Spantax

Takeoff acceleration was normal, failure was not detected on engines, systems or structures. The crew registered a strong vibration at or close to V1. The captain felt how this vibration was highly increased as he began rotation, consequently rejecting the takeoff at a speed between VR and V2. Physical evidence shows how detachment of the tread of a tire of the nose gear, retreated, began before the aircraft had reached V1. The reject of takeoff began where there were another 1,295 meters (4,250 feet) of runway left. The aircraft crossed the runway end at a speed slightly over 110 knots, colliding with an ILS concrete building, breaking the metal fencing of the airport, crossing a highway, causing damage to three vehicles on the same, colliding then with farming construction. Engine number three detached after impact with the ILS building. Approximately three quarters of the right wing as well as the right horizontal stabilizer were detached as a result of the impact with the afore mentioned farming construction. The fuselage also ran over the construction with which the right wing collided. The aircraft stopped 450 meters (1,475 feet) away from the end of runway 14, and approximately 40 meters (130 feet) off to the left from the centerline. Neither the passenger department nor the cockpit showed damage that could impede survival when the aircraft stopped. Fuel was spilled off the right wing, from the time it collided with the farming construction, and the fire began in the rear of the fuselage. The fire destroyed the aircraft completely. There were 381 passengers and 13 crew members on board. 333 passengers and 10 crew survived, and as a result of the fire subsequent to the impact, 47 passengers and three assistant crew members died.

While on a visual approach to runway 24, the crew failed to realize his altitude was too low when the airplane struck the slope of a mountain located 8 km short of runway. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and all four occupants were killed.

After liftoff at Tenerife-Norte-Los Rodeos Airport, while climbing to a height of 100 meters, the airplane went out of control, plunged into the earth and crashed in a huge explosion about 325 meters past the runway end. The airplane was totally destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and all 155 occupants, 148 West German tourists and 7 Spanish crew members were killed. At the time of the accident, the visibility was near zero due to low ceiling and fog.

The crew was completing a local training flight at Madrid-Barajas. At liftoff, the airplane lost height, stalled and crashed. A pilot was killed while five other occupants were injured. The aircraft was destroyed.

Suffered a ground accident at Madrid-Barajas Airport. No casualties.

The aircraft was originally planned to fly a non-scheduled international flight from Stockholm-Arlanda to Palma de Mallorca. During the take-off run No. 4 engine did not function properly; the take-off was aborted and the aircraft was taxiied back to the apron. Inspection of the engine revealed damage to the compressor. After consultation with the Spantax Operations Department in Madrid, it was decided to ferry the aircraft on three engines to Zurich, where No. 4 engine would be changed. The technical preparation of the aircraft for the ferry flight was supervised by a ground engineer from Spantax. Meanwhile, the flight crew planned the flight. As the ATS briefing office at Arlanda was closed after 2100 hours, the co-pilot phoned the ATS flight plan to Stockholm Control Centre (ACC) . Neither when phoning the flight plan nor at the weather briefing did the crew advise that the flight was a 3-engine ferry flight. However, the Air Traffic Controller (Tower) in some other way had been informed about the nature of the flight. At 2208 hours the crew received a taxi clearance to Runway 08, but as they considered that this runway was too short for a 3-engine take-off , they requested permission to use Runway 19 and this was granted. Another advantage of using Runway 19 was that it made it possible to join the outbound track with minor heading changes. During taxiing the aircraft and the engine anti-icing system were checked according to the checklist. (After checking the engine anti-icing was switched OFF.) At 2221 hours the flight was cleared to take-off, and at 2224 hours the crew reported "Rolling". According to the pilot-in-command,maximum EPR take-off power was set on engines Nos. 1, 2 and 3 with brakes on, then, after having checked the instruments, No. 1 engine was throttled back to 85 per cent and the brakes were released. When the aircraft had rolled for 5-10 seconds the nose wheel skidded to the right and to regain heading he had to retard throttle No. 1 to 80-60 per cent. When back on the centre line he slowly opened the throttle again. Maximum EPR take-off power was set when the aircraft reached a speed of 100 kt. He rotated the aircraft at the calculated speed Vr - 134 kt (27° of flaps) and it became airborne. He retracted the gear when positive climb was indicated. Just after lift off he was blinded by the aircraft landing lights illuminating unexpectedly low clouds over the runway. Initially he kept the speed at V2 (145 kt) and noticed a rate- of-climb of 800 ft/min. He had to apply extremely hard left rudder to centre the turn indicator (ball). He did not observe any bank or turn tendency, but noted that the indicated airspeed (IAS) was not increasing normally and shortly thereafter that the rate-of-climb and speed decreased. The pilot-in-command felt they urgently needed more power, but all happened very quickly and shortly after he had noticed the speed drop the aircraft collided with the terrain. From the time take-off power had been set on the runway the throttle positions were not changed. The co-pilot stated that they had to taxi down the runway to avoid ice patches on the first part of the runway. He could not say how far they taxiied and it was not possible to determine it in any other way. During preparation for take-off he asked the pilot-in-command if they should use 10° flaps, but the decision of the pilot- in-command to uae 27° was not changed. He completed the pre-take-off instrument check and did not notice any abnormal readings. The three gyro horizons indicated no differences. When rolling he kept the control column forward, to increase the friction on the nose wheel, and gave full left aileron. Gradually he decreased the pressure on the column and reduced left aileron deflection. At V1 the pilot-in-command took mr the controls. The co-pilot kept his left hand on the throttles and verified that no changes were made on throttles Nos. 2 and 3 after takeoff power was set, but he noticed that the pilot-in-command had to vary the No. 1 throttle setting several times during the roll. After lift-off when the gear was retracted the co-pilot received a message from the tower giving the take-off time and instruction to change over to STOCKHOLM RADAR on 124.1 MHz. He never acknowledged the message but when leaning forward to select the new frequency he noticed on his horizon a banking to the right of 4 to 60. He also observed the gyro horizon of the pilot-in-command indicating o bank to the right. Zhe speed had dropped to 10 kt belau V2 and he called: "The speed, the speed". Ifc felt no buffeting in the aircraft aud noted no tendency to Dutch roll. Be also stated that he observed a power drop of about 2 per cent below EPR take-off power. Shortly after the first contact with the treetops the banking to the right had increased to 10-lSO and the co-pilot retarded the throttles. The flight and the ground engineers sitting in the cockpit observed nothing abnormal until the crash. None of them observed any indications of power changes on the instruments. No buffeting was felt in the aircraft, neither were any warning signals heard. Whilst in a right bank of 4-6° the aircraft collided with tree-tops approximately 26 m above and 1 060 m from the far end of Runway 19, or about 1 800 m from the point of lift-off, having turned through about 25 degrees from the runway heading. The aircraft came to a final stop approximately 500 m after first contact with the trees on a heading of 240°. The aircraft was destroyed and five occupants were killed while five others were injured.

The flight was a non-scheduled domestic flight from Tenerife to Las Palmas. It took off from runway 30 at Tenerife Airport with an IFR flight plan at 1830 hours and disappeared from the view of the tower controller in low cloud about 500 m before the end of the runway. According to the tower controller, the pilot acknowledged the last instructions from the tower two minutes after takeoff and did not re-establish contact afterwards. The aircraft was not seen again until a few moments before the accident which was presumed to have occurred between 1834 and 1840 hours according to witnesses. It was later determined that the airplane went into a dive and crashed few km from the airfield, killing all 32 occupants, most of them Scandinavian tourists.

The twin engine aircraft departed Al Aaiun Airport at 1605LT on a schedule flight to Las Palmas-Gando, Canary Islands. Less than one hour later, while cruising, the left engine hydraulic pressure dropped. Unable to maintain a safe altitude, the pilot ditched the airplane about 74 km east of the Canary coast. All four occupants were rescued while the airplane sank and was lost.