Washington-Ronald Reagan-National

On January 29, 2025, about 2048 eastern standard time (EST), a Sikorsky UH-60L, operated by the US Army under the callsign PAT25 (Priority Air Transport Flight 25), and an MHI (Mitsubishi Heavy Industries) RJ Aviation (formerly Bombardier) CL-600-2C10 (CRJ700), N709PS, operated by PSA Airlines as American Airlines flight 5342, collided in flight about 0.5 miles southeast of Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA), Arlington, Virginia, and impacted the Potomac River in southwest Washington, DC. The 2 pilots, 2 flight attendants, and 60 passengers on board the airplane and all 3 crew members on board the helicopter died. Both aircraft were destroyed as a result of the accident. Flight 5342 was operating under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 as a scheduled domestic passenger flight from Wichita Dwight D. Eisenhower National Airport, Wichita, Kansas, to DCA. PAT25 originated from Davison Army Airfield (DAA), Fort Belvoir, Virginia, for the purpose of the pilot’s annual standardization evaluation flight with the use of night vision goggles (NVGs). Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed in the area of DCA at the time of the accident. PAT25 departed DAA and landed at sites in Virginia and Maryland before the crew turned south toward Washington, DC, and was cleared by the DCA tower controller (who was working combined local control and helicopter control positions) to transition the DCA airspace via helicopter Routes 1 and 4 before proceeding back to DAA. The helicopter joined Route 1 near Cabin John, Maryland, and followed the Potomac River southbound at low altitude, passing the Key Bridge, Memorial Bridge, Tidal Basin, and Hains Point before continuing onto Route 4. At the same time, flight 5342 was approaching DCA on an instrument flight rules flight that had been uneventful during departure, cruise, and initial descent. The airplane was inbound from the south on a visual approach to runway 1 when the DCA tower controller asked the flight crew if they could accept runway 33 instead. After confirming landing performance, the crew accepted a circling approach to runway 33 and maneuvered the airplane to align with the runway 33 final approach path. While PAT25 was transitioning from Route 1 to Route 4 and flight 5342 was circling to land, the controller issued a traffic advisory to the helicopter crew about the airplane, which was south of the Woodrow Wilson Bridge. At this time, the airplane was about 6.5 nautical miles (about 7.5 statute miles) south of the helicopter’s position, and its exterior lights would have been visible in the dark among those of several other airplanes, which were on approach to runway 1 from the south. The instructor pilot onboard PAT25 stated that they had the traffic in sight and requested visual separation, which the controller approved. As the aircraft flightpaths converged near the runway 33 approach corridor about 1 1/2 minutes later (20 seconds before impact), the controller asked the helicopter crew whether they had the airplane in sight and instructed PAT25 to pass behind it; however, one of the helicopter pilots pressed the radio push-to-talk switch for 0.8 seconds while the controller was speaking, and this brief radio transmission blocked the helicopter crew from receiving the “pass behind” portion of the controller’s instruction. The instructor pilot onboard PAT25 again indicated that they had the airplane in sight and requested visual separation, which the controller approved. PAT25 continued southbound along Route 4 while flight 5342 descended on final approach for runway 33, and the aircraft collided over the Potomac River at an altitude about 278 ft above mean sea level (msl).

This was the first flight after a maintenance inspection. The flaps were left full down after a post-inspection by company mechanics, before the flight. Witnesses stated the flaps were down when the aircraft taxied to takeoff on runway 19L. Witnesses stated the aircraft climbed steeply after it lifted off with a pitch attitude up to 60°. According to witnesses, the aircraft climbed to 200 to 500 feet agl, before it stalled and descended nose down in a left turn. The aircraft crashed about 300 ft left of and 2000 ft down the rwy. Examination of the aircraft revealed the flaps were full down. The scroll type checklist was positioned at the beginning of the takeoff check. The flight manual recommends a 10 degree flap setting for takeoff and prohibits flap full down takeoff. Review of previous DHC-6 accidents involving flap full down resulted in a steep takeoff climb and excessive pitch attitude followed by a stall. The position of the control lock suggests it may have been in the locked position during the takeoff. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

On a flight from Newark, NJ to Richmond, VA, the departure time was delayed, and subsequently, the aircraft did not arrive at Richmond until after the refueling facilities were closed. The pilot decided there was sufficient fuel aboard to complete the next flight to the Washington National Airport, so he departed on that flight. However, about 21 mikes from his destination, he declared a low-fuel state and requested vectors to the nearest airport. Vectors were provided toward Davison Army Airfield. However, both engines subsequently lost power from lack of fuel and the aircraft crashed in a wooded area approximately 500 yards short of runway 32. The aircraft was destroyed and both occupants were seriously injured.

Air Florida Flight 90 was scheduled to leave Washington National Airport at 14:15 EST for a flight to Fort Lauderdale International Airport, FL (FLL), with an intermediate stop at the Tampa, FL (TPA). The aircraft had arrived at gate 12 as Flight 95 from Miami, FL, at 13:29. Because of snowfall, the airport was closed for snow removal from 13:38 to 14:53. At about 14:20 maintenance personnel began deicing the left side of the fuselage with deicing fluid Type II because the captain wanted to start the deicing just before the airport was scheduled to reopen (at 14:30) so that he could get in line for departure. Fluid had been applied to an area of about 10 feet when the captain terminated the operation because the airport was not going to reopen at 14:30. Between 14:45 and 14:50, the captain requested that the deicing operation be resumed. The left side of the aircraft was deiced first. No covers or plugs were installed over the engines or airframe openings during deicing operations. At 15:15, the aircraft was closed up and the jet way was retracted and the crew received push-back clearance at 15:23. A combination of ice, snow, and glycol on the ramp and a slight incline prevented the tug, which was not equipped with chains, from moving the aircraft. Then, contrary to flight manual guidance, the flight crew used reverse thrust in an attempt to move the aircraft from the ramp. This resulted in blowing snow which might have adhered to the aircraft. This didn't help either, so the tug was replaced and pushback was done at 15:35. The aircraft finally taxied to runway 36 at 15:38. Although contrary to flight manual guidance, the crew attempted to deice the aircraft by intentionally positioning the aircraft near the exhaust of the aircraft ahead in line (a New York Air DC-9). This may have contributed to the adherence of ice on the wing leading edges and to the blocking of the engine’s Pt2 probes. At 15:57:42, after the New York Air aircraft was cleared for takeoff, the captain and first officer proceeded to accomplish the pre-takeoff checklist, including verification of the takeoff engine pressure ratio (EPR) setting of 2.04 and indicated airspeed bug settings. Takeoff clearance was received at 15:58. Although the first officer expressed concern that something was 'not right' to the captain four times during the takeoff, the captain took no action to reject the takeoff. The aircraft accelerated at a lower-than-normal rate during takeoff, requiring 45 seconds and nearly 5,400 feet of runway, 15 seconds and nearly 2,000 feet more than normal, to reach lift-off speed. The aircraft initially achieved a climb, but failed to accelerate after lift-off. The aircraft’s stall warning stick shaker activated almost immediately after lift-off and continued until impact. The aircraft encountered stall buffet and descended to impact at a high angle of attack. At about 16.01, the aircraft struck the heavily congested northbound span of the 14th Street Bridge and plunged into the ice-covered Potomac River. It came to rest on the west end of the bridge 0.75 nmi from the departure end of runway 36. When the aircraft struck the bridge, it struck six occupied automobiles and a boom truck before tearing away a 41-foot section of the bridge wall and 97 feet of the bridge railings. Four persons in vehicles on the bridge were killed; four were injured, one seriously.

On a VOR/DME approach to Washington-National Airport, the crew encountered low clouds and failed to realize his altitude was insufficient. On final, the twin engine airplane struck a radio antenna. Upon impact, the left wing was torn off and the aircraft crashed in flames in the garden of the American University campus. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and all five occupants were killed.

At approximately 10:48 a.m. eastern daylight time on July 2, 1970, Short Brothers & Harland, Ltd., Skyvan Series 3, N21CK, operated by Jetco Aviation, Inc., Washington, D. C., as air taxi cargo flight, Flight 106, crashed during an approach to Washington National Airport. The aircraft was demolished but did not burn. Both cremnembers received fatal injuries. There were no passengers. According to witnesses, the aircraft was first visible to them, through fog and haze, when it was 700 to 800 feet above and about one-half mile out from the threshold of Runway 15. Shortly after the aircraft came into view of the witnesses, it nosed down and rolled left until the wings were nearly vertical. The nose-down angle steepened progressively until it reached 45° or more. The aircraft struck the water of Roaches Run in this attitude, cartwheeled onto the right wingtip and sank in water 12 to 15 feet deep about 1,800 feet north of the threshold of Runway 15. Both pilots were killed.

Training flight H-3 was scheduled by Capital (Capital Airlines) flight training department for Captain Carl R. Burke, instructor, and two Copilots, Henry A. Podgurski and Robert K. Thomas. This was the second of a series of six flights being made for the purpose of giving Messrs. Podgurski and Thomas flight instruction to prepare them for upgrading from copilot to captain. The flight was dispatched in accordance with visual flight rules to operate in an area northwest, north, and northeast of Washington, D. C. This area was used by Capital as its local practice area for training flights. The aircraft was fully serviced with 820 gallons of fuel. Its gross takeoff weight was less than the max allowable and the center of gravity was within allowable limits. The weather was clear and was not a factor in thin accident. Takeoff was made at 0625. At 0631 the flight advised the company by radio of the trip number, time of takeoff, fuel aboard, and flight duration. There were no other radio contacts with the flight. At approximately 0745, N88835 was observed in the vicinity of Clarksburg, Maryland, by many people who saw it during several tea of flight and in its plunge to the ground.

Capital Airlines Flight 500 originated in Memphis, Tenn., December 12, 1949, and proceeded in a routine manner to Norfolk, Va. No difficulties of any kind were experienced. At Norfolk a new crew consisting of Captain William J. Davis, Copilot Lloyd L. Porter, and Flight Attendant Joseph W. Buell were assigned to the flight for the remainder of the trip to Newport News, Va., and Washington, D. C. Before takeoff from Norfolk, Captain Davis studied all weather data in the Capital Airlines office, and called the company’s dispatcher in Washington who advised him that weather conditions would remain above landing limits until after midnight. Flight 500 took off from Norfolk at 1816; arrived at Newport News, Va., at 1836; and seven minutes later, at 1843, was again in the air en route to Washington by way of Richmond, Va., at a cruising altitude of 4,000 feet. On board were 20 passengers, the crew of three, 792 pounds of cargo and 3,000 pounds of fuel. Total aircraft weight was 25,472 pounds, which was 126 pounds in excess of the certificated aircraft weight. The load was distributed so that the center of gravity of the aircraft was within the certificated limits. The trip continued without incident. It reported over Richmond at 1910, and was then cleared by Air Route Traffic Control to proceed at 8,000 feet to the Clifton Intersection, which is 32 miles southwest of the Washington National Airport. By the time that the flight arrived over Clifton, however, ceiling and visibility at Washington were below landing minimums, so instructions were given to the flight to “hold.” Approximately 410 gallons of fuel remained on board, and weather conditions at the al-ternate airports of Richmond and Norfolk were remaining well above landing minimums. At 2025, a weather observer stationed at the south end of runway 36 at the National Airport reported that the ceiling was 400 feet variable, and that the visibility was 3/4 of a mile. Since landing minimums were now indicated, the control tower cleared one aircraft to land and the Capital flight to descend to 3,500 feet in the holding pattern. The air-craft which had been cleared to land completed its landing at 2033 without incident using the instrument landing system (ILS). At 2033 another runway observation was made, reporting the ceiling to be 400 feet variable, and the visibility 1 1/2 miles restricted by light rain and fog. Immediately following the transmission of this observation, clearance was given to Capital’s Flight 500 to descend to 1,500 feet and to commence its landing approach. Flight 500 acknowledged. Five minutes later, at 2038, the flight reported leaving the outer marker, five miles south of the end of runway 36, at which time it was cleared by the tower to land. From the holding pattern to the outer marker the aircraft was observed in the ground control approach (GCA) radar scopes which are in the Washington National Tower. Nothing unusual was noted. As the flight passed over the outer marker at 1,500 feet, entering its ILS approach, the GCA operator advised that the approach would be monitored. This message, as is customary, was not acknowledged, so it is not known whether either the pilot or the copilot was listening to GCA. In the GCA radar scopes, the flight path and descent at first appeared to be normal. When the aircraft was 4 1/2 miles from its point of landing, it was 200 feet to the right of the intended track, an extended center line of the runway, and the glide was good. When it was three miles from intended point of touchdown, it was 50 feet to the right and the glide was still good. When two miles out, the aircraft was on the center line, and only 25 feet above the glide path. One and one-half miles out, it was on the center line, and on the glide path. Then, the flight began to deviate to the right from the center line. The GCA operator in his monitoring conversation advised the flight that it was drifting sharply to the right, and followed by saying that it had gone 1,500 feet off course. The flight then appeared to turn left, proceeding back to the center line, but when within 1,000 feet of the center line and only 1/2 mile from the end of the runway, it disappeared entirely from the scopes. The aircraft was neither seen nor heard by any of the control tower operators, nor by the weather observer stationed at the end of runway 36. A few minutes after the accident, the runway observer reported the ceiling to be 400 feet variable and visibility to be 3/4 of a mile. There was light rain and fog, and the wind was from the south-southwest at nine miles per hour. The aircraft struck the water, left wing and nose first, in a steep nose down, left turning attitude. Both pilots and four passengers were killed. The aircraft was lost.

The flight departed Pittsburgh at 1724 and at 1753, 29 minutes later, reported over the Flintstone Intersection, 88 miles southeast of Pittsburgh at 7,000 feet. At 1754 the flight received a message from Washington Airway Traffic Control clearing it to the Herndon Fan Marker to maintain 7,000 feet until further advised The flight was also instructed that there would be an indefinite delay at Herndon but that approach clearance could be expected no later than 1920, which was approximately one hour and 10 minutes later than its estimated time of arrival Immediately after receiving this message the flight was given the 1730 hourly weather sequence report for Washington After acknowledging receipt of the Washington weather report, Flight 410 instructed the company station at Washington to request from Airway Traffic Control a clearance to approach Washington in accordance with contact flight rules on the right side of the west leg of the Arcola radio range This request was approved by Airway Traffic Control and at 1803 the flight received a message clearing it to the Washington tower to cross the Arcola radio range station at or below 2,500 feet and in accordance with contact flight rules. The flight was advised that if this were not possible it was to hold at 2,500 feet and to inform Airway Traffic Control. Prior to establishing its descent the flight was instructed to report when leaving each 1,000-foot level In accordance with these instructions Flight 410 reported leaving the 7,000-foot level at 1805 and two minutes later another report was received from the flight indicating it was leaving 6,000 feet. The flight reported its position as "south of Martinsburg" at 1808 and immediately thereafter reported that it was leaving 5,000 feet at that time At 1810 another report was received from the flight, leaving 4,000 feet." Three minutes thereafter the flight again reported its progress and indicated it was leaving 3,000 feet. Approximately 6 minutes later the company station at Washington initiated several calls to the flight but, although these transmissions were continued for several hours, no contact was established.

At 2107, the American Airlines’ radio station at New York received a message from the flight on very high frequency, indicating that it had no range reception or operative direction finding facilities. Because it had become apparent that precipitation static was so severe that it would not be possible to use the Philadelphia radio range for an approach to the Municipal Airport, the flight advised that it was continuing northeastward until visual contact with the ground was established. During this transmission, Flight 203 reported its position as in the vicinity of Lake-Hurst, New Jersey. When asked by the New York station of American Airlines at 2115 if he were “contact” in the South Jersey area, the pilot of Flight 203 replied that he had not been “contact” since leaving Washington. At 2128, Flight 203 declared an emergency, reporting that it had 70 gallons of gas aboard, with little or no D/F or radio range reception, and requested a report on the “neatest weather that is 1,000 feet or better.” While maintaining a northeasterly heading, the flight descended to an altitude of 200 feet. However, inasmuch as instrument conditions were still being encountered at that altitude, the pilot climbed again to an altitude of 1,500 feet. By the time the American Airlines’ New York station was able to provide the flight with weather reports in the area northeast of La Guardia Airport, the pilot had decided to effect an emergency landing without further delay. At this time there was but 30 minutes gas supply remaining on board. The pilot turned to a heading of 110 degrees toward the Atlantic Ocean in order to permit a descent to be made over open water. At 2156, after having maintained an east-southeasterly heading for 15 minutes, the flight advised the American Airlines’ station at New York that it intended to drop a flare. Upon dropping the flare and following it to the surface, the pilot found that the flight was over water. The pilot turned, therefore, to a heading of 300 degrees and, with the aircraft landing lights shining on the surface, continued westbound until sighting a shore line. He immediately maneuvered the aircraft to align it with the beach, which was oriented approximately 60 degrees to the left of his flight path, and completed an emergency landing at 2208 with his wheels retracted. Being unaware of his location, the pilot requested that bearings be taken in order to identify the position of the aircraft. At 2245, American Airlines was advised by telephone that Flight 203 had been located on the beach approximately one mile east of the Coast Guard Station at Jones Beach, New York.