New York

After landing on runway 04 at New York-LaGuardia Airport at night, the crew initiated the braking procedure when, at a speed of 114 knots, the airplane collided with a Port Authority Aircraft Rescue and Firefighting vehicle which was responding to a separate incident. The truck n°35 had preliminarily been cleared and was responding to a nearby flight (United Boeing 737 MAX 8 flight 2384) that requested assistance for an unknown odor in the cockpit. It entered the runway from the left side of the airplane's track, from taxiway D, when the collision occurred while the speed of the airplane was still at 114 knots. Following the collision, the airplane went out of control, veered off runway to the right and came to rest in a parallel taxiway with the cockpit and the front section totally destroyed. Both pilots were killed and nine passengers were injured. 41 passengers and crew were transported to the hospital and 32 of those have since been released. Additionally, two crew of the fire truck were injured.
Crew:
Antoine Forest, pilot,
Mackenzie Gunther, copilot.

After completing a last turn to the right, the twin engine airplane was descending to Columbia County Airport, New York, when it entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in an open field located in Copake. All six occupants were killed.

The airplane departed Dunkirk-Chautauqua County Airport, State of New York, on a ferry flight to Fort-Lauderdale-Executive Airport, carrying a crew of two. After he reached the altitude of 10,000 feet, the crew reported technical problems with the onboard electric system and elected to divert to Jamestown-Chautauqua County Airport. On final approach to runway 25, at an airspeed of 157 knots and with a rate of descent of 1,000 feet per minute, the airplane impacted the ground at runway threshold and went out of control. It caught fire, veered off runway to the left and came to rest in a grassy area, bursting into flames. Both crew members were rescued with various injuries. The airplane was totally destroyed by fire.

The single engine airplane was returning to its base at Youngstown-Windsor Airfield following a local skydiving mission. On approach to the grassy runway, the airplane went out of control, impacted a road and crashed below in a pasture. The airplane was totally destroyed and the pilot, sole on board, was killed.

The pilot filed an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan from the departure airport with an estimated time en route of 2 hours 47 minutes and a cruising altitude of 12,000 ft mean sea level (msl). The flight planning application the pilot used to file the flight plan provided weather briefing information, which included a convective SIGMET active for the time and route of flight and pilot weather reports (PIREPs) for turbulence and moderate chop; however, it could not be determined whether the pilot reviewed this information. The flight departed about 45 minutes after the pilot’s filed departure time. Flight track data and air traffic control communications showed that, about 1 minute after departing, the pilot contacted air traffic control (ATC) to obtain an IFR clearance. The controller cleared the pilot to his destination as filed, issued a climb to 10,000 ft msl, and provided a weather advisory for moderate and heavy precipitation along the route, which the pilot acknowledged. About 4 minutes later, the controller issued the pilot a climb to 12,000 ft msl, which the pilot acknowledged. About that time, the controller began a position relief briefing with a relieving controller, which took about 2 minutes. About 2 minutes later, the new controller queried the pilot after observing that the flight had deviated left of course. The flight track data showed that, just before the query from the controller, the airplane deviated from its southwesterly ground track and began a 45-second, right 270° turn starting at an altitude of 9,800 ft msl. While in the turn, the airplane descended to an altitude of 8,700 ft msl before climbing back to an altitude of 9,800 ft msl when the airplane rolled out on an easterly ground track. About 1 minute after the query from the controller, the pilot responded, stating he had “lost” something, followed by a similar transmission 27 seconds later. This was the last transmission heard that could be attributed to the accident airplane. The airplane continued on a wavering east track for about 40 seconds, descending back down to 8,700 ft msl before climbing to 9,025 ft msl, after which the airplane entered a tight, right, descending spiral until track data was lost. The airplane crashed in a dense wooded area located in Trout Creek and was totally destroyed. All five occupants were killed.

The pilot departed runway 19 at Albany International Airport on a ferry flight to Montreal. After takeoff, while climbing, the pilot informed ATC about engine trouble and was able to climb to an altitude of about 800 feet when the airplane entered a left descending turn. It later gained a little altitude then entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in a residential area, bursting into flames. The airplane was destroyed and the pilot, sole on board, was killed. The airplane was en route to Montreal-Pierre Elliott Trudeau International Airport.

The pilot reported that he was under the impression that his airplane’s inboard fuel tanks had been topped and he had 202 gallons on board prior to departure. He had a “standing order” with the airport’s fixed base operator to top the tanks; however, the fueling was not accomplished and he did not visually check the fuel level prior to departure. He entered 202 gallons in cockpit fuel computer and unknowingly commenced the flight with 61 gallons on board. Prior to reaching his destination, his fuel supply was exhausted, both engines lost all power, and he performed a forced landing in a cemetery about one mile from the airport. The pilot and his passenger had minor injuries. Inspectors with the Federal Aviation Administration examined the wreckage and determined that damage to the wings and fuselage was substantial. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.

The pilot reported that, during the initial climbout, about 1,000 ft above ground level, one of the engines stopped producing power. He confirmed that all engine controls were full forward and the main fuel tanks were selected. Immediately thereafter, the remaining engine began to surge, then stopped producing power. He established best glide speed and looked for an area to perform a forced landing. The airplane crashed into a solid waste disposal facility, about 2.3 nautical miles northwest of the departure airport. First responders arrived immediately after the accident and found only a trace amount of fuel within the confines of the accident site or in the fuel tanks. The only postaccident fire was centered on a small, localized area near the right engine turbocharger. Both main fuel tanks were empty, and the auxiliary bladder tanks were ruptured by impact forces. Examination of both engines revealed no evidence of a pre accident malfunction or anomaly. A surveillance video showed no evidence of smoke or mist training the airplane seconds prior to impact. The pilot reported that he departed the airport with 112 gallons of fuel on board. The pilot did not provide evidence of the latest refueling when requested by investigators. The available evidence is consistent with a total loss of engine power to both engines due to fuel exhaustion.

The flight crew were conducting an instrument landing system (ILS) approach in night instrument meteorological conditions when they were advised by the tower controller that the weather had deteriorated below minimums. The captain was the pilot monitoring, and the first officer was the pilot flying during the approach. Since the airplane was inside the final approach fix and stabilized, both pilots agreed to continue with the approach. Both pilots stated that they had visual contact with the runway approach lighting system at the 200 ft above ground level (agl) decision altitude, and they decided to continue the approach. The first officer said he then returned to flying the airplane via instruments. As the first officer continued the approach, the captain told him the airplane was drifting right of the runway centerline. The first officer said that he looked outside, saw that the weather had deteriorated, and was no longer comfortable with the approach. The first officer said he pressed the takeoff and go-around switch, while at the same time, the captain called for a go-around. The captain said that he called for the go-around because the airplane was not aligned with the runway. Although both pilots stated that the go-around was initiated when the airplane was about 50 to 100 ft agl, the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) recording revealed that the first officer flew an autopilot-coupled approach to 50 ft agl (per the approach procedure, a coupled approach was not authorized below 240 ft agl). As the airplane descended from 30 to 20 ft agl, the captain told the first officer three times to “flare” then informed him that the airplane was drifting to right and he needed to make a left correction to get realigned with the runway centerline. Three seconds passed before the first officer reacted by trying to initiate transfer control of the airplane to the captain. The captain did not take control of the airplane and called for a go-around. The first officer then added full power and called for the flaps to be retracted to 15º; however, the airplane impacted the ground about 5 seconds later, resulting in substantial damage to the fuselage. Data downloaded from both engines’ digital electronic engine control units revealed no anomalies. No mechanical issues with the airplane or engines were reported by either crew member or the operator. The sequence of events identified in the CVR recording revealed that the approach most likely became unstabilized after the autopilot was disconnected and when the first officer lost visual contact with the runway environment. The captain, who had the runway in sight, delayed calling for a go-around after the approach became unstabilized, and the airplane was too low to recover.

The airplane was in cruise flight at FL280 when the instrument-rated pilot failed to contact air traffic control (ATC) following a frequency change assignment. After about 25 minutes, and when 30 miles east of the destination airport, the pilot contacted ATC on a frequency other than the one that was assigned. He requested the instrument landing system (ILS) approach at his intended destination, and the controller instructed the pilot to descend to 8,000 ft and to expect vectors for the ILS approach at the destination airport. The controller asked the pilot if everything was “okay,” to which the pilot replied, “yes sir, everything is fine.” The controller then observed the airplane initiate a descent. About 2 minutes later, the controller asked the pilot where he was headed, and the pilot provided a garbled response. The controller instructed the pilot to stop his descent at 10,000 ft, followed by an instruction to stop the descent at any altitude. The pilot did not respond, and additional attempts to contact the pilot were unsuccessful. The airplane impacted terrain in a heavily wooded area 17 miles from the destination airport. Rhe aircraft disintegrated on impact and both occupants were fatally injured.