.
Final Report:

Crash of a PZL-Mielec AN-28 in Weston-on-the-Green

Date & Time: Aug 28, 1993 at 1620 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
HA-LAJ
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Weston-on-the-Green - Weston-on-the-Green
MSN:
1AJ005-11
YOM:
1988
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
17
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
9400
Captain / Total hours on type:
1200.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
2310
Copilot / Total hours on type:
510
Aircraft flight hours:
1616
Aircraft flight cycles:
1384
Circumstances:
The twin engine aircraft was engaged in a local skydiving mission, carrying 17 skydivers and two pilots. After takeoff, while climbing, both engines simultaneously suffered a total power loss. The commander reported that the simultaneous failure did not induce any yaw and that the only two warning lights which illuminated in the cockpit were those indicative of double engine failure. Following the power loss, the aircraft's speed decayed rapidly leading the commander to suspect that the automatic outboard wing spoilers had also deployed. Realising that a forced landing was the only option available to him, he initiated a steep descent to maintain airspeed and a turn through 90° to the right to position the aircraft for a forced landing in a large field of corn stubble. The aircraft landed heavily in a slightly nose up attitude, banked slightly to the right, at an estimated speed of 170 km/h (92 knots) and slid to rest with substantial damage to the fuselage, landing gear, wing struts, propellers and wings. All 19 occupants evacuated the cabin and were uninjured.
Probable cause:
The following findings were reported:
- A latent defect in the electrical system caused a simultaneous total power loss as the flaps were retracted at 500 feet agl on climb out, with automatic operation of both asymmetric spoiler systems.
- The latent defect had been caused by progressive loosening of a single earthing screw, which provided a common earth point for the flap electric signalling and propeller auto feathering systems. This induced a high resistance to earth at this point and caused feathering of both propellers when flap retraction was selected, in addition to automatic closure of both engine fuel shut-off valves (within the fuel control units) and extension of both outboard spoilers.
- At manufacture in Poland a single earthing point had been installed which was not in accordance with the design requirements for this aircraft type as issued by the Antonov Design Bureau, which had required dual combined earthing terminals for the flap signalling and propeller auto feathering systems.
- The Antonov Design Bureau had never cleared this type of aircraft for flight with the aft clam-shell doors removed, or for parachute training.
- This aircraft had been incorrectly granted an Aerial Work Permit for parachuting operations in the UK by the Department of Transport, assisted by the CAA, as a result of implicit reliance upon submitted documentation which was subsequently proven invalid.
Final Report:

Crash of a Socata TBM-700 in Oxford

Date & Time: Dec 10, 1992 at 1642 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
F-GLBD
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Oxford - Oxford
MSN:
24
YOM:
1991
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
4
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
1441
Captain / Total hours on type:
104.00
Circumstances:
The accident flight was the final one of a series of sales demonstration flights. The demonstration pilot occupied the right seat and a potential customer was handling the aircraft from the left seat. The handling pilot was qualified and current on helicopters but had only 100 hours of fixed wing flying experience and had not flown a fixed wing aircraft as-pilot-in-command for some eight years; he controlled the aircraft throughout the flight, under the instruction of the demonstration pilot. After some general handling, including turns and a demonstration of the final approach configuration, F-GLBD returned to the local circuit. The first approach to runway 20 was slightly steep and the landing was firm but satisfactory. During the ground roll the demonstration pilot reconfigured the aircraft and the handling pilot applied power and made a take-off for another circuit. The second approach which was for a final landing was initially stable and on the glideslope. However, on short finals the aircraft went below the glideslope and the nose attitude was too high. There was a crosswind from the right and F-GLBD was on the left of the extended centerline. The demonstration pilot put his left hand on the power lever below that of the handling pilot and, as he did so, told the handling pilot to increase power. When no power was apparent the demonstration pilot repeated his instruction and also applied pressure to the power lever. As the aircraft approached the flare the handling pilot released the power lever and put both hands on the control wheel; the power lever moved quickly to the fully open position under the hand pressure of the demonstration pilot. The aircraft rolled rapidly to approximately 20° to 30° angle of bank to the left and the demonstration pilot took control with both hands on the control wheel. However, the left wing tip and the outboard trailing edge of the left flap struck the ground; the wing tip impact mark was off the runway to the left and the flap impact mark was just on the runway. The left main wheel then made contact with the runway, closely followed by the right main wheel. As the aircraft left the runway at an angle of approximately 230° to the left, the demonstration pilot closed the power lever, the aircraft continued across the grass for a distance of approximately 350 metres. It passed through and destroyed part of the PAPI installation, crossed runway 30 and came to a stop. At the time of the accident, it was dark and the weather was good; the surface wind was 230°/5 knots. All six occupants escaped uninjured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Final Report:

Crash of a De Havilland DH.89A Dragon Rapide in Oxford

Date & Time: Feb 5, 1989 at 1108 LT
Operator:
Registration:
G-AJHO
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Oxford - Shoreham
MSN:
6835
YOM:
1947
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
3136
Captain / Total hours on type:
68.00
Circumstances:
After takeoff from runway 20 at Oxford-Kidlington Airport, while climbing to an altitude of 1,500 feet, the pilot reduced engine power when the right engine failed. He informed ATC at Oxford Airport and was cleared to return. Shortly later, the right engine caught fire and the pilot attempted an emergency landing. The aircraft crash landed in a soft ground about 8 km south of the airport, bursting into flames. The pilot escaped uninjured.
Probable cause:
Failure of the right engine following the failure of the 4th cylinder in flight.

Crash of a Piper PA-31-310 Navajo at RAF Brize Norton

Date & Time: Jun 11, 1986 at 1145 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
G-BFON
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Oxford – Cardiff
MSN:
31-405
YOM:
1968
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
7000
Captain / Total hours on type:
150.00
Circumstances:
The aircraft departed Kidlington at 1133 hrs, the takeoff and initial climb to 1,500 feet being uneventful. Radio contact was made with Brize Norton Controller who requested the aircraft to climb to 2,000 feet on the Brize Norton QFE of 1005 millibars. This was complied with, and at 1140 hrs the aircraft experienced surging of one, then both engines culminating in a complete loss of power at a position 5 nautical miles north north west of Brize Norton. The commander advised the controlled that an engine problem had developed and that he was turning southwards towards the airfield. He subsequently declared a Mayday after opening the crossfeed and switching on the two electric fuel pumps to no avail. The commander stated that up until that time he had been on straight feed, ie right inboard tank feeding the right engine and left inboard tank feeding the left engine, with the crossfeed OFF. The commander also stated that during the unsuccessful attempts to restart the engines, the tank selectors remained as selected as he was aware of the physical presence of fuel in both inboard tanks prior to the departure from Cardiff, and uncertain of the contents of the outboards. The company pilot seated behind the front seats recalled the right fuel gauge was still reading over FULL, and that the left gauge was indicating empty. The commander decided that a forced landing short of the airfield was inevitable, and lowered the gear. The passengers were also warned to tighten their seat belts. At approximately 250 feet above ground level, the mixture levers were pulled back to idle cut off, and the magneto switches thought to have been selected to OFF. The aircraft landed in a field of standing barley and the nose gear detaches causing the nose and the right wing to strike the ground, the aircraft rotate approximately 180° to the right, and the main gear to collapse. On impact, the right engine caught fire immediately followed by the cabin, with fire spreading rearwards along the aisle. The two front seat occupants left by the left main door, the rear passenger by the right overwing exit. Minor injuries were suffered, the commander being detained in hospital for 24 hours with burns. The aircraft was destroyed by a severe fire.
Probable cause:
Double engine failure caused by a fuel exhaustion.
Final Report:

Crash of an Armstrong Whitworth AW.650 Argosy C.1 at RAF Benson

Date & Time: Jun 4, 1970
Operator:
Registration:
XP441
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Benson - Benson
MSN:
6773
YOM:
1962
Region:
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The crew was completing a local training flight at RAF Benson. On final approach, the pilot-in-command failed to realize his altitude was too low when the airplane struck the ground and crashed in an open field. The undercarriage were partially torn off as well a part of the left wing. All five crew members escaped uninjured.
Probable cause:
Too low approach on part of the flying crew.

Crash of a Hawker Siddeley HS.780 Andover C.1 at RAF Abingdon

Date & Time: Jul 5, 1967
Operator:
Registration:
XS598
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Abingdon - Abingdon
MSN:
SET05
YOM:
1966
Region:
Crew on board:
0
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
Shortly after liftoff from RAF Abingdon, the crew encountered engine problems. The captain decided to land immediately back onto the runway but the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance, overran and came to a halt. There were no casualties but the aircraft was written off.
Probable cause:
Engine problems on takeoff.

Crash of a Handley Page H.P.67 Hastings C.1A in Little Baldon: 41 killed

Date & Time: Jul 6, 1965 at 1609 LT
Operator:
Registration:
TG577
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Abingdon - Abingdon
MSN:
68
YOM:
1949
Region:
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
35
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
41
Circumstances:
The four engine aircraft departed RAF Abingdon with six crew members and 35 paratroopers for an exercise over the Weston-on-the-Green area. Shortly after takeoff, while climbing, the pilot reported control problems to ATC and requested permission to return for an emergency landing. Clearance was given and the crew started a circuit to return to RAF Abingdon when the aircraft climbed steeply to a height of 2,000 feet then banked left, dove into the ground and crashed in a field located in Little Baldon, about 10 km east of the airbase. The aircraft was totally destroyed and all 41 occupants have been killed.
Probable cause:
The elevator jammed in an inappropriate position following the failure of two bolts due to metal fatigue.

Crash of a Blackburn B-101 Beverley C.1 near RAF Abingdon: 20 killed

Date & Time: Mar 5, 1957 at 1100 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
XH117
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Site:
Schedule:
Abingdon – Akrotiri
MSN:
1023
YOM:
7
Region:
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
17
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
20
Circumstances:
The aircraft departed RAF Abingdon at 1042LT bound for RAF Akrotiri in Cyprus. It was carrying cargo, a relief crew, eight RAF police dog handlers and eight police dogs. There was low cloud at 500 feet (150 m), visibility was less than 1,000 feet (300 m), and an easterly wind of 10 knots (19 km/h). As the aircraft climbed, the engine number one developed a fuel leak. The flight crew responded by shutting down the engine and feathering its propeller. The flight crew declared an emergency and requested a blind approach to RAF Abingdon. The controller alerted emergency services on the ground. A short time later, cockpit instruments alerted the flight crew to a large loss of fuel from No. 2 fuel tank, the second of four such tanks in the port wing. In an effort to stop the leak, the crew de-activated the fuel cocks and boosters for the No. 2 tank, but left them on for the No. 1 tank. As the Beverley turned on to final approach for RAF Abingdon the crew attempted to increase power from the remaining three Bristol Centaurus engines but No. 2 engine – also on the port wing – failed to respond and the aircraft began to lose speed and height. Knowing he could not reach the airfield, the captain tried to land in a field. However, the aircraft became uncontrollable and struck a number of high tension cables and a group of elm trees that tore the port wing from the fuselage. On impact with the ground, the aircraft destroyed a caravan and a prefabricated house before somersaulting and crashing upside down. Eighteen occupants were killed, among them three crew members, and two people on the ground.
Probable cause:
A Board of Inquiry investigated the crash and found it was caused by loss of power from Nos. 1 and 2 engines, both mounted on the port wing. George Ward told the House of Commons that "the four fuel tanks on the port side of the Beverley feed into a collector box from which the two port engines are fed. From the available evidence, including inspections of part of the aircraft's fuel system, it is clear that a non-return valve between No. 1 (port) tank and the collector box had been fitted in reverse and that the fuel supply from Nos. 3 and 4 (port) tanks were switched off throughout the flight." Ward continued, saying that the loss of power from No. 1 was caused by it being shut down as a precautionary measure, and the fuel starvation to No. 2 engine was caused by an incorrectly fitted non-return valve in the supply line from No. 1 fuel tank. No. 2 fuel tank had been isolated and two smaller fuel tanks in the port wing had not been selected during the flight. The tradesman who had fitted the valve, and his supervisor, were prosecuted and charged, and the technician was court-martialled for negligence and punished with a reprimand. The Board also noted that some fuel was available from two smaller tanks but they were not used during the flight, and that the captain "must bear some responsibility" for not using those tanks. Ward said, however, that "owing to the nature of the flight the amount of fuel in the two smaller tanks was not large, and it can only be assumed that the captain had no reason to believe that both port engines would not operate satisfactorily off the two main port tanks individually." The captain was killed in the accident and no allegations were brought against him or any of his crew.