San Fernando

During the climb, immediately after takeoff, the aircraft rolled to the left, stabilized momentarily, and then rolled again to the same side. The second roll caused excessive bank, resulting in localized lift loss on the left wing, which led to a loss of altitude until impact with the ground. Information obtained during the investigation suggests that the aileron interconnection cable was disconnected at the time of the accident. Disconnection of the aileron interconnection cable causes a loss of synchronization between the left (pilot) and right (copilot) controls, allowing only right turns from the left control and left turns from the right control. This disconnection likely generated asymmetrical responses in the control inputs, making it difficult to control the aircraft and contributing to the loss of control. Cockpit conversations suggest that the copilot, seated on the right, began the takeoff run and, after the second left bank, transferred control to the pilot, seated on the left. At low altitude, the attempt to correct the left wing tilt, once in a stall situation, proved ineffective. According to the aircraft's maintenance records, the last replacement of the aileron interconnection cable was performed at 13,217.5 total flight hours July 18, 2016. The procedure for replacing the aileron interconnection cable did not clearly establish the removal and installation of the locking clips. The procedure for checking the tension of the aileron system cables, carried out on February 28, 2020, at 13,695.7 flight hours, did not clearly establish the installation of the locking clips. It is reasonable to conclude that the cable became disconnected due to the absence of the locking clips, which would have allowed the tensioner to gradually unscrew under the dynamic loads resulting from successive flights. The conclusion that the cable detachment was due to the absence of the locking clip suggests shortcomings in the training of the personnel responsible for inspecting the aircraft, as well as in the supervision of maintenance tasks by the maintenance manager. No evidence of failure of other flight control components that could have contributed to the accident was found.

It was determined that the accident was the consequence of a controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) and the airplane did not suffer any technical anomalies.
The following contributing factors were identified:
- The crew failed to check the approach charts according to SOP's,
- The approach was initiated and continued in conditions that were below weather minimums,
- Visibility data transmitted by Tower to the crew were inaccurate, leading to confusion on the part of the pilots and their decision-making,
- Both engines were at full power upon impact as the crew was initiating a go-around procedure.

The accident was the consequence of a controlled flight into terrain after the pilot suffered a loss of situational awareness due to a poor evaluation of the flight conditions upon arrival. The following contributing factors were identified:
- The pilot failed to return to his departure airport or to divert to the alternate airport due to poor weather conditions at the destination airport,
- The pilot continued the approach under VFR mode in IMC conditions with visibility below minimums,
- Poor evaluation of the flight conditions at destination on part of the pilot due to the combination of psychological and physiological factors.

Impact with the ground following a spiral fall due to a stall probably consecutive to an asymmetric accumulation of ice on the fuselage.

The aircraft impacted ground after takeoff while in instrument conditions. The pilot was not qualified nor trained for this type of flight.