Springdale

As the airplane was descending toward its destination airport, the pilot reported to an air traffic controller en route that he needed to change his destination to a closer airport because the airplane was low on fuel. The controller advised him to land at an airport that was 4 miles away. Shortly after, the pilot contacted the alternate airport’s air traffic control tower (ATCT) and reported that he was low on fuel. The tower controller cleared the airplane to land, and, about 30 seconds later, the pilot advised that he was not going to make it to the airport. The airplane subsequently impacted a field 3.25 miles southeast of the airport. One witness reported hearing the engine sputter, and another witness reported that the engine “did not sound right.” Forty-foot power lines crossed the field 311 feet from the point of impact. It is likely that the pilot was attempting to avoid the power lines during the forced landing and that the airplane then experienced an inadvertent stall and an uncontrolled collision with terrain. About 1 quart of fuel was observed in each fuel tank. No evidence of fuel spillage was found on the ground; no fuel stains were observed on the undersides of the wing panels, wing trailing edges, or engine nacelles; and no fuel smell was observed at the accident site. However, the fuel totalizer showed that 123 gallons of fuel was remaining. Magnification of the annunciator panel light bulbs revealed that the left and right low fuel pressure annunciator lights were illuminated at the time of impact. An examination of the airframe and engines revealed no anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. About 1 month before the accident, the pilot had instructed the fixed-base operator at Camden, Arkansas, to put 25 gallons of fuel in each wing tank; however, it is unknown how much fuel was already onboard the airplane. Although the fuel totalizer showed that the airplane had 123 gallons of fuel remaining at the time of the crash, information in the fuel totalizer is based on pilot inputs, and it is likely the pilot did not update the fuel totalizer properly before the accident flight. The pilot was likely relying on the fuel totalizer instead of the fuel gauges for fuel information, and he likely reported his low fuel situation to the ATCT after the annunciator lights illuminated.

The twin-engine airplane was on the base leg to final turn, about 1-1 1/2 miles from the approach end of the runway when the left engine lost power. Instantly after, the right engine lost power and the pilot feathered both engines. The airplane then impacted a 70-foot high tree and collided with the ground about 1,000 feet short of the runway. The 700-hour pilot reported that he activated the electric fuel boost pumps and switched the fuel selectors from the auxiliary fuel tank positions to the main fuel tank positions, about 17 miles from the airport. He recalled that the fuel gauges indicated approximately 70 gallons of fuel in the main tank and about 10-15 gallons of fuel in the auxiliary tanks. The original installed fuel system was configured with a center tank and two outboard tanks. The center tank was composed of five, interconnected rubber cells, having a total capacity of 150 to 159 US gallons. Each outboard fuel tank was composed of two fuel cells with a combined capacity of 33.5 gallons. The total of the two outboard fuel tanks (four cells) was 67 gallons, providing a total usable capacity of 233 gallons. Each engine had its own fuel shutoff switch. Rotating a switch to the RIGHT OUTBOARD or LEFT OUTBOARD position allows fuel from the outboard tanks to flow to the respective engine and shuts off fuel from the center tank. Rotating a fuel shutoff switch to the CENTER position allows fuel to flow from the center tank to the respective engine, and shuts off flow from the respective outboard tank. Rotating the switch to the OFF position shuts off all fuel flow to the respective engine. There was no cross-feed configuration of the switches. Documentation was found in the historical records that indicated extended range fuel system modifications, however, the information was incomplete. After review of all available records and examination of the wreckage, it was determined that the fuel system configuration/capacity of the airplane at the time of the accident was: 156 gallons for the center tank system; 67 gallons for the outboard wing tanks; and a set of auxiliary tanks capable of holding 21 gallons (records of installation unknown). The total usable fuel capacity was estimated at 244 gallons. Cockpit fuel selector positions were: LEFT Fuel Shut Off Valve Selector-LEFT HAND OUTBOARD; LEFT Fuel Boost Pump-OFF; LEFT Engine Primer-OFF; LEFT Ignition Switch-RIGHT; RIGHT Fuel Shut Off Valve Selector-RIGHT HAND OUTBOARD; RIGHT Fuel Boost Pump-ON; RIGHT Engine Primer-OFF; RIGHT Ignition Switch-BOTH. Airframe fuel shutoff valves were found in the following positions (Each valve position corresponded to the cockpit selectors): Right Wing Auxiliary-OPEN; Right Wing Main-CLOSED; Left Wing Auxiliary-OPEN; Left Wing Main-CLOSED. A total of 37.5 gallons of usable fuel was drained from the uncompromised tanks (unknown amount had leaked at the accident site). Excerpts from the " Normal Procedures" section of the flight manual regarding fuel selector positions for take off and landing: "CAUTION; Burn center tank fuel first, when 100 gallons is shown on center tank gauge, switch to outboard tanks. Do not allow engine to be starved of fuel when outboard tanks run dry. Select center tanks at first indication of fuel pressure loss. Fuel boost pumps must be on when switching tanks." The "BEFORE LANDING CHECK" procedures in the aircraft flight manual state that the Fuel Selector Valves must be in the "CENTER TANK" position before the approach. The manufacturer stated that the simultaneous loss of power of both engines was likely a result of the outboard fuel tanks unporting. No mechanical anomalies were found during examination of the engines or airframe, and usable fuel was available in the center tank at the time of the accident.

Impact forces and fire destroyed the airplane when it impacted the terrain after a loss of control during cruise flight. The pilot received a weather brief by AFSS prior to departure concerning the IFR conditions along the route of flight, which included, rain, freezing rain, icing, turbulence, and snow. The cloud tops were forecast to be 25,000 feet. The pilot filed a flight plan with a cruise flight level of 28,000 feet. About 32 minutes after takeoff, at 1345:58, the pilot reported he had an attitude gyro problem and that he was hand flying the airplane. The airplane's altitude remained at about 28,000 feet for the next seven minutes. At 1352:46, the pilot stated he had an emergency, but at 1352:53, the pilot stated, "Uh it came back on never mind." At 1353:26, the pilot stated, "I need to get to uh anywhere I can get a visual." At 1353:56, the airplane was cleared to climb to 31,000 feet, and radar data indicated the airplane was currently at 27,000 feet. The radar data indicated the airplane went into a series of steep descents and climbs over the next 4.5 minutes until radar contact was lost at 2,500 feet. The pilot of a commercial airline who was flying in the same sector as the accident airplane reported that he heard the accident pilot state that he was in a spin. The commercial airline pilot stated they were flying at 33,000 feet and were "barely above the tops" of the clouds. The airplane impacted the terrain in a steep nose down attitude and burst into flames. The engines, flight controls, and flight instruments did not exhibit any pre-existing anomalies. A witness reported that two days prior to the accident, the pilot had advised him that the airplane's attitude gyro was having problems. There was no record that the pilot had the attitude gyro inspected prior to the accident. A witness reported the pilot routinely flew with the autopilot engaged soon after takeoff. He reported that he had never observed the pilot hand-fly the airplane in instrument conditions.

The pilot was flying a pressurized airplane at 25,000 feet (cabin altitude of 10,000 feet). For approximately 43 minutes before the accident, ARTCC called the pilot approximately six times and asked him to correct his altitude. Two transmissions from the pilot, between 2305 and 2311, were made with "slurred, and unclear speech." A 2 minute period followed with over 30 hot mike transmissions in which heavy breathing could be heard in some. At 2318:20, the pilot's last transmission was "ah Charlie Hotel, we, we've a little bit of a problem here. We're in a descent, we'll straighten it out in a minute." Witnesses observed the airplane spin into ground. The pilot's autopsy revealed moderate emphysema in his lungs with the presence of air filled bullae measuring up to 3 cm. On the two flights before the accident flight, the owner of the aircraft said that the pilot slept 2 hours out of the 4.5 hours of flight. Several friends of the pilot reported that he was also observed to "easily doze" off while on the ground, but he did so more regularly and for longer time periods while flying.

During a cross-country flight, the pilot of the twin-engine airplane reported to air traffic control that he has 'lost an engine.' A witness observed the right engine hanging from its lower mounts as the airplane turned right and headed towards the nearest airport. The airplane impacted trees approximately 1 mile short of the runway threshold. Examination of the right engine propeller revealed that one of its blades was separated about mid-span. The separated tip section of the blade was not recovered. Metallurgical examination of the fracture surface revealed that the blade failed as a result of a fatigue crack that originated from corrosion pits on the camber surface (face) of the blade. The failed blade was examined approximately 6 hours prior to the accident in accordance with an airworthiness directive (AD 81-13-06 R2) that called for inspections of the blade for corrosion and fatigue. However, the inspections called out in the AD were only applicable to the blade fillet and shank regions, well inboard of the fracture location on the failed blade. Overhaul of the propeller in accordance with the propeller manufacturer's manual includes grinding of each blade to 'remove all visual evidence of corrosion.' According to the airplane's owner, the propellers had not been overhauled in the eight years that he had owned the aircraft. The maintenance records were destroyed in the accident, which precluded determination of the date and time of the last propeller overhaul. The accident airplane was being operated under Title 14 CFR Part 91, and therefore, the propellers were not required to be overhauled at specified intervals.

The passenger sitting in the copilot's seat stated that she saw fire coming from the right wing and engine area. She stated that she could see a bright 'glow' beneath the skin of the wing. The pilot made a forced landing on a freeway and the aircraft struck a light pole on the highway median. Heavy fire damage was found in the aft portion of the right engine nacelle and right flap assembly. In addition, heavy fire and soot were evident in the interior of the right wing assembly. The passenger was seriously injured and the pilot was killed.

The pilot received two weather briefings. Most of the first briefing was spend finding an alternate. The forecast include IMC with low ceilings, low visibilities with light snow, fog and possible freezing drizzle. The aircraft was not certificated for flight in known icing conditions. During arrival, the plane entered an overcast at 3,500 feet MSL. Two minutes later, the pilot reported and encounter with freezing precipitation. The first approach was abandoned in the vicinity of the FAF/outer marker after the pilot flew through the localizer course line and was half mile to the right. He was vectored for another ILS approach. While inbound on the approach, he was informed that approach control had received a low altitude alert. He was reminded that his altitude should be 2,600 feet until reaching the FAF; however, he reached only 2,400 feet. His airspeed was much higher than normal while descending from the FAF. The plane struck a building and burned about 1/3 mile northeast of the end of runway 18. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

While in cruising altitude, the twin engine airplane entered an area of turbulences. The airframe failed in flight, the airplane entered a dive and eventually crashed in a prairie. All five occupants were killed.